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 Abstract 
 
 
 This thesis studies the ways in which the Shuar people confront a large-
scale mining project in Zamora Chinchipe, the southernmost province in 
the Amazon region of Ecuador. The main focus of this work centers on the 
ways in which the Shuar Federation and its leaders, construct and play out 
identity discourses and political practices regarding the development of 
Project Mirador (an open-air copper mine) at different levels of the 
organization’s hierarchy. I also examine if the ethno-politics of the Shuar 
Federation have been successful in achieving the objectives of their 
struggles related to mining extraction. This analysis is framed in a wider 
trans-local political and economic context, understanding that the responses 
from local communities are in part the result of interactions with a variety 
of actors, including the state (through different institutions like Ecuador 
Estratégico, a governmental institution which directs local develpment), the 
mining company, mestizo populations, and others. 
 In the thesis, I argue that the practice of ethno-politics is complex and at 
times contradictory, and that the definition of political strategies based on 
identity discourses is flexible and, at times, even fragmented. The 
construction of indigeneity, defined as the process of articulating a group’s 
identity discourse, and the definition of a position vis-à-vis large-scale 
mining does not necessarily apply to the Shuar as a collectivity, which results 
in individualized and even isolated efforts. However, rather than applying 
notions of efficiency and efficacy, this thesis explores a variety of internal 
and external elements that could play a role in shaping those discourses. 
After offering a detailed description of the structure, composition, and 
organization of the Shuar Federation and communities in terms of land and 
subsistence practices, I analyze various discourses and practices which are 
interconnected as a part of historical territorial dynamics; I primarily focus 
on 1.) The re-configuration of the territory and the local communities’ 
changing relationship with it, 2.) The current and evolving composition of 
the Shuar communities, and 3.) The notions of modernity and ancestrality 
 
xvi  
 
 
Overall, this thesis aims to show that, while from a Western mestizo 
perspective Shuar ethno-politics might seem inefficient and even lack 
coherence, forms of des-centralization in discourses and practices can also 
be used as strategies in a process of re-signification and adaptation to the 
larger mestizo society and as a part of continuous colonization. In this 
context, Shuar identities are evidently not the result of a historical continuity 
but are rather constantly being reshaped in specific political, social, and 
economic conjunctures. 
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 Samenvatting 
 
 
Dit proefschrift gaat over de manier waarop de Shuar-bevolking zich opstelt 
tegenover een grootschalig mijnbouwproject in Zamora-Chinchipe, de 
zuidelijkste provincie in het Amazonegebied van Ecuador. Daarbij gaat het 
vooral om op de wijze waarop de Shuar Federatie en haar leiders 
identiteitsdiscoursen en politieke praktijken met betrekking tot de 
ontwikkeling van Project Mirador (een kopermijn in de openlucht) opzetten 
en uitwerken op verschillende niveaus van de organisatiehiërarchie. Verder 
wordt onderzocht of met de door de Shuar Federatie gevoerde etnopolitiek 
de doelen van hun strijd rond de mijnbouwactiviteiten worden bereikt. In 
dit onderzoek wordt rekening gehouden met een bredere trans-lokale 
politieke en economische context, omdat de reacties van lokale 
gemeenschappen gedeeltelijk het resultaat zijn van interacties met diverse 
actoren. Onder die actoren vallen de overheid (via verschillende instellingen 
zoals Ecuador Estratégico, een overheidsinstelling die de lokale ontwikkeling 
begeleidt), het mijnbouwbedrijf, mestiezenbevolkingsgroepen en anderen.  
 In dit proefschrift wordt betoogd dat de praktijk van etnopolitiek 
complex en soms tegenstrijdig is, en dat de definitie van politieke strategieën 
die zijn gebaseerd op identiteitsdiscoursen flexibel en soms zelfs 
gefragmenteerd is. Het idee van inheemsheid, gedefinieerd als het proces 
van het formuleren van het identiteitsdiscours van een groep, en het bepalen 
van een positie ten opzichte van grootschalige mijnbouw is niet 
noodzakelijk van toepassing op de Shuar als een collectiviteit, wat resulteert 
in geïndividualiseerde en zelfs geïsoleerde inspanningen. In plaats van de 
begrippen efficiëntie en effectiviteit toe te passen wordt in dit proefschrift 
een verscheidenheid aan interne en externe elementen onderzocht die een 
rol zouden kunnen spelen in het vormgeven van die discoursen.  
 Na een gedetailleerde beschrijving van de structuur, samenstelling en 
organisatie van de Shuar Federatie en Shuar-gemeenschappen in termen van 
grond en levensonderhoud, volgt een analyse van verschillende discoursen 
en praktijken die in onderlinge samenhang onderdeel vormen van de 
xviii  
 
historische territoriale dynamiek. Daarbij ligt de focus primair op: 1) de 
herschikking van het territorium en de veranderende relatie van de lokale 
gemeenschappen met dit territorium; 2) de huidige en zich ontwikkelende 
samenstelling van de Shuar-gemeenschappen en 3) de begrippen 
moderniteit en afkomst. In het algemeen is het doel van dit proefschrift om 
te laten zien dat hoewel de etnopolitiek van de Shuar vanuit een Westers 
mestiezenperspectief inefficiënt lijkt en zelfs coherentie mist, het mogelijk is 
om vormen van decentralisatie in discoursen en praktijken ook te gebruiken 
als strategieën bij het opnieuw betekenis geven en aanpassen aan de bredere 
mestiezensamenleving en als onderdeel van voortdurende kolonisatie. In 
deze context zijn de Shuar-identiteiten duidelijk niet het resultaat van een 
historische continuïteit, maar worden ze steeds opnieuw vormgegeven in 
specifieke politieke, sociale en economische constellaties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
   
1 Introduction 
  
1.1 Setting the Stage 
This thesis focuses on the ways in which Shuar people confront large-
scale mining in Zamora Chinchipe, the southernmost province in the 
Amazon region in Ecuador. It primarily focuses on the ways in which 
the Shuar Federation and its leaders construct identity discourses and 
define political practices related to the development of Project Mirador, 
an open-air copper mine located in the Cordillera del Cóndor. However, 
this is not an ethnographic study of this organization; rather, this project 
should be considered a multi-site study of the complex interactions 
among diverse actors (Hannerz 2003) within a specific territory and 
around the context of a large-scale mining project. From this 
perspective, it is understood that the responses of local communities are 
also connected to trans-local political and economic dynamics. This 
thesis attempts to illustrate those dynamics by examining the interactions 
between the Shuar and other specific actors like the state and the mining 
company.  
The fieldwork for this thesis was carried out during two years, from 
October 2013 to January 2015 in four different visits to the field. 
However, the first time I travelled to the province of Zamora Chinchipe 
was in April 2013; while proposing my thesis project, I decided that it 
was important to get to know this area in advance, as it would become 
my research site for the next two years. A year before, in 2012, the 
government of Rafael Correa had signed a contract to allow the 
exploitation of copper in the Cordillera del Cóndor (Project Mirador) 
with the Chinese consortium Tongling-CRCC Tongguan, which had 
purchased the company from the previous Canadian owners 
(Ecuacorriente S.A. or ECSA). Mirador is located on a copper deposit in 
the Cordillera del Cóndor, a highly biodiverse mountain range in the Alta 
Amazonía (Ortiz 2011), located along the northern border of the 
province of Zamora Chinchipe and the border with Peru. At the time of 
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my first visit, the local population and indigenous organizations were 
becoming adjusted to this new Chinese administration, which, unlike the 
previous Canadian administration, was not open to direct negotiations or 
support for local development projects. 
Unlike neoliberal regimes from the eighties and nineties, the 
Ecuadorian government led by Correa (2007-2017), similar to that of 
Bolivia, emphasized a national, populist agenda in which the decision to 
expand and intensify the extractive industry was based on the need to 
increase the state’s capacity to satisfy the populations’ needs, especially 
amongst the poorest sectors of society (Bretón 2013; Davidov 2013; Lu 
et al. 2017; Pellegrini and Ribera Arismendi 2012). Thus, the extractive 
industry has become a macroeconomic pillar that should allow these 
governments to maintain and even increase social expenditure (Arsel et 
al. 2016; Bebbington and Humphreys 2011: 140). In Ecuador, for 
example, the Ministry of Non-Renewable Natural Resources (Ministerio de 
Recursos Naturales No Renovables), has assigned different percentages of 
royalties, profits, and mining taxes that both large-scale and small-scale 
mining operations must pay to the state (Riofrancos 2017; Sacher and 
Acosta 2012). Companies that are involved in large-scale mining must 
pay 12 per cent of their profits and no less than 5 per cent of their sales 
to the state, in addition to other types of taxes, which should be allocated 
exclusively to social programs in the areas of health, education, housing, 
and so forth (information provided at the Agency for Mining Control 
and Regulation or ARCOM—Agencia de Regulación y Control Minero). 
Project Mirador was part of a new set of policies regarding development 
and distribution of wealth and it quickly became the first large-scale 
mining project to use exploitative extraction in Ecuador. 
The populated areas directly impacted by Project Mirador (see Map 
1.1) include the town of Tundayme, which is the closest head 
administrative parish 1  to the mining project, and several nearby 
indigenous and mestizo 2  communities which belong to Tundayme’s 
jurisdiction.  
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Map 1.1 
Northern Province of Zamora Chinchipe 
Canton of El Pangui and Administrative Parishes of El Guismi and Tundayme 
 
 
Source: Instituto Geogáfico Militar www.igm.gob.ec 
 
 In addition, there are other mestizo and indigenous communities 
within the area of indirect impact, which are located closer to the city of 
El Pangui (23 km from Tundayme) and belong to a different 
administrative head parish (El Guismi). Tundayme and its surroundings 
were traditionally inhabited by the indigenous Shuar people; however, 
since the 1960s these areas have been “colonized” by mestizos coming 
from the highlands (Salazar 1977; Troncoso 1999). In spite of being the 
historical settlers of the province of Zamora Chinchipe, the current 
Shuar population is relatively small. In the last census of 2010, of the 737 
inhabitants of the Tundayme parish (which includes rural Shuar and 
mestizo communities) only 22 per cent considered themselves to be 
indigenous Shuar, compared to 78 per cent of people who self-identify as 
mestizo (National Population and Housing Census, Instituto Nacional 
de Estadística y Censos, INEC 2010). The Shuar in this area do not 
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engage much in traditional subsistence practices such as hunting and 
fishing; like the mestizos, they work their farms, take paid jobs (many in 
the mining company), and may engage in artisanal mining. 
Around 2006, a strong anti-mining movement had surged through the 
regions of El Pangui and Tundayme. However, at the time of my first 
visit to the province in 2013, the climate appeared to be relatively calm. 
Although in 2006 there had been violent confrontations between groups 
resisting the presence of the mining company and the supporters of the 
project, throughout my fieldwork (between 2013 and 2015) I never saw 
or experienced any strong demonstrations against large-scale mining (the 
most outstanding event was the creation of a peasant organization which 
began to demand that their land be adequately compensated by the 
mining company). This is not to say that local communities (both 
indigenous and mestizo) were unanimously supportive of mining, but 
there was a generalized sense of implicit acceptance of the project: the 
local population felt there was nothing left to do once the contract 
between the government and the company had been signed in 2012.  
Despite this apparent state of tranquility, I did observe a variety of 
reactions towards Project Mirador. Some people in the indigenous 
communities had strong positions either in favor of or against the 
mining company and actively engaged in negotiations or some type of 
activism, while others were somewhat indifferent or complained but 
never took any action. Moore and Velásquez (2012: 115) argue that, 
beyond resistance and negotiation, the presence of the mining industry in 
an area also generates internal conflicts and polarizations within the local 
population. Promises of wealth and direct support for improving living 
conditions in poor communities have created divisions between those 
who support mining and its promises of “development” and those who 
are more concerned about environmental impacts and perhaps more 
aware of the effects of mining on their traditional subsistence strategies 
and territory. This is also the case in Project Mirador; in fact, some 
people who had previously supported the presence of the company later 
became its strongest detractors, probably because they had negative 
experiences with it. 
 Some mestizo people in Tundayme were concerned about the impact 
of copper extraction, while others were quite content because their 
businesses were growing. One of the Shuar federations in Zamora, the 
Shuar Federation of Zamora Chinchipe (FESZCH—Federación Shuar de 
 Introduction 5 
Zamora Chinchipe)3, had adamantly supported Project Mirador; the leaders 
even proudly called themselves “pioneros” or “pioneers” in their 
relationship with the mining company. Meanwhile, the indigenous 
communities’ opinions and positions regarding the project were highly 
diverse. For example, in Etsa, one of the first communities that I visited, 
I talked to one of the members who seemed uncomfortable discussing 
the topic of mining. He was wearing a t-shirt that had the company’s 
logo on it and he affirmed that he and most of the members of the 
community worked for ECSA, the mining company. However, this did 
not indicate that he fully supported large-scale mining; rather, he was 
concerned about the environmental effects on rivers, changes in the way 
mining workers were treated by the new owners, and the fact that no 
significant, permanent local development projects had been developed in 
his community.  
This first experience with the local Shuar communities was repeated 
throughout my fieldwork and attested to the multiplicity of local 
perspectives related to the presence of the mining company around 
Mirador. Additionally, regardless of the official positions of the 
indigenous organizations, people within the affected communities have 
conflicting views on extractivism and its benefits. Furthermore, while the 
company offered jobs and some funds for small projects in the 
communities, most community leaders had more ambitious expectations 
of development that have not been fulfilled by the company nor by the 
state. Amidst these conflicts, a new actor came onto scene: Ecuador 
Estratégico, a state company that was created in 2011 which took charge 
of channeling royalties from strategic national projects (including mining 
and oil extraction initiatives) into local development. The integration of 
this new entity evidenced the increased presence of the state in 
extraction projects. Through the establishment of Ecuador Estratégico, the 
state began to take back natural resource extraction and began to assume 
its role as a welfare state, thereby linking the importance of extractivism 
to the well-being of the people. 
 The creation of Ecuador Estratégico and the definition of new 
government policies regarding the distribution of resources discouraged 
extractive companies (in this case, ECSA) from having a direct 
relationship with the local communities and from creating development 
projects as a form of compensation. In this new arrangement, the Shuar 
Federation of Zamora Chinchipe (FESZCH) and the communities in the 
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area felt that they had been omitted from planning. To begin with, while 
the mining company had previously signed several agreements and 
donated funds to the Shuar Federation to carry out projects in the local 
communities, the new Chinese owners had embraced the rule of no 
direct negotiation with the communities; as such, they limited their 
funding and support to their environmental management plan. 
Furthermore, the company insisted that it had already paid the 
government advanced royalties for the mining project, which meant they 
had no intention of funding any additional projects. Second, the Shuar 
Federation and communities expected that Ecuador Estratégico would 
invest in the Shuar people, but were disappointed by the lack of funds 
for local projects. 
In conclusion, at the time of my second visit to the field and 
throughout the duration of my fieldwork, there was a general sentiment 
that the Shuar communities were not receiving the kind of development 
assistance that they had expected, neither from the company nor from 
Ecuador Estratégico. The mining company had become hermetic; while the 
department of community relations was still operating, higher officials of 
the company were not interested in meeting with the federation’s 
authorities. When they finally did meet in Quito in 2014, the federation 
leaders came back completely disappointed and had not achieved any of 
their objectives. The most significant complaint of community leaders 
was that the mining project was not really generating wealth and 
development, as the company once had promised. Furthermore, while 
there were many signs of Ecuador Estratégico doing work in Tundayme 
and El Pangui (such the construction of health centers, schools, 
roadwork, and information centers) the perception among the Shuar was 
that their communities had been left out. While some of this 
infrastructure was also available to the people in the communities, they 
still lacked basic services such as clean water, sewage systems, and 
electricity. They questioned whether Ecuador Estratégico would ever come 
to their communities. 
1.2 Research Objectives and Main Questions 
As part of the nationalist agenda of President Correa’s government, the 
extractive industry is used as a reat launching pad for the distribution of 
wealth and the implementation of social programs. Project Mirador has 
become emblematic of this strategy; it is set to become the first 
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government-sanctioned, large-scale mining project to begin extraction 
(now scheduled to begin in 2018) and, as such, has generated many 
expectations, as well as local reactions and conflicts (Teijlingen et al. 
2017). Anti-mining organizations and local groups opposed to mining 
are mostly concerned about environmental and social impacts; however, 
this sentiment coexists with expectations of local development and 
wealth generation among indigenous and mestizo communities who 
support the presence of mining in the area (Avci and Fernández-
Salvador 2016).  Thus, Project Mirador is part of a transformative 
political, economic, and social conjuncture that should be studied and 
addressed.  
 Local struggles related to a massive extractive project like Project 
Mirador occur in a context of inequality and uneven development, 
manifested in profound gaps of well-being, security, and dignity. These 
inequalities generally correspond to categories of race and ethnicity, 
gender, geography or place (rural/urban), and others; noncoincedentally, 
such inequitie are part of those patterns of exclusion brought about by 
colonization and which are extremely difficult to change, especially in 
areas with a high concentration of indigenous populations (Radcliffe 
2017: 78-84). From a postcolonial perspective, the high levels of 
inequality in Ecuadorean society of today are essentially the legacy of 
hundreds of years in which there was no interest in confronting 
“unbalanced societies” (Hoffman & Centeno 2003; Radcliffe 2017).  
 The Shuar communities involved in this research are an interesting 
case study for addressing issues of marginality. As will be discussed 
throughout this thesis, the history of contact and colonization carried 
out by missionaries, the state, and mestizo society (which began in the 
late 1800s) has inevitably positioned them in situations of vulnerability 
and limited their access to power. The Shuar’s racial distinctiveness and 
culture (as is the case of any other indigenous group in Ecuador) was 
enough justification for discriminatory actions from the larger mestizo 
society; these actions resulted in the reduction and loss of their territory 
and then escalated to altering their subsistence practices, losing their 
language and so forth. Furthermore, other identity categories, such as 
geography or place also play an important role in establishing patterns of 
exploitation; in this case, the experience of living in rural areas has also 
served to exacerbate situations of exclusion and marginality (Radcliffe 
2017).  
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 Data from the last census carried out in 2010 clearly illustrate the gaps 
discussed by Radcliffe in terms of well-being and the irregular and 
geographically unequal levels of development (which prevent 
populations in rural areas from having access to basic services and 
education) (INEC 2010). For example, Tundayme parish has low 
percentages of access to sewage services (21.15 per cent), potable water 
(44.23 per cent), and electrification (52.05 per cent). The percentages of 
access is even lower for the Shuar population in the same parish: only 3 
per cent of Shuar households have access to sewage systems, 14.29 per 
cent have access to potable water, and 43.56 per cent to electricity.4 As a 
whole, the canton of El Pangui (which includes the parish of Tundayme) 
has a very low level of education access: only 7.36 per cent of the adult 
population has finished high school and 0.79 per cent has had post-
highschool education; in the case of the Shuar population, only 5.56 per 
cent have finished highschool and 0 per cent have had any type of post-
high school education. As a part of El Pangui’s development plan, a 
diagnosis of all urban and rural parishes of El Pangui canton was 
completed; the included poverty indicators (calculated based on 
unsatisfied basic services) were as high as 87.8 per cent for the parish of 
Tundayme (INEC 2010; GAD de El Pangui-Plan de Desarrollo y 
Ordenamiento Territorial 2012-2022). This data evidences the important 
roles that ethnic/racial and geographic categories play in exacerbating 
and reinforcing patterns of exclusion related to access to basic services, 
education, work opportunities, and other fundamental rights. This 
system of exclusion is coupled with a lack of political representation: the 
Shuar people from the communities around Tundayme and El Pangui 
have never had official political leaders, which has prevented them from 
having direct representatives to advocate for their communities.  
 In the literature on ethno-politics, several authors (Bolaños 2011; 
Gros 1999; Warren and Jackson 2005) have already pointed out that the 
notions of a marginal existence are part of the ethnic reaffirmation of a 
group: this means that the struggles that marginalized peoples experience 
are not only related to protecting what is considered vital in terms of 
group identity (such as their history, traditions, language and culture), but 
it is mostly related to sharing situations of exclusion and racism from a 
mostly mestizo society (Selverston-Scher 2001: 21). Thus, in the context 
of both material precariousness (insecurity) and limited access to 
participation in decision-making processes in extractive programs such as 
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Project Mirador, it is important to understand how the Shuar leadership 
at the different levels navigate through a system that historically and 
presently excludes them. For some Shuar people from the communities 
around the project, Project Mirador represents an opportunity to 
improve their everyday subsistence; however, for others, it represents 
another attack on the community’s rights, particularly their right to 
maintain and protect their ancestral territory. Thus, in this work, the 
struggle of the Shuar people and, more specifically, of the Shuar political 
organization, is understood in terms not only of direct resistance to 
large-scale mining, but also in terms of those efforts intended to 
negotiate material benefits and to gain some control over the decision-
making processes. For example, while the FESZCH has supported large-
scale mining since the first companies arrived to the area, it constantly 
struggles to have some control over the resources or access to mining 
royalties and to encourage the implementation of development projects 
in the communities.   
In this research, I sought to achieve a more general understanding of 
the changing and diverse mobilizations of indigenous communities in 
response to extractive projects; I concentrated on responses to Project 
Mirador by the local indigenous communities, specifically on the 
FESZCH Shuar federation, and several communities associated with it 
(Bebbington et al. 2008). The FESZCH is the strongest federation in the 
province of Zamora Chinchipe, with over 50 affiliated communities; 
furthermore, all communities in this study belong to this federation and 
are located within Project Mirador’s area of influence. I decided to focus 
on the Shuar people living in the area around Project Mirador for several 
reasons. First, the Shuar have a strong political organization which—as is 
the case of most indigenous organizations in Ecuador—is based on 
ethnic recognition and demands. Created in the province of Morona 
Santiago, the original Shuar Federation5, the Interprovincial Federation 
of Shuar Centers (FICSH—Federación Interprovincial de Centros Shuar), was 
actually the first federation to be officially recognized by the state in the 
1960s (Salazar 1977, 1981; Rubenstein 2005). The establishment of this 
organization demonstrated the Shuar’s great ability to adapt to new ways 
of conducting politics as they also became more active within the 
national mestizo society. Thus, as the only indigenous group in the 
Project Mirador area which claimed its presence in the territory to be 
ancestral, it was important to understand the Shuar’s stance on mining, 
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their decisions related to the project, and the motivations underlying 
those decisions. My first visit in 2013 proved to be fruitful in this regard 
because I could already observe the complex context in which Project 
Mirador was situated: of the two Shuar federations in the province, only 
one had been a strong supporter of the two most important mining 
projects. Furthermore, the Shuar communities in the project area were 
internally divided in their stance related to the mining, and there was 
already some conflict among family members because of the presence of 
the mining company. 
Second, in some of the literature regarding the extraction of natural 
resources (Conklin and Graham 1995; Rudel et al. 2002; Troncoso 1999) 
and according to general public opinion of this process, indigenous 
people are usually portrayed as the ones who protect the territory and 
take a stand against extractivism. While this is true in many cases, and, in 
fact, the national indigenous organization, the Confederation of 
Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE-Confederación de 
Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador) has built part of its political agenda to 
resist neo-liberalism, capitalism, and extractive practices, the decisions 
made by local indigenous people might be quite different than this 
rhetoric. Therefore, it was important to understand the complex scenario 
which the Shuar navigate and in which they negotiate with all the actors 
that have settled in their territory and to debunk the romantic notion 
that Amazonian peoples are the perennial guardians of the forest.  
Third, while the large national and regional indigenous organizations 
in Ecuador have worked for decades on similar political agendas to 
consolidate a national indigenous movement (Becker 2010; Sawyer 2004; 
Yashar 2005; Zamosc 2004), it is necessary to acknowledge and to study 
the areas of divergence and heterogeneity regarding indigenous political 
activity (Martínez 2009). It is important to study the composition of local 
indigenous organizations, their political ideologies, and the connections 
they establish with the people in the communities in order to achieve 
common objectives. Furthermore, local and community leadership has 
not necessarily been the focus of attention in much of the literature on 
ethno-politics, thereby leaving a gap in the understanding of ethno-
politics beyond the work of regional and local organizations. Based on 
the findings of this research, I have concluded that community 
leadership is more effective in understanding, advocating for, and 
achieving the local populations’ goals given that they are better 
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positioned to understand and value their needs and objectives than 
federation leaders, who may spend more time lobbying with government 
authorities and external organizations. 
 The main objective of this research is to understand the diversity of 
fluid and changing identity discourses and political practices that are 
constructed at all levels of the Shuar Federation in its dealings with 
Project Mirador. My characterization of the nature of these discourses 
and practices stand in opposition to homogenizing and monolithic 
constructions of indigenous groups like the Shuar by the mestizo society 
and even the academic literature about them. This study is unique in that 
it recognizes the complexity of the Shuar leadership and examines the 
factors that can help explain the diverse discourses, positions, and 
political practices of this organization. 
 The second objective of this research is to understand if the practice 
of ethno-politics has been a useful strategy in terms of the achieving the 
federation’s objectives in their struggles related to Project Mirador. In 
other words, has the leadership at the federation level and the 
community level been able to meet their goals, both in material and 
symbolic aspects? Have their efforts to either resist or negotiate 
produced results that are considered positive by the Shuar federation 
itself and by the people in their communities?  
As my research evolved and I began to investigate organizational and 
community life, issues like community division and transformation as 
well as the relationship between these communities and their ancestral 
territory became important in the discussion on identity discourses and 
helped me answer the previously mentioned questions. While in official 
discourses (mostly in the federation’s discourses), Shuar identity was 
linked to the notion of an ancestral territory, this was not as important to 
many community leaders. Territory had been an important part of the 
lives of the Shuar’s ancestors; for example, their vast lands allowed them 
to carry out their traditional subsistence practices. However, the Shuar’s 
modern, everyday lives in the communities around Tundayme are quite 
different now. Their concerns and vision of what they want for 
themselves in many cases have less to do with claiming back territory 
than with making sure their communities become modern and their 
members have good living conditions. Even concerns of large-scale 
mining damaging the environment and their territory were not as strong 
(some leaders did not even mention them) as other concerns that were 
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related to the development of their communities as a result of having the 
mining project present.  
The issue of land and territory is also linked to how the community 
has been transformed in the last decades; as may be expected, 
communities are not tight-knit entities, not only because members might 
migrate to the cities and other provinces, but also because their 
boundaries are quite flexible. People may travel back and forth between 
the community and urban centers even in the same day, but actually live 
in places like Tundayme. This high level of mobility is also tied to ideas 
of progress and modernity: most parents want their children to go to 
school in Tundayme and El Pangui, and for that reason they may make 
huge sacrifices to achieve that goal. For example, many mothers rent or 
purchase homes so that their children can go to school in specific areas 
and access services like electricity, a basic necessity for completing 
academic activities. In this case, they see education as a way to improve, 
a sign of progress, and a way for their children to insert themselves into 
the wider mestizo society.  
Furthermore, while reflecting upon questions related to Shuar 
identity, I also investigated other important actors involved in the mining 
project including the mining company, state institutions, environmental 
organizations, and, in particular, the mestizo population that had greatly 
outnumbered the Shuar since they started colonizing the area. The 
colonos, as they are called, are mestizos who came from the highlands 
around the 1950s and 1960s and started settling in what used to be the 
territory inhabited by the Shuar (Bjureby 2006; Esvertit Cobes 2015; 
Salazar 1977). Towns like El Pangui and Tundayme were created after 
the colonos’ arrival and they have become the strongest local population, 
both in terms of numbers and representation in positions of authority 
and power. Their relationship with the state and mestizo society, 
specifically the colonos and the missionaries at some point, has had a great 
impact on the Shuar’s lifestyle and has profoundly altered the ways in 
which they conceptualize and manage their territory, subsistence 
practices, and, more generally, their culture. The construction of a Shuar 
identity and its use as a political strategy, thus, is inextricably linked to a 
process of constant negotiation and even improvisation with these actors 
and, more broadly, with the mestizo and Western world. This theme is 
one that appears repeatedly throughout the thesis and which has been 
present throughout the recent history of the Shuar, beginning with the 
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early history of contact between the Shuar and missionaries and 
continuing today with their daily interactions with colonos, state 
institutions6, and the mining company. These interactions have been 
permeated by notions of development, progress, and modernity, to 
which most of the Shuar communities and leaders in this study aspire. 
At this point, it is important to clarify that, while the main interest of 
this thesis was to study the identity discourses and strategies of the Shuar 
federation towards large-scale mining, its context is much wider. When 
looking at the interactions between local populations and an extractive 
project, the research necessarily becomes trans-local and becomes part of 
a wider discussion related to the political economy of the country and 
the region. In a country such as Ecuador, in which oil extraction has 
been one of the most important sources of income for decades, it is 
important to understand the role of large-scale mining in a new era of 
extractivism under a government that has defined itself as contrary to 
neo-liberal practices. As Hogenboom (2012) explains, minerals in 
Ecuador and other countries in Latin America have acquired a political 
status in the new context of nationalist, progressive governments 
because they are considered key to the re-distribution of wealth and the 
investment in social programs. Mining projects such as Project Mirador 
thus play a political role because they are part of a new way of conceiving 
extractivism (Arsel and Avila 2011; Bebbington and Humphreys 2011; 
Davidov 2013); from this perspective, the ultimate goal of these 
initiatives is to facilitate the well-being of the most impoverished people 
in Ecuador and especially of the local populations who have been 
historically marginalized. Mineral extraction is not only an economic 
strategy but it also has political implications. This is evident in the work 
of some government institutions in charge of local development, which 
also interact with the Shuar people and organizations, such as Ecuador 
Estratégico. This state company is precisely one of those institutions 
created with the specific purpose of channeling royalties from 
extractivism into local development and, as such, it became an important 
part of this research. Therefore, the focus of one chapter of this thesis is 
on the politics of Ecuador Estratégico, as the institution responsible for the 
development of local communities. It forms the link between local 
dynamics and wider issues in the political economy of Ecuador. 
Furthermore, the discourses and rhetoric utilized by the company are 
permeated by certain notions of development and buen vivir7, which are 
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also very much present in the discourses of the Shuar people and leaders. 
The expectations of development and progress are also part of a theme 
that is repeated throughout the research, as part of the discourses of and 
the interactions with external actors. 
One of my primary goals was to explore, in depth, the interactions 
between the Shuar communities and federations with the mining 
company. However, as I have already mentioned, this proved to be quite 
difficult because the company was not open to offer any kind of official 
information. While the Canadian owners had encouraged regular 
meetings with local community members and had even posted video 
materials on the Internet, the current Chinese administration is not 
interested in developing any ties with local communities. Although the 
director of the community relations department (who had been present 
during the transition from the Canadian to the Chinese owners) was 
quite willing to offer information during an interview with me in the first 
months of my fieldwork in January 2014, several months later, my 
experience with the new director of the department and vice-president of 
the company was different. No official information could be given out to 
the public without having approval from the general manager. I then 
decided to focus more on Ecuador Estratégico as its role was becoming 
more important to the development of strategic projects in local 
communities. 
I also did not explore further other issues such as land loss and land 
claims because they were beyond the scope of the main interest of this 
thesis. While I do incorporate the notion of territory in the chapter that 
analyses Shuar discourses and practices, the issues around land should be 
further studied. In the area around Mirador and throughout Zamora and 
Morona Santiago, there is a history of land loss due to colonization by 
mestizos (Bjureby 2006; Rubenstein 2005; Salazar 1977) which began in 
the 1960s and continues today, albeit in different ways. This problem is 
related to other interesting issues, such as the relationship between the 
descendants of colonos and the Shuar population; while the interactions 
between the two groups are generally cordial and friendly, these 
exchanges also marked by racism, unequal power relations, strong 
emotions, and the resentment the Shuar feel towards mestizo people in 
general.  
From both an academic and political perspective, the Shuar 
population in Zamora Chinchipe has overall received less attention than 
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the Shuar living in Morona Santiago (Harner 1978; Rubenstein 2005; 
Salazar 1977; Troncoso 1999). On one hand, most ethnographic studies 
have been carried out in the northern province probably because that 
Shuar population is larger; however, there are important differences 
between the Shuar in the two provinces with respect political 
organization, distribution of land, and even access to positions of power 
and authority. Thus, it is important, to continue to research issues related 
to the political organization of the Shuar in Zamora; I document my 
study of these topics in this thesis.  
1.3 Main Arguments and Findings 
1.3.1  The Construction of Identity in Postcolonial Contexts 
The environmental justice perspective (Ali 2003; Banks 2002; Ballard and 
Banks 2003; Gedicks 1993; Martínez-Allier 2002) provides us with a 
diversity of ways to conceptualize how local populations cope with 
struggles related to resources and other issues that go beyond 
environmental and ecological considerations. Within this framework, 
authors from different disciplines have analyzed the ways in which 
indigenous people and organizations make decisions regarding the use 
and control of resources, often while negogiating with powerful state 
institutions or extractive companies (Bolaños 2011; Castillo and Cairo 
2002; Conklin and Graham 1995; Gros 1999; Perreault 2003a, 2003b; 
Sawyer 2004; Valdivia 2005; Warnaars 2010, 2012). These struggles are 
diverse and include efforts to gain control over their land (as ancestral 
territory for cultural reproduction) in order to prevent intensive resource 
extraction and thus environmental destruction, to make demands from 
oil companies to make reparations for damages, to negogiate benefits, 
and even to demand recognition as “nationalities” within a nation-state. 
All such struggles are intimately tied to the material needs which these 
local populations need to fulfillin order to secure their livelihoods and to 
fulfill symbolic objectives, which include performing and being 
recognized as political agents and citizens from their own particular 
ethnicity in a wider cultural and political context. 
The use of ethnic identity by indigenous people is defined by some 
authors as strategic and performative because it achieves desired results 
for indigenous groups and has been instrumental in opening spaces for 
them in national and even international contexts (Castillo and Cairo 
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2002; Gros 1999). Furthermore, from a political science perspective, 
Selverston-Scher argues that the best way to measure the success of any 
political movement is to evaluate the material gains that the movement 
provides to its supporters. Just the fact that people belonging to an 
ethnic group identify with it in order to have access to those material 
benefits is precisely evidence of its level of success (Selverston-Scher 
2001: 23).  
Nevertheless, other authors like Perreault (2003b) and Sawyer (2004), 
who also discuss the strategic use of ethnicity, warn against an analysis of 
identity politics that reduces and simplifies the processes of “ethnic 
recovery” and identity construction of indigenous people in a wider 
political context. Sawyer avoids discussing ethnic identity in terms of 
specific strategies to achieve certain goals and rather considers the ways 
in which identity is constructed in the process of negotiation in which 
subaltern groups try to create spaces for themselves (Sawyer 2004). Thus, 
as much as material gains demonstrate that a certain political movement 
is fulfilling its members’ needs, the symbolic aspects of identity 
construction are equally important. As Perreault argues, processes of 
cultural revalorization and identity recovery should be considered from a 
broader perspective that examines the response of historically 
marginalized indigenous peoples to “political and cultural openings made 
possible by strengthening indigenous movements, increased presence of 
international NGOs, constitutional reform, and a degree of state 
openness to indigenous political organizing” (Perreault 2003b: 81). In 
other words, the political use of ethnic identity should be understood in 
terms of identity recovery, self-determination, political participation, and 
as a means through which previously marginalized groups (whose 
subaltern position was closely related to their ethnicity) create spaces for 
themselves in the larger society. 
Using the general framework of environmental justice and ethno-
politics, this thesis joins in the theoretical discussion of identity politics 
and indigeneity, which is relevant postcolonial contexts (Valdivia 2005, 
2007). To better understand how ethnic identity is constructed and 
utilized as part of a group’s political discourse and practices, I use Hall’s 
conceptualization on identity as a base, and then incorporate the concept 
of indigeneity to understand and analyze specific political practices and 
discourses among the Shuar.  
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Before addressing Hall’s discussion, it is important to understand that 
the notion of indigenous identities itself necessarily situates us within a 
postcolonial discussion on the construction of social categories. From 
this perspective, ethnic-racial categories are a product of a colonial 
structure that came to be considered as a natural and objective 
phenomenon, instead of and not as a product of a history of power 
(Quijano 1998). Aníbal Quijano argues that the pattern of control and 
domination between colonizers and the other was organized through the 
framework of “race”, which in biological terms is fictional, but has been 
used to reshape the idea of humanity and reorganize social relations 
(Lugones 2008; Quijano 2011). Using this framework, new categories of 
social identity, such as white, indians, and mestizos were created; the 
diverse native populations in the Americas became “Indians” through a 
process in which their original identities were repressed and, in some 
cases, even completely erased, as they were all reduced to the same 
negative identity category (Quijano 1998: 230). From this perspective, 
coloniality underpins the creation of and permeates the experience of 
new social and geo-cultural identities, a categorization that is “the most 
profound and long-lasting expression of colonial domination”8 (Quijano 
2002: 1). 
This categorization was also part of a systematic form of repression 
of ideas, beliefs and knowledge systems over which Western patterns of 
thought and cultural models were imposed. In short, “the European 
culture became the universal cultural model. The imaginary of non-
European cultures could hardly exist and, overall, reproduce, today 
outside those relations”9 (Quijano 1992: 13).  The entire experience of 
indigenous peoples has been permeated by colonization in such a way 
that colonial categories and structures are even now a part of their 
existence and way of understanding the world. However, it is also clear 
that the indigenous groups that had been dominated also learned to 
attribute new meanings to foreign symbols, images, and patterns to then 
transform and appropriate them (Quijano 1998: 233). 
For Quijano, the ultimate form of appropriation is imitation-
subversion, as demonstrated by the creation of the category of cholo10 in 
Peru. The cholo is the result of a process of re-originalization in which 
new cultural elements, together with other previously acquired ones, 
were transformed in a way that was not simply acculturation or even 
mestizaje or hybridation. “It was, above all, an alternative of 
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decolonization of imaginaries, of practices, values and institutions of the 
cultural relations among the people of the country” 11  (1998: 236). 
According to a similar line of thought, Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui argues 
that in Bolivia the ch’ixi or mestizo illustrates a reality in which multiple 
cultural differences coexist in parallel without actually blending in, but at 
time antagonize or complement each other. The ch’ixi is an alternative to 
the notions of the Indian as a rigid form of identity and to the “ficticious 
discourses of hybridation”, which in the end subsumes what is 
indigenous (2010). 
Thus, while it is understood that coloniality has permeated every 
aspect of the experience of indigenous people, it is crucial to 
acknowledge those spaces in which they have given new meanings and 
re-signified categories as part of a process of appropriation, which 
challenges the notion that indigenous identities are fixed and rigid and 
indigenous people are passive subjects. The Shuar political organization 
may very well illustrate this process. By imposing religious orders, the 
Spanish tried to control the Shuar during colonial times, but were 
unsuccessful; however, the Spanish colonization of Ecuador opened the 
door for a posterior form of “colonization” which was first carried out 
by missionaries and later by mestizo people. These processes were both 
part of a “civilizing” process intended to incorporate the Shuar into the 
nation-state. Social and racial categories established during colonization 
were already part of the sociocultural fabric of Ecuador and, as such, the 
Shuar and other Amazonian groups were automatically incorporated into 
them. 
As part of the process of conversion and civilization, the Shuar slowly 
stopped speaking their language and adopted a more Western lifestyle. 
These processes were reinforced by constant contact with state 
institutions and mestizos, who had been moving into their territory. 
However, while the Shuar political organizations created in the 1960s to 
protect their territory were already an accommodation to a Western-
national political structure, they were also a way for the Shuar to gain 
some leverage in their benefit. As Rubenstein writes: “What from the 
perspective of the Ecuadorean citizenship, (the federation) is an 
extension of the state into a new social and geographical space, from the 
Shuar’s perspective it means the inclusion into a bigger entity” 
(Rubenstein 2005: 299).  
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Returning to Hall’s discussion, there are two important points in his 
theoretical approach to postcolonial identities that are most relevant for 
my work (Hall 1990; Hall and Du Gay 2003), and these are related to the 
articulation of collective identities. However, it should be clear that, 
unlike other postcolonial/poststructuralist authors, Hall’s writings have 
been heavily influenced by the work of Gramsci and thus have a strong 
Marxist approach. He has argued, for example, that the discussion about 
race and ethnicity can benefit from Gramsci’s non-reductionist vision of 
the intersection between class and race, which avoids classical tendencies 
to privilege the importance of the first. This non-reductionist approach 
to the problem of race/class is also reinforced by Gramsci’s attention to 
the culturally specific quality of class formation in a specific society (Hall 
2010: 281). In Hall’s view, while identities are created as tools of 
representation they also function as discourses that give meaning to 
concrete experiences and material things and have political and material 
consequences. As has been previously mentioned, material dynamics are 
also highly relevant to the discussion of ethno-politics; I will address this 
topic throughout the thesis as it relates to identity discourses and 
practices within the Shuar political organization.12 Thus, in this thesis, the 
emphasis on the material implications of identity discourses challenges 
poststructuralist positions that tend to dismiss issues of poverty and 
material needs which, from my perspective, may warp and limit our 
understanding of the decisions of indigenous people in their dealings 
with large-scale mining and other practices. 
 The first point from Hall’s work which is relevant to this thesis is that 
identities are part of an ever-changing process in which there is no 
essence, fixed history, or defined sense of cultural belonging. Since 
identities are constructed in specific historical contexts, they are 
contingent on those specificities and thus fragmented and subject to 
voids and ruptures; the notion that identities are tied to a seamless or 
monolithic historical continuity is not possible (Hall and Du Gay 2003). 
The second point is the idea that identities are processes in which 
individuals position themselves according to a particular context (Hall 
1990). Discourses and practices can thus be seen as part of the way 
individuals or groups have chosen to position themselves or articulate 
their sense of identity. In this context, articulation is defined as the 
process of rendering a collective identity that is based on common 
interests and positions in specific political and mobilization moments; 
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thus, identities are understood, to some extent, to be provisional. To be 
clear, in terms of the conceptual discussion of identity politics, I use the 
concept of articulation in Hall’s terms; however, I also use it to describe 
how the different levels of the Shuar Federation and their leaders 
(federations, associations, and communities) converge, join, or come 
together (or not) in terms of their discourses and political practices, as 
well as in their regular, daily interactions and work in favor of the Shuar 
people.  
When looking at the Shuar’s identity and their discourses, it is 
possible to understand Hall’s argument on identity fragmentation. As 
Hall argues, it is quite difficult to speak of historical continuity or a sense 
of cultural belonging based on specific cultural traits, if some of such 
characteristics are already in a process of serious change, thereby causing 
some identity fragmentation and dispersion. Quijano further argues that 
specific, heterogeneous, and even discontinuous experiences can be 
brought together in a collective subject as the result of a shared history 
of conflicts; this articulation “only becomes a unit when those elements 
come together around a specific axis, under concrete conditions, in 
relation to specific needs and in a transitory way”13 (Quijano 2011: 24). 
In her book on an indigenous Amazonian group and their relationship to 
oil extraction, Sawyer also argues that identity is a process and not 
permanent essence. She explains that ethnicities are not about what 
essential and inherent characteristics a group possesses, but rather about 
how and why they came to be (Sawyer 2004). Who the Shuar are now, 
how they think, and how they position themselves within the larger 
society is very different from who they were fifty years ago, as their 
identity is the response to different sets of circumstances and 
conjunctures.  
1.3.2  Indigeneity as a Political Strategy 
Based on the findings of this research, I develop several arguments 
throughout the thesis. The central point regarding the Shuar ethno-
politics vis-à-vis large-scale mining is that identity discourses and political 
strategies are flexible, changing, and individualized at all levels of the 
federation; additionally, from the perspective of Western politics, the 
federation itself may be interpreted as scattered and fragmented, thus 
indicating that it does not exemplify western understandings of collective 
action. This reveals that the process of articulation of collective identities 
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is complex and incorporates a variety of internal and external elements. 
These elements include the group’s own knowledge and understanding 
of their world, their own constructions of identity, and their exchanges 
with the mestizo society which, in this case, involve the change and 
transformation of local communities and the territory as well as 
interactions with diverse notions of development and modernization 
(Cepek 2008). Valdivia (2005) argues that indigeneity, which refers to the 
articulation of a group’s identity discourse, is partly imposed and adapted 
but also reshaped and reinvented according to external views of 
indigenous people and the indigenous group’s own view of themselves. 
Indigeneity is the way in which indigenous groups position themselves in 
relation to different types of political, economic, environmental, or 
socio-cultural processes. As such, it can be understood as a political 
strategy: a way to negotiate and achieve goals.  
Marisol de la Cadena (2010) also discusses the ways in which 
indigenous people have engaged with Western society and particularly 
how they construct their indigeneity vis-à-vis the larger society and even 
national politics. She argues that Andean indigeneity, as a historical 
formation, did not disappear into Christianity or national citizenship, but 
was also not impervious to either of them. She affirms, “Neither 
indigenous nor mestizo, it is an indigenous-mestizo aggregate that we are 
talking about: less than two, not the sum of its parts (therefore not the 
‘third’ result of a mixture) and indeed not one—let alone a pure one.” 
(De la Cadena 2010: 348). In other words, indigeneity in the Andes has 
been constructed alongside a strong mestizo presence such that it has 
not necessarily created a completely new identity, but there is also not an 
identity that has remained untouched or unaffected. Through the 
concept of partial connections (De la Cadena 2010: 347; Strathern 2004), 
she analyses the presence of indigeneity in regional and national political 
spaces in which discourses historically shaped in relation to class and 
ethnicity are “exceeded” by the use and inclusion of “earth-beings”14. 
She calls this appearance of “earth-beings” in social protests an emergent 
indigeneity, which is not a new way of being indigenous but rather “an 
insurgence of indigenous forces and practices with the capacity to 
significantly disrupt prevalent political formations.” (De la Cadena 2010: 
336). This insurgence refers to the capacity of disavowing the separation 
between “Nature” and “Humanity,” that is part of the Western political 
theory (2010: 342). 
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The emergence of this new form of indigeneity calls to the forefront 
the discussion of how indigenous leaders have had to learn to speak in 
modern terms, translating categories and leaving others behind (such as 
the use of ‘earth-beings’) to accommodate what the state and modern 
politics consider appropriate, as in the notion behind the Indio Permitido 
(Hale 2004). For indigenous people to have access to resources, their 
demands must be articulated in terms that make sense in Western 
mestizo politics. As such, they must change and adapt the ways in which 
they voice their struggles related to territory, gender and ethnic rights, 
and so forth15 (De la Cadena 2010: 349), which is a main point of interest 
in ethno-politics and in this thesis. On the other hand, Lu et al. (2017), 
argue that indigenous groups in the Ecuadorian Amazon who have 
become part of the national political process are in a “continuous re-
signification of indigenous identity vis-à-vis the state and social 
movements seeking political transformation” (Lu et al. 2017: 60), thereby 
creating contradictory notions of citizenship. In the case of the Shuar 
Federation, those contradictions are evident in the ways in which identity 
discourses and political strategies are shaped and how their positions 
related to large-scale mining are defined. In this process of re-
signification, indigeneity seems to occur at micro levels and appears to be 
scattered, fragmented, and constantly changing. 
In order to understand the ways in which Shuar leaders construct 
their indigeneity, I have turned to certain elements (some external) that 
might play a role in shaping or re-signifying those notions of identity, 
which, in turn, create diverse discourses, objectives, and political 
strategies. I concentrate on views and discourses related to progress, 
development, ancestrality, the changing relationship between the Shuar 
and the territory itself, and the transformation experienced by the 
communities.16 The aim is to show that, while from a Western mestizo 
perspective, Shuar ethno-politics might seem inefficient and lack 
coherence, these forms of dispersion and decentralization can also act as 
strategies to cope with situations of change as part of the process of re-
signification and re-appropriation (Lu et al (2017; Quijano 2011). Thus, it 
is understood that federation and community leaders define their 
political identities and strategies in a very flexible and changing way, 
negotiating and at times improvising according to specific political, 
social, and economic contexts and conjunctures.  
Furthermore, to better understand the fluidity of identity discourses 
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and to avoid an analysis that would suppose a binary relationship 
between the Shuar and the mestizo world, it proved to be important to 
consider other categories of social difference. Feminists and critical race 
theorists have used the concept of intersectionality to understand the 
relationship between and interdependence of social categories that 
influence hierarchies among and between groups. Kimberle Crenshaw’s 
work was pioneering in that it attempted to understand the interactions 
between race, gender, class, and ethnicity to elucidate the “multiple 
dimensions of Black women’s employment experiences.” (1991: 144). If 
before these categories were seen as disparate and exclusive, from this 
perspective, they are considered to be interlocking and part of a complex 
web of hierarchical relations. Thus, rather than understanding social 
categories as fixed or stable, they can be considered to be “situated 
accomplishments” (Mollet and Faria 2013: 123; West and Fenstermaker 
1995) through which people actively negotiate and contest power 
hierarchies. As Radcliffe argues, intersectionality is not just a sum of all 
forms of discrimination, but rather “when they are interrelated the 
disadvantages are mutually reinforced and exacerbated” 17 (2017: 75). 
From a postcolonial perspective, interlocking categories are part of a 
system of power hierarchies in which colonial inequalities are defined by 
‘superior’ categories; thus, race is not separable or secondary to gender 
oppression because they are co-constitutive (Lugones 2008: 134).  
Evidently, social categorization among Shuar leaders and members of 
communities is flexible and is intersected by multiple identities. While 
defining themselves as Shuar in racial/ethnic terms, they also see 
themselves as (artisanal) miners, pro-mining and anti large-scale mining, 
and even as mining workers. Being a leader is also not a homogeneous 
category: federation and community leaders may have important 
differences in terms of status and positions of authority, as well as 
gender18, but they may also have different personal aspirations and 
political strategies that are influenced by their age group. Thus, categories 
of class, ethnicity, and even age come together as part of their identity 
discourses and rhetoric about large-scale mining. However, while some 
of these interlocking categories might reinforce disadvantages and 
discrimination (for example, community leaders who do not have any 
ties to the mining company), others might increase social status and 
certain privileges, as in the case of federation leaders who had been able 
to negotiate with the company. Other forms of intersectionality can 
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explain different notions related to modernity and development that 
result in certain political strategies and forms of negotiation with the 
state and mining company. 
Finally, it is also important to consider another influential element in 
the articulation of collective identities among the Shuar: the presence and 
role of missionaries in the colonizing process have also influenced the 
structuring of different Shuar federations.  While the first Shuar 
federation was created in the northern province of Morona Santiago 
under the auspices of Salesian missionaries, Shuar communities in 
Zamora did not have the same support from the Franciscans and 
developed their own organization decades after the establishment of the 
federation in Morona. In this context, some forms of political 
organization became stronger or more successful than others in defining 
certain positions and exercising their leadership, as seems to be the case 
in Morona19; others, like the organization in Zamora, have had more 
trouble agglutinating forces around certain positions and decisions.  
1.3.3  Development and Modernity  
Finally, as part of the colonizing process, the Shuar and other indigenous 
groups in the Amazon region have engaged with two important concepts 
that permeate much of their decision-making, especially with regards to 
processes like large-scale mining. Modernization and development have 
become part of the identity discourses and goals of many Shuar leaders 
and people from the communities. As mentioned earlier, these two 
concepts are also part of a theme present throughout my dissertation 
because they are 1.) intimately connected with the Shuar strategies and 
political practices related to Project Mirador and 2.) key in the 
interactions with Ecuador Estratégico and its development logic.  
The concept of development has been at the center of an ongoing 
debate among academics of a variety of disciplines. Theories on 
development that understand it as a result of economic growth (such as 
modernization theory and neoclassical economics) have been widely 
criticized by different approaches that question the validity of a Western 
model that has clearly not benefitted most of the world’s population 
(Bretón and Palenzuela 2016; Peet and Hartwick 2009). From the 
perspective of post-structural theory, what in the past was considered to 
be automatically good and beneficial –such as the notions of 
improvement and progress— in this theory are considered to be 
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mechanisms through which power and control are exercised (Peet and 
Hartwick 2009: 218). Poststructuralists question the very idea of progress 
and the benefits that development supposedly brings to people: who 
determines what is beneficial and for whom and what is considered to be 
progress in life? Furthermore, instead of conceptualizing development as 
something that occurred naturally in the modern world, post-
structuralism sees development as an invention, social construction, and 
discourse that seeks to exercise control through the use of dominant 
Western ideas and representations (Escobar 1995; Ferguson 1990; Peet 
and Hartwick 2009: 222; Rist 2002). Notions of developed and 
underdeveloped countries, first and third world countries, etc., have 
become so naturalized that they have hardly been contested or had their 
parameters questioned (Escobar 1995). Thus, more than just a model of 
economic growth, development is considered to be a Western method of 
control and set of parameters to judge other societies (Walsh 2010a: 15-
16). 
As discussed above, this Western model of development is 
intertwined with the concepts of modernity and progress. Following 
Marx, Berman (1982), describes modern experience or modernity as 
radically contradictory because scientific, industrial, and technological 
progress has been accompanied by the transformation of the human 
environment in ways that are not always positive.  
In the last century, the “maelstrom of modernity,” as he calls it, or 
science, industry and technology, have created new human environments 
and destroyed old ones: 
…the industrialization of production, which transforms scientific 
knowledge into technology, creates new human environments and 
destroys old ones, speeds up the tempo of time, generates new forms of 
corporate power and class struggle; immense demographic upheavals, 
severing millions of people from their ancestral habitats, hurtling them 
halfway across the world into new lives; rapid and often cataclysmic 
urban growth; systems of mass communication, dynamic in their 
development, enveloping and binding together the most diverse people 
and societies; increasingly powerful national states, bureaucratically 
structured and operated…finally, bearing and driving all these people 
and institutions along, an ever-expanding, drastically fluctuating capitalist 
world market. (Berman 1982: 16) 
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According to Berman, while modernity has been developing over the 
course of five hundred years, creating its own history and traditions, it 
has been in the XX century that this process has expanded to affect the 
whole world, according to what scholars like Escobar define as a 
homogenizing model. Escobar defines modernity as the “kinds of 
coherence and crystallization of forms (discourses, practices, structures, 
institutions) that have arisen over the last few hundred years out of 
certain cultural and ontological commitments of European societies” 
(2010: 9). As such, he argues that modernity has homogenized and 
universalized certain fundamental notions: the belief in the existence of 
an objective truth, the idea that the only way to produce knowledge is 
through science and reason, the dichotomy between and separation of 
nature and culture or nature and society, the separation of societies 
through the colonial divide, and other recent assumptions about the 
separation of the economy from social practices and the role of the 
market as a self-regulating entity (Escobar 2010: 9). Thus, the notion of 
progress is very much tied to Cartesian dualism; by the end of the 
seventeenth century, progress was “marked by the increasing domination 
of humankind over nature; the more man masters nature the farther 
humanity moves along the line of progress” (Blazer 2010: 4). According 
to this framework, there is also a clear conceptualization of nature as a 
source of resources that should be exploited for people’s welfare 
(Gudynas 2003: 17). 
Furthermore, the notion of progress was gradually crystallized in the 
concept of development; in the newly-created nations in Latin America, 
which were strongly guided by European thinking of the time, a massive 
extraction of natural resources and products started to take place 
alongside industrialization and the organization or “civilization” of much 
of the territory. “The European heritage of development highlighted 
economic growth as the main source of social and political progress”20 
(Gudynas 2003: 29). Around the end of World War II, development was 
becoming a universal modelbased on the assumption that progress and 
well-being in a society can be achieved through economic growth. 
Economic growth was seen (and still is) as the only way to alleviate 
poverty and solve redistribution issues, as well as to help consolidate 
industrialization and the production of technology (Gudynas 2012). 
Notions of progress have also been applied to indigenous populations, 
who should be modernized, meaning they had to adopt certain values 
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held by a “white minority or a mestizo majority and, in general, those 
embodied in the ideal of the cultivated European” (Escobar 1995: 43). In 
the end, from Escobar’s perspective, development has been a top-down, 
ethnocentric, and technocratic approach that has treated people and 
culture as abstracts, concepts, and statistical figures. (Escobar 1995: 44). 
Esteva explains how the notion of development automatically 
invalidates those people who are not or have not followed its path: 
The word always implies a favorable change, a step from simple to 
complex, from inferior to superior, from worse to better. The word 
shows that you are doing the correct thing because you are advancing 
towards a desired goal, in terms of a universal, necessary, inescapable 
law. (…) But, for two thirds of the world’s population, this positive 
meaning of the word “development”–deeply ingrained after two 
centuries of social construction- is a remainder of what they are not. It is a 
reminder of an undesirable and worthless condition. To escape from it, 
they need that the experiences and dreams of others enslave them. 
(Esteva 2000: 75)21 
Post-structuralism has contributed to a critique of development and 
its consequences, the ethnocentric approach to understanding the lives 
of non-Western people, and the notions of what is or should be normal, 
civilized, and desirable. However, post-structuralism has also been the 
center of criticism for dismissing the notion of development, based on 
false deductions (for example, assuming that the problems of poor 
countries are always the result of capitalism and development), aprioristic 
assumptions, romanticizing the life of the poor, and vilifying modernity 
(Corbridge 1998:138-139). It has also been strongly criticized for failing 
or being unwilling to define a “constructive agenda for development” 
(Arsel and Dasgupta 2015: 646).  
 Critical modernism is a set of theories that disapprove of the 
conventional view of development based on economic growth and those 
theories that remain uncritical towards Western modernism. However, 
critical modernism positions itself as an alternative to the overly critical 
tendency of post-structuralism. According to this perspective, it is clear 
that, while development cannot be understood solely as aggregate 
economic growth, material transformation to improve people’s lives is an 
ethical issue and a necessity. Critical modernists compare themselves to 
postmodernists in these terms: “Critical modernism criticizes material 
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power relations in order to change them, while postmodernism criticizes 
discourses and ideas to undermine their modern certainty; critical 
modernism wants to transform development, while postmodernism 
wants to abandon it.” Development is thus understood as “the social use 
of economic progress” (Peet and Hartwick 2009: 275). 
Unlike poststructuralists, critical modernists propose rethinking 
development and seek to actively engage with modernity by criticizing 
and changing it, rather than dismissing it as a discursive formation (Peet 
and Hartwick 2009: 282). This school of thought seeks to use valid 
modern principles such as democracy, emancipation, progress, and 
development as well as technology and science to improve the lives of 
people. However, critical modernists are clear that these principles have 
been “corrupted by the social form taken by modernity-capitalism as a 
patriarchal class system, a type of society operated in the interests of a 
male elite, based on the profit motive to the exclusion of virtually 
everything else” (2009: 280). In essence, scholars from this line of 
thought envision development as a way to improve peoples’ lives, 
especially those of the poor, by building economic capacity, which is 
interpreted as all activities that employ labor organized through social 
relations. Means of production should be collectively owned by 
partnerships, cooperatives, and so forth, and economic growth should be 
understood as the growth of the productive capacity of those who need 
more (Peet and Hartwick 2009). In this context, “development means 
channeling resources directly to poor people to enhance their 
productivity”, and not to the already rich hoping that the leftovers 
eventually trickle down to to the poor (2009: 291).  
In this discussion, I have concentrated mainly on criticisms posed by 
poststructuralists regarding classical notions of development, who have 
even proposed different conceptions of development and alternatives to 
the homogenizing Western values and ideas underpinning development 
projects. A key part of this argument centers on the concept of 
modernity, which is understood as the homogenizing, though at times 
contradictory, aspect of Western society which views well-being and 
progress as a result of economic growth, industrialization, and the 
civilization of nature. In this context, while it is important to be aware 
that development is part of a capitalist power structure with all the 
implications already discussed in this section, people’s material needs and 
poverty cannot and should not be ignored, as proposed by critical 
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modernists. Furthermore, as will be shown in several chapters of this 
thesis, for indigenous peoples who have had a prolonged contact with 
the mestizo society, the experience of modernity has implied the growing 
desire for all the amenities, comfort, technology, and infrastructure that 
mestizo people enjoy as part of their urban lifestyle. Specifically in 
regards to Ecuador Estratégico and local development, I show that while 
there is a clear agenda of state control in the work of this institution, 
there is also a strong response from indigenous communities who 
embrace development as it has been proposed. As will be discussed 
throughout the dissertation, the majority of Shuar people who are part of 
this study appreciate some elements of their lifestyle (or what it used to 
be in the past), but they also have expectations to improve the material 
life of their communities and to improve themselves, as part of a modern 
national mestizo society.  
A final issue that remains to be discussed is if development, especially 
in the context in which the issue of large-scale mining is situated, is only 
about the reduction of poverty and the satisfaction of basic material 
needs. In their book on oil extraction and citizenship in Amazonian 
Ecuador, Lu et al. (2017) question the ways in which the government of 
the Citizens’ Revolution 22  has approached development. While an 
important part of its political and economic agenda to alleviate poverty 
and meet basic needs depends upon increased economic growth 
achieved primarily through extractive practices, the authors argue that 
Correa’s administration has not addressed a variety of forms of inequality 
“that reproduce vulnerability alongside economic inequality-along the 
lines of gender, race, life expectancy, environment and territoriality” (Lut 
et al. 2017: 116). They see an inherent contradiction in the fact that 
development is promoted through those industries that have perpetuated 
poverty and exclusion. From this perspective, development should be 
understood as holistic well-being which is not merely related to material 
conditions, but also to issues of social justice and access to equal rights, 
in this case, as indigenous people and Ecuadorian citizens.  
1.4 Thesis Structure  
As discussed in this introduction, the context in which Project Mirador is 
situated is quite complex. I have offered a brief and simple description of 
how local people, especially the Shuar, have dealt with Project Mirador, 
the changes in the mining company that directs this project, as well as 
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with the state’s institutionality related to the extraction of resources. This 
thesis focuses on the ways in which the Shuar Federation, at all levels, 
confronts and positions itself in relation to large-scale mining. However, 
it also attempts to illustrate the trans-local political and economic 
dynamics around it. Thus, this thesis is organized in a way that first 
highlights the importance of examining the macro and global aspects of 
extractivism and large-scale mining, and then goes on to discuss local 
interactions through the lenses of ethno-politics. 
The second chapter of the dissertation presents the main theoretical 
discussion on ethno-politics and the struggles of indigenous people 
related to the use and control of natural resources. It considers that 
politics, culture, and identity are important factors to consider when 
discussing the decisions and choices people make in regard to extractive 
practices (Perreault and Valdivia 2010). This chapter first addresses a 
discussion on identity from a non-essentialist perspective, which allows 
one to understand it in terms of a process rather than a fixed entity. A 
key concept I use in the discussion of identity politics and strategies is 
indigeneity, which helps us to understand the ways in which identity 
discourses are constructed in the interactions between indigenous groups 
and a variety of actors, and how these discourses allow such groups to 
strategically position themselves in their struggles with external forces. 
Finally, the discussion of identity politics and indigeneity is 
contextualized within the framework of territory and territorial dynamics, 
which helps us to understand the relationship of the Shuar with other 
actors in a given geographic space and over time.  
 The second part of Chapter 2 presents the methodological aspects of 
the thesis; I provide a description of how and when the research was 
carried out. I also describe the main actors involved in the project, the 
main qualitative methods used in the field, and some comments on the 
positive experience of doing long-term fieldwork. The methodological 
section focuses on the significance of doing multi-site research because 
of the possibility of exploring different locations, actors, and the inter-
connections between them (Hannerz 2003). This approach meant that 
my visits to the field usually required staying different periods of time at 
different locations, not only in the area of Zamora but also in Quito and 
the city of El Puyo, in the Amazonian province of Pastaza. Another 
interesting point that I highlight in this section deals with positionality 
and ethics in the fieldwork. I discuss the omnipresent issues of class and 
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gender in the field and also focus on the biggest obstacle in my 
relationship to the people and the leaders of the Shuar communities, 
which was a certain sense of distrust towards me. The expectations of 
development and progress that large-scale mining generated in the 
population were soon replaced by a sense of disappointment towards the 
state and the mining company, which was also transferred to me. In 
conclusion, this chapter provides some thoughts on the reality of life in 
Shuar communities as a critique to classic notions on community 
structure and homogeneity and on my personal stance regarding mining. 
My decision to stay “neutral” during my research allowed me to better 
understand the ways in which Shuar people make different decisions 
related to extractive practices based on what they believe to be best for 
their livelihoods, their unique experiences and understandings of their 
world, and their different relationships with the mestizo society. 
How and why did large-scale mining become so relevant in the 
political and economic agenda of the progressive, New Left government 
of Rafael Correa? While in the neo-liberal period in Ecuador extractivism 
was part of a set of policies that reduced social expenditures and 
deregulated the economy in order to attract foreign investment, it has 
now become re-politicized. Extractivism and particularly large-scale 
mining have become key elements of a redistributive apparatus that, 
unlike previous governments, favors social investment and ultimately 
seeks to reduce poverty. A discussion of these issues is offered in the 
first section of Chapter 3 as a way of providing context from a political 
economic perspective for the development of large-scale mining in 
Ecuador; at the same time, this discussion briefly touches on certain 
problematic areas associated with extractive practices that are now 
shared by the governments of Bolivia and Ecuador: issues of local 
participation, sovereignty, and the criminalization of protest.  
The second section more specifically tackles the development of 
large-scale mining in Ecuador, but it uses an environmental justice 
perspective to concentrate on the technical aspects, certain 
environmental effects, and possible sources of socio-environmental 
conflicts related to Project Mirador. To provide context for the following 
chapters, Chapter 3 concludes with an analysis of the interactions 
between the Shuar Fderation and the mining company, underscoring the 
possible sources of tension and conflict.  
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Chapter 4 is mostly descriptive and attempts to provide context to 
explain the ways in which the Shuar Federation is constituted at different 
levels and how it interacts with other actors like the mining company, 
state institutions, and other indigenous organizations. This chapter 
includes an historical description of the Shuar as the first settlers of the 
region and of their early contact with missionaries and colonos, which 
provides a general context of the colonization process. This further 
addresses the ways in which the Shuar have managed their interactions 
with Western/mestizo society. As was mentioned earlier, a theme that 
frequently re-emerges throughout the thesis is the constant process of 
negotiation with different external actors, which is key in the 
construction of the Shuar’s identity and which prompted the creation of 
their political organizations. In fact, an important point in this chapter is 
that the Shuar organized themselves based on a Western political model 
as part of their insertion in the national society and in a process that 
allowed them to be interlocutors of the state. 
A second objective of this chapter is to convey the complexity of the 
Shuar Federation, which is evident in the discussion of its composition 
and the difficulties they encounter in working as an articulated structure 
for the well-being of the Shuar people. The chapter also considers the 
links with other regional and national indigenous organizations to 
understand the kind of ideologies that guide the work of the federation, 
their political agenda, and the strategies that have been defined as part of 
their ethno-politics.  
 The third objective is to present a description of the Shuar 
communities which are, in reality, the heart of the Shuar Federation and 
the reason for its existence. Before going into the discussion of 
discourses and political practices at this level in the following chapter, it 
is necessary to first understand how the communities have been 
constituted in terms of its members and land as well as in terms of their 
subsistence practices, which have been greatly altered since the migration 
of the mestizos from the highlands to their ancestral territories. This sets 
the context for the discussion of issues like the notions of the territory 
and of the community as a changing scenario that are important when 
discussing identity discourses. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the identity discourses and political strategies of 
Shuar leaders at the level of the federation and the associations, and 
especially within the communities. Based on a discussion of indigeneity 
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(Valdivia 2005), the purpose of the chapter is to attempt to explain how 
and why discourses and practices are shaped in such diverse and flexible 
ways. For this, I provide a rich description of discourses among the 
leaders and tie them to the ways in which they articulate this identity and 
position the federation and the communities in relation to large-scale 
mining. I show that discourses on being Shuar generally inform the 
decisions they make either to resist the presence of the mining project or 
to welcome and initiate negotiations with the company. However, I also 
point out the complexity and the changing nature of these discourses as 
they might work at the official level (especially at the federation level) 
and how they are utilized as rhetoric, which contrasts with discourses 
that are more closely tied to everyday subsistence issues. 
Indigeneity discourses are interpreted as they relate to different 
elements that are part of the territorial dynamics (Valdivia 2005) within 
which the Shuar people have interacted with a variety of external actors 
for decades: these elements include notions of modernity and 
development as well as ancestrality, the changing relationship to the 
territory and the transformation of the communities. Together, these 
factors may help explain why people and leaders from certain 
communities might articulate their identity in particular ways that allow 
them to look at the mining project with a more positive perspective than 
others. However, the complexity of the context in which Project Mirador 
is situated still leaves room to further investigate the presence of the 
mining company in order to understand the series and waves of 
interactions among local and extra-territorial actors (Little 2001). 
Chapter 6 focuses on a new state actor in the extractive scenario and 
its interactions with the local population, particularly with the FESZCH 
(Shuar Federation of Zamora Chincipe) and the communities. In many 
areas, Ecuador Estratégico, the state company in charge of channeling 
royalties from strategic projects into local development, has assumed the 
role formerly occupied by extractive companies as providers of certain 
benefits to local communities. The objective of this chapter is twofold. 
First, it seeks to analyze the political role of the state company as part of 
a nationalist resource agenda in which the ultimate goal of the extraction 
of natural resources is to invest in social development and to facilitate 
the distribution of wealth. Second, it analyzes the interactions and 
discourses of the Shuar population vis-à-vis Ecuador Estratégico, discusses 
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their position and expectations related to the notions of development 
and modernity, and describes their struggle to achieve these goals.  
This chapter addresses important contradictions between the concept 
of buen vivir and extractivism and development, and also discusses the 
role of Ecuador Estratégico as key in legitimizing the extraction of natural 
resources despite these contradictions. However, it also shows that the 
Shuar endorse the logic of development utilized by the company and in 
fact struggle constantly to be a part of the development apparatus. 
Chapter 7 offers an analysis of the main findings and contributions of 
the thesis, as well as a discussion of some of its limitations and 
suggestions for future research.  
Notes
                                                
1 Ecuador is divided into 24 provinces which are then divided into cantons and 
then into rural and urban head parishes. The mayor and the municipal council are 
the elected governing bodies in the cantons, while the parishes have the parish 
council as its main governing entity. In this research, the parish council of 
Tundayme plays an important role.  
2 People of mixed European and Indigenous descent 
3 In the province of Zamora Chinchipe, there are two Shuar federations, the 
Provincial Federation of the Shuar Nationality of Zamora Chinchipe 
(FEPNASH-CH) and the Shuar Federation of Zamora Chinchipe (FESZCH), 
both of which will be discussed in later chapters. However, research for this 
thesis focused on the second for several reasons that will be explained in Chapter 
4. 
4  The issue of basic services is interesting and shows a paradox that only 
reinforces the marginalization suffered by indigenous people. If many of the 
Shuar households were given access to all services, this would force them to pay 
for services that most cannot afford. 
5 Morona Santiago is the province to the north of Zamora Chinchipe, also 
located in the Amazon region (see Map 1.1). 
6  Such as the IERAC (Ecuadorean Institute for Agrarian Reform and 
Colonization) and INDA (National Institute for Agrarian Development) which 
were in charge of land titling and were key in the process of colonization. More 
recently and related to large-scale mining, institutions like Ecuador Estratégico are 
key because they are in charge of channeling the royalties from mining projects 
into local development. 
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7 The concept of buen vivir (Sumak Kawsay) was taken from the Andean Kichwa 
(or Quechua) peoples and refers to the notion of living in harmony within the 
community and with nature. This concept was incorporated into the Constitution 
of 2008 and has already caused much debate amongst academics and indigenous 
organizations (see Arsel 2012; Radcliffe 2012; Walsh 2010). 
8  Original text in Spanish: “…la expresión más profunda y duradera de la 
dominación colonial” (Quijano 2002: 1). 
9 Original text in Spanish: “La cultura europea pasó a ser un modelo cultural 
universal. El imaginario en las culturas no-europeas, hoy difícilmente podría 
existir y, sobre todo, reproducirse, fuera de estas relaciones.” (Quijano 1992: 13). 
10 A loosely defined term in Spanish that refers to mixed-blood descendants, 
generally used in derogatory ways. 
11 Original text in Spanish: “Era, ante todo, una alternativa de la descolonización 
del imaginario, de las prácticas, valores e instituciones de las relaciones culturales 
entre los pobladores del país.” (Quijano 1998: 236). 
12 In relation to this, I should point out that, besides providing basic information 
on poverty rates as well as access to basic services and description of subsistence 
practices, the objective of this thesis was not to use of data that would prove 
Shuar communities to be poor and in great material need, rather, that most Shuar 
leaders perceive their reality to be that way, and thus the emphasis on their 
discourses and political strategies around issues like poverty, marginalization and 
exclusion. 
13 Original text in Spanish: “…llegar a ser una unidad sólo cuando esos elementos 
se articulan en torno de un eje específico, bajo condiciones concretas, respecto de 
necesidades concretas y de modo transitorio.” (Quijano 2011: 24) 
14 Marisol de la Cadena refers to “earth beings” as those entities or presences that 
are no human (such as the Pachamama or the mountains) that can be considered 
as political actors in the indigenous cosmovision and politics. 
15 In an effort to bring decolonial practices into academia and particularly into 
ethnographic methodologies and approaches, Viveiros de Castro (2004) discusses 
the concept of equivocation that precisely addresses the reference to different 
meanings behind concepts. In other words, even though indigenous people may 
be using the same categories or concepts we use, the meanings behind them may 
not be the same.  
16 The discussion on the use and translation of certain categories (such as 
community and territory) by indigenous leaders as a way to accommodate to 
modern state politics will be addressed in Chapter 5.    
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17  Original text in Spanish: “Cuando se encuentran interrelacionadas las 
desventajas se refuerzan y exacerban entre sí.” (Radcliffe 2017: 75) 
18 While I include the category of gender in this discussion, it is important to 
point out that all federation and community leaders in this study, except for two, 
are males. This is already interesting information, but I chose not to concentrate 
on gender issues because it would have required a different line of analysis.  
19 The Shuar federation in Morona Santiago has a very strong presence and 
participation in local politics and has a strong position of resistance to 
extractivism and large-scale mining.  
20 Original text in Spanish: “La herencia europea del desarrollo ponía el acento en 
el crecimiento económico como generador del progreso social y político.” 
(Gudynas 2003: 29) 
21 Original text in Spanish: 
 La palabra siempre implica un cambio favorable, un paso de lo simple a lo 
complejo, de lo inferior a lo superior, de lo peor a lo mejor. La palabra indica 
que uno lo está haciendo bien porque está avanzando hacia una meta deseada 
en el sentido de una ley universal necesaria, ineluctable. (...) Pero, para dos 
tercios de la población terrestre, este significado positivo de la palabra 
‘desarrollo’ –profundamente arraigado tras dos centurias de construcción 
social– es un recordatorio de lo que no son. Es un recordatorio de una condición 
indeseable e indigna. Para escapar de ella, necesitan que las experiencias y 
sueños de otros los esclavicen (Esteva, 2000: 75). 
22 Citizens Revolution is the way in which Rafael Correa and his political party, 
Alianza País, named the period in which they governed the country (2007-2017). 
This period was characterized for implementing radical changes in terms of the 
Constitution of the country and the ideology of the “XXI century Socialism”. 
 
 
  
 
 
2 Theory and Methods 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the main research questions and arguments of 
this dissertation were discussed; the main interest of this thesis is to 
examine the identity discourses and strategies of the Shuar political 
organization in its negogiations with large-scale mining, specifically in 
relation to Project Mirador in Zamora Chinchipe. However, the scope of 
this study is large given that it considers the interactions between local 
populations and those actors involved in the extractive project and 
touches on issues related to the political economy of Ecuador and the 
region. 
The objectives of this chapter are twofold; I will first address a 
theoretical discussion on identity politics, indigeneity, and territory to 
establish the ways in which indigenous people deal with issues related to 
the control and extraction of natural resources based on the politics of 
their ethnic-identity. Second, I will describe the methods I used to carry 
out this research and then go on to discuss aspects of positionality and 
ethics in the field. 
2.2 Indigenous Politics: Ethnic Identity in the Struggle over 
Natural Resources  
Struggles over natural resources and for control over them have been 
addressed by academics from a wide variety of disciplines. Mining 
extraction has specifically attracted much analysis and debate because of 
the great damage mining companies have caused to the environment as 
well as because of the socio-economic and even cultural implications for 
local populations. As has been documented in many cases around the 
world and in the United States, a high percentage of mining and other 
extractive projects take place in indigenous territories (Ballard and Banks 
2003: 287-288; Gedicks 1993). In Ecuador, this has also historically been 
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the case for oil extraction. Thus, many spaces for indigenous 
organization and politics (including total resistance and also negotiation) 
have actually taken place in a framework of resource exploitation, 
especially in the Amazonian region. Ecuador’s recent and future 
development of industrial mining in the Amazonian province of Zamora 
Chinchipe has begun to and will continue to directly affect different 
populations, including the indigenous Shuar, indigenous Salasacas, and 
mestizo migrants. 
While Ballard and Banks (2003) argued that there is still much 
anthropological research to be done around the mining industry, they 
acknowledge that there has been growing interest in the area, especially 
related to the increased recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights and the 
need to defend them from the extractive industry (Ballard and Banks 
2003: 288). In Peru, for example, even though most peasant populations 
are indigenous, most studies about mining in this area do not point out 
to this fact for various reasons; this is due, at least in part, to the fact that 
the population is not necessarily organized around an ethnic agenda 
(Paredes 2006).  
In Ecuador, since the 1960s and 1970s, indigenous groups in the 
Amazon have had to fight many different kinds of invasions and threats 
to their territories and resources: catholic and protestant missionaries, 
colonos’ migration from the highlands to take possession of what they 
considered to be their lands, and, finally, the oil extraction industry 
alongside its powerful political machinery and implicit support from the 
state. In countries like Ecuador, the extractive industry has become a 
new form of colonization: as Gedicks argues, it is a powerful system that 
has forced indigenous people to respond in different ways by adapting, 
resisting, or even negotiating with it through a diversity of strategies 
(Gedicks 1993). 
In her study on citizenship in Latin America and the formation of 
contemporary indigenous organizations, Yashar (2005) asks several key 
questions that may also be relevant in a context of struggle over 
livelihoods and natural resources. For example, she asks why some 
identities become more important at certain times and not at others and 
in certain places and not in others. She also questions when and why 
politicized identities translate into political action. Through a 
comparative study of the emergence of indigenous organizations (or lack 
thereof) in several Latin American countries, Yashar argues that for 
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mobilization to occur, three conditions need to be met: changes in 
citizenship regimes, political associational spaces, and the creation of 
transcommunity networks (Yashar 2005: 8). She argues that in Ecuador, 
the effects of changes in citizenship regimes from corporatist regimes to 
neoliberal regimes affected both highland and Amazonian groups in 
different ways, but ultimately exacted the same effect on organization 
and mobilization. Accompanied by clear attempts to establish links 
between organizations and aided by external actors such as NGOs and 
the Catholic Church, changes in citizenship regimes paved the way for 
mobilization and political action. Generally speaking, the history of 
indigenous organization at the local, regional, and national level in 
Ecuador is an example of indigenous groups and communities slowly 
evolving into a sophisticated network of leadership and organization; for 
example, the highland organization has grown out of class-based 
demands and goals, while the Amazonian organization has developed to 
address issues more apparently related to ethnic consciousness such as 
ancestral land ownership and use (Yashar 2005).   
Warren and Jackson also discuss a variety of cases that illustrate the 
heterogeneity of indigenous movements in Latin America.  For example, 
they highlight the differences between long-standing and temporary 
movements as well as the differences between community and 
regionally-based movements. Additionally, they consider the diverse 
terms of inclusion or exclusion into such communities and organizations 
which are based on practices of self-determination. At the same time, 
they also documented “the interplay of local leaders and their 
communities with pan-community activists who operate primarily in 
national affairs” (Warren and Jackson 2002: 10-12). Of course, this 
phenomenon is very common in indigenous organizations in Ecuador 
because the national organization in and of itself is made up of the 
different local and regional organizations, as Yashar pointed out (2005). 
 Indigenous organizations and communities, as well as the external 
links and networks they have (which can range from other types of 
indigenous organizations, NGOs, international organizations, 
conservation organizations, state agents, etc.) are extremely diverse. 
Thus, it is logical that people’s goals, and their choices related to their 
struggles and desires over issues like their right to land, control over 
resources, development, etc., are also heterogeneous. As Warren and 
Jackson write,  
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In these circumstances, the anthropology of indigenous organizing 
becomes the study of the choices that people in different setting make in 
the ongoing process of their own identity formation…these [choices] are 
not unencumbered choices; rather they are contingent on wider political 
and economic pressures as well as on local history. (Warren and Jackson 
2002: 12) 
 It should be interesting, then, to examine the interactions between 
community, local level, and other multi-scalar level organizations, not 
only in terms of cooperation and open support for local livelihoods, but 
also in terms of the tensions that might arise from having different 
objectives (Perreault 2203b; Valdivia 2007); each group’s unique 
objectives are a result of different needs and perceptions of the use of 
resources, development, etc. Yashar’s analysis of mobilization and 
indigenous organization is a comparative study that seeks to clearly 
establish a general framework to understand different dynamics in ethnic 
politics and the ways in which they have emerged since the second half 
of the twentieth century. However, ethnic or identity politics are always 
at play and they are constantly adapted to changes in the conditions 
affecting the indigenous population’s rights, livelihoods, and control over 
their own territory and natural resources. The study of the community 
leadership and its struggles related to the extraction of resources is 
therefore important; it is the local community that will suffer the 
consequences of having extractivism in its backyard, as has been the case 
in the Amazon region for the past four decades. Extractivism has also 
provoked indigenous mobilization throughout the region in different 
ways. 
The theoretical framework of this thesis is based on the premise that 
conflicts related to natural resources and control over them are not only 
a practical matter related only to their scarcity or availability, but that 
these struggles are very much related to politics, culture, and identity 
(Perreault and Valdivia 2010). This chapter begins with a discussion of 
identity and the ways in which it shapes and can be shaped by specific 
political and historical contexts, and the ways in which people articulate 
identity in ways that can be strategic for them as a collective entity. I 
then go on to discuss issues of cultural and identity politics, as well as the 
importance of considering cultural meanings and practices as part of the 
way people get involved in politics. However, the concept of indigeneity 
as an identity discourse that results from the articulation of local and 
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external actors frames most of the discussion in this thesis. Finally, the 
discussion of identity politics and indigeneity is contextualized within the 
framework of territory and territorial dynamics, which helps us to 
understand the relationship of the Shuar with other actors in a given 
geographic space and over time.  
Besides the theoretical discussion, this chapter also includes a review 
of the literature that specifically analyzes the ways in which indigenous 
groups have practiced cultural politics and articulated their indigeneity to 
secure not only material but also symbolic benefits in Ecuador and the 
Americas. I also include information about everyday politics and 
resistance to help to orient the discussion about local community 
practices and the interaction with local and regional organizations. Then, 
I continue with a review of Hall’s ideas on identity and positioning, 
which are fundamental to understanding the process of construction and 
re-configuration of identity. 
2.2.1 Discursive Approach on Identity: Positioning and 
Articulation  
With the discussion of Barth (1976) and other authors about ethnic 
groups and ethnicity in the 1960s, the essentialist approach to the 
conceptualization of identity changed dramatically (Bazurco Osorio 
2006). Essentialist or primordial theories emphasized an integral, 
original, and unified group identity as being inherent and essential to the 
group. This emphasis focused on shared cultural traits within a group, 
which led us to conceptualize a world with separate cultural groups 
instead of focusing on the realities of contact, frontiers, and borders 
(Barth 1976: 10-12). 
New approaches resulted in more dynamic views of identity and a 
need to regard identity in terms of contact spaces and ethnic boundaries. 
According to Barth, ethnic differences persist even when there is contact 
between groups; they are the foundations upon which social systems are 
built. Thus, we should focus not only on those shared characteristics 
within a group but especially on the boundaries between them (Barth 
1976: 10). In other words, ethnic identity becomes relevant in the 
context of interaction between groups. 
Since Barth, much has been written about ethnicity from a more 
constructivist point of view. The constructivist approach understands 
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identity as socially-constructed and bound to change and transformation 
according to a specific context; furthermore, it is defined in a context of 
power relations (Conklin 1997; Conklin and Graham 95; Escobar 2001). 
While essentialism understood ethnicity as part of a pre-existing set of 
essential characteristics (Jackson and Warren 2002: 2005) or presupposed 
the existence of a previous context or social structure, constructivism 
defines ethnicity as simultaneously being part of the construction of 
social reality and as a result of that same social construction (Bazurco 
Osorio 2006: 55).   
On the other hand, Hall considers the concept of identity from a 
discursive perspective in which identity is seen as a process in 
construction, part of the discursive practices that provides meaning and 
context to concrete experiences and material things. Hall takes the 
conceptualization of identity into the sphere of representation; to him, 
identity is built within a discourse and it is through this representation 
and discourse that it produces meaning, thereby establishing 
relationships between material things, experiences, and concepts. In 
other words, even though identities are created in the sphere of the 
symbolic and the imaginary, they have real effects at the discursive, 
political, and material level (Hall 2003: 17-18). Identity is not only about 
the specific material relations in a given context, but also about how 
people conceptualize them. The process of “identification” is always in 
construction and, since it acts through difference, it needs certain 
symbolic markers and material resources to reaffirm those differences. 
Once again, Hall does not accept a concept of a unified or stable identity 
but thinks of it as strategic and positional (Hall 2003: 16). He views 
identities as fragmented and fractured because they are constructed 
through different discourses and practices which are sometimes 
antagonistic. For him, the concept of identity accepts: 
…that identities are never unified and, in late modern times, increasingly 
fragmented and fractured; never singular but multiply constructed across 
different, often intersecting, and antagonistic, discourses, practices, and 
positions. (Hall 1996: 4)  
Another key element in understanding Hall’s perspective is that 
identities are constructed within specific historical and institutional 
contexts through specific enunciations and articulations. In Hall’s view, 
identities are not defined through an essence, a fixed history, or a defined 
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sense of cultural belonging, but rather they are in a constant process of 
construction; thus, identities are often fragmented, multiple, and 
constantly being shaped by different types of discourses and practices 
(Hall 2003: 17-18). In the process of identity construction, there is not 
always historical continuity but rather rupture, voids, and fragmentation 
(especially when there are processes of migration, colonization, etc.).  
To understand the dynamics of identities, it is vital to understand the 
concepts of positioning and articulation/enunciation, which are also 
discussed by some of the authors reviewed in this thesis. According to 
Hall, we all take a position in some place and time of our lives, and what 
we say and do (as individuals and as part of a collective group) from that 
particular context is defined by our identity and the way we have 
positioned ourselves; the particular meaning given by our own 
positionality is what he calls enunciation or articulation (Hall 1990). 
Thus, the notion of identity should be understood as an unfinished 
process. Since identities are contingent, meaning that they are produced 
in a specific context, they are part of an imperfect process that will be 
never complete; thus, the idea of either “losing,” “abandoning,” or 
“keeping” them are inadequate because they are constantly changing due 
to specific positionings and articulations (Hall 2003: 15). To view identity 
as an unfinished process problematizes the notions of authority and 
authenticity to which the concept of identity has been attributed. What 
was considered to be “real” and “authentic” for a certain group at a 
certain period of time might not even be relevant to the same group in a 
different historical, political, and economic moment.  Similarly, it might 
not be in the group’s best interest to position itself in the same context 
when certain elements have changed in the wider political and social 
landscape. Hall offers an interesting example of Jamaicans who, in a 
particular context of civil rights struggles and social movements, 
embraced a black and African identity that was not previously considered 
relevant (Hall 1990). The positioning of self-identity within many 
indigenous groups has proven to be useful as a strategic way to create 
spaces of representation and to achieve goals. The discussion that 
follows focuses precisely on collective identity as a strategy and as a 
means for indigenous groups to position themselves within different 
political, economic, and historical contexts. 
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2.2.2 Ethnicity as Strategy  
Conceptualizing identity as a strategy to obtain material and symbolic 
resources is an approach that has been used by different authors 
(Bolaños 2011; Gros 1999; Perreault 2003a, 2003b; Valdivia 2007) who 
have analyzed the ways in which indigenous groups frame their identity 
in relation to important issues such as access to power and spaces of 
representation. Gros, for example, argues that due to a new world 
dynamic in which there is a marked interest in biodiversity, cultural 
diversity, protection of the environment, and sustainable development, 
the indigenous population in Latin America has come to occupy a 
“growing strategic and symbolic place”: “This is their ‘strategic symbolic 
capital’ and allows them to suddenly have access to new resources- 
discursive, economic, organizational, political, etc.” (Gros 1999: 6). This 
strategic use of identity is “performative” in the sense that it actually 
benefits a group (in this case, the indigenous population) in particular 
ways. The same argument is also used by Castillo and Cairo Carou to 
analyze the situation of indigenous populations in Colombia and 
Ecuador as multicultural countries. According to them, the instrumental 
use of difference based on ethnic identity has shown the great strategic 
and “performative” capacity of such groups (Castillo and Cairo Carou 
2002: 58), with the most obvious result being a change in what was 
previously seen as a homogenous state. According to the authors, this 
change is evidenced by the Ecuadorian constitution of 1998: in order to 
recognize cultural diversity and to respond to demands made by 
indigenous organizations after national uprisings in 1990 and 1992, 
Ecuador was declared a multicultural nation.  
Both authors emphasize the performative and strategic use of an 
indigenous identity that has allowed the indigenous population to access 
new spaces and different types of resources; the concept of 
performativity means that, in this context, indigenous groups have 
shown an ability to achieve desired results for their benefit and have 
been able to strategically use their identity as symbolic capital in such 
processes, as in Spivak’s definition of strategic essentialism. In her view, 
subaltern groups, in this case indigenous people, tend to simplify their 
differences and essentialize their characteristics so as to create a sense of 
collectivity (Spivak 1990). In fact, many authors have discussed the ways 
in which indigenous groups (especially those in the Amazon region) have 
constructed an identity discourse that essentializes their relationship to 
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nature and reinforces the idea that they are ecologically concious 
caretakers of the forest, (Brysk 1996; Conklin 1997; Conklin and Graham 
1995; Valdivia 2005); all of this forms part of a strategy that allows them 
to be part of a national and international network that supports their 
projects and helps them to gain funding.  
However, other authors like Perreault warn against the type of 
analysis that tends to simplify and view the process of identity 
construction as “entirely instrumental or strategic”1 (2003b: 81). In his 
analysis of an indigenous Amazonian organization and the way it has 
shaped its identity discourse, he discusses the process of reorganization 
that a local community and its political organization have initiated to 
achieve what he calls an “ethnic recovery” of the group, based not so 
much on shared experiences or shared memories, but rather on the 
contributions of indigenous leaders and even academics. One of the 
objectives of this new definition of being a Quichua in the Amazon (with 
an historical background tied to an earlier group, the Quijos), was to be 
able to attract more attention from certain international organizations, 
like the World Bank and some of its local projects aligned with the 
national indigenous organization in Ecuador (CONAIE), and to open up 
spaces for negotiation at different levels and within different kinds of 
organizations. Thus, as part of an identity discourse, notions of identity, 
nationalities, and territories are more elaborate and self-conscious than 
regular everyday life in practice. As part of the indigenous organizations, 
community leaders have learned, to some extent, to facilitate exchanges 
between the community and other political actors, the media, the 
tourism industry, conservation, and environmental and human rights 
organizations (Conklin and Graham 1995; Hutchins 2007; Valdivia 
2007). Thus, they have had to recreate their own conceptualization of 
“being indigenous” to be able to reach out in ways that can be 
understood, verbalized and categorized by the wider mestizo society. 
Instead of reading this process as instrumental, Perreault argues that 
cultural revalorization in the community of Mondayacu is part of a larger 
process of identity reconstruction within the indigenous population at a 
national level; to him, these processes “…may be seen as responses to 
political and cultural openings made possible by strengthening 
indigenous movements, increased presence of international NGOs, 
constitutional reform, and a degree of state openness to indigenous 
political organizing” (Perreault 2003b: 81). Furthermore, he thinks it is 
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more important to understand that the dynamics of ethnic politics in 
Ecuador are the result of the constant shifting and overlapping of 
different multi-scalar networks of indigenous organizations, different 
kinds of institutions, and entities (NGOs, state agencies, national 
intellectuals, foreign researchers, etc.) (Perreault 2003b: 81). 
2.2.3 Identity Politics, Articulation, and the Struggle for 
Resources  
When issues of identity are contextualized around the material aspects of 
human life, the discussion takes on a more political dimension and the 
analysis can become more complex, thus avoiding those simplifications 
about which Perreault warns us. Politics can simply be defined in terms 
of “the control, allocation, production, and use of resources and the 
values and ideas and values underlying those activities” (Kerkvliet 2009: 
227). The struggle and control over resources is dependent upon 
situations of resistance and negotiation between different actors, 
including situations which pit a local community against the state or 
powerful transnational companies, as is usually the case in the extractive 
industry. In this context of struggle, collective identities can be 
understood as a form of cultural politics in the sense that they produce 
and carry meanings and values in their discourse and their practices 
related to issues like resources and their use, the environment, concepts 
of development, notions of what it is to be indigenous, etc. (Vadjunec et 
al. 2011: 11).  
For Alvarez et al. (1998), a crucial element in the discourse and 
analysis of the “new social movements” in Latin America is precisely that 
of identity, which is considered to be relevant to political action and 
allows those social movements to become engaged in a “different way of 
doing politics” (Alvarez et al. 1998: 6; Coate and Thiel (eds) 2010: 4). 
Thus, cultural politics refers to the process in which different sets of 
actors, who have been shaped by different “cultural meanings and 
practices come into conflict with each other,”; this may imply that those 
differences in meanings are structured hierarchically such that the 
marginal, alternative, and oppositional groups have to struggle against a 
“dominant cultural order” (Alvarez et al. 1998: 7). Embedded within this 
definition of cultural politics are the notions of hierarchy, inequality, the 
struggle of certain groups to change and transform that dominant order, 
 Theory and Methods 47 
and the cultural values and meanings that inform the different actors in 
the structure. 
From this perspective, cultural politics is a wider scenario that 
describes political process and action in a variety of social movements 
and collective identities. All social movements, from modern ecological, 
ethnical, indigenous, women, gay, and human rights movements (all of 
these are considered to more adequately fit the description of new social 
movements) to the more traditional peasant and labor movements, 
engage with and mobilize against current power structures by utilizing 
their “cultural identity” as the axes of their daily lives and political 
practices (Escobar 1992). As is the case within many indigenous 
organizations in Latin America, in Ecuador the issue of identity is tied to 
notions of ethnicity and cultural distinctiveness and has been marked by 
a history of exclusion (Grey Postero and Zamosc 2004; Selverston-Scher 
2001). Nevertheless, the same cultural and ethnic differences that have 
excluded indigenous peoples from the project of nation building 
(informed mainly by ideas of mestizaje and cultural homogenization)2 until 
recently, have now become strategies in political action, network 
building, and the fight for symbolic and material benefits (Radcliffe 
2010).3 
In this context of struggle for material and symbolic benefits, it is 
important to go beyond the instrumental role of ethnicity in order to 
understand the bigger picture. Part of this more complex analysis also 
takes into account the issues of citizenship, rights, and demands of the 
indigenous population in a context of historical exclusion. Grey Postero 
and Zamosc propose a framework of contestation about what they call 
the Indian Question in Latin America, in which indigenous citizenship is a 
central topic. In this sense, the Indian Question refers to the kinds of rights 
that indigenous people in Latin America should be granted as citizens in 
a process of democratization that should replace every aspect of 
marginalization with “full and robust citizenship” (Grey Postero and 
Zamoc 2004: 5). However, the Indian Question should be understood in 
specific contexts, considering that indigenous organizations and 
populations have different claims for rights and demands. While some 
indigenous people may struggle for social and economic rights to be able 
to get out of poverty, other groups may be more interested in their 
cultural rights to protect their traditions, languages, or territory. 
Whatever their specific demands, these authors argue that, “what is at 
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stake in the Indian Question is ultimately the right of indigenous people 
to have a say in the political, economic and cultural processes that 
determine their lives as citizens” (Grey Postero and Zamoc 2004: 7). In 
this sense, material and symbolic struggles are very much embedded in 
the fight for rights not only because these grant control and power over 
material things such as territory and resources, but also because they 
imply issues of self-determination, the exercise of citizenship, and 
national belonging. These issues are extremely relevant to indigenous 
peoples who demand their right to be able to actively participate in 
decisions related to extractive activities in their territories and the ways in 
which the extraction of resources will affect their livelihoods in positive 
or negative ways.  
Although in practical terms it would be impossible to universalize a 
set of demands for the indigenous population of Latin America, 
according to Grey Postero and Zamoc, there are certain common 
elements and issues important across the different groups. Obviously, 
the most important of these issues is that of cultural recognition and 
protection. Other important issues are related to political autonomy, 
territorial control, and political participation (Grey Postero and Zamosc 
2004: 15). In Ecuador, León has grouped the demands of the indigenous 
organization into three categories: ethnic, class, and political policy (in 
Selverston-Scher 2001: 83). The first category refers to that of cultural 
recognition and protection through strategies of cultural reproduction 
such as bilingual intercultural education programs. The third category 
refers to the demands that CONAIE has made, demanding that Ecuador 
recognize itself not only as a pluri-cultural nation but rather as a pluri-
national country (this demand was granted in the Constitution of 2008). 
The second category addresses an important issue for the purposes of 
this thesis; it refers to economic demands related to funding for the 
resolution of land conflicts and issues of control and access to profits 
from the oil industry intended to contribute to the development of 
indigenous communities in the Amazon (Selverston-Scher 2001: 83). 
Despite the intention to categorize indigenous organizational 
demands, it is clear that material struggles cannot be divorced from 
symbolic struggles or the cultural aspects implicated in the fight for 
livelihood and well-being. Issues of ethnic and cultural protection cannot 
be resolved apart from their practical and material implications. Cultural 
reproduction is tied to territory control and the protection of everyday 
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practices that can include the use of language as well as basic subsistence 
strategies. Furthermore, the sense of being indigenous, culturally distinct, 
and of being excluded precisely because of a particular cultural heritage 
contribute to a more flexible understanding of an interplay between 
issues of class and ethnicity. While Grey Postero and Zamosc argue that 
new indigenous organizations are not solely based on an identity politics 
but rather on a more “fluid mixture of livelihood and culture” (2004: 14), 
I argue that ethnic or identity politics were always about securing 
peoples’ livelihoods and survival on their own cultural and identity 
terms. Concerns about culture and livelihood go hand in hand. 
Many authors have analyzed the different ways that indigenous 
peoples and organizations that place strong emphasis on 
indigenous/ethnic identity, engage with cultural politics. These groups 
see themselves as struggling for different material and symbolic reasons 
and have sought to overcome these struggles, at least in part, through the 
articulation and positioning of an indigenous identity or through 
discourses of indigeneity4; these struggles are related to access and rights 
to land, control over the use of natural resources, or control over the 
distribution of profits from extractive activities. They have organized 
themselves to obtain aid for development projects and even to openly 
resist development projects (Bolaños 2011; Murray Li 2000; Perreault 
2003a, 2003b; Sawyer 2004; Vadjunec et al. 2011; Valdivia 2007; Valdivia 
and Perreault 2010).5 A brief discussion of some of these cases follows. 
While Perreault avoids simplistic interpretations of organization and 
self-identification, he does acknowledge the workings of symbolic 
strategies within discourses and rhetoric. Tracing the history of a local 
indigenous Amazonian organization in Ecuador, the FOIN, Perreault 
analyses the way in which this organization has reworked global 
discourses of development through its own identity discourse. To do so, 
he also uses Hall’s notion of articulation (1990) in which certain 
identities, ideologies, and interests are rendered explicit as they are 
simultaneously tied to “specific political subjects.” When he looks at the 
way the organization’s discourse has changed over time (from a modern, 
non-ethnic nationalistic organization to an organization whose discourse 
centers on the notion of nationalities), he argues that these changes, 
rather than being contradictory, should be read as a reflection of the 
changing nature of identity (Perreault 2003a: 598). Referring to Hall, he 
views identities as constantly changing, not timeless essences: “FOIN’s 
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discursive representations of identity…are not stable, unchanging, and 
timeless essences, but may be seen as positionings, reflecting historically 
constituted cultural understandings and relations of power” (Perreault 
2003a: 598). Like Murray Li (2000), he sees identities not as merely 
created, invented, or imposed, but rather as positioned in often 
“contradictory” subjectivities and emerging out of historical contexts and 
particular patterns of “engagement and struggle” (Murray Li 2000: 151; 
Perreault 2003a: 584).  
Ultimately, the organizations discussed above have managed to create 
an identity discourse in which sustainable development does not exclude 
or reject development and modernity. At the same time, since the 
discourses also aim to improve the livelihoods of the people and 
promote development for the local communities, they are as much about 
identity as they are political; they ultimately seek to obtain political rights 
and material claims. The identity discourses in the context of 
development make it possible for indigenous groups to articulate 
symbolic and material struggles (Perreault 2003a: 603). 
A similar analysis is used by Murray Li’s study (2000) on the 
articulation of a collective indigenous identity in a context of opposition 
and resistance to a dam project in Lake Lindu, Indonesia.6 Basing her 
argument on Hall’s framing of articulation as the “rendering of a 
collective identity” in terms of positions and interests (rather than a long-
shared history and fixed cultural essentials), Murray Li discusses the 
process of self-identification of the Lindu people. To avoid threats 
associated with a large hydroelectric project that often implies relocation 
of people, the Lindu managed to articulate their identity in terms of a 
shared history and distinct cultural characteristics. They also staked claim 
to a territory that is essential to the group’s cultural reproduction; these 
actions were all vital elements of what national and international 
advocates and activists expected to define an indigenous people. Because 
the dam was threatening their livelihoods, the Lindu articulated their 
identity as rightful dwellers of the territory, a fact that prevented them 
from being relocated anywhere else. As does Perreault, Murray Li 
recognizes the tactical and strategic element of positioning identities 
within specific contexts; this positioning becomes more explicit at times 
like this, when politicization and mobilization are produced around 
struggles for control over their own lives. However, she insists that “the 
flow of meaning from which an articulation is derived and the fields of 
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power with which it is engaged transcend that temporary fixity” (2000: 
153). In other words, contingency and temporality do not mean that 
articulations are not meaningful to those who produce them as a 
collectivity; therefore, they have the potential to “define broad 
constellations of shared or compatible interests, and mobilize social 
forces across a broad spectrum” (Murray Li 2000: 153). 
2.2.4 Indigeneity and Multi-Scalar Networks  
Valdivia inserts the concept of indigeneity into the discussion of 
indigenous self-identification in the context of resource extraction. She 
defines indigeneity as “an articulated identity imposed and inhabited, 
contested and negotiated by different groups of people” (Valdivia 2005: 
285).7 Valdivia does not conceptualize indigeneity as holding the “truth” 
over indigenous identity and their authentic practices or beliefs, a notion 
then taken up and reproduced by organizations. (Valdivia 2007: 44-45). 
Rather, she coincides with Hall in that indigeneities are produced and 
articulated in specific contexts through “networks of social interaction.” 
Thus, in the same way that Hall interprets identities as being constantly 
shaped and as “becoming” rather than having essential components 
(Hall 1990), indigeneities are the result of the articulation of indigenous 
identities by different groups of people, including the indigenous 
communities themselves, indigenous organizations, and even external 
agents (Valdivia 2007: 17).  
 For example, the image that positions indigenous groups (especially in 
the Amazonian territory) as being culturally distinct, isolated, and in close 
contact with nature as the guardians of the environment, has been 
configured by transnational discourses that place expectations on and 
create understandings of indigenous groups according to their own 
agendas. This “authentic” indigeneity has allowed indigenous groups to 
develop alliances and links locally as well as internationally in order to 
make land and environmental claims (see Conklin and Graham 1995, for 
a discussion on authenticity among the Kayapó and other Amazonian 
indigenous people). Nevertheless, Valdivia (2005) argues that this 
positioning of indigeneity is only one of many performances of 
discourses and practices of indigenous identity, considering the variety of 
political and economic processes and movements that act at a local level 
and the different ways in which people respond to these. Valdivia 
recognizes that indigeneity is an identity discourse that is partly imposed 
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by others, but which is simultaneously adapted or even reinvented by the 
indigenous people in ways that allow them to negotiate with and work 
on different cultural, environmental, and socio-economic agendas.  Thus, 
indigeneity is about building political discourses and practices that 
configure an indigenous identity at local, national, and international 
levels. Furthermore, the articulation of indigeneity is related to 
environmental and cultural claims and to multi-scalar notions of 
development, human rights, and citizenship (Valdivia 2005: 286). 
Her work analyzes the ways in which three different indigenous 
organizations (representing three types of indigenous Amazonian people 
in Ecuador) articulate their notions of indigeneity in relation to natural 
resources and oil extraction, as a way to understand how issues of 
livelihoods (and the ways in which local actors interact with their 
environment) relate to notions of identity and modernity. An example of 
this relationship between identities, livelihoods, development, and 
modernity is the way in which one of the local organizations articulated 
their indigeneity as being global citizens with a “political voice,” which 
allowed them to negotiate with oil companies instead of resisting oil 
extraction and becoming “environmental stewards,” as other 
communities had done (Valdivia 2007: 59). In their discussion of 
indigeneity and identity politics, both Valdivia (2007) and Perreault 
(2003b) discuss multi-scalar networks, which they view as being crucial 
to understanding the dynamics involved in political agency at local, 
regional, and national levels. Both authors have studied the history and 
dynamics of local indigenous organizations and the multi-scalar networks 
of which they are a part; Perreault argues that much attention has been 
placed on national movements but not on the role of local, community, 
and household experiences as a “politics of place.” As he argues, it is the 
community that many times has to face powerful actors (like the state or 
transnational companies) and, to do so, it must rely on different external 
actors and multi-scalar networks. By using the Actor Network Theory, 
Valdivia embraces the critique of notions that consider global actors to 
be more powerful than local ones by emphasizing that political action 
comes from network and alliances that can prove powerful: “Political 
agency comes from the idea of network association and interpreting the 
world as nested global, national and local scales” (Valdivia 2007: 43). For 
Valdivia, organizations like the ones she studied in the Ecuadorean 
Amazon are considered local agents, but they are importantly positioned 
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as the connection between local livelihoods and wider processes. “The 
goal of organizations such as FEINCE, OISE, and FOISE is to achieve 
control over local living spaces by establishing connections between local 
desires for life improvement and the moral, financial, or political 
interests of actors beyond ‘the local’” (2007: 44). According to the 
discussion above, it is necessary to consider local and community spaces 
as key to the political work of indigenous organizations. A discussion on 
the importance of the place and territory in the construction of identity 
politics follows. 
2.2.5 Identity Politics, Place, and Territory  
A key element in the dynamics of identity politics is the relationship that 
people build with the place they inhabit. Authors from different fields 
(Bolaños 2011; Escobar 2001; Ingold 1993; Rocheleau et al. 2001) have 
discussed the relevance of place and the environment in the discussion 
of identity and culture. From their perspective, it is important to 
recognize that place is not merely an inert entity and a container of 
biophysical attributes, but rather is the result of different social, political, 
and biophysical processes as well as cultural meanings and values; in a 
way, these diverse processes, values, and meanings define what place is 
(Cheng et al. 2003: 90). 
 Places are socially constructed through the interactions between the 
forces of nature and the meanings we give them, thereby producing 
experiences and assigning meaning to nature and the environment. 
When such a subjective relationship to the environment and a place is 
created, the notion of landscape arises. According to archaeologist Tim 
Ingold, landscape “is constituted as an endured record of and testimony 
to the lives and works of past generations who have dwelt within it’’ 
(Ingold 1993: 152). Thus, the landscape becomes part of people’s daily 
experiences and struggles, and places and identities thus become 
mutually constitutive (Escobar 2001: 146); those meaningful 
relationships created with the place inhabited are intimately related to the 
development of the self and to peoples’ identities. According to Bolaños, 
this dynamic is key to understanding the relationship between identity 
and land, an important issue in political activism of indigenous groups in 
Latin America (Bolaños 2011: 45-46). In the Amazon region as well as in 
the Andes, the active engagement between the people and the place or 
landscape has been the object of much interest among social scientists. 
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For example, Bolaños and other authors explore the importance of land 
and territory in political claims over cultural reproduction and 
sovereignty in different countries in the Amazon region (Bolaños 2011; 
Perreault 2001; Sawyer 2004). Escobar, on the other hand, points out 
that many anthropologists have paid attention to the importance of 
people’s engagement with the landscape in the Andes: 
Cultural anthropologists have begun to draw on these theories to show the 
extent to which local people’s engagement with the landscape, in some 
Andean communities for instance, reveals that the landscape is endowed 
with agency and personhood. The enduring connectedness of people with 
the land results from an active engagement with it. (Escobar 2001: 146) 
 Escobar also points out that the study of place is still relevant to 
understanding culture, knowledge, nature, and economy even though its 
importance within social science analysis has diminished due to the 
notions of deterritorialization and mobility brought about by 
globalization (Escobar 2001: 141). In this new scenario, the community 
and locality are no longer obviously-defined spaces; as such, they have 
become the setting in which complex relations between culture and 
power that go beyond local boundaries are played out (Escobar 2001: 
146). There are still locally-based practices and modes of consciousness, 
but these have been changed and, in some cases, hybridized by trans 
local relationships and forms of power. This discussion is highly relevant 
to addressing issues of extractivism and the struggle over resources in 
which local and/or indigenous groups are challenged by national and 
global forces while fighting to protect their territories and places, 
however hybridized these may have become. 
In this context of extractivism, some authors have looked at the way 
territorial dynamics have influenced mining conflicts and how the 
presence of mining projects provokes specific local territorial and social 
transformations (Bebbington et al. 2008a; Warnaars 2013a,b). For 
example, Warnaars utilizes the notion of territory to analyze conflicts 
around Project Mirador and concludes that they are the result of 
previous and on-going processes of territorialisation 8 by the mining 
company, the local mestizo population, and the indigenous populations. 
Warnaars also concludes that they are also simultaneously responsible for 
reshaping the territory in terms of identity and meaning (Warnaars 
2013b: 159).  
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While the concepts of territory and territorial dynamics are not part of 
the main theoretical backbone of this thesis, I incorporate them as a 
framework to facilitate the discussion of the construction of the political 
discourses of indigeneity. In other words, the Shuar identity discourses 
and political practices related to Project Mirador can be understood as 
part of the territorial dynamics of which they are a part, and not only as 
an isolated response to the project. I have taken this approach from 
Little, who argues that to analyze a territory, it is important to 
understand it as a historical product of social and political processes 
(Little 2002). Little’s discussion of territory focuses on the Amazon 
region, which he considers to be a frontier zone and a scenario in which 
different “human territories” have been established over time time, each 
of which has appropriated the geographic spaces in their own way. In 
order to understand the particular ways in which each group relates to a 
specific space or territory, he utilizes the concept of cosmography, which 
he defines as “the environmental knowledge, ideologies and identities –
collectively created and historically situated- that a social group utilizes to 
establish and maintain its territory”9 (Little 2002: 4). This concept is 
similar to territorialisation, which has been utilized by other authors. In 
all these discussions, territory is clearly understood as a biophysical space 
that is inhabited by a group of people who give meaning to it. Sack 
agrees with Little that territory should be understood in terms of the 
efforts that a group makes to occupy, use, and establish control over a 
geographic area (Sack 1986: 19; Little 2002). From this perspective, 
territories are considered processes and unfinished products, and the 
interactions that occur in them are not only related to the space itself, 
but also to the social groups occupying them. According to the same line 
of thought, Brighenti argues that territory is “a social process in itself,” 
which means that it should be understood in terms of the social and 
power relations that occur within it as part of the attempts of different 
groups to control it (Brighenti 2010: 55).  
The concept of territorial dynamics, understood as the efforts that 
a group of people make to create symbolic and material attachments to a 
given geographical space and the relationship they establish with other 
groups of people in it (Little 2001; Warnaars 2013), incorporates several 
points that will facilitate the discussion of Project Mirador. The first 
concept important to understanding Project Mirador is the notion that 
the appropriation of a territory is an unfinished process and for that 
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reason is part of a historical process. The second important concept is 
that a given territory may have been territorialized by different waves of 
groups and external actors throughout history (Little 2002). Finally, the 
last important point is that the interactions between local or native and 
external actors (who, overtime, might also become part of the local 
population) are permeated by power struggles (Birghenti 2010). 
Following this discussion of place and territory, in the final section of 
this theoretical discussion I address the importance of political struggles 
and practices at the local level. As will be emphasized in the later 
chapters, while regional and national indigenous organizations are 
important in some aspects of the political life, local leaders are the ones 
who fight for their communities on a daily basis and, of course, are in 
touch with the needs of the people.  
2.2.6 Everyday Life Struggles and Politics  
In his study on everyday resistance and politics, Kerkvliet (2009) argues 
that there is a problem with conventional politics and academia because, 
in general, there is a tendency to look at politics in terms of Western 
traditional structures, organizations, and actors (for example, the state, 
government officials, political parties, and activists). Using this 
framework, it is easy to overlook a great portion of the population which 
might be involved in politics in one way or another, but which may 
never really have access to those traditional structures (Kerkvliet 2009: 
228). 
Kerkvliet’s research focused on the impact of the agrarian reform and 
the “green” revolution on the village of San Ricardo in the river delta 
region of Vietnam; through this research, he found that peasants 
engaged in different kinds of political behaviors and practices: debates 
and discussions around education, jobs, workers, the government, access 
to land, wages and credit, and other topics which influenced everyday 
life.  One example of the success of political engagement in the village 
was the way in which everyday resistance strategies created by the 
villagers put so much pressure on government authorities and agents that 
the villagers were actually successful in having the government revert a 
policy regarding communal farming and changing it back to household 
or family farming, as it had been before. (Kerkvliet 2009: 229-231) These 
everyday practices and others were interpreted as political because they 
were related to access to and control of resources. Kerkvliet categorizes 
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this and other types of political behavior in terms of resisting, adapting 
to, and even complying with the status quo:  
Everyday politics involves people embracing, complying with, adjusting, 
and contesting norms and rules regarding authority over, production of, or 
allocation of resources and doing so in quiet, mundane, and subtle 
expressions and acts that are rarely organized or direct. Key to everyday 
politics’ differences from official and advocacy politics is it involves little 
or no organization, is usually low profile and private behavior, and is done 
by people who probably do not regard their actions as political. (Kerkvliet 
2009: 232) 
 On the other hand, according to other authors discussed by Kerkvliet 
like Seabrooke and Hobson, not only individuals in communities but 
also sizable organizations can engage in everyday politics. Korovkin 
(2000) draws interesting conclusions from her study of peasant methods 
of resistance in the highlands of Ecuador, establishing a link between 
everyday political struggles between peasants and the powerful 
landholders. Some documented examples of methods of hidden 
resistance used by these groups include trespassing, using unauthorized 
land for their benefit, and forming a national indigenous organization, 
the CONAIE. She argues that the greater success of this kind of ethnic-
based organization compared to other organizations that were more 
class-oriented (like the Ecuadorean Indian Federation, the FEI—
Federación Ecuatoriana de Indios), was precisely because CONAIE had been 
built upon the foundation of local cultural practices, covert struggles, and 
long-standing, traditional practices. Thus, the relationship between local 
rural leadership and urban political leadership worked to emphasize the 
ethnic aspects of political action and mobilization more strongly than the 
class/peasantry element. 
As in Kerkvliet’s argument related to the poor attention that everyday 
struggles and political practices have received, the analysis of social 
movements and indigenous organizations in Ecuador have often left 
daily life and struggles invisible in academic discussions. For example, 
Perreault argues that much attention has been paid to the identity politics 
played out by national and regional indigenous movements and 
uprisings, but the community and household level of political discussions 
have often been ignored; in reality, these levels of consideration are 
important spaces for the enactment of politics of place and are the 
spaces in which the cultural and material bases of indigenous politics are 
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located (Perreault 2003b: 63). 10  Escobar also calls attention to the 
invisibility of daily life in the study of social movements in Latin America 
and the importance of articulating all levels of social movements, from 
the daily practices and struggles through which discourses and identity 
are constructed to the institutional level. Based on a discussion of 
women’s movements by Jelin, he argues that by merely living 
“differently” and asserting one’s difference through daily practices, one is 
already engaging in some sort of political practice and cultural innovation 
(Escobar 1992: 70). He points out: “Culture is not something that exists 
in the abstract; it is embedded in practices in the everyday life of people. 
Culture is (made of) peoples’ practices” (Escobar 1992: 70). 
Following this discussion on identity and its role in the way people 
engage in politics at local levels, it is important to now consider local life 
and the ways in which households and communities look at issues that 
are relevant to their basic survival and that might threaten or create 
possibilities to strengthen their livelihoods. As has been previously 
discussed, political practices have to do with access to resources and 
control over them in order to ensure that the needs, desires, and 
objectives of a group of people can be adequately fulfilled. Furthermore, 
when engaging in politics involves asserting cultural differences and 
reaffirming identities or strategically using those differences for the 
group’s benefit, the whole picture becomes more complex.  
On the other hand, looking only at the local level might be too 
simplistic and prevent us from connecting local and community politics 
to higher levels or to organizations that are also important in the 
interactions with other political actors (like the state and the companies 
in the case of extractive projects). As Perreault argued in the article 
mentioned earlier (2003b), local dynamics are never wholly local, rather 
they also are influenced by external actors and incorporate and reflect 
what is happening at higher, national levels. It is only by examining both 
the local community and higher-level organizations that we are able to 
understand areas of conflict and tension that have not been analyzed in 
other literature about ethnic politics.  
The context of mining in Ecuador poses interesting questions 
regarding the ways in which local communities include themselves in the 
dynamics and/or conflicts related to the extractive industry and the ways 
in which they confront the different actors involved, especially the state 
and the company. As we saw earlier, the ways that local people confront 
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their daily struggles—in this case, facing dramatic changes to their 
landscape—could be considered a way of engaging in politics. The ways 
in which people react to and make choices (to resist, negotiate, etc.,) 
related to struggles are very much informed by their cultural practices 
and meanings. In the case of the Shuar population, with its history of 
organization, defense of the group around ethnic markers, and claims to 
an ancestral territory, the dynamics of cultural and identity politics 
become even more relevant. The interactions, positions of resistance, 
and negotiations that community leaders choose to carry out will 
probably also be informed by their sense of cultural distinctiveness, 
claims to a particular way of life, and their right to improve their 
livelihoods. As Warnaars suggested in her article on mining in El Pangui, 
the political claim of “being Shuar” can be used  as a strategy to justify 
either a stronger resistance to the presence of the company and the 
mining activities or to embrace development through the control of 
resources allocated to them by the government (Warnaars 2010); 
alternatively, this political claim can also be used to position themselves 
in such that they can resist some issues and negotiate others, thereby 
adapting to the circumstances and responding to their needs. As 
Perreault and Valdivia argue, issues related to resources involve much 
more than just the resources themselves or their availability or scarcity; 
to these authors, these issues are also tied to citizenship, rights, and 
identity, which are central to the discussion of cultural politics and 
political economy “as contests over the distribution of rents and the 
objectives of national economic policy are infused with struggles over 
the meanings of development, citizenship and the nation itself” 
(Perreault and Valdivia 2010: 697).  
As a result of Correa’s government’s new approach to mining and oil 
extraction to distance itself from earlier neo-liberal governments, local 
political action has become limited and reduced. Mining extraction is one 
of the primary ways the government plans to finance social programs 
and to meet the needs of the most impoverished people in the country. 
These national projects aim to benefit a large part of the country’s 
population and to bring development to local communities, but, at the 
same time, they have either coopted or gained control over the 
population that has decided to resist extractivism. It is in this context 
that questions about the ways in which local indigenous communities 
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and organizations react to these new dynamics and the way their sense of 
cultural identity permeates those dynamics, become relevant. 
Finally, I would like to conclude this review by discussing an article by 
Warnaars on future mining activities in El Pangui, in the province of 
Zamora Chinchipe, Ecuador (Warnaars 2010). She is interested in 
mining in this area particularly with respect to how it may change its pre-
existing, historically conflictual territorial dynamics (for example, the 
Shuar previously defended their territory from mestizo colonos, who are 
now considered to be their rightful neighbors, and the area was also 
involved in land conflicts between Peru and Ecuador). In her discussion 
of the formation of new coalitions and the rupturing of new alliances, 
Warnaars discusses the topic of identity, especially Shuar identity. She 
argues that, in the context of coalitions between different groups of 
people (including between the Shuar and mestizos), the Shuar identity 
can be used to legitimize different positions vis-à-vis the mining 
company and the issue of territory, negotiation with the territory, etc. 
She suggests, for example, that the Shuar identity might be utilized either 
to legitimize arguments to defend their ancestral land and thus prevent 
them from negotiating with the company or, in other cases, it might 
push for new ways or forms of development. In the latter case, this 
means that by negotiating with the company, the Shuar also negotiate 
benefits for the community and access to infrastructure that has not 
been provided by the state; such lack of access is an unfortunately 
common problem in most impoverished communities affected by 
mining. In this case, the issue of people choosing to welcome mining in 
their territory and to negotiate benefits for themselves should be read, as 
Ali suggests, as a way of exercising a self-conscious attempt of self-
determination in absence of other ways of doing so, and not as a 
desperate attempt to survive or to manipulate identity to have access to 
natural resources and their benefits (Ali 2003). The choices local and 
community leaders make in relation to Project Mirador are the focus of 
this dissertation. Like Perreault (2003b), I propose to study the workings 
of identity and identity politics at the federation and community level; I 
am particularly interested in how indigenous organizations and 
communities shape the discourses and practices of their identity politics 
vis-à-vis other actors in the mining context.  
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2.3 Methodology  
2.3.1 Research Design and Methodology  
The methodological implications of this investigation are tied to the 
notion that ethnicity and ethnic identity shape a wide web of interactions 
at different levels and among different actors. Ethnicity is a social 
construction that does not occur in isolation, but, rather, is an important 
element of the political practices of a group. The context of an extractive 
industry in which there is a struggle over the control of the resources 
being exploited or the richness it creates can be an interesting scenario 
for the making of identity politics. 
The methodology of this project included ethnographic and 
qualitative methods applied in a variety of contexts and at different levels 
within the Shuar federation. I conceived this research as a multi-sited 
ethnography, the purpose of which (in agreement with Hannerz) was to 
study not only different locations or actors, but also the relationships 
that connect them (2003). The objective, then, was to look at different 
spaces and scenarios of interaction and to examine the interplay between 
local issues, communities, and national interests represented by 
government institutions, the mining company itself, and, to some extent, 
even by national indigenous organizations.  
Traditionally, one of the most important objectives of ethnography 
has been to account for cultural phenomena and to “produce cultural 
interpretations” (Clifford 1988: 22-23) based on close, personal 
experiences when doing research. The most important characteristic of 
ethnography has been precisely the close contact and long-term 
engagement of the ethnographer with the people who are being studied, 
in order to come to understand their everyday lives and behaviors 
(Hammersley 2002: 66).   
Classic ethnography was conceived and practiced in a way that 
allowed the researcher to spend long periods of time isolated from 
others like them in order to understand a reality that was different from 
their own; according to Malinowski, getting immersed in the “village’s” 
life was the only way to collect all information needed (from rules and 
structures in the economic and political organization to the 
“imponderabilia” of life, the details of everyday life of the Trobriand 
islanders)(Malinowski 1984: 2-13). Classic ethnography was also about 
studying and making generalizations about the totality of a culture 
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(Hannerz 2003: 202) based on a single location or site (a village, for 
example); it disregarded issues of power relations between the 
ethnographer and the natives and it conceptualized culture as a coherent, 
cohesive system of patterns that should always accommodate itself in 
order to function adequately.  
With changes in global relations and shifts in social thinking brought 
about in the 1960s, the notions of culture and the way it should be 
studied started changing in anthropology. Rosaldo (1993) argues that, 
even though the classic vision of culture, which concentrates on shared 
patterns and configurations as in a unique, self-contained kaleidoscope 
could be useful, it also has many limitations: “It emphasizes shared 
patterns at the expense of processes of change and internal 
inconsistencies, conflicts and contradictions” (Rosaldo 1993: 28). 
According to Rosaldo, the vision of shared, coherent cultural patterns 
makes it difficult to view those cultural borderlands that are increasingly 
common in a changing and globalized world.  
The classic view of culture is very much linked to the idea of doing 
single site ethnography, just as most classic and even contemporary 
ethnography has been produced. Hannerz argues that the concept of 
engaging in one single site had become a model of work among 
anthropologists for many generations, although many of them have 
already discretely been involved in a “greater variety of spatial and 
temporal practices as they have gone about in their research” (Hannerz 
2003: 202). The idea of anthropologists like Evans-Pritchard and 
Malinowski of studying the entire social and cultural life (Hannerz 2003; 
Malinowski 1984: 2-13) of a people is a response to a functionalist view 
of culture that emphasized coherence, interrelations between cultural 
elements and institutions, and shared patterns, even at the expense of 
understanding historical processes and contacts with other societies. 
Thus, single site ethnography made sense according to a more static and 
delimited view of culture. 
On the other hand, cultural borderlands (Rosaldo 1993) and multi-
sited ethnography call for a different and more contemporary 
understanding of culture. Hannerz argues that it is not so much about 
choosing a site (such as a village or community) to study it as whole, but, 
rather, pinpointing a problem or a research design that focuses on 
certain problems.  For him, multi-site research is not just about having 
several or a collection of different locations, but rather it is about the 
 Theory and Methods 63 
relationships that connect those sites or localities: “one must establish 
the trans local linkages, and the interconnections between those and 
whatever local bundles of relationships which are also part of the study” 
(Hannerz 2003: 206). Thus, as I understand it, doing multi-site 
ethnography focuses on a problem that ties together different locations 
and actors in a framework that allows for cultural borderlands to become 
important spaces of analysis. 
The focus of my research, called for a multi-site ethnographic 
approach because it sought to problematize the issue of identity politics 
in a mining project that has local, national, and even global dimensions. 
The research studied spaces and connections between different actors 
from different localities (communities that might be scattered and not 
necessarily homogeneous) and organizations and institutions that are not 
necessarily monolithic, but rather changing and dynamic (government 
institutions, indigenous organizations, etc.). 
Although I focused more on the Shuar population and organization, a 
multi-sited approach in my study allowed me to pay more attention to 
diverse local populations and their relationship to actors from the state, 
mining company, and even NGOs.  Thus, the idea of having a variety of 
“sites” refers not only to physical places but also to different objectives 
and interests, access to power, cultural backgrounds, and needs and 
objectives that inform each actor’s performance. The notion of a multi-
site ethnography refers to all those inconsistencies, conflicts and 
contradictions that are part of the the cultural borderlands between all 
the localities and actors. The mining industry brings together this variety 
of actors in one single locality (Project Mirador and its surroundings), 
but the effects of this single site project are multiple, occur at different 
levels, and affect different types of people at different times (even before 
the mining operation starts).  
As part of the multi-site ethnographic approach, I utilized different 
methods and paid attention to different kinds of material and 
information; my research was heavily based on in-depth formal 
interviews and participant observation at the local level, but I 
completmented these methods with information from diverse sources 
such as informal meetings and conversations, marches, meetings, web 
pages, official documents, newspapers articles, and so forth. 
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2.3.2 Doing Long-Term, Multi-Site Ethnography  
In practical terms, this methodology implied that I was not to stay in a 
single town or community, but rather that I was constantly moving 
around in order to reach all those actors involved in the mining project. 
My trips to the field always started in the airport of Loja and, from there, 
I continued to the city of Zamora (about an hour from Loja), which was 
the place from which I contacted the federation leaders and 
representatives of government institutions. From Zamora, I travelled 
directly to Tundayme where I visited all the Shuar communities that are 
part of this research, but also spoke with and interviewed mestizo and 
indigenous people in the town itself. After my stay in Tundayme, I 
would return to El Pangui from where I had easier access to the Shuar 
communities located closer to the town, the municipality, and other 
Shuar leaders. Many interviews were also conducted with government 
representatives, indigenous leaders from national organizations, and 
NGOs representatives in Quito. Besides the usual trips from Quito to 
Zamora, the furthest I had to travel was to Puyo (in the northern 
Amazonian province of Pastaza). Here, I interviewed the manager of the 
Regional Amazónica, an institution within Ecuador Estratégico, which is in 
charge of developing projects for indigenous groups in the Amazon 
region.    
An interesting consideration regarding this fieldwork is the time 
frame in which it was carried out. Initially, the plan was to do intensive 
research during four consecutive months in Zamora (October 2013-
January 2014) and to return for periodic visits in the period between 
February 2014 and June 2014. However, this schedule changed because 
of personal and professional commitments. Having obligations at the 
university where I work and being a part-time PhD researcher actually 
changed the way I had planned to do fieldwork. Thus, my first visits to 
Zamora took place in February 2013, and then in October and 
November 2013 with a short follow-up in January 2014; after the 
semester ended in May, I went back to Zamora until August. The visit 
that was planned for December 2014 was cancelled because of the 
murder of one of the Shuar leaders who was one of my informants, and 
the situation around Tundayme seemed somewhat unsafe. My final visit 
to Zamora was then in January 2015.  
 This extended form of research proved to be much more interesting 
and useful in terms of gaining a perspective on how things evolved 
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around the mining context. As authors like Kirsch (2012) suggest, it is 
important to look at the way that the relationship between the local 
population, the mining company, and other actors evolves over time, 
sometimes over many years, from the period of exploration to 
exploitation. In the case of my research, while I started fieldwork after 
the transition from the Canadian to the Chinese owners of the mining 
company in 2012, it was easy to perceive the Chinese company 
becoming very hermetic in terms of sharing information and 
participating in interviews. For instance, while in November 2013 I had 
actually interviewed the director of the Department of Community 
Relations, a year later, the new director and also the company’s vice-
president politely excused themselves from giving any official 
interviews11; one of the reasons for this change was probably related to 
an event (around April-May 2014) in which several mine workers–
including indigenous people from different communities— declared a 
strike and took over the mining campsite for several days; this event 
caused much turmoil in the area. Another interesting development of 
events over the last few years was the creation of Cóndor Mirador 
Association (ASCOMI—Asociación Cóndor Mirador) in December 2013, 
which later became Amazonian Community for Social Action Cordillera 
del Cóndor Mirador (CASCOMI—Comunidad Amazónica de Acción Social 
Cordillera del Cóndor Mirador). This is probably the only active organization 
currently against the mining company in the area. Even as other 
organizations in Zamora have gone silent, CASCOMI has become 
stronger during the last year, especially in their activism in defending the 
town of San Marcos, which the company had bought and taken over to 
turn into a tailings area for the mine. 
Aside from these specific events which I cite to better illustrate my 
perspective, the experience of going to the field at different moments 
gave me the opportunity to understand how permanent or transitory 
certain discourses in favor or against mining were, and if radical 
discourses among the Shuar and the federation would become real at any 
time. It also allowed me to observe and evaluate the evolution of the 
relationship between certain government institutions like Ecuador 
Estratégico and the local communities, as well as any changes in the 
communities’ perceptions towards this state company. Finally, as in any 
long-term ethnographic work, I had the opportunity to develop trusting 
relationships with the people in the field and to build rapport with them. 
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While my presence among the Shuar people in the federation and in 
most of the communities, was probably tolerated and accepted but not 
necessarily welcomed at the beginning, the last trips proved to me that I 
had become more respected and appreciated. I will elaborate more on 
the issue of ethics and positionality later. 
2.3.3 Description of the Qualitative Methods used in the Field  
As I explained in my proposal, the most important qualitative methods 
used in my fieldwork were in-depth interviews and participant 
observation. I carried out what Dewalt and Dewalt call a “moderate 
participation” (Dewalt and Dewalt 1998: 262-263), which refers to a kind 
of participation in which there is not always an active and constant 
interaction because the context itself will not allow it or due to the need 
to be in many sites. As described above, because of the complexity of the 
research situation and the variety of actors involved, I did not stay for 
long periods of time within one single community, but rather moved 
around different communities and commuted to and from other 
locations that were also important to the scope of the study. For 
example, since the Shuar Federation and the government institutions 
have their main offices in Zamora, I had to spend some time in the city 
conducting interviews. El Pangui and Tundayme were also important 
because they are home to the municipality and parish council, both key 
institutions to negotiate projects and receive benefits directly from 
mining revenues. Quito was also an important location for conducting 
interviews with government authorities and indigenous leaders. 
I interviewed all federation leaders (actually, in the first period of my 
research, I interviewed leaders from two Shuar federations), community 
leaders, and members in the first round of interviews. In the first 
interviews, I used a format that focused first on different parts of the 
federation/community structure, the level of authorities and political 
practices, and the articulation within the Shuar Federation; a second 
section included questions about the position of the leaders towards 
mining and their relationship to the mining company and finally their 
relationship with government institutions and local institutions. After the 
first round of interviews in which the information obtained was more 
general and contextual, I conducted up to three rounds of interviews 
with most community and federation leaders in relation to the structure 
of the community, the history of the change of the territory and the 
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community, and the changing relationships with the company and the 
state. The rest of interviews I had with representatives of government 
institutions, local institutions, company representatives, and NGOs 
representatives were usually carried out only once, except when I needed 
more specific information or there had been a change in authorities.  
Besides formal interviews, I had many informal conversations with 
most people and leaders in the communities and mestizo people living in 
Tundayme. For example, the owner of the small hostel in Tundayme 
where I stayed during my visits was always quick to tell me the latest 
news in Tundayme, related to the authorities of the parish council, the 
mining company, or the situation at the mining campsite. She was also 
very helpful by connecting me with Shuar women who attended the 
same evangelical church she did and who lived in Tundayme or the 
communities. 
I complemented such conversations and interviews with participant 
or  moderate type of observation (Hammersley 2002), not only related to 
daily routine and visits, but also during specific events and in certain 
spaces. These included observation of meetings in communities, in 
associations, or with some government institutions. They also included 
some events that included people struggling against the company, 
community and federation celebrations, and political rallies. All activities 
in the field—which included visiting communities, talking to people, 
interviewing, and going to events—were organized by date in my field 
diary; this diary contains not only detailed descriptions of the events, but 
also my personal perceptions, questions, and doubts as well as 
annotations of what to ask or what issues to explore in future interviews.  
As indicated above, my fieldwork for the thesis officially started in 
October 2013, although I had previously visited Zamora and several 
Shuar communities in February 2013. The intention for this first visit 
was to get a general sense of the situation, approach the Shuar 
federation, and to evaluate the accessibility of the communities located 
around Tundayme and El Pangui. During this visit, I had the 
opportunity to speak with the president of the Shuar Federation of 
Zamora Chinchipe (FESZCH), several representatives of government 
institutions, and with the then manager of the company’s office of 
community relations of the mining company. This first round of 
interviews gave me insight into the general context of large scale mining 
in Zamora which, in turn, helped me to identify the most important 
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actors involved in it; it also helped me to understand certain perceptions 
of the Shuar political organization among state actors and the official 
position of the FESZCH towards the presence of the mining companies 
in the area (since Project Mirador is not the only mining project in the 
province). 
In my second visit from October-December 2013, I sought to first 
understand the dynamics of the federations in Zamora as well as their 
most basic ideologies and political strategies. I spent much time in the 
city of Zamora visiting the offices of the FESZCH, observing their daily 
routine, and interviewing all the leaders. Although I was not always 
allowed to be part of certain meetings with other leaders or with 
government institutions, I did have access to important events such as a 
meeting that was organized in Tundayme with leaders from local 
communities and Ecuador Estratégico. During this time, I also established 
contacts and interviewed representatives of certain government 
institutions. 
While my intention at this point was to establish strong relationships 
with the leaders from both federations, it proved harder to meet with 
authorities from the Provincial Federation of the Shuar Nationality of 
Zamora Chinchipe (FEPNASH-CH-Federación Provincial de la 
Nacionalidad Shuar de Zamora Chinchipe), since they did not have 
permanent offices in Zamora as the FESZCH does. Eventually, I 
decided to concentrate only on one federation given the complexity of 
the everyday politics and organization of the Shuar. Thus, the second 
part of this trip was dedicated to approaching and building rapport with 
the leaders of the Shuar communities around Tundayme and El Pangui, 
as well as to better understanding the Shuar political structure and the 
dynamics of the leadership of associations and communities. During this 
period, I also visited and had interviews in the offices of the parish 
council and the Department of Community Relations of ECSA in 
Tundayme and even visited the mining campsite. During this visit, I 
established several important contacts with leaders from the 
communities and attempted to define their position towards mining. 
This was probably the hardest moment in the fieldwork since my 
presence in the communities was sometimes viewed with distrust and I 
had to earn my right to visit and talk to community members. In January 
2014, I came back for an additional trip to establish additional contacts 
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with communities around El Pangui and to interview the leaders from 
Asociación Shuar El Pangui. 
During the second period of fieldwork between May and August 
2014, I deepened and strengthened the relationships that I had 
previously established with leaders of certain communities. I also reached 
out to other members of the communities. After my usual stop in 
Zamora to visit the federation and the offices of Ecuador Estratégico, I 
headed up to El Pangui and Tundayme. In this visit, I conducted several 
interviews with Shuar people who live in Tundayme in order to 
understand the reasons for them moving out of their communities 
(important for the dynamics within the communities). I also established 
contact with other communities that I did not include in the first round 
of visits. These included the community of Mirador near Tundayme and 
several communities around El Pangui such as San Andrés, Certero, 
Santiago Paty, and Paquintza. I also visited, talked to, and formally 
interviewed the presidents of the Asociación Shuar El Pangui (Shuar 
Association of El Pangui) and of the the Asociación Shuar Kakaram 
(Shuar Association of Kakaram). During this visit, I also completed 
important interviews in the offices of Ecuador Estratégico.  
This was probably the most productive part of my fieldwork since I 
had already established good relationships with many leaders and some 
members of certain communities. As such, I made multiple visits on 
several occasions not merely to have a second or even third round of 
interviews, but also just to talk to people and see how they were. Key 
connections during this visit were the president of Asociación Shuar 
Kakaram and the president of Yanúa, both activists against the mining 
company. Through them, I had the chance to participate in meetings and 
events associated with the recently-created CASCOMI, which gave me a 
better insight into the Shuar participation in the process of resistance. 
Interestingly, while my relationships with the Shuar people had been 
improving, the leaders of CASCOMI and the newly elected president of 
the parish council of Tundayme had become suspicious of my presence 
in the area. Even though I had approached them on several occasions 
and explained my reasons for being there, in certain meetings the 
president of the parish council was very resistant to being interviewed, 
given that I was rumored to be a spy working for the company. Even 
though I tried to make my position very clear by presenting official 
documents from my university in Quito, the interview was not 
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unproductive, and the president seemed uncomfortable the whole time I 
was there.  
Finally, January 2015 was the opportunity to gather additional 
information and to finalize some pending interviews. During this visit, 
for example, I had the opportunity to finally visit the community of San 
Carlos, to which its president had previously denied my entrance, but 
fortunately changed his mind when we talked during a meeting at the 
FESZCH. I also finally conducted an interview with the president of 
CASCOMI, after much assurance that my interest in visiting Tundayme 
was strictly academic and not connected with the company. 
In addition to all the ethnographic information I collected, during the 
time of my research I also collected documents from government and 
local institutions, the FESZCH, and the Asociación El Pangui and 
visited official web pages to monitor information published by the 
government, NGOs, and even the company. In the periods in which I 
was living in Quito, I also carried out interviews with leaders of 
indigenous organizations, government institutions, and NGOs. 
2.3.4 Positionality and Ethics in the Fieldwork  
Doing ethnographic work necessarily brings us to the discussion of 
positionality, which is the place or position from which one, as a 
researcher, interacts with the people in the context of research (Ng 
2001). The presence of a researcher is never a neutral matter since there 
is much cultural and social baggage carried to the field that influences the 
way information is collected and the level of access granted by local 
people to certain spaces. In my proposal, I posed a question regarding 
the ways in which my research might be affected by my own 
positionality, especially in relation to the Shuar leaders and local 
communities; I wondered how people would react to my presence, being 
an “urban academic mestiza”12 asking questions on such a hot topic as 
large-scale mining. The experience was a little different from what I had 
expected: while during my preliminary visit in April 2013 and in the first 
period of my research I could sense some degree of distrust and 
indifference from people towards my queries, this seemed to be more of 
a response to the general state of affairs in the area and not necessarily to 
me as a mestizo woman.  
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Especially from my first interviews, I sensed that people were tired of 
being asked about their needs (usually by government agents) without 
actually receiving the benefits they were expecting. Furthermore, since 
many questions revolved around the mining company, I was also 
bringing up a topic that had been disappointing for most. Both the state 
and the company had failed the people’s expectations of local 
development, and that seemed to condition their attitude towards the 
presence and curiosity of outsiders, at least at the beginning. This is 
precisely what happened during my first visit to the community of 
Churuwia, where I had expected to spend a few days. Upon my arrival, 
together with the president of Asociación Shuar Kakaram, the president 
of the community became very angry at a surprise visit that he 
considered to be an imposition. Even though I had asked for permission 
to visit the communities from the federation, I did not have the 
opportunity to previously contact him directly. He spoke in Shuar to the 
president of the Asociación so I could not understand what he was 
saying, but his wife eventually calmed him down and he then agreed to 
allow me to stay one night. He left for a walk and when he came back we 
started talking about the mining company and other issues, and he 
immediately started complaining about how the company and different 
state institutions never keep their promises. This was something I would 
hear from almost everyone in the communities and, in a way, this feeling 
of frustration and disappointment made people distrustful of others, 
especially of outsiders who were looking for information. 
Contrary to my expectations, then, the gender issue did not seem to 
be much of a problem in my initial contacts with the Shuar. While I had 
expected male leaders to be dismissive of my presence in their 
communities, mostly for being a woman in what I perceived to be a 
chauvinistic context, I think two elements came into play to actually 
facilitate interactions. One of them was the fact that I presented myself 
as a researcher from a university in Quito (Universidad San Francisco de 
Quito, where I have worked and taught for years) doing PhD studies 
abroad; I also presented my credentials and official documents to 
confirm this relationship (one of these documents was an official form 
of informed consent that interviewees had to sign). A second 
consideration was that being older than most student/researchers, the 
people in the communities seemed to automatically grant me a higher 
status, which I assumed came from a perceived sense of experience; this 
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usually meant that people would never accept calling me by my name but 
insisted on using the terms “doctora” (doctor) or “ingeniera” (engineer), 
both terms that are very respected not only in Zamora but in general in 
Ecuadorean society. In a way, it would seem that working in a university 
(many times perceived automatically as having direct contact even with 
government institutions), being older, and perceived as more mature 
neutralized the gender factor, something that I also noticed in the 
leaders’ relationship to female government agents in charge of the 
development of projects. 
Besides reflecting on my own position and identity in my relation to 
the people involved in the research, another important and ethical issue 
is the level of commitment that a researcher has to people in the 
communities. Even though the academic purposes of my research were 
always made clear to the people I interviewed, there was always the hope 
among the leaders that I could do something more than write up a 
document to later be distributed among them. Thus, I constantly 
struggled over the question as to what to do beyond assuring people that 
I was not there to make any promises that I could not keep (especially 
regarding issues related to improving the community welfare), and that 
the most I could do was to share the results of my work with them. As a 
matter of fact, I had previously planned to have workshops with the 
federation and the communities to share the information I had collected 
so that they can use it as feedback or input for the benefit of their 
political organization. However, I always felt that this offer was almost 
more of a way to keep my conscience clean and not a real contribution 
to the people in the communities of the federation, or at least not a 
contribution on their own terms. Fortunately, during research and after 
hearing about all the broken promises made by the government, I 
realized I could use my role as a professor at the Universidad San 
Francisco de Quito to be able to approach people more easily and offer 
to them something that I knew could be delivered: scholarships offered 
to indigenous people through the Program of Ethnic Diversity.  Since I 
had already been working for and supporting this program at the 
university, I decided to act as intermediary and to distribute information 
on it in the federation and during each visit I made to the communities. 
Although people were immediately interested in the scholarship 
program, I cannot say that my good intentions were very fruitful, but I at 
least organized a visit of two groups of potential students to the 
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university (this was done through the FESZCH and the Asociación 
Shuar El Pangui). From a total of 23 students who were interested in 
applying, only a few actually took the exam; from that group, only one 
was admitted and is currently an undergraduate student with a full 
scholarship. 
As a final note on commitment to local people, long-term research 
gave positive results and I was able to establish closer relationships with 
some leaders, as explained earlier. While the president of the community 
of San Carlos initially denied my access to it, during the last part of 
fieldwork I managed to have an interesting interview with him. After a 
few months, through the university, I invited him to be part of an 
“Indigenous Planning Workshop” and we are now working together 
with an international organization to develop productive projects in 
certain Shuar communities.  
2.3.5 Final Thoughts on Doing Research in the Communities  
In my original description of the methodology I planned to employ in 
fieldwork, I had expected to spend at least two or three weeks immersed 
in one Shuar community and to be able to understand its dynamics. As it 
turned out, the possibility and the relevance of doing this made me 
rethink my initial intentions. The open reluctance of the president of 
Churuwia to my stay in the community made me consider the 
importance of building rapport and confidence with people rather than 
imposing my presence upon them. After this incident, I decided to visit 
the communities and talk to the leaders as much as I could to slowly 
start building trusting relationships with them. However, during all the 
visits I made to different types of communities (described in my chapter 
about results), I realized that my notion of the “community” and 
“community life” was not necessarily realistic. From a classic 
ethnographic perspective, the community is “everything;” it is the 
appropriate place to conduct fieldwork because it contains the whole 
experience of a group of people. This was not necessarily the case in the 
Shuar communities that are part of my research, and that resulted not 
only a change in the methodology, but it also opened up an area for 
discussion that I had not previously considered in my research proposal. 
Life in the communities was shaped by many different elements. For 
example, in some communities, both men and women worked in the 
mine in two-week shifts, which meant that they were out all day 
74 CHAPTER 2 
 
(including weekends) and they could only be found when they were off 
shift and they could dedicate time to their farms. In other cases, men 
worked elsewhere and sometimes even had to rent plots of land to farm 
because they did not have enough land in the communities. Many 
younger men and women were living in Tundayme or El Pangui and had 
left their communities and only returned on the weekends. Some simply 
migrated further away. Thus, I decided that it would be more productive 
to visit leaders and people on their own time and to deal with such a 
mobile group in different ways according to their own terms. 
In general terms, it is important to acknowledge that being a 
researcher with an anthropological background does not guarantee that 
one will not carry stereotypes and biases to the field and even when 
analyzing the data one has gathered. One such stereotype is the one I 
previously described about the life in the community and that could be 
applied to the whole Shuar political organization. Since the beginning of 
my research, the conflicts and divisions within the FESZCH called my 
attention; I mistakenly tried to find cultural answers for these, while it 
would have been more productive to interpret them as part of the 
political nature of the organization and the subsequent struggles for 
power.  
To conclude, while I personally stand against large-scale mining, I 
decided before going to the field that I would present myself as neutral 
as possible to the people with whom I interacted. This was not a strategy 
to mingle with all kinds of people and to be able to obtain information, 
but rather a decision to respect each person and each group’s position 
regarding Project Mirador. It was also a decision I made during my first 
visit to the field and when I realized that the context in which mining is 
situated is much more complex than I had imagined, and it was hard to 
identify specific groups within the indigenous and mestizo population as 
either pro or anti mining. This decision proved to be positive since it 
also allowed me to better understand the changing discourses and 
positions among the Shuar people from the communities and even the 
federation. It has also allowed me to understand that people make 
choices regarding their livelihoods based on a variety of elements: their 
previous experiences with government institutions or the mining 
company itself, their understandings of what development is, and their 
desire to be part of a modern mestizo society. All these elements 
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permeated a great part of this research and are also be part of the 
discussion throughout the thesis. 
Finally, it is important to mention that, prior to starting fieldwork, I 
was somewhat apprehensive regarding the safety of doing research in a 
large-scale mining context. However, while at times I might have felt 
somewhat uncomfortable, especially when I could sense that certain 
community leaders or mestizo authorities were somewhat distrustful of 
my presence, I never felt unsafe doing research in the communities and 
travelling around the area.13 This probably has to do with the fact that I 
was in the field in the initial stages of the operation of the mining 
company, and Tundayme and its surroundings were relatively calm. 
However, I know the scenario has now changed: now there is greater 
migration from other parts of the country and increased commercial 
activity in Tundayme, including restaurants, hostels, and even brothels. 
During the past two years, these changes have probably altered the 
conditions for doing research. 
On a final note, while it is hard to maintain most of the Shuar leaders 
anonymous since it is common knowledge who is or has been president 
of communities and organizations, I have decided that it would be 
important to not mention their names in this thesis. For this reason, I 
only identify them by their position and the community or organization 
they represented throughout the dissertation. 
2.4 Conclusions  
In this chapter, I have discussed the main theoretical aspects of my 
dissertation as well the methodology I used and important considerations 
regarding doing research in the context of mining. The main theoretical 
discussion in this thesis addresses the way indigeneity and the political 
discourses on identity are constructed in specific contexts and how they 
are used to deal with and make decisions regarding the extraction of 
resources. In this context, political identities are understood as being 
positioned in different ways according to particular political, social, and 
economic contexts, and not necessarily as a result of historical 
continuity. Thus, ethnic identities are contemplated from a non-
essentialist perspective and as part of the way in which different groups 
negotiate and elaborate strategies to achieve certain objectives for their 
group as they simultaneously deal with external situations and actors.  
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In the second part of this chapter, I have discussed the methods 
utilized in this research and described how research was carried out. This 
included the multi-site approach, which was very important when trying 
to make sense of the role of different actors in the complex scenario 
around large-scale mining. The section on methods also included a 
description of the evolution of the research in terms of level of rapport I 
developed, especially with the Shuar leaders. I also discussed some issues 
of ethics and positionality related to these interactions. In this sense, one 
of my conclusions is that doing field research always brings up issues and 
perspectives that one was not expecting; thus, it becomes a both a 
professional and personal learning experience. The next chapter 
discusses large-scale mining in the specific context of resource 
nationalism, which was a key strategy in the government of Rafael 
Correa. It describes the political processes through which mining came 
to have an important role in the government’s economic and political 
agenda as well as in social programs and local development. In a second 
section, this chapter describes Project Mirador and concludes with a 
discussion on social mobilization and conflicts. The objective of this 
chapter is to describe the wider discussion about large-scale mining while 
simultaneously considering how the local population has responded to 
Project Mirador; this chapter sets the groundwork for a discussion about 
the Shuar’s discourses and practices in the following chapters. 
Notes
                                                
1 Melina Selverston-Scher (2001: 21) argues that critics of the approach that 
places emphasis on the strategic aspect of ethnic identity in social movements 
and not on its emotive nature overlook that the success of political movements, 
including ethnic movements, is actually measured in terms of the material 
benefits they can provide for its members.  
2 In this case, mestizaje refers to an ideology that looks to homogenize society in 
terms of a European, mestizo/white cultural background. 
3 See Radcliffe (2010) for an interesting discussion on neoliberalism and the rise 
of multiculturalism ideologies and projects amongst the indigenous population. 
4 For analysis that focus more on the discourse of the organizations itself see 
Varese, (1996) and Conklin and Graham (1995); for a critical view of the real 
power of political participation of indigenous groups see Hale (2004); for identity 
politics and human rights and self-determination see Niezen (2003).  
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5 See Grueso et al. (1998) for an interesting analysis of a process of organization 
within Afro populations on the Pacific Coast based on similar identity claims as 
indigenous groups in Ecuador: cultural differences and the right to territory. The 
authors use Hall’s concept of positionality, arguing that there is a double 
articulation of identity, one in terms of tradition and another in terms of present 
political organization. 
6 See Bolaños (2011: 45-72) for a similar discussion on the construction of 
indigenous identities in the Brazilian Amazonia; the focus of her study is on the 
use of historical and socio-political discourses to gain legitimacy as an indigenous 
group and to make claims to their territory in order to avoid relocation. She also 
studies the use of discourses to question that same legitimacy.  
7 Other authors like De la Cadena have argued for different definitions of 
indigeneity; as discussed in the introduction she sees indigeneity not as an 
adapted and negotiated political discourse, but rather as the capacity of the 
indigenous population to disrupt political formations and structures (2010: 336). 
8 Warnaars (2013a,b) and other authors (Brighenti 2010; Sack 1986) use this 
concept as the “act of territory”, the process through which a social group 
establishes and maintains a human territory. 
9 Original text in Portuguese. “…os saberes ambientais, ideologias e identidades − 
coletivamente criados e historicamente situados − que um grupo social utiliza 
para estabelecer e manter seu território”. (Little 2002: 4) 
10 Examples of studies focusing on the indigenous national organization are 
Andolina 2003; Becker 2011; Jameson 2011; Korovkin 2002; Sawyer 1997; 
Varese 1996; Pick 2010; Selverston-Scher 2001; Zamosc 2004. 
11 The vice-president assured me that the only way he could give an official 
interview would be if he got a specific authorization from the president of ECSA. 
I wrote a letter to the president and delivered it personally to the offices of ECSA 
in Quito but never got an answer.   
12 Even though indigenous people are friendly to mestizos and vice-versa, there 
are always mixed and ambivalent feelings in these interactions. The Shuar people 
from the communities and even the federations have some resentment towards 
mestizo society in general: the people from the communities resent mestizos 
because their land was taken away by them. Similarly, the leaders in the 
federations resent mestizos because they feel the Shuar people have been 
historically neglected by the mestizo state. 
13 As I mentioned before, one of my informants was murdered during the time of 
my research so I decided to postpone the next trip to the field. However, when I 
arrived to Tundayme a month later, the atmosphere in the town was calm and 
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most people did not seem to connect his death to the mining industry. More on 
this on Chapter 5. 
  
 
 
3 
The Political, Economic and Social 
Implications of Large-Scale Mining in 
Ecuador  
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I laid out the theoretical and methodological 
framework of this thesis. I discussed the relevance of using the approach 
of ethno-politics in analyzing the ways in which indigenous groups deal 
with issues of cultural rights, territory, livelihoods, and the control of 
natural resources (specifically in regard to their extraction). This 
chapter’s intention is to offer a more complex view of Project Mirador as 
part of the development of the government’s political and economic 
program that reinforces the role of mineral extraction as a means to 
alleviate poverty and re-distribute resources. Part of this complex 
scenario also involves the local conflicts and mobilization that usually 
take place in large-scale mining contexts and the response of the 
government to resistance from the local population and activists. 
In this chapter, I will show how resource extraction, especially 
mining, has acquired political significance in a government that has 
strongly distanced itself from previous neo-liberal practices. I start out 
with a discussion about the shift from neo-liberal to progressive 
governments. The so-called “New Left” emphasizes a stronger presence 
of the state in extractive operations as well as in the investment in social 
programs. This shift has facilitated the intensification of large-scale 
mining through the approval of a new law regulating large-scale mining 
practices and has been associated with the government’s growing 
intolerance of social protest and resistance. In the second part of this 
chapter, I describe the development of Project Mirador and I then 
discuss the sources of conflict and the mobilizations related to the 
project. 
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3.2 The Extractive Industry in Ecuador: The Transition 
from Neo-Liberal to Post-Neoliberal Regimes  
The economic and political history of Ecuador has been tied up in the 
extraction and exportation of natural resources since its colonial era. 
Once an independent country, it has gone from producing or extracting 
one product or resource to another, from rubber to bananas, flowers, 
and, of course, to oil (Acosta 2009). While much faith has been placed 
on all of these products to save the country’s economy, oil has definitely 
been the most treasured resource because it indeed opened up a door to 
modernization and progress in the 1970s. Unfortunately, those 
expectations of development and well-being only lasted until oil prices in 
the world market dropped, and the revenues from oil exportation were 
redirected to repaying Ecuador’s oil debt (Acosta 2009; Davidov 2013: 
490). The decline of the oil boom coincided with Ecuador’s slow 
transition into a neo-liberal regime in the 1980s, which started with a 
currency devaluation pressured by the International Monetary Fund 
(Arsel 2012: 153-154; Sawyer 2004: 12-13) and eventually led to the 
privatization of state-owned companies, budget cuts, and the creation of 
mechanisms to attract foreign investment to develop the oil industry in 
the Amazonian region. 
In her book on the oil industry and indigenous organizations in the 
Ecuadorean Amazon, Sawyer defines neo-liberalism as “a cluster of 
government policies that aim to privatize, liberalize and deregulate the 
national economy so as to encourage foreign investment and intensify 
export production;” in other words, it is a political ideology that allows 
the market to take over society (Sawyer 2004: 7). This means that 
governments in Latin America reduced their capacity to control and 
regulate the economy while they simultaneously encouraged the 
privatization of the public sector and reduced their role in providing 
mechanisms of social welfare (Acosta 2009: 45-49; Arsel 2012: 152; 
Gudynas 2012: 31). These policies came from the belief that “markets 
are the most efficient and effective means to allocate resources and guide 
economic transactions, and that they self-regulate” (Arsel 2012: 152). 
Furthermore, in the context of neo-liberal policies, the discussion about 
development lost relevance since it was assumed that the market would 
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eventually generate development itself, thus leaving the government out 
of the discussion on development (Gudynas 2012: 31). 
 Specifically in Ecuador, the end of last century and the beginning of 
this century were marked by political turmoil and social unrest due to 
one of the worst economic crises the country has ever experienced. After 
years of budget cuts, extremely low social spending, the privatization of 
oil companies, and the accrument of a huge national debt, the country 
finally went through a process of dollarization. As Arsel argues, “neo-
liberalization delivered largely negative results, especially for Ecuador’s 
poor and indigenous people” (Arsel 2012: 154). These political and 
economic situations served as the foundation for Rafael Correa’s 
progressive, leftist, post-neoliberal government when he was elected 
president in 2007. 
Several authors have analyzed, from different perspectives, the shift 
from neo-liberal to post-neoliberal regimes in the region of Latin 
America (with emphasis on certain countries) and the implications of 
these changes for extractive practices and the protection of natural 
resources (Arsel 2012; Bebbington and Humphreys 2011; Davidov 2013; 
Escobar 2010; Gudynas 2012; Hogenboom 2012). In general, all of these 
authors appreciate the efforts of some governments (Ecuador, 
Venezuela, and Bolivia) to turn away from a neoliberal ideology, giving 
the state a more central role in controlling the economy. Nevertheless, it 
has become quite clear that the decision to expand the extractive 
industry in these countries contradicts other policies and even the newly 
approved constitutions (in the case of Bolivia and Ecuador), which tend 
to more progressive in terms of intercultural participation, respect for 
nature, and even new conceptions of development and of well-being.  
In their discussion of certain specific issues, these authors agree that 
there are some characteristics common to post-neoliberal regimes 
(especially those of Ecuador and Bolivia). As was previously mentioned, 
the most obvious common characteristics is that of an increase in the 
state control over the economy and the extractive industry itself, which is 
intended to use mineral extraction as the chief pillar of a macroeconomic 
strategy that would allow the government to increase and maintain social 
expenditure (Bebbington and Humphreys 2011: 140). In Ecuador, for 
example, a very important shift in the new constitution was the increased 
state control over the mining sector that had been abandoned and left 
unregulated for years (Davidov 2013; Hogenboom 2012). What initially 
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appeared to be an effort to exert general control over the extractive 
industry, though, eventually resulted in the creation of a law to regulate 
illegal mining operations. This change also opened the door to large-scale 
mining. “The period since late 2008 has seen both new legislation that is 
much more favorable to the large-scale mining sector and a progressive 
hardening of Correa’s positions on the rights of citizens to protest 
against extractive industry” (Bebbington and Humphreys 2011: 136). 
Ecuador and Bolivia are two interesting examples of post-neoliberal 
or leftist governments that have actively attacked earlier neo-liberal 
projects and even re-written the constitutions of their countries to 
include new notions of development and well-being that incorporate 
some elements of the value systems of indigenous population as well as a 
different vision of nature and natural resources (Bretón 2013; Escobar 
2010; Pellegrini and Ribera Arismendi 2012; Walsh 2010a). Clear 
examples of the innovations in Ecuador’s constitution include the notion 
of sumak kawsay or buen vivir, an indigenous view of well-being that is 
based on a harmonious relationship with nature, and the incorporation 
of an article that grants rights to nature itself. 
However, this early concern and appreciation for cultural diversity 
and respect for nature has been overshadowed by an active interest in 
developing the extractive industry (Acosta 2012; Gudynas 2012). As 
Arsel and Avila Angel discuss in their paper on the Yasuní-ITT initiative 
(2011), there is a growing tension and contradiction between the “means 
and aims of development policy in Ecuador” (Arsel and Avila Angel 
2011: 9), which is strongly based on an extractivist model. To accomplish 
the first main goal of making sure that all groups in society “enjoy their 
rights,” the second goal, respect for nature, would have to be sacrificed 
or at least minimized for the time being. At the same time, since the 
extractive development model is conceived of in terms of a 
macroeconomic strategy (Bebbington and Humphreys 2011), it is most 
likely that local communities suffering direct impact from the extractive 
industry will not necessarily consider themselves to be “enjoying their 
rights,” but rather quite the opposite.  
Contrary to a constitution that appeared to include an alternative to 
the classic model of development, the insistence on extractivism fits 
within that same classic view of development of the 1960s. This model 
views the well-being of society in terms of material richness and 
economic growth. According to Arsel (2012), for this reason, there is an 
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important emphasis on providing basic social services to the people and 
also on the development of infrastructure that are symbols of progress 
and modern development: construction of roads, bridges, hospitals, 
schools, etc. This is also the reason why extractive industries have been 
developed, such that they may increase revenues from exports that in 
turn can be used to facilitate much-needed economic growth. According 
to Gudynas, this is a progressive neo-extractive process that distances 
itself from the strategies of earlier, more conservative governments but 
that still “repeats that massive appropriation of Nature, the enclave 
economies and a subordinate global insertion”1 (Gudynas 2012: 35-36). 
As Arsel (2012) and other authors (Bebbington and Humphreys 2011; 
Davidov 2013; Hogenboom 2012; Lu et al. 2017) have also stated, this 
type of extractive strategy under progressive governments justifies 
mineral or oil exploitation by defining them as necessary to sustaining 
different social programs and plans that are directed at helping the most 
impoverished social groups (Gudynas 2012: 36). Unfortunately, the issue 
of social justice is still not resolved precisely because those strategies for 
redistribution do not change the economic structures in society and 
remain as a form of charity (Gudynas 2012: 37). 
The emphasis on classic notions of development as described above 
and the need to improve material conditions and address issues of 
poverty is part of what Arsel et al. (2016) have called the “extractive 
imperative.” This concept is marked by “an ideological commitment to 
further extraction as a necessary and unavoidable step towards higher 
levels of development…” as part of a “stages of growth” model of 
development (Arsel et al. 2016: 884). In this model, earnings coming 
from extraction should be invested in infrastructure as well as in 
“physical, social and human capital” to help the productive sector grow. 
Furthermore, this emphasis on development and economic growth is 
directly tied to the idea that poverty reduction should be achieved in a 
short time period by a government that plays a central role in regulating 
the national economy. Thus, this line of thought concludes that, in order 
to significantly reduce poverty, extraction of resources is key; the 
government has framed the extraction of natural resources as an 
imperative to develop the country and satisfy the material needs of a 
great portion of the population.  
 
 
84 CHAPTER 3 
 
 
3.2.1  The Politics of Minerals 
In line with the logic of the extractive imperative, extraction of resources 
and the development of a large-scale mining industry are key objectives 
in the government agenda and they have even acquired a symbolic and 
political importance. Hogenboom (2012) does an interesting analysis on 
the political use of minerals in neo-liberal and post-neoliberal regimes. 
Looking back to earlier governments in Latin America, minerals were a 
symbol of national identity, sovereignty, and independent political 
development and were, unsurprisingly, highly politicized. Minerals were 
indeed key in the development of many countries (Hogenboom 2012: 
136-137) and, as in Ecuador’s case with oil exploitation, they were 
perceived to be the door to modernization and progress. On the other 
hand, under neo-liberal type governments, resource extraction was 
considered to be part of the process of privatization and lost its 
“strategic” status, becoming just another sector in many countries’ 
economies. Governments in this period gave up the control and 
regulation of the extractive industry, favoring instead its privatization and 
liberalization (2012: 136). Thus, minerals lost their political meaning in 
the context of market regulation and with the absence of the 
government in the extractive industry. 
As has been the case in other countries in Latin America, Ecuador 
and Bolivia have revived policies of re-taxation, re-regulation, and even 
re-nationalization of resources that are intended to increase national 
budgets in order to expand social programs (Hogenboom 2012: 144). In 
this case, nationalization does not necessarily mean a “complete takeover 
of private enterprises by the state” (Arsel and Avila 2011: 9), but rather 
refers to a process in which the state increases its role in the operation 
and negotiation of contracts in order to increase revenues from the 
extractive industry that should be destined for social and redistribution 
programs. According to Hogenboom, it is through these processes that 
minerals have become re-politicized, because they are part of a new 
agenda of social welfare and redistribution (Arsel and Avila 2011; 
Hogenboom 2012).  As in earlier decades, Correa, Morales, and other 
Latin American leaders have sought to expand state control and are 
capitalizing on issues of sovereignty to assert control over resources and 
to develop the state’s capacity to assure the country’s welfare. 
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Moreover, beyond practical issues of redistribution, governments use 
these discourses to shape their agendas and political objectives in the 
perception of the people. Davidov’s understandings of eco-politics in 
Ecuador points out a dichotomy between oil and mineral extraction that, 
in reality, is merely part of a discourse. Just as Correa’s regime (2007-
2017) positioned itself since the beginning as the “opposite face” of neo-
liberalism, it has also positioned certain practices, like mineral extraction 
–which could easily fit within a neo-liberal agenda— as part of a more 
“newly progressive” populist state (Davidov 2013: 491). To a certain 
extent, oil had become a symbol of old neo-liberal practices and seemed 
to entail a total disregard for environmental protection as well as “selling 
out” the country to oil multinationals. Mineral extraction, on the other 
hand, became part of a nationalist discourse and a state-building project 
that is more concerned about the peoples’ welfare. Thus, mineral 
extraction became the symbol of a new form of extractivism in which 
the ends (redistribution of wealth) justify the means (exploitation of 
natural resources) (Arsel and Avila 2011; Davidov 2013). The transition 
of Bolivia’s national identity from a mining country (“país minero”) to a   
petro-state provides another poignant example of the use of discourse 
and symbols in economic transitions. Under a nationalist, state-led model 
of development, Morales has aligned the country’s political and 
economic “aspirations” with its potential to produce and export 
hydrocarbons, especially gas. In this case, the political discourse about 
gas extraction revolves around nationalist visions of sovereignty which 
reference the “Héroes del Chaco” and the long-standing struggles against 
white elites and neoliberal policies (Perreault and Valdivia 2010). 
3.2.2  Large-Scale Mining: Issues of Sovereignty and Local 
Participation  
Mining has historically posed a number of threats to the environment, 
the landscape, and the communities living around mining projects’ areas 
of influence. The analysis of the impact of mining on landscapes focuses 
on modifications caused by mining activities (such as open pits, waste 
piles, built structure, and geomorphological features) (Bridge 2004a: 
209), while the pollution analysis focuses mainly on the mineral 
processing flow and “seeks to quantify releases to the environment from 
each of the controlled chemical interactions that occur during mineral 
processing” (Bridge 2004a: 210). In this analysis, an important 
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characteristic of metal mining is that it is a segregative process in which a 
very small amount of a desired type of mineral is isolated from a larger 
mass of material that is not as valuable through a series of steps in which 
a separate waste stream is produced. For example, in the case of copper, 
over 90% of the material mined for its production is actually rejected as 
waste (Bridge 2004a: 210-211). Waste disposal thus poses a serious 
problem to the mining industry; tailing ponds, for example, are 
considered to be a main source of contamination from this industry. 
Additionally, chemical pollution can occur through the release of 
chemicals utilized in the process of extracting the ore from the 
environment and from the “oxidation of naturally occurring minerals in 
the ore as a result of exposure to the air” (Bridge 2004a: 213). 
 Increasingly, communities around the world have been affected by 
large and small-scale mining projects that result in landscape changes, 
chemical pollution, and other socio-environmental impacts that have to 
do with land rights, access to resources, and other issues. For these 
reasons, large-scale industrial mining has become the target of resistance 
and criticism from local communities as well as environmental and 
conservation organizations, especially over the last several decades. As a 
response to this resistance, mining companies have developed different 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) strategies in order to be able to 
continue with their operations under more rigorous environmental 
control and to contribute to the development of social programs for 
local communities (Jenkins 2004; Kapelus 2002). 
Despite growing environmental concern around the world, resistance 
from local communities, and a growing awareness of indigenous rights, 
there has been a pattern of mining expansion throughout the global 
south, particularly concentrated in a few countries that had not 
previously been investment targets in the past (Bridge 2004b: 411). In his 
study on mining investment around the world, Gavin Bridge concludes 
that, even though traditional targets for mining investment such as 
North America and Australasia have maintained their absolute 
investment flows, in relative terms, they experienced a decline during the 
1990s. Furthermore, “South America increased its share of worldwide 
investment from 18 per cent to 39 per cent between 1990 and 2001,” 
while Africa increased its share from 12 per cent to 28  per cent (Bridge 
2004b: 411). More specifically, between 1990 and 2001 in South 
America, there were 12 mining investments located in just three 
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countries: two in Peru, nine in Chile, and one in Argentina (Urkidi 2010: 
384). On average, Chile only received 30 per cent of the world’s 
investment between 1990-2001 (Bridge 2004: 414). 
Bridge argues that this pattern of worldwide investment is primarily 
related to geological conditions and is determined by the location of ore 
reserves; however, these elements alone are not the only important 
factors for investment projects in new places. He argues that even 
though geographies of mining investment are structured by geology, they 
are also socially mediated (Bridge 2004b). Favorable political and 
economic policies and conditions can be very much responsible for this 
industry’s expansion and investment, while political turmoil and 
economic instability can actually prevent investment in mining in certain 
areas. In fact, much of the growth of mining investments during the 
1990s might actually be a response to national economic liberalization 
policies. For example, during this decade, certain South American 
countries like Peru and Chile positioned themselves as more attractive 
countries for investments “by improving their risk/reward ratio relative 
to other jurisdictions” (Bridge 2004b: 416). 
As part of the nationalist agenda discussed earlier, Correa announced 
the creation of a Mandato Minero in 2008 (Mining Mandate), intended to 
put an end to illegal and badly-managed mining operations in Ecuador, 
thereby asserting the state’s sovereignty over the mining sector (Moore 
and Velásquez 2012: 115).  At the same time, he assured that he would 
seek out a responsible way to facilitate mining in every sense of the word 
(economically, environmentally, and socially). In that same year, he also 
called for a dialogue about mining extraction with different communities, 
local craft-industry miners, and representatives from the industrial 
mining companies in order develop a new mining law (Diálogo Minero). 
Contrary to initial expectations, however, the results of this dialogue 
were somewhat negative for local communities and for social and 
environmental organizations: it actually eliminated any possibilities for 
debate and made it clear that the government was determined to support 
industrial mining (Cisneros 2016: 164-165; Moore and Velásquez 2012: 
122). In the end, the dialogue process was really just an excuse for the 
government to identify and neutralize certain “radical” organizations and 
movements who were “opposed to a national project” (Cisneros 2009: 
18). Furthermore, in the second part of this dialogue, the government 
asserted its position of exploiting mineral resources as a means of 
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investing in education, health programs, road construction, and so forth; 
a new regulatory mining legislation was approved in 2009. Just as Bridge 
argues in his article (Bridge 2004b), beyond the availability of minerals in 
Ecuador’s territory, it was the political decision of the government in 
conjunction with the design and implementation of certain policies (in 
this case, not necessarily neo-liberal policies) that laid the groundwork 
for possible increases in mining investment in the country.  
Several authors point out the exclusion of local communities and 
organizations in decision-making processes (Bebbington and Humphreys 
2011; Cisneros 2009; Hogenboom 2012), as happened in the discussion 
around the New Mining Law in Ecuador. While mining extraction has 
been justified in terms of its social objectives, not all social sectors agree 
with this economic strategy. In fact, local resistance to mineral extraction 
has grown; nevertheless, the same progressive leftist regimes, concerned 
about the welfare of the people, have actually reacted in various 
intolerant ways to that resistance. Contrary to what would be expected of 
progressive governments, local and community participation has not 
been considered before making decisions or passing laws. Correa and 
Morales have found ways to control, co-opt, or weaken organized civil 
society (Bebbington and Humphreys 2011; Hogenboom 2012).  
In Bolivia, indigenous organizations complained that they had not 
been previously consulted before mineral extraction began in their 
territory (Bebbington 2012: 11) and that they could not demand or 
suggest substantial changes because the project’s design (in this case, for 
gas extraction) was already finished when the consultation process was 
just beginning (Flemmer and Schilling Vacaflor 2016: 182). As Pellegrini 
and Ribera Arismendi argue, instead of responding to legitimate 
concerns of local populations, consultation and compensation policies 
are actually “biased in favour of a project that a priori cannot be 
questioned and has resulted in the weakening of local indigenous 
institution” (Pellegrini and Ribera Arismendi 2012: 115). In the case of 
Ecuador, Correa not only excluded an important environmental 
organization like Acción Ecológica (local environmental organization) from 
the discussion about the mining law, but he even went so far as to order 
it to be shut down (Bebbington 2012). Thus, after the New Mining Law 
was passed, several indigenous organizations showed their opposition by 
arguing that discussions prior to its writing failed to include the views of 
the local indigenous population. On January 20, 2009, a national anti-
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mining strike organized by two indigenous organizations, CONAIE and 
the Confederation of Kichwa Peoples of Ecuador (ECUARUNARI—
Confederación de Pueblos de la Nacionalidad Kichwa del Ecuador), took place in 
eight Andean provinces. A small protest march was also organized in 
Quito by CONAIE and some ecological organizations.  Additionally, in 
several southern provinces including Zamora and Azuay, local 
indigenous organizations built roadblocks (Ortiz 2011: 11). 
With regards to this context of tension between the government and 
civil society, Hogenboom (2012) argues that, even though the issue of 
sovereignty over resources gives the government the capacity to assure 
the country’s welfare, local resistance has emerged as a reaction to their 
own view of sovereignty. To begin, the civil society and organizations 
felt that their expectations related to participating in issues related to 
extractive projects that have a direct impact on their territory were not 
met. Furthermore, there are contrasting views of sovereignty between 
the government and local communities. Moore and Velásquez (2012) 
argue that the activists’ sense of sovereignty is more focused on local 
communities and peoples and who should have the right to make 
decisions of how water, land, and forests are utilized, especially those 
found within their boundaries and territory. On the other hand, the 
government’s position on sovereignty rests on the notion of a national 
government’s domain over natural resources that are strategic in terms of 
financing national social projects, thereby justifying the government’s 
control over them and their right to determine the use of those resources 
(Moore and Velásquez 2012: 114). 
In Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru, protests and clashes between 
government and local communities and organizations have been violent 
to different degrees. According to Bebbington, though, the difference 
between Peru, Ecuador, and Bolivia, is that, after times of crisis, the 
Peruvian government allowed negotiation to take place between the 
company and the local population. However, governments in Ecuador 
and Bolivia have a more direct participation in and control of the 
extractive process and companies; as such, these governments usually 
assume the responsibility of mediating conflicts and organizing 
consultation processes (Bebbington 2012). In Ecuador, for example, 
after the government signed the contract for Project Mirador in Zamora 
Chinchipe to secure a percentage of utilities and taxes from the 
company, the relationship between the latter and the local communities 
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changed. One important government institution, Ecuador Estratégico, is 
now in charge of channeling revenues coming from mining extraction 
and other strategic projects to local communities and municipalities. 
Thus, according to this new scheme of resource extraction, the state has 
increased its presence and control not only over the company’s utilities 
and profits, which are to be directed to the areas directly influenced by 
mining activities.  
I began this section by discussing the politics of extractivism in Latin 
America, as well as the implications of this industry on issues of 
sovereignty and local participation and resistance. I will now explain the 
economic and political background of the development of large-scale 
mining in Ecuador as well as the characteristics of the first project to 
reach the phase of exploitation, Project Mirador. 
3.3  The Development of Large-Scale Mining in Ecuador  
Starting in the 1990s, governments throughout Latin America 
encouraged foreign investment in the mining sector through a series of 
reforms that included the reduction of taxes and a new system in which 
royalties were paid to the state (Cisneros 2009). For example, in Ecuador 
in 1991, the government passed Mining Law 126 and later a series of 
reforms that opened the mining sector to foreign investment. 
Furthermore, between 1995-2000, the World Bank supported the 
creation of the Mining Development and Environmental Control Project 
(PRODEMINCA—Proyecto de Desarrollo Minero y Control Ambiental), which 
sought to modernize the mining industry, improve environmental 
management, and further investigate natural resources in Ecuador 
(Sacher and Acosta 2012: 14; Warnaars 2013: 165). However, until the 
latter years of the early 2000s under the government of Rafael Correa, 
the mining sector in Ecuador had not really been developed in a way that 
it would have an important impact on the economic growth of the 
country (Cisneros 2009). 
In spite of the clear intentions to strengthen the industry during the 
last twenty years, the real contribution of mineral extraction to the 
country´s GDP had been quite marginal. A report from the Ministerio de 
Energía y Minas (Ministry of Energy and Mine) (Ministerio de Energía y 
Minas 2007) shows that mining products represented 0.35 per cent of 
the GDP of 2002, while in 2007 it was estimated to be as low as 0.25 per 
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cent of the GDP. Regardless of this historical trend, Cisneros (2009) 
argues that metal mining in Ecuador is interesting because of its 
potential. According to data obtained from mining concessionaires, 
mining potential equals approximately 70 per cent of the current oil 
reserves, which amount to 1,436 million dollars (at the prices in 2007). 
Most of this potential profit lies in possible copper extraction (Ministerio 
de Energía y Minas 2007) that could be completed in the provinces of 
Morona Santiago and Zamora Chinchipe. 
As of 2007, there was still no large-scale mining exploitation. Thanks 
to the new mining laws and reforms that had been passed in the 1990s, 
in 2000, the number of mining concessions approved by the state 
increased dramatically. According to the Ministerio de Energía y Minas, by 
2007 a total of 4,112 concessions had been granted by the state; 
however, only 17 per cent of the companies involved in these 
concessions had declared their intent to initiate any mining activities 
(Cisneros 2009: 6; Ministerio de Energía y Minas 2007), given that they 
were not obligated by the state to present any plans for exploration or 
exploitation (Acosta 2009). Additionally, most mining concessions were 
controlled by only a few companies, which made it possible for them to 
make huge gains. Furthermore, even though most companies had not 
reached the phase of exploration, the studies of social and environmental 
impacts presented by these companies were very poor in terms of the 
quality of assessment they had carried out and showed that they had 
already created situations of conflict within local communities, 
disregarding proper consultation processes and creating division among 
community members (Acosta 2009: 90-97).   
Rafael Correa’s government’s mining mandate (Mandato Minero) was 
passed in 2008 precisely to deal with all the issues related to illegality and 
the indiscriminate number of mining concessions; it revoked those 
concessions that had not made any investments or were located in 
protected areas (Riofrancos 2017) and created a national mining 
company that would regulate the mining activity in the country, the 
National Mining Company of Ecuador (ENAMI—Empresa Nacional 
Minera del Ecuador) (Riofrancos 2017; Sacher and Acosta 2012: 18). 
Following the Mandato Minero in 2008, the New Mining Law was 
approved only a year later with a clear intention to facilitate large-scale 
mining in Ecuador. The law strengthens the role of the state as a 
regulating entity in the mining sector, not only through the national 
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mining company, but also in terms of the financial obligations of the 
investment companies. The law contemplates the following sources for 
state income: tax on windfall profits (70 per cent); royalties (at least 5 per 
cent); value-added tax (12 per cent); tax on capital gains (25 per cent), 
and 12 per cent of profits (Art. 67: 93). In addition to this, a percentage 
of the revenues have to be channeled to the local communities in the 
area directly impacted by mining projects (12 per cent of profits and 60 
per cent of royalties, Art. 93) (Reglamento General de la Ley de Minería 
2009; Riofrancos 2017: 59). 
By 2012, the government had identified five “strategic” large-scale 
mining projects: Project Mirador and Fruta del Norte in Zamora 
Chinchipe, Panantza-San Carlos in Morona Santiago and Río Blanco, 
and Quimsacocha in Azuay (Sacher and Acosta 2012: 67). Of all these, 
only Project Mirador has moved on to the phases of exploitation after 
signing the contract with the government in 2012. Large-scale mining is 
defined as the extraction of large quantities of minerals, which requires 
sophisticated technology as well as significant financial investments 
(Ministerio de Energía y Minas 2007: 56). Compared to the 300 tons that 
a small-scale mining operation can produce daily, large-scale mining can 
produce thousands of tons per day. For example, the copper production 
in Project Mirador was expected to produce around 27,000 tons per day 
(Garbay 2011: 48), but, according to a new environmental impact study, 
the actual production may be twice as much as that initial projection 
(Cardno 2014). Although mining production in Ecuador up to now has 
constituted as little as 0.3 per cent of the country’s GDP, the National 
Plan for Mineral Development projects that large-scale mining will 
contribute to around 4 per cent to 5 per cent of Ecuador’s GDP and 
create 10,000 permanent local jobs over the next twenty years (Sacher 
and Acosta 2012). 
3.3.1  Project Mirador: A Threat to Life in Cóndor-Mirador  
As previously discussed, the Ecuadorean government had clear 
intentions of developing large-scale mining in the country since the 
beginning of the 1990s, and the laws and reforms passed in that decade 
attracted foreign investment to different regions of Ecuador. In the area 
of Project Mirador, two companies, Gencor and Billington, were already 
completing exploration and prospecting activities in the 1990s 
(Eguiguren and Jiménez 2011). In 1999, the Canadian company 
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Corriente Resources created a subsidiary in Ecuador under the name of 
Ecuacorriente S.A. (ECSA) in order to carry out exploratory activities 
(Chicaiza 2014: 65). Until 2010, ECSA was the owner of Project 
Mirador, but, as a young company, it did not have the technical or 
financial capability to actually exploit the mine. Thus, in August 2010, a 
consortium of two huge public Chinese companies, China Tongling 
Nonferrous Metals Group Holdings Co., Ltd., and China Railway 
Construction Corporation Limited, CRCC-Tongguan Investment Co., 
Ltd., bought Corriente Resources and subsequetly became the owner of 
Project Mirador (Chicaiza 2014). 
Project Mirador was designed to be an open-pit copper mine located 
in an area that covers about 350,000 hectares of a highly diverse 
ecosystem within the Alta Amazonía (Ortiz 2011). According to a report 
presented by the Regional Foundation for the Advisory on Human 
Rights (INREDH—Fundación Regional de Asesoría en Derechos Humanos), 
the removal of land material so that minerals can be accessed within 
deeper layers will result in a crater that is 250 meters deep and with a 
diameter of 1.2 kilometers (2013). This crater will be located in a 
mountain south of the Wawayme River and it will cover 223 hectares, 
including some protected areas (Cardno 2014). Since not all rock 
contains high amounts of copper, most of the mined material would 
have to be disposed of (INREDH 2013, no page). Thus, especially in the 
exploitation phase, large swaths of land are needed to create landfills or 
slagheaps to deposit material with no important mineral content and 
waste material (tailings).   
Project Mirador sits on a copper deposit in the Cordillera del Cóndor 
in the province of Zamora Chinchipe, an area of six concessions 
covering 9,928 hectares (Chicaiza 2014: 81); this includes two 
concessions located in El Pangui that cover 2,985 hectares, plus 
additional areas for protection and related activities (as specified in the 
contract) that cover 6,310 hectares.  According to Riofrancos, the size of 
additional areas of protection exceeds the legal limit of 5,000 hectares 
established by the law (Riofrancos 2017). Although the Ministry of the 
Environment of Ecuador (MAE—Ministerio del Ambiente del Ecuador) had 
already approved all the environmental licenses necessary to initiate the 
phases of exploitation to process 25,000 tpd of rock material (following 
the completion of the environmental impact study by the company 
Walsh in 2006), ECSA decided to increase the amount of processing to 
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60,000 tpd; this meant that the company had to present an update of the 
environmental impact study, which was completed by the consultant 
company Entrix Inc. in 2014 (Cardno 2014: 2-1). 
Map 3.1 
Project Mirador and the area of direct impact 
 
Source: Ecuacorriente, Environmental Impact Study 2010 
 
As in the case of other open-pit mines, the project includes the crater, 
the mining campgrounds, landfills and tailing pools, water treatment 
facility, tunnels, internal roads, and its own network of electricity and 
communications (Leifsen and Benham 2017). The processing facility will 
have the capacity to process up to 20 million tons of material per year 
(Cardno 2014: 4-2; Leifsen and Benham 2017: 222-223). Of this material, 
98% will be discarded as mud and toxic material in two different 
landfills; the first (Relavera Quimi), located in what used to be the town 
of San Marcos, covers an area of 170 hectares and will only be enough to 
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hold material for the first four years of exploitation (Cardno 2014: 4-4,4-
11; Leifsen and Benham 2017: 222). After that period, the waste material 
will be deposited in the Relavera Tundayme which should have a greater 
capacity (573,000 tons of material) and should occupy an area of 7.3 km2. 
According to the World Bank, this type of rock material disposal 
represents one of the greatest threats of environmental contamination 
because it results in a environmentally-damaging process known as acid 
rock drainage, in which a great deal of the solid and liquid minerals and 
water material slowly filtrate into the subsoil and water sources below 
(Sacher 2011). Additionally, according to William Sacher, other processes 
of contamination that should have been considered in the first 
environmental impact study are: 
…the discharge of black, grey and industrial waters; alterations due to the 
pull of fine solids by the current; mix of superficial and subterranean water 
pumped from the mine […]; oil spills; fall of crushed material, spill of 
chemical material utilized in the processes; filtration of recycled water to 
the treatment plant, […] soil shifting or because of fracture occurred 
during extractive work […], or dust generated by machinery transit. 
(Sacher 2011: 21)2 
 Furthermore, the project requires large amounts of water to process 
the rock material: around 166,540 m3 of water per day; in practical terms, 
this means that around 1,900 liters of water per second will have to be 
taken from rivers and subterranean sources. Additionally, even in the 
construction stages before the exploitation phase, the rivers also suffer 
from contamination. As Leifsen indicates, “the massive land-clearing 
combined with heavy rainfall in the phase of construction have produced 
highly visible turbidity levels on the Quimi, Wawayme and Tundayme 
rivers”3 (Leifsen and Benham 2017: 214). This, of course, has already 
been noticed by the people around the area being mined, who feel that 
they can no longer access the water or the fish because of the 
contamination.  
 While the ecological damage in this kind of open-pit mining is quite 
extensive, a full description and analysis of the environmental 
consequences are beyond the scope of this research. Thus, I now turn to 
a discussion on the effects of mining on the population around the 
project and the possible socio-environmental conflicts that might arise as 
a consequence of such projects. Map 3.1 identifies those local 
communities and locations that will be most affected by the mining 
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activity, which have been identified by ECSA as being located within the 
area of direct impact. This discussion will serve as an introduction to the 
complex, diverse reactions, positions, and expectations of local 
communities towards the mining project. 
3.3.2  Beyond Environmental Impacts: The Environmental Justice 
Perspective in Project Mirador 
Besides the environmental impacts associated with this type of mining, 
the people in the area of Tundayme and El Pangui have already begun to 
suffer because of the presence of the mining company and the mine 
itself. Large-scale mining and other extractive activities create conflicts 
among the local population that may be related to issues other than harm 
to the natural environment. The presence of large-scale mining and 
mining companies creates complex conflicts related to access and rights 
to land as well as to the royalties generated by extractive activities; it can 
cause new divisions within the local community. In this section, I will 
first address the environmental justice perspective on socio-
environmental situations and conflicts. Then, I will briefly discuss the 
mobilization of groups in the context of Mirador that will offer a sense 
of the complexity of the reactions and positions towards the project. 
Following this discussion, I will more specifically address the relationship 
between the mining company, the state (through certain institutions and 
policies), and the Shuar population, considering the changes in this 
relationship and certain tensions that might have arisen over time. This 
will provide a context for the next chapters of the thesis that discuss the 
ways in which the Shuar Federation and the communities deal with the 
project and investigate their discourses and positions on large-scale 
mining. 
The conditions of the working environments of mines have 
historically been a source of political struggles; in 19th and 20th century 
Europe and the United States, worker safety and occupational health 
were important concerns until the Second World War broke out. On the 
other hand, the boom of small-scale gold mining in Latin America and 
Africa in the 1980s awakened interest not only related to the working 
conditions, but also in the contamination and health effects of mining 
that workers and communities experienced, especially related to their 
exposure to heavy metals (Bridge 2004a). Bridge argues that throughout 
this period, the main focus on the mining industry and its effects was 
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related to the physical impact on workers and communities, “whether it 
be the physical hazards of explosions and rockfalls, the risk of 
contracting black lung disease, or exposure to mercury poisoning” 
(Bridge 2004a: 217). More recently, though, the communities themselves 
and some workers organizations have actually started to pay attention to 
other issues that are relevant not only in terms of direct physical 
exposure, but in terms of other forms of impact: concerns over 
environmental justice and cultural integrity, participation in decision 
making, rights and access over land and water, and other issues. Mining 
is increasingly understood not merely as a technical process, but rather as 
a political process in which negotiation and contestation occur between 
local communities and different actors (Ballard and Banks 2003; Bridge 
2004a: 217-218; Gedicks 1993). 
Struggles over natural resources have drawn attention from a diversity 
of scholars. Anthropologists, geographers, and political scientists have 
concentrated on the impacts of resource extraction on human 
populations as well as the struggles and conflicts over those natural 
resources (Bebbington 2012; Bebbington et al. 2008a, 2008b; Ballard and 
Banks 2003; Banks 2002; Gedicks 1993). Political ecology is precisely the 
discipline through which scholars have studied conflicts related to 
resources and resource extraction from somewhat different perspectives. 
Within this discipline, the perspective of environmental justice is 
predominant, as evidenced by its omnipresence in most literature on 
mining.  
The environmental justice movement was born in the 1980s in the 
United States as a form of political activism concerned with “the 
burdens of pollution and risk associated with waste and industrial sites 
and how these sites were distributed, particularly in relation to race…” 
(Walker 2009: 616). However, in recent years, there has been a 
recognition of other issues that are not only related to equal distribution, 
but which include “matters of fairness in process and regulation, 
inclusion in decision-making and access to environmental information” 
(Walker 2009: 617). As such, in both academia and activism, the 
environmental justice approach has been applied to a variety of often 
excluded and marginalized human groups that face conflicts related to 
environmental contamination and to the use and appropriation of 
natural resources (Martínez-Alier 2001: 167). Thus, the environmental 
justice perspective looks beyond ecological and environmental issues to 
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consider the conflicts over resources in terms of the struggle of 
communities for their livelihoods. Furthermore, in extractive contexts, it 
is assumed that governments and corporations hold more power than 
people in the communities in their struggle over resources (Ali 2003; 
Gedicks 1993; Sawyer 2004). Some authors even argue that extractive 
industries (especially the mining industry) constitute a new form of 
resource colonialism, establishing dynamics in which international 
corporations and even governments work together for their own 
particular objectives and against the interests of local indigenous people 
(Gedicks 1993: 41-43).  
Environmental justice or the environmentalism of the poor analyzes 
conflicts that arise when people are threatened by the loss of natural 
resources that affect their livelihoods. From this perspective, the well-
being of a group does not include only basic subsistence issues, but also 
includes other “idioms” within ecological distribution conflicts; this 
perspective diverges from the dominant “economic discourse” and 
instead focuses on indigenous territorial rights, the defense of cultural 
identity, the protection of old languages and ancestral traditions, the 
ecological and aesthetic value of the landscape and the environment, and 
issues of civil and  human rights (Martínez-Allier 2001: 163; Martínez-
Allier 2002: 150). In other words, this kind of ecological approach tends 
to value nature and its conservation not because of nature’s value per se, 
but as a means of protecting especially poor and vulnerable humans 
from extractive practices that are harmful to nature and thus to human 
populations. The interest in vulnerable groups is a consequence of the 
growing demands and expansions of frontiers for extensive mining, oil 
exploitation, growing of palm oil, etc.; such expansions generally affect 
poor and indigenous groups living in areas that big industry wants to use 
for profit (Martínez-Allier 2002). 
In the post-material views typical of developed countries, issues of 
environment protection are related to the value of non-material things 
and needs (which are already satisfied) like quality of life and the 
environment; in opposition to this view, the environment and the 
resources are considered to be vital and the basis for everyday life 
(Walter 2008: 17). Issues of control over resources and land ownership 
as well as actual differences in what ownership and landscape mean are 
key to the ways in which communities react and deal with mining or 
other extractive activities. Thus, some authors argue that people from 
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the generally affected communities often do not make a real distinction 
between their social, political, and economic lives and the environment. 
Environmental effects are undeniable, but the responses from the 
communities have much to do with their access to resources (material or 
political) and their livelihoods in general (which are also tied to the 
environment) (Banks 2002: 40-42; Gil 2009; Urkidi 2010; Walter 2008). 
Thus, it is better to incorporate the environment into a framework of 
human livelihood.  
An important area of study of structural political ecology and 
environmental justice specifically focuses on the struggles of indigenous 
people regarding extractive activities, specially mining. This has become 
an important area of focus because an important number of mining 
projects are developed in rural areas and, in many countries, such areas 
make up territory that is close to or part of indigenous communities. 
Issues of environmental impact such as water pollution and tailings 
disposal as well as human-centered conflicts related to land rights and 
revenue distribution are important elements of this agenda (Bridge 
2004a: 237-238).  
Much of the literature I reviewed on mining in Latin America is 
particularly concerned with development and subsistence issues 
(including access to and control of resources and benefits). In Peru, 
several authors have analyzed conflicts related to large-scale mining in 
their relation to subsistence issues and the use of resources and land for 
everyday survival. They argue that ecological conflicts are also economic 
in nature and, as such, they are also related to power relations (Banks 
2002; De Echave et al. 2009; Gil 2009). For example, Arellano Yanguas 
(2011) identified several types of conflicts in the regions of 
Tambogrande, Cajamarca, and Antamina. In the first two areas, he 
affirms that conflict arises from communities that are completely 
opposed to mining or hydrocarbon development and which intend to 
block any kind of mining activity; however, while these demands might 
seem environmental in nature, in reality most of them have to do with 
control over their resources and their territory. Similarly, in Esquel, 
Argentina, mobilization was mostly based on the fact that the mining 
company was not open about information on the mining project and its 
effects; tensions also arose because the community was excluded from 
making decisions with adequate information. However, most of the 
complaints about the possibility of water contamination were really 
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related to an unequal distribution of costs and benefits and a sense that 
the local community could not trust the authorities and political actors 
involved in the project (Walter 2008). 
Antamina’s case was slightly different; conflict emerged because local 
communities wanted to increase their negotiation power in order to 
obtain benefits from the mining companies such as employment. 
However, as other authors point out, the situations of conflict in this 
case were triggered because the population felt that their expectations of 
development and progress were not fulfilled by the company (Gil 2009; 
Salas 2008). Thus, in order to appease the population, the company 
adopted paternalistic behavior, concentrating on short-term benefits and 
infrastructure instead of significantly contributing to local development 
(Arellano Yanguas 2011; Salas 2008). As Bebbington et al. (2008a) argue, 
while mining might be considered a contentious activity because of its 
social, economic, and environmental impacts, it is also an ambiguous 
process because people expect mining to contribute much more to their 
livelihoods in terms of development and other benefits, even in spite of 
those adverse effects. When such expectations of development are not 
met, the result is conflict. Thus, what constitutes development and how 
the mining company should contribute to the improvement of life in the 
local communities are important elements in the analysis of conflict. 
Local communities expect the companies to fulfill their promises of 
progress and modernization in different ways. For example, companies 
may support the local communities through job creation and by using 
services and products from the community, or they may make more 
direct contributions through the creation of public infrastructure. 
However, many conflicts arise when these promises are not met 
adequately or in the ways they were expected (Gil 2009; Salas 2008).  
The case of Pascua Lama brings a different perspective to the issue of 
development. Urkidi argues that an interesting outcome of the 
mobilization of the local community against the mining company was 
the construction of new and alternative imaginaries around development; 
these new conceptualizations involved in recovering the local indigenous 
culture, traditional agricultural practices, and a more community-oriented 
life style, which, in reality, was a very different kind of development than 
the one offered by the mining industry. This alternative form of 
development seemed to even motivate the company itself to develop 
strategies for environmental security, protection, and water conservation. 
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(Urkidi 2010). Clearly, these cases demonstrate that the notion of 
development itself is quite complex and differs between communities. 
For example, some communities may wish to receive direct profits and 
material benefits. However, different understandings of well-being that 
go beyond economic growth and incorporate issues like citizen rights, 
identity, territory, control over their livelihoods through resource 
control, etc. may be highly pertinent for other communities (Bebbington 
et al. 2008a: 901).  
Mirador illustrates several of the conflicts and issues above-
mentioned which will be addressed throughout this dissertation. Given 
the complexity of the history and the population of the affected area, 
there has not been one, unified reaction or consistent position towards 
mining from the whole local community. This means that different 
groups have resisted or negotiated with the company at different times, 
but also that conflict may even arise within indigenous or mestizo 
communities because of the different views towards the project. Thus, it 
is important to acknowledge that the local community should not be 
considered one single and consistent actor in this scenario (Ballard and 
Banks 2003). As was described in the introduction, the population in 
Tundayme and El Pangui (the closest administrative parish and 
municipality to the project) is composed of mestizos and the Shuar, 
which is already a significant, although not the only source of conflict. 
Among the Shuar and among mestizo people, there are also different 
perceptions of the mining project that may be related to how close the 
given individual lives to the project, if they had any experiences working 
in the company, their views on the environment, their attachment and 
notion of the territory, and so forth. Furthermore, the ways in which 
some of the Shuar communities in the area of Tundayme and El Pangui 
perceive large-scale mining is also different from the indigenous 
organization to which they belong. 
In Mirador’s case, opposition and resistance to the project itself have 
changed over time. Even though ECSA has been present in the area for 
more than a decade, opposition movements to mining have not been 
consistent or long-lasting; the most vocal organization created, not in 
Tundayme but in the town of El Pangui, was not particularly active 
during the time of this research (from 2013 to the end of 2014). The 
Committee for the Defense of Nature, Health and Life of El Pangui 
(Comité en Defensa de la Naturaleza Salud y Vida de El Pangui) was created in 
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2006 after violent confrontations occurred between communities and 
organizations that supported the mining company, like the FESZCH, 
and those against it (Avci and Fernández-Salvador 2016). Mestizos and 
Shuar people who adamantly resisted mining during this period did so 
for various reasons. According to Warnaars (2013), some resented the 
government for failing to carry out any process of consultation before 
granting concessions in their territory, others were really concerned 
about the environmental impacts, and many others were disappointed by 
unfulfilled promises of economic growth and employment (Warnaars 
2013: 171-172). As Arellano Yanguas argued (2011), in these cases, 
resistance groups were not only concerned about the environmental risks 
or impact, but also about other issues that emerged around them. 
Concerns about the loss of land or the issue of relocation were also 
important enough for people to get involved in strong anti-mining 
groups. As Warnaars describes in the case of Mirador, “Deeper 
grievances surface over the growing sense of uncertainty in relation to 
land ownership. The possibility of relocation or loss of land forces many 
families to live in a constant state of uncertainty” (2013: 172). In fact, 
while groups like the above-mentioned committee became less active 
over time, at the time of my research, another organization called 
CASCOMI was created in Tundayme in December 2013. This 
organization was made up mostly by colonos whose land was bought by 
the mining company and who wanted to demand fair treatment and 
compensation (Avci and Fernández-Salvador 2016). For this rural 
agrarian organization, the issue of land was crucial to their everyday 
survival (see De Echave et al.’s discussion (2009) on the land and the 
symbolic meanings attached to it). However, for the Shuar, the notion of 
territory was more important than the land itself because of its meaning 
in their ancestral heritage. I will discuss the issue of the Shuar territory at 
length in chapter 5. 
Besides direct confrontation or conflicts related to large-scale mining, 
other issues mentioned by Arellano Yanguas (2011) and De Echave et al. 
(2009) included struggles over benefits and the distribution of economic 
resources generate by the mining projects. In Mirador’s case, the 
FESZCH was one of the most important local organizations to negotiate 
with the mining company. In fact, to justify their demands, the 
federation has utilized a discourse based on their rights over the ancestral 
territory where the mine is located and also as a form of compensation 
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for being historically marginalized by Ecuadorean society. However, as 
will be discussed in the next section, while the Canadian administration 
agreed to fund development projects for the Shuar communities, the 
situation changed dramatically with the new company administration and 
the implementation of new government policies. This shift in the 
relationship with the companies created some tension and left the 
Federation and some communities with the expectation that ECSA 
would eventually negotiate with and support them again. Most 
community and federation members are disappointed that the company 
did not fulfill its promises of development (for a discussion on the 
unequal distribution of costs and benefits for the local population and 
the relationship with authorities in Esquel, Argentina, see Walter 2008). 
3.3.3  Alliances, Negotiations, and Tensions Related to Project 
Mirador  
The confrontation described in the previous section between groups 
resisting and supporting large-scale mining resulted in the mining project 
being paralyzed for a year, after which the company resumed its work 
and opened the Department of Community Relations in Tundayme and 
El Pangui. At the time of my early fieldwork, the manager of this office 
acknowledged that one of the weak points of the company was its poor 
relationship with the people from local communities, which created an 
atmosphere of resentment in the area. Thus, even though it seemed risky 
at the time to open offices precisely because of the conflict, it proved to 
be important in order to advise people on what he calls the “bondades” 
(benefits) of the mining project.4 As a result of the Mining Mandate 
(Mandato Minero) and the approval of the New Mining Law (2009) (both 
attempts to regulate the mining activity), there was a series of delays in 
the exploration phase soon after these conflicts occurred. Several large 
mining companies including ECSA even participated in the making of 
this new legislation (Interview Department of Community Relations). 
While the mining activities were delayed, ECSA continued operating 
with fewer employees and still maintained their relationship with the 
communities and even the Shuar Federation. 
In his September 2009 visit to Tundayme, Correa announced a 
change in the relationship between the company and the local 
communities, which was also officially confirmed by the Secretariat of 
Peoples, Social Movements and Citizen Participation (Secretaría de Pueblos, 
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Movimientos Sociales y Participación Ciudadana). This decision was part of the 
new state policies, including the New Mining Law, which gave the state 
more authority over extractive activities and even afforded them a larger 
percentage of the contracts (51 per cent) and a more important role in 
the redistribution of the earnings. Although the initial decision was to 
eliminate the relationship between the communities and the company, it 
was eventually agreed that they would preserve the social programs and 
projects related to the environmental management plan.  
This change in policies, along with the change in ownership of the 
company in 2012 marked the beginning of a new period for large-scale 
mining in Mirador. According to the director of the Department of 
Community Relations these changes drastically changed the way the 
project was operated; the company previously presented itself as a 
charity organization creating expectations (“let’s face it, we are not the 
Ministry of Welfare”) that it would accept the responsabilities supposed 
to be assumed by the state in abandoned rural communities and 
accommodate the petty requests of communities (t-shirts for soccer 
teams, for example). After these changes occured, however, the issue of 
community relations had become more clear and regulated: “the role, the 
responsibility of the company towards the communities is based on the 
environmental management plan approved by the state and we have to 
go by it.”5 In short, the main purpose of the company’s program for  
sustainable management and community relations is to develop projects 
directly with local communities within the area of impact to manage 
resources and develop health, education, and waste management 
programs (Program of Community Relations/Plan of Environmental 
Management) (Cardno 2014). The purpose of this program is to help 
local and indigenous communities work on small projects for the 
community and to generate income through initiatives such as fish 
farming, small animal raising, and cacao production. However, the 
implementation of some of these projects can be conflictive, especially 
because local people question their real impact in the development of the 
communities.  
Overall, the Shuar communities and the federation perceive the 
change in the relationship between the company and the local 
communities as the result of a lack of interest and desire to help and 
adequately compensate the indigenous people. They see the transition 
from the Canadian to the Chinese owners as drastic. Before, the high-
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level Canadian executives met with the Shuar leaders and would often 
hold open meetings with the people from Tundayme; they spoke 
Spanish and agreed to many of the local demands. However, the Chinese 
executives are not open to meeting with the local leaders and they do not 
speak Spanish or even English. Furthermore, from 2007 to 2011, even 
after the change in government policies, ECSA had made several direct 
agreements with the FESZCH, which amounted to a total of around $1 
million dollars (internal document ECSA). One of the conditions to sign 
these agreements was that the federation would implement development 
projects in the communities located in the areas influenced by Project 
Mirador. However, the federation did not comply with this part of the 
agreement and, thus, the company decided not to sign further 
agreements. In July 2014, during an interview with the president of the 
federation and the leader in charge of education, they gave an account of 
a meeting they had just held in Quito with some of the Ecuadorian 
executives from ECSA (under Chinese administration) and several Shuar 
leaders from Zamora; they returned to Zamora empty-handed after a 
two-hour meeting in which they were essentially told that ECSA had 
already given the state a percentage of the royalties in advance and, as 
such, the company recommended the leaders make their demands 
directly to the state.6 
Several interesting dimensions of the relationship between the mining 
companies (especially ECSA) and the Shuar political organization should 
be considered in this analysis. To begin with, the most obvious 
consideration is the total change of position regarding community 
relations between different company owners, which has ultimately 
resulted in resentment and negative attitudes within the local population 
towards the company. It also shows that the FESZCH has greatly relied 
upon the mining companies to consolidate the organization itself and to 
resolve the difficulties involved in transferring funds offered by the 
mining company to the communities. However, it is important to note 
that, while the Canadian administration was more open to dialogue with 
the people, their relationship with the communities was essentially 
paternalistic in nature and ultimately reflected the patterns of other 
extractive companies in that their efforts were intended to keep the 
population happy to prevent complaints about their presence. This 
relationship was characterized by promises of development and well-
being as well as the implementation of short-term benefits and 
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infrastructure instead of significant contributions to local development 
(Arellano Yanguas 2011; Salas 2008). As Arellano Yanguas and Salas 
point out in the case of Antamina, Peru, in these situations, conflicts 
arise precisely because the population feels that its expectations of 
development and progress were not fulfilled by the company. This is 
exactly what happened in the Shuar communities around Mirador: they 
not only felt cheated by ECSA in their expectations, but also by the 
federation’s leaders at the time.  
Additionally, after the company’s transition to the Chinese ownership 
and administration, community leaders and members as well as the 
federation have not only felt that the promises made by the Canadians 
would not be fulfilled, but also believe that the Chinese were 
intentionally limiting negogiations and the direct relationship they have 
with the people; for example, in the highly-anticipated meeting between 
Ecuadorean executives and Shuar leaders that I just described, there 
were no clear outcomes. The Chinese are perceived as distant and 
completely closed off to any negotiation. This has also been emphasized 
by many community leaders in the area of indirect impact of the project, 
who wish the company were open to dialogue and efforts to support 
their communities (even if they are not located within the area of direct 
impact). Others complain about the poor treatment the Shuar workers 
receive in the company, accusing the Chinese of being racist.7 
A third interesting consideration is that, while the company’s 
environmental management plan has regulated in a better way the kind 
of support that ECSA should be delivering to the local communities, it 
has not been quite successful in delivering that support to all 
communities. As explained by the manager of the department of 
community relations, ECSA’s objective is to work with state institutions 
in order to complement their long-term actions in different areas such as 
health and education. It has also developed certain productive projects 
whose objectives are to help families generate income and consume 
healthy food. Examples of these projects include the production of 
chickens, fish, and guinea pigs. Nevertheless, the perception of 
community members and federation leaders is that those projects are too 
small to generate any kind of development. In the words of the leader of 
education at the federation, “ECSA limits itself to projects that fit within 
the environmental management plan, but people need other kinds of 
projects, people don’t need projects to raise guinea pigs and chicken, we 
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need more important, emblematic projects that have to do with our Life 
Plans (Federation strategic plans for the communities), with water and 
environment sanitation and education.” Supported by the discourse that 
the company is taking away the riches from their land, they demand 
something more significant in return: “they take away tons and millions 
of gold and riches and they trick us with chickens, we want emblematic 
projects to live with dignity in the long-term.”8  
A fourth point of consideration is that, in addition to the conflicts 
related to failed expectations of development and well-being, the 
presence of the mining company has reinvigorated issues around land 
and territory between the mestizo and the Shuar population. Although 
the company does not have any operations directly on Shuar community 
lands around Tundayme (although it did buy land from the community 
of Paquintza), some leaders and the federation itself have claimed that 
the territory in the area of Cóndor-Mirador belongs to the Shuar’s 
ancestral territory and thus should be returned. While the FESZCH has 
adopted a more conservative position, asking that the territory should be 
given back to the Shuar after the project is over, Asociación Shuar 
Kakaram (a lower level organization which is part of the FESZCH) 
demands that the company leave immediately so that the ancestral 
territories can be recuperated and used by the community. The 
community of Ijisam, which was located close to the mining campsite, is 
at the center of this struggle; although the federation does not get 
directly involved in the claims that Asociación Shuar Kakaram and Ijisam 
are making, they do support them because: 
ECSA hasn’t really harmed the federation but it has done a lot of harm to 
eight Shuar communities in the area of influence; there is a community 
with the name of Ijisam in the area of direct influence which has been 
displaced through lies. ECSA took the land from them and now we are 
trying to recuperate the land, but it is actually Association Kakaram who is 
taking the lead on this, we are not as active but we do support them.9 
 Although there are several versions of how the land from Ijisam10 was 
sold or transferred to ECSA, the discourse utilized is that of 
displacement. Ultimately, the Shuar political organization is concerned 
that ECSA is occupying the land of what was legally constituted as a 
community; thus, they believe the land should be returned to the 
community. For Asociación Shuar Kakaram and some leaders, Ijisam 
became symbolic of the struggles over the ancestral territory in 
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Cordillera del Cóndor, which the Shuar also defended from Peru in the 
war of 1995. As the president of Kakaram says:  
What we want is to defend our territory, the ancestral territory of our 
grandparents, but the Shuar don’t have land anymore…the territory in the 
Cordillera del Cóndor belongs to the Shuar and they even died defending 
it, but now everything belongs to the Chinese, even the mestizo people are 
being displaced. The government has to respect our culture and let the 
Shuar people have their territory.11 
 This claim to the ancestral territory in Cóndor-Mirador motivated the 
Asociación Shuar Kakaram (which has dwindled so significantly that it is 
currently only actively made up of the organization’s president and vice-
president) to join CASCOMI. However, while in the discourse of the 
federation and some Shuar leaders the recovery of ancestral territory is 
key in their demands to the company and the state, this is not necessarily 
an important issue for all the Shuar communities in the area. I will 
discuss the notion of territory as part of the identity discourse in Chapter 
5.    
3.4  Conclusions 
This chapter’s main goal was to offer a contextualization of the 
development of large-scale mining in Ecuador and to situate Project 
Mirador within this context. On one hand, my intention was to 
emphasize the political role of resource extraction (especially mining) in 
sustaining the government’s development plans and social expenditure. I 
also sought to describe the ways in which the mining sector has evolved 
over the last decades (even before Correa’s administration), especially 
after new policies and laws were approved precisely to exploit the 
potential of large-scale mining in Ecuador. 
Besides the emphasis on extractivism, an important trait of this and 
other post-neoliberal governments in Latin America is the strong 
presence of the state as a regulating and distributing entity. In practical 
terms, the state has taken on this role in Mirador and other projects 
through legislative changes that allow it to receive higher percentages of 
profits and royalties from extractive projects, the creation of policies and 
the institutions to channel profits into social programs, and through 
various strategies intended to undermine the role of extractive 
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companies as entities of regulation and social welfare in the affected 
areas.  
Furthermore, the state has asserted its control over extractive 
practices in terms of regulating and stopping resistance and mobilization. 
I would argue that, while it is difficult to affirm that the lack of 
consistency and permanency of social mobilization around Project 
Mirador is a direct result of the government’s policy of intolerance, there 
are a few elements that should be taken into account. First, before the 
approval of the New Mining Law in 2009 and the celebration of 
Mirador’s 2012 contract for exploitation, there was hope that local 
resistance groups might eventually halt the progress of the project, as 
had ocurred following the conflicts in 2006 and with the Mandato Minero. 
However, the growing presence of the Chinese company, its managers, 
and its large number of workers as well as its increasing hermeticism 
seemed to have greatly limited any possible resistance to the project 
(except for the efforts of CASCOMI who are supported by the 
environmentalist Non-Governmental Organization, Acción Ecológica). In 
2015, during one of the last times I was in Tundayme, I visited one of 
the communities whose leaders had a strong anti-mining discourse; this 
time, however, the community really seemed to have given up any hope 
that the mining company would leave the area. They preferred to 
negotiate and sell their land to the company so that they would be able 
move elsewhere. They thought that it would be better to move away 
than to live with the effects of mining exploitation. 
Additionally, according to the government’s nationalist agenda, 
resources from mining should be invested in local development through 
institutions like Ecuador Estratégico. While it can be argued that the 
communities closest to Project Mirador were not necessarily the chief 
benefactors of the company’s profits, investment in infrastructure can be 
seen all over the province. As will be argued in Chapter 6, this emphasis 
on local development works in two ways: to justify the existence and 
continuity of projects like Mirador and to control the population by 
providing well-being so as to quell any potential resistance. 
In this chapter, I have described the context for the development of 
Project Mirador as part of Ecuador’s large and ambitious extractive 
agenda and briefly described the process of mobilization around it. In 
the next chapter, I will concentrate specifically on the Shuar Federation 
to understand its role in the politics related to the project. 
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Notes 
                                                
1 Original text in Spanish: “repite esa apropiación masiva de la Naturaleza, las 
economías de enclave y una inserción global subordinada.” (Gudynas 2012: 35-
36) 
2 Original text in Spanish: “…las descargas de aguas negras, grises e industriales; 
alteraciones debido a arrastre de sólidos finos por las corrientes; mezcla entre 
aguas superficiales y subterráneas bombeada desde la mina [...]; derrame de 
combustibles; caída de material triturado; derrame de químicos utilizados en los 
procesos; fuga de las aguas de recirculación a la planta de tratamiento, [...] el 
movimiento de suelo o por la fractura durante los trabajos de extracción [...], o el 
polvo generado por el tránsito de la maquinaria” (Sacher 2011: 21) 
3 Original text in spanish: “El desbroce masivo junto a las lluvias fuertes en la fase 
de construcción han producido niveles altos de turbidez visibles en los ríos 
Quimi, Wawayme y Tundayme.” (Leifsen and Benham 2017: 214) 
4 Interview director of the Department of Community Relations of ECSA, 
November 2013 
5 Interview director of the Department of Community Relations of ECSA, 
November 2013 
6 Interview president and Leader of Education of the FESZCH, July 2014 
7  Interview with president of Certero, January 2014; Interview president of 
Santiago Paty and Paquintza, January 2015 
8 Interview Leader of Education, FESZCH, July 2015 
9 Interview president of FESZCH, July 2014 
10 The most common version on the origins of Ijisam is that a Shuar family had 
been living in the area of the mine but had sold their farm a long time ago (there 
is no specific information on when exactly) to a colono. This person had later sold 
the land to the mining company and now the Asociación is claiming right to the 
territory, arguing that the sale was illegal in the first place. 
11 Interview president of the Asociación Kakaram, November 2013 
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4.1  Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I discussed the role that extractivism and 
especially large-scale mining have played as part of a redistributive 
apparatus of the new nationalistic government that favors social 
investment and ultimately seeks to reduce poverty. The intention of that 
chapter was to frame the political and economic context in which large-
scale mining projects (specifically Project Mirador) have been developed 
in Ecuador. It also discussed the dynamics of the socio-environmental 
conflicts related to the project with a particular emphasis on the 
interactions between the Shuar population and the mining company. 
That chapter serves as the background for the discussion around the 
ethno-politics of the Shuar political organization in the context of the 
first large-scale mining project in Ecuador. 
The Shuar people have historically lived in the territory that now 
belongs to the Amazonian provinces of Morona Santiago and Zamora 
Chinchipe, in the south of Ecuador. During the last century, they have 
started a slow process of contact with the Western and mestizo world 
and, as such, they have been compelled to share their space with a variety 
of external actors such as missionaries, mestizos migrating from the 
highlands, state institutions, and, more recently, mining companies. 
During the last two decades, the presence of mining companies in the 
area around Project Mirador in the province of Zamora Chinchipe has 
altered the dynamics of this region quite significantly, and has thus 
provoked different reactions from the indigenous population and from 
the mestizos who have permanently lived in the area at least since the 
1960s. Strong mobilization against large–scale mining has been 
periodically organized in the area, but these efforts have not necessarily 
been consistent over time and have not always had strong support from 
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the Shuar communities located closest to the project; in fact, while the 
general public may consider indigenous people to be the guardians of the 
territory, there have not always been strong positions of resistance 
against extractivism in the Shuar communities or even in Shuar political 
organizations.  
As such, one of the main objectives of this thesis is to document and 
analyze the positions, discourses, and strategies of the various levels of 
the Shuar Federation regarding large-scale mining in the area. However, 
before discussing the specific dimensions of their discourses and 
practices (which are discussed in Chapter 5), it is important to first 
understand the history and organization of the Shuar organization as a 
whole. This will give us insight into the way the Shuar population was 
introduced into the national society and how it adapted to a new way of 
engaging in politics. Additionally, by looking at the levels of 
cohesiveness, conflicts, and divisions within the organization, I lay some 
of the groundwork necessary for understanding the diversity and 
changing dynamics of discourses and positions of Shuar people towards 
the mining company and other issues related to land and resources. 
Thus, this chapter will answer several important questions regarding the 
Shuar Federation: How integrated is the FESZCH’s work with other 
levels of the organization such as the associations and communities? 
How does the Shuar political scenario in the north of Zamora Chinchipe 
affect the possibility of resisting or negotiating with the mining 
company? What does this mean for their struggle to control the mineral 
resources in their ancestral territory? This discussion is especially relevant 
in the context of the government of Rafael Correa, in which social 
protest against extractivism had been criminalized or at least neutralized. 
Furthermore, this chapter contributes to the discussion regarding the 
choices indigenous organizations make regarding issues related to 
resource use, territory, development, and so forth (Warren and Jackson 
2005). 
As mentioned in the introduction, it is important to emphasize that 
Shuar politics are quite complex. For the purposes of this dissertation 
and to facilitate the research process, I have concentrated on only one 
federation and the communities that belong to it, which are located in 
Project Mirador’s area of direct impact. While I will discuss the origins of 
the first federation in the province of Morona Santiago (FICSH) as part 
of the process of creation and evolution of the Shuar political 
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organization, my study will concentrate mainly on the FESZCH. This 
latter organization was born from the first federation as a way of 
demanding autonomy for the Shuar people in Zamora Chinchipe, as I 
will further explain later. 
In the first part of this chapter, I will briefly describe the historical 
context of the Shuar presence in the southern provinces of the Amazon 
region and their initial contact with the mestizo society through 
missionaries, colonos, and state institutions. I will then go on to discuss the 
process of creation of the different Shuar federations in the area as a way 
of interacting with and adapting to the national society and to the state 
itself. Thirdly, I will discuss the key levels within the Shuar federations in 
Zamora Chinchipe, starting with the communities and associations. 
Finally, I will then address the way the FESZCH operates, its main 
objectives, and some possible conflicts related to large-scale mining. The 
goal of this chapter is to present a general picture of how the 
organization is articulated and to make visible a complex scenario that 
includes a variety of strategies, conflicts, and possible fragmentation at 
different levels.1 This scenario is understood as part of the complex web 
of experiences and interactions between the Shuar and different actors in 
the area that has been going on for decades and is not limited to the 
presence of the mining company.  
4.2  Historical Context: The Creation and Evolution of the 
Shuar Federations in Zamora-Chinchipe  
4.2.1  Early Shuar History and First Contacts with Missionaries 
The Shuar have historically occupied the territory in the Upano and 
Zamora River Valleys and the Cordillera del Cutucú (the Unturi Shuar), 
as well as the region west of the Pangui River crossing the border into 
Peru (the Achuara Shuar) (Salazar 1977: 10) and spreading into the 
southernmost Amazonian provinces of Morona Santiago and Zamora 
Chinchipe in Ecuador. The Shuar have also been known as Jívaros, a term 
that has been mostly discarded due to its derogatory use (Bjureby 2006: 
102; Hendricks 1996). However, some authors believe that the term jívaro 
is the result of adapting the word from the native language (Shiviar or 
Shivar) to Spanish. Since in Spanish there is no letter for the “sh” sound, 
this was written with an x, which was later transformed into a J; 
eventually, shivar turned into jivar, which then evolved into jívaro 
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(Bottasso 2011: 9; Troncoso 1999: 105). More specifically, Jívaro refers to 
the linguistic group that includes the Unturi, Achuar Shuar (Achuales, 
lower Pastaza Rivers), the Aguaruna (Awajún in Peru), Huambisa 
(Wampis, along the rivers Morona and Santiago), and the Mayna people 
(Bottasso 2011; Harner 1978). 
The history of the Shuar prior to the Spanish conquest is largely 
unknown and there is not much archaeological information from the 
time period when they started settling the area, although there is 
evidence of a pottery-making horticultural group occupying the Shuar 
territory from around 2000 years ago (Salazar 1977: 12-13). There is also 
evidence of hostile encounters with the Cañari people from the 
highlands prior to the arrival of the Incas, but the Shuar eventually allied 
with them to be able to fight the attempts of the Incas to subjugate the 
native groups in the Amazon region.  
Despite several attempts to establish the authority of the Crown over 
Shuar territory during the Spanish conquest, the Spaniards never 
managed to conquer the Shuar in any permanent way; after a couple of 
unsuccessful expeditions, in 1549 Fernando de Benavente was finally 
able to explore the region including the land along the Upano River. He 
was awarded by the Crown what would become known as the province 
of Macas, but he could not establish any ties with the Shuar and was 
forced to retreat to the highlands (Salazar 1977: 14). Around the same 
time, Alonso de Mercadillo and Benavente founded the town of Zamora, 
to the south of the province of Macas. On another expedition in 1557, 
Juan de Salinas Loyola took possession of the territory that belonged to 
the province of Macas since it had never been occupied by the former 
governor. He declared this territory to be part of the new province of 
Yaguarzongo; several towns were founded at this time, such as Logroño 
de los Caballeros (later destroyed by the Shuar), Nuestra Señora del 
Rosario, Sevilla del Oro (what later became Macas), and Mendoza 
(Salazar 1977). Eventually, all of these towns were destroyed or 
abandoned after Shuar attacks, except the town of Macas, which 
remained as the only “white” presence in the area from 1599 to 1870. As 
such, Macas became one of the first spaces to facilitate trade between 
whites (who were connected to the city of Riobamba by a trail) and the 
Shuar. By the nineteenth century, the Shuar and the Macabeos were 
active in trade and had a permaneant participation in the exchange of 
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pigs, salt, chickens, and shrunken heads for shotguns, textiles, and axes 
(Harner 1978: 26; Salazar 1977: 17). 
No military or missionary expeditions (neither Franciscan nor Jesuit) 
were successful in establishing peaceful relations or conquering the Shuar 
in the following centuries. The expulsion of the Jesuits from the Spanish 
colonies in the 18th century and the wars of independence in the first half 
of the 19th century left the lowlands free of any military or religious 
presence (Salazar 1977). Nevertheless, by the end of the century, several 
religious orders again made attempts to settle in the area and establish 
missions. In 1887, the Dominicans founded a mission in Macas but 
abandoned it in 1898. For the first time in the area, in 1893 the Salesians 
were granted the Vicariat of Méndez and Gualaquiza and the Franciscans 
were granted the Vicariat of Zamora, which they left after a few years 
(Bottasso 2011; Salazar 1977).  
While the Salesians seemed to be relatively successful in establishing 
their missions, the Franciscans had more difficulties. In 1892, Franciscan 
missionaries settled in the city of Zamora and started building 
infrastructure for the mission; at the same time, they explored Shuar 
territory, traveling north towards Yacuambi and eventually reaching 
Gualaquiza (which was the limit of the Salesian vicariat) (Moradillo 1966: 
9-19). While they had established some contact with several Shuar 
families and hoped to start the process of conversion, the missionaries 
abandoned the vicariat five years later. The head of the mission argued 
that the liberal government had left them unprotected and without 
economic support, which they actually perceived as open persecution; 
they also felt threatened by a Shuar family from the area of Yacuambi 
that was supposedly plotting to attack the town of Zamora and the 
mission and to kill everyone living there (Celi Jaramillo 1998: 112-113; 
Testimony of Torra in Moradillo 1966: 10-12). Besides this threat of 
violence, however, it seems that the lack of support from the authorities 
was coupled with a feeling of disappointment expressed by the director 
of the mission at not finding enough “savages” in the area (Torra in 
Moradillo 1966: 18). According to this missionary, while they were 
expecting to find around five or ten thousand “jíbaros” to convert; in 
reality, they could not find more than 400 or 500 people in all of the 
territory they visited. Twenty years later, around 1912, the vicariat was 
reactivated and, by beginning of the 1940s, they had begun pushing for 
more sustained contact and missionary work with the Shuar living close 
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to the Pachicutza River in what is now the canton of El Pangui. In the 
1960s, the presence of the Franciscans became stronger and they 
established themselves in a convent located by the Zamora River, very 
close to what is now the heart of El Pangui (Jumbo Pineda 2005: 211-
212).  
It is clear that this history of missions in the Amazon region is 
intimately linked with the political past and present of Ecuador as well as 
with to the needs of the state. While the missionaries had become the 
state’s agents in a “civilizing” process that aimed to organize the local 
population and bring them into the national society, both religious 
orders had suffered from changes in political ideologies that disfavored 
religious institutions, especially after the Liberal Revolution of 1895 
(Bottasso 2011: 25). Furthermore, the Franciscan’s isolation and poor 
knowledge of the territory probably prevented them from permanently 
settling in Zamora.2 This, however, was not the case with the Salesians, 
whose missions were created in an area in which there had already been 
some contact between mestizos and the Shuar for centuries (Harner 
1987; Salazar 1977).  
4.2.2  Change and Transformation among the Shuar 
Although not always consistently, the late 1800s marked a period of great 
culture contact and change brought about by the presence of Salesian or 
Franciscan missionaries and, later, by migrants from the highland 
provinces. The Salesians who settled in the northern province of Morona 
Santiago became agents of a slow colonization process that started in the 
1920s and 30s.  This implied that, aside from their evangelizing duties, 
they were also in charge of building roads, hospitals, and schools and 
promoting agricultural activities (Esvertit Cobes 2014: 504).  According 
to Salazar, the Salesians used two strategies to expand and consolidate 
their order: they uprooted young children from their families to be raised 
in boarding schools where they could be “civilized” and evangelized, and 
they resettled and concentrated the Shuar (who traditionally lived in 
scattered households across large territories) in villages around the 
mission center (Salazar 1977: 19). These strategies, which where 
common in most missionary work in the Amazon region, were also 
implemented by the Franciscans around 1951. Salazar reports that by the 
end of the 50s, the Franciscans had already established four mission 
centers and five boarding schools in which 175 Shuar children resided 
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(Roldán in Salazar 1977: 20). Although schools and other infrastructure 
were financed by the state, they were built and supervised by the Salesian 
and the Franciscan missions. This was one of the strategies implemented 
by the state to incorporate and civilize indigenous groups in the Amazon 
region by proxy through the action of the missionaries (Esvertit Cobes 
2015: 504). Furthermore, around 1940, the state decided to hand over 
the “legal representation” of the Shuar people to the Salesian order 
(Troncoso 1999: 119). Thus, besides taking charge of their education and 
evangelization, the Salesians also became the official voice of the 
indigenous group.  
The boarding school educational system fundamentally changed the 
Shuar lifestyle (Rubenstein 2005) as did the migration of mestizos from 
the highlands, which was encouraged by the national government in the 
1960s.  Both of these strategies forced the Shuar to give up their 
traditional ways of life, which involved traditional subsistence practices 
including hunting, fishing, and other traditional uses of their extensive 
forest territories. They also imposed further cultural changes, including 
changes in language use in the schools and in marriage practices 
(prohibition of polygamy), in order to civilize the Shuar’s “savage” 
practices.   
Nevertheless, the most definitive transformation for the Shuar came 
with the agrarian reforms that took place in the highlands and that also 
had important implications for the indigenous people in the Amazon 
region (Salazar 1977: 21-23; Esvertit Cobes 2015: 504-507). The Agrarian 
Reform Law of 1964 (Ley de Desarrollo Agrario) was implemented to end 
the system of serfdom and to expropriate large land holdings in the 
highlands to redistribute them to the indigenous and peasant population 
(Bjureby 2006: 92). Besides this distributive dimension, the law also had 
a colonizing component that was crucial to alleviate the demand for land; 
thus, in 1964 and in 1973, the Law of Fallow Lands (Ley de Tierras 
Baldías) was passed in order to encourage migration to and colonization 
of the Amazon region.  
Besides providing land for colonos from the highlands, the agrarian 
reforms helped to accomplish the government’s objective of expanding 
the agricultural frontier and developing the tropical forest (Troncoso 
1999: 125). While the Shuar had been living in the provinces of Morona 
Santiago and Zamora Chinchipe without legal land titles and occupying 
large areas of land according to their traditional subsistence practices (as 
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most indigenous groups in the Amazon region did at that time), the Ley 
de Tierras Baldías and the arrival of the colonos changed the configuration 
and use of the territory. Through the application of this law, the state 
could declare most of the territory occupied by the Shuar as uncultivated 
and uninhabited land available for colonization by peasants from the 
highlands (Bjureby 2006: 92). This clearly meant a sudden loss of land as 
well as a reconfiguration of cultural notions of territory for the 
indigenous people who (Harner 1978: 198-199), in order to be able to 
keep their land from the colonos, had to clear it for agriculture or cattle-
raising in order to claim ownership over it (Rudel et al. 2002; Troncoso 
1999: 125-127).  
4.2.3  The Beginnings of the Shuar Political Organization  
Although Salesian missionaries had already reorganized many Shuar 
practices and had imposed a Western/Catholic system of education 
upon them, they actually supported Shuar efforts in getting organized 
against what they perceived to be an invasion to their homeland, even 
before the first Ley de Desarrollo Agrario was passed. Thus, in 1962, the 
first Shuar politically organized centers or communities (based on the 
first mission centers) were created; and later on, in 1964 the first 
federation (the FICSH), was founded, both under the auspices of the 
Salesians. Furthermore, the federation was the first political indigenous 
organization to be created in Ecuador3 (Rubenstein 2005; Salazar 1981; 
Stavenhagen 1996; Troncoso 1999). Salazar argues that one of the 
reasons the Salesian missionaries not only supported but actually planned 
the organization of the Shuar federations was mostly to maintain the 
Shuar people as labor on their farms (Salazar 1977: 24). Nevertheless, 
Salazar and other authors (Esvertit Cobes 2015: 506; Troncoso 1999: 
120-121) also attribute this support to a new wave of Salesian 
missionaries who were critical of the traditional ethnocentric strategies of 
evangelization and called for actions to protect and safeguard indigenous 
cultures (Salazar 1977: 25; Salazar 1989: 66-67). This new ideology 
implied siding with the Shuar in the protection of their territory; as a 
result, the relationship between the missionaries and colonos became 
strained. In fact, the colonos “accused the Salesian Fathers of ‘obstructing 
the progress of the country’ by preventing them from penetrating Shuar 
reservations” (Salazar 1977: 24). 
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The situation was quite different in Zamora Chinchipe. While both 
the Franciscans and the Salesians owned haciendas in which they utilized 
Shuar labor, there are reports that the Shuar living under the control of 
the Franciscan order were far more precarious than those living under 
the control of the Salesians; this situation generated deep resentments 
towards the order (Galarza Zavala in Salazar 1977: 20). Even nowadays, 
the general perception among some of the leaders from the communities 
in Zamora is that the experience the Shuar from Morona Santiago had 
with the missionaries was quite different from their own experience with 
the Fransciscans. For example, the president of Asociación Shuar 
Kakaram in Zamora Chinchipe (affiliated with the FESZCH) clearly 
stated that the Shuar had lost much of their culture because of the 
influence of the missionaries who “came to kill their culture” and their 
religious practices, while in Morona Santiago things were different: “So, 
here, it is the missionaries who were at fault…in Morona Santiago, the 
salesians have supported the Shuar culture…that is why people in 
Morona are more educated and better equipped. Looking back, the only 
important personage for the Shuar people is Father Chumapi.” 4 
Furthermore, some leaders recognize that while Salesians wanted the 
Shuar to maintain and value their language as part of their education in 
the Salesian schools, Franciscans missionaries were intolerant towards 
Shuar cultural practices and strongly pushed for acculturation. In one 
interesting case, the leader of the community of Etsa experienced both 
Franciscan and Salesian education; he affirms that in the school run by 
Franciscans in Zamora, they were not supposed to speak Shuar or carry 
Shuar names, while in the Salesian school in Bomboiza (Morona 
Santiago), the teachers and missionaries encouraged the Shuar people to 
preserve their cultural traditions and language.5  
This dichtomoy in treatment accounts for important differences in 
the way the Shuar were educated, their vision of their own culture, and 
the evolution of their political organizations, which specifically started in 
the northern-province. Indeed, the creation of the centers and the 
federation supported by the Salesians was, to an extent, a sign of how 
much the missionaries valued the Shuar, their territory, and their culture6; 
this was quite unlike the experience of the Shuar in Zamora. As stated in 
the introduction, the Shuar political organization began in Morona 
Santiago, where the support of the Salesians and their mediation with the 
state might have enabled them to develop a strong organization and 
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important political presence in the province. While the FESZCH is also 
recognized as a strong political actor in Zamora, the context in which it 
was created was permeated by extensive conflict and power struggles; 
even nowadays there are many indications of a lack of integrated work 
which complicates the definition of unified positions in relation to 
important issues such as large-scale mining. This will be discussed in this 
and the next chapter. 
Thus, the beginnings of the Shuar political structure took place only 
in the northern-province. It first began with a few Shuar families living 
around the town of Sucúa who intended to establish formal 
administrative units, the centros (which, to some extent, had already been 
previously established as mission centers) (Rubenstein 2005). These 
isolated centros were later brought together into a larger administrative 
unit known as the Asociación (the first being the Asociación de Sucúa, 
which was formed in 1962) and eventually into an even higher-level 
administrative unit, the federation FICSH (which was created to 
incorporate all the new centros and associations across all Shuar territory). 
It is important to emphasize that the centros were very much tied to the 
work done by the Salesian missionaries and, in fact, the missionaries 
became advisors to the associations and later on to the federation 
(Federación de Centros Shuar 1976: 115). The FICSH was officially 
established in January 1964 as an organization for the integral 
development of its members. Its main objectives revolved around “the 
social, economic and moral improvement of its members” (projects to 
improve the well-being of the communities), and the implementation of 
colonization and household projects7 in coordination with government 
institutions (Federación de Centros Shuar 1976: 121). As Rubenstein 
states, the centro was therefore a key institution through which the 
federation promoted the political inclusion of the Shuar within the state 
and the national society and at the same time it provided “a legal base for 
the incorporation of the Shuar within the national economy” 
(Rubenstein 2005: 43). While it seems contradictory that the federation 
would work with state institutions to facilitate colonization projects, it 
was actually the only way for the Shuar to keep their land and obtain 
legal status for it, a concept mostly unknown to them in the past but that 
was crucial in their new relationship to the state. Thus, the federation 
was born out of the need for the Shuar to defend their identity; the only 
way for them to achieve this goal was to act according to the unwritten 
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cultural rules of mestizo society and to comply with the demands of the 
state. In order to survive, the federation was thus compelled to capitulate 
to those initial colonizing strategies and must continue to do so in their 
dealings with a variety of external, non-Shuar actors, such as the mining 
company and the state institutions. 
At this point, it is important to acknowledge that the Shuar’s decision 
to politically organize themselves took place in a very specific 
conjuncture. On one hand, the Shuar needed to protect their territory 
from the colonos and the state institutions and, on the other, they had the 
support and auspice of the Salesian missionaries. Along with the first 
waves of colonos, the missionaries represented their first encounters with 
the Western world and became the most important force in their cultural 
transformation (Rubenstein 2005: 30; Salazar 1981; Troncoso 1999), 
especially through their education system and the reconfiguration of 
their territories and households around the mission centers. However, 
once the state had taken an interest in developing the Amazon region, 
the Salesians actually became the most adamant protectors of the Shuar 
culture and territory, encouraging the Shuar to politically organize 
themselves. It is in this context that the Shuar started to actively engage 
with the wider national society, using the tools made available to them by 
the missionaries. As Rubenstein argues (2005), far from just being docile 
subjects of evangelization and education, the Shuar had already begun to 
take advantage of their contact with the Salesians by having their 
children learn to speak Spanish and engage with the mestizo society at 
different levels. Furthermore, their new political organization used the 
centros (the early mission centers) as their foundation and recruited 
students who had been taught Spanish in the Salesian schools as leaders. 
Thus, from this perspective, the Shuar were actively and strategically 
collaborating with the Salesians to become national citizens and, in the 
process, they expanded their sphere of influence beyond their 
households and local missions to the associations and then on to the 
federation (Rubenstein 2005). In this sense, Salesian missionaries played 
a key role in the history of contact between the Shuar and the Western 
mestizo society, not only as acculturating agents but also as mediators 
between different social worlds. In this cultural borderland (Rosaldo 
1993), the Shuar have struggled to make sense of changing scenarios, 
constantly negotiating between their world and the mestizo world and 
122 CHAPTER 4 
 
trying to delineate a sense of what it means to be Shuar as they 
simultaneously become part of the national Ecuadorean society.  
4.2.4  The Emergence of an Autonomous Shuar Federation in  
 Zamora Chinchipe 
The history of the Shuar political organization in Zamora Chinchipe 
reveals conflicts for autonomy as well as power struggles related to 
different agendas or even personal interests from community leaders, 
which remain important dynamics of the organization even today.  It was 
within this conflictive scenario that leaders from the province separated 
themselves from the original federation in Morona Santiago and created 
an independent organization, the FESZCH. 8  The history of the 
organization also reveals the complex relationship between the Shuar, 
the state, and other actors such as the mining companies over the past 
sixty years. After the FICSH had grown and become more consolidated 
in Morona Santiago, in 1971 several centros were then created in 
Mankusas, Guadalupe (Federación de Centros Shuar 1976: 119), and in 
the valley of the Yacuambi and Nangaritza Rivers in Zamora; thus, the 
FICSH supported the growing centros in both provinces for almost two 
decades. Nevertheless, while the federation continued growing as an 
organization, including more communities that wanted to be a part of it, 
several problems emerged that prevented it from effectively serving the 
Shuar people in both provinces. The first and most obvious reason was 
that there were too many communities that demanded attention in 
different regions. Additionally, there was a perception that the federation 
had centralized all decision-making in Morona and was thus working to 
benefit the northern communities more than those in the south. The 
second prominent reason was that the federation had acquired 
considerable debt from different institutions to finance cattle and 
agriculture projects for the communities that it could not pay back, a 
situation that weakened its power. Lastly, leaders in Zamora wanted to 
have access to positions of power and authority and to work directly for 
the benefit of their own communities.9 
In this context, several leaders from Zamora began to push for 
positions of leadership within the FICSH so that they could have more 
control over the communities of their province. In 1985, this factor, 
combined with the need to expedite the paperwork and bureaucratic 
work to continue legalizing land and communities in Zamora (which was 
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more complicated through the offices of the FICSH in Morona Santiago 
because of the large distances between thes offices and the communities 
in Zamora), motivated leaders to eventually establish a new independent 
federation for the province of Zamora Chinchipe, the FESZCH. 
Although the conflict related to securing autonomy for the communities 
in Zamora peaked almost thirty years ago, some community and 
federation leaders still remember this period and the main instigators 
with some resentment. These feelings persist today because some 
families were divided and some people were actually murdered due to 
organizational and land conflicts in the communities around the 
provincial border (especially the community of Paquintza, which is part 
of this study). Some community members wanted to continue being part 
of the FICSH because of their proximity to Morona while others wanted 
to separate from the organization in order to have more control over 
their own territory.10 After this first separation, a second federation was 
created in Zamora a few decades later. Even though the FESZCH had 
been created with the support of several communities, some other centros 
still remained loyal to the FICSH (the organization based in Morona 
Santiago). It was only in 2007 that these communities petitioned the 
FICSH in Morona to facilitate the creation of their own independent 
organization in the province of Zamora. In 2007, the Provincial 
Federation of the Shuar Nationality of Zamora Chinchipe (FEPNASH-
CH–Federación Provincial de la Nacionalidad Shuar de Zamora Chinchipe) was 
created to gain greater local autonomy and to avoid the bureaucratic 
hassle of the paperwork required to create communities and legalize 
land.  This is an autonomous organization that is aligned with the FICSH 
in Morona Santiago. 
Ultimately, many leaders are convinced that many of the 
organizational conflicts and divisions are the result of individuals or 
groups looking out for their personal interests and seeking power and 
control.11 For example, power struggles over positions of leadership are 
now a common occurrence associated with the presence of the mining 
companies; I will discuss this further later in this chapter.  
Despite this type of complexity in indigenous organizations, for many 
years academics have favored a positive and non-critical analysis of the 
indigenous organizations in Ecuador (Martínez Novo 2009). Academics 
have generally emphasized these organizations’ unified and consistent 
strategies although, in reality, there is great diversity regarding the 
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objectives, strategies, and conflicts in their ideologies, discourses, and 
practices. For example, many authors (Andolina 2003; Becker 2008, 
2010; Jameson 2011; Selverston-Scher 2001; Varese 1996; Yashar 2005; 
Zamosc 2004) have analyzed the history of the indigenous movement at 
a macro level (some even within Latin America), emphasizing the 
movement’s political accomplishments and the strategies that allowed it 
to become a strong national movement. Other studies have concentrated 
on regional and local organizations and emphasized their links with 
different actors but have not necessarily concentrated on their 
relationships with the communities they represent, thus leaving the 
participation of community leadership outside of the ethno-political 
analysis (Sawyer 1992: 2004; Valdivia 2005: 2007). However, as Perreault 
and Warren and Jackson argue, there is profound heterogeneity within 
and between indigenous organizations not only at the national and 
regional level, but also among indigenous people themselves and the 
organizations that represent them (Perreault 2001: 4; Warren and 
Jackson 2005). This is the case of the FESZCH and FEPNASH-CH. 
Although there were no clear ideological discrepancies at the time the 
FESZCH was created as an independent federation, today the FESZCH 
and FEPNASH-CH have different affiliations with higher level political 
organizations and hold different views on how to accomplish their 
shared objective of improving the lives of the Shuar people. Similarly, 
there is not always a clear and straightforward relationship between 
communities and the federations. 
The FESZCH is a long-time supporter of governmental projects and 
large-scale mining; it conceives of the mining industry as a way to 
alleviate poverty within the indigenous population. On the other hand, 
the FEPNASH-CH rejects large-scale mining and is very adamant about 
the lack of participation of indigenous communities and organizations in 
the process of decision-making regarding extractivism. These differing 
positions also reflect the ties that each federation has with national 
organizations, their own particular ideologies, and their unique political 
discourses. While the FEPNASH-CH is affiliated with the FICSH and 
both organizations are affiliated with the CONAIE, the national 
indigenous organization which has adamantly resisted extractivism and 
has been considered a strong actor in Ecuador’s political scene, the 
FESZCH purposely distanced itself from CONAIE and chose to 
affiliate itself with the National Federation of Peasant Organizations 
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(FENOC—Federación Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas). This is a 
peasant-based organization that also includes a diversity of members 
such as indigenous groups, wholesale retailers, and others, and does not 
hold a strong position regarding extractivism (See Figure 4.1, which 
details the relationship between national, regional, and local 
organizations). The FENOC’s primary objective is to promote socio-
economic development and work in areas such as land legalization, 
housing projects, and implementation of productive projects. Unlike the 
FESZCH, this is not an ethnicity-based organization and its agenda is 
directed mostly at alleviating the poverty of its members. As its leader 
expressed in an interview, cultural identity is constantly reinforced 
through the work of the federation, but the organization’s primary 
objective is alleviating poverty: “one cannot think of anything else if the 
people don’t have anything to eat.”12 However, the FESZCH did not 
benefit much from its affiliation with the FENOC in terms of 
development projects, but rather in terms of having legal and judicial 
support from a national organization. It was clear to me that the 
FESZCH chose to belong to an organization that ideologically would 
not limit their lines of action and decisions regarding the welfare of the 
Shuar people, but would give them the necessary formal and legal 
endorsement when negotiating with state institutions and other actors 
for specific projects.13 Thus, the participation of FENOC in FESZCH’s 
affairs was very limited and this was made obvious to me: after the first 
interviews conducted at the federation in which I specifically asked about 
their affiliation with the FENOC, I never again heard any leader from 
the federation mention the organization or any projects in which they 
might be working together.  
This desire for autonomy was precisely one of the reasons for the 
FESZCH to separate from CONAIE, and it also worked as a strategy 
that allowed the federation to negotiate with different actors such as 
mining companies. Another reason was the notion that the national 
organization is extremely centralized on the highlands and has paid little 
attention to the Amazon region. According to the leaders of the 
FESZCH, “the federation is an autonomous and private institution, with 
its own ideology…it can make its own decisions together with its 
people,” and, besides, “we are Shuar, we are not indigenous people,”14 
referringto their specific characteristics and needs as Shuar people and 
their preference for independence and autonomy.  
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Figure 4.1 
Organizational Chart: National and Regional Organizations 
 
Source: Fieldwork Information. Consuelo Fernández-Salvador 
 
However, each federation’s structure is not completely homogeneous 
and its members do not unanimously belong to a single ideology or line 
of thought. For example, although an important difference between the 
FESZCH and the FEPNASH-CH is their position regarding large-scale 
mining, this does not mean that all communities within the FESZCH 
will support the presence of the mining company. In fact, as will be 
shown, there is a variety of positions among community leaders and 
members. Some of these leaders may participate in local resistance 
movements with mestizo people while others might work with or 
advocate working closely with the mining company. This diversity of 
strategies will be discussed at length in the chapter on Shuar political 
discourses and practices. These different positions are respected by 
authorities in the FESZCH, who are conscious of the complex and 
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delicate situation of the communities in the area of direct impact. 
However, the FESZCH’s ideology and support for large-scale mining 
will probably remain the same given its consistency over the last decade.  
Regardless of their position towards mining, specific political 
affiliations, or differing objectives, there are certain common elements 
which both organizations must contend with in terms of mining, the 
relationship to the state, and different social and economic conflicts 
related to land, work, and acculturation within the indigenous 
communities. In fact, while the federations had worked separately since 
the FEPNASH-CH was created, during the last months of my fieldwork 
the leaders of FESZCH were talking about joining together with 
FEPNASH-CH in their efforts to address some of the major problems 
of the Shuar people. However, at least during the time of my fieldwork, 
it was not clear how those collaborative efforts would be channeled and 
if they would agree on major issues such as large-scale mining. 
4.3  The Shuar Federation of Zamora Chinchipe: A Snapshot 
of its Internal Structure 
The FESZCH and the FEPNASH-CH are structured similarly to the 
original federation in Morona Santiago; this structure mimicked the 
political organization of the state and adapted past forms of leadership 
connected to the notion of being warriors to create a sense of hierarchy 
that did not exist in the past (Rubenstin 2007: 377-380). The base of the 
structure is made up of the communities or centros and their leaders; 
associations, which are second-level organizations formed by several 
communities of the area with their own elected-leaders, make up the 
next level.  Finally, the highest level of the hierarchy is the federation, 
whose leaders are elected in general assembly by all of its members. The 
current board of directors of the FESZCH has designed a basic strategic 
plan to state the main objectives and lines of action of the federation 
during the next years. According to the last Strategic Plan of the 
FESZCH 15 , the federation is made up of six associations and 52 
communities (centros or barrios, neighborhoods)16 (Plan Estratégico de la 
Federación Shuar de Zamora Chinchipe 2016), while the FEPNASH-CH 
is made up of only 32 communities (Interview President of FEPNASH-
CH, February 2013). It is clear that the FESZCH has great influence in 
the Shuar communities in Zamora and has an even stronger presence in 
the province; its relationship with the mining companies in the area 
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during the last decade or more made it possible for the federation to 
acquire a certain status and economic stability which allowed it, at least 
for some time, to have modern offices and even hire personnel to work 
in it alongside the elected leaders.  
The president of the FESZCH explained the way the Shuar political 
structure is organized: it is clearly built up from the communities and 
also reflects the way the political process started in Morona Santiago. To 
him, the federation is a network that works together in harmony:  
We are an organic structure. Because we are constituted from the bottom 
up, from the communities and centros. Communities group together into 
associations and they, in turn, group together into the Shuar Federation of 
Zamora Chinchipe. We are a network, we work together, that is why there 
is harmony. That is why we fight together, so that no one can tear us apart, 
for the rights and principles of our organization…and because we have 
our own structure for work, we have technical staff, educated and trained 
leaders.17 
  
 For this research, I have concentrated on those communities and 
associations located in the area of direct and indirect impact of Project 
Mirador that are also part of the federation. I include two associations 
that are members of the FESZCH, although their positions towards 
large-scale mining are quite different. The communities and associations 
that participated in this research include: the Asociación Shuar El Pangui, 
which supports the mining company and includes all the communities 
that belong to the parish of Guismi (Paquintza, Certero, San Andrés, and 
Santiago Paty) as well as two others that belong to the parish of 
Tundayme (San Carlos Numpai and Etsa) and Asociación Shuar 
Kakaram, which is a very strong opponent of the mining company and 
only includes the communities of Churuwia and Yanúa, which belong to 
the parish of Tundayme. In figure 4.2, I illustrate the structure of the 
federation with respect to the associations and communities included in 
this study: 
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Figure 4.2 
Structure of the FESZCH and Associations and Communities in this Study 
 
 
Source: Fieldwork Information. Consuelo Fernández-Salvador 
 
4.3.1  The Heart of the Shuar Political Organization: The 
Communities 
The centros or communities are the most basic form of organization 
among the Shuar and they constitute the raison d’etre of the federation. 
Clearly, the communities are the places where everyday life happens and, 
thus, the work of the federation is directed towards the well-being of the 
people living in them. While a century ago the notion of communities 
did not have any meaning to the Shuar because they lived in scattered 
households (Harner 1978; Rubenstein 2005; Salazar 1977), they are now 
important spaces for the everyday reproduction of culture and for the 
construction of a Shuar identity, however changing it may be.  
Scholars have given much attention to the importance of 
communities as physical and symbolic spaces for the construction of 
identity and the discourses related to it (Bolaños 2011; Cheng et al. 
2003). They have also discussed the relevance of communities in the 
130 CHAPTER 4 
 
definition of collective identities as a form of cultural politics. They are 
part of those discourses and actions that are fundamental to the control 
of the environment and the resources in it, notions of development, 
access and rights to land, and so forth (Murray Li 2000; Perreault 2003; 
Vadjunec et al. 2011). Murray Li, for example, describes the process of 
articulation of an indigenous identity among local communities in their 
resistance to building a dam project in Lake Lindu, Indonesia (2000). 
Shuar communities have definitely played an important political role 
since their creation and, thus, they make an excellent case study in the 
field of cultural politics. However, it is also important to acknowledge 
that, as Escobar argues, the community is no longer an obviously defined 
and culture-bound place; rather, it has become a scenario for complex 
relations of power and a hybridization of cultural practices as a result of 
trans-local relationships. Shuar communities are also an example of these 
changing scenarios and complexity (Escobar 2001: 146). These are 
precisely some of the issues that I will address more fully in the chapter 
on identity discourses and practices and the discussion on community 
change, transformation, and the relationship to the territory. For now, I 
will focus on a description of the construction of and aspects of 
everyday living in a Shuar community in the area around Project 
Mirador; this will provide as an insight into the complexity of issues 
addressed above. The loss of land and the constant contact with colonos 
for the past six decades have had a profound impact on the life in the 
communities and this is shown, for example, in the changes in 
subsistence practices and the high levels of mobility among the 
population. These issues have also shaped the way the Shuar perceive 
themselves and how they construct discourses and political strategies 
related to mining.  
Communities are the foundation of the whole Shuar political 
organization; they legitimize the federation’s authorities and also have 
their own leadership structures. Although the federation is at the highest 
level of the organizational hierarchy, communities and associations have 
complete autonomy to make decisions and even have ties and work with 
external actors, such as government institutions and NGOs. The level of 
authority of the community leaders was made very clear to me when I 
started fieldwork in the area of Tundayme; although I had talked to the 
president of the FESZCH several times and had his permission to visit 
and do fieldwork among the communities, this did not imply that I was 
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welcomed by the local leader. In the first visit I made to the largest 
community, Churuwia, the president was not pleased by my presence 
and made it very obvious that he did not trust my intentions, despite the 
fact that I was accompanied by the president of Asociación Shuar 
Kakaram (member of the FESZCH), as advised by the president of the 
federation.  
Furthermore, while it makes sense that the federation should be in 
charge of creating projects for the communities (such as electricity, 
housing, etc.), due to its ability to negotiate and lobby with higher level 
government institutions and different types of organizations, in reality it 
is the community leader who usually accomplishes this in conjunction 
with local institutions to actually obtain specific, concrete benefits for the 
communities. As discussed above, while the federation is considered to 
be an important actor within the high-level political scene, the 
community leaders are the ones in charge of the everyday work which, in 
the end, is more fruitful for the people in the centros. Those who have 
inserted themselves into the system and are persistent enough will tend 
to achieve benefits for their communities.  
4.3.2  Life in a Shuar Community in the Area of Project Mirador 
The reality of living in a Shuar community is very complex and defies 
stereotypical notions of tight and cohesive spaces. However, as I 
explained above, communities are still important to the construction of 
notions of identity and maintaining family ties, as part of a changing way 
of “being Shuar” in a mestizo society. Therefore, in this section, I 
present a basic picture of the life of the people of the communities. I 
describe the composition of the the communities, their subsistence 
practices, and their relationship to the land. Hopefully, this will offer a 
view of the diversity that exists among Shuar communities and provide a 
background for the different dynamics that are at play in the area around 
Mirador, in terms of political identities and practices. 
 When I started to visit Shuar communities, I realized that each one 
was highly unique in terms of history, territory, views of large-scale 
mining, and experiences and perspectives on other issues like 
development, modernity, and so forth. 
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Map 4.1 
Project Mirador and Shuar Communities in the Study 
 
Source: Instituto de Geografía USFQ 
 
I also confirmed what I had heard at the beginning from certain leaders: 
while the company had given money both to the federation and the state 
to supposedly promote local development, it was obvious that the 
communities had been left out. Most of them still lack sewage systems, 
drinking water, and adequate electricity, just as the strategic plan of the 
FESZCH reports.  
 While some communities are located right along the main highway 
that connects Zamora to the other Amazonian provinces, others have 
very difficult access because they are located across the rivers (San Carlos 
is located across the Zamora River, while Churuwia and Etsa are located 
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across the Kimi River). Since there are no roads connecting these 
communities, they must be accessed by boat or waiting for the tide to go 
down and wading through the water, then finally walking along a foot-
path for 20 minutes or more (see map 4.1).  
 
 
 
Community of Certero: several houses are located across the centre of the community, and 
on the edge of the highway 
Photograph: Consuelo Fernández-Salvador 
 
Communities like Churuwia and Paquintza have large areas of land, 
allowing the families to live in a somewhat scattered way, each occupying 
their own farm. However, San Andrés, Certero and Santiago Paty have a 
town-like distribution with much smaller plots of land (see Tables 4.2 
and 4.3 for land extensions). Furthermore, in some of the communities, 
like Etsa and Churuwia, some members do not actually live in the 
community but rather in towns like Tundayme or El Pangui and visit 
their farms regularly when they are not working in the mine. On the 
contrary, in San Andrés and Santiago Paty, people have migrated from 
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communities in Morona Santiago and only occasionally return to their 
original homes to work and visit their families. These are just a few 
examples of the diversity in the constitution of the communities in the 
area of Mirador which I will discuss in this section. The overall goal of 
providing this description is to describe the complexity of the area and 
thus be able to contextualize some of the conflicts surrounding the 
communities, their relationship to the mining company, and their 
position towards large-scale mining itself. 
 
 
 
Walking bridge to access the communities of Churuwia and Etsa 
Photograph: Erika Rosado 
  
 As discussed in the historical section of this chapter, the Shuar 
traditionally engaged in certain practices like hunting, fishing, and some 
horticulture in order to survive. In the process of colonization, the Shuar 
lost much of their territory to the mestizos who came from the highlands 
(for different reasons and in a variety of ways, some legal, some not) and 
this, combined with state policies regarding the use of land, forced them 
to make dramatic changes in their livelihoods, as was mentioned above. 
Furthermore, the notions of modernity, progress, and development 
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introduced by the state and more generally by mestizo society have also 
altered ideas about livelihood and well-being. All the changes brought 
about by the incorporation of the Shuar to national life have forced them 
to look elsewhere in order to ensure their well-being. As a community 
leader said when talking about his work in the mining company, “they, 
the mestizos, imposed a new way of life on us and now we are forced to 
compete with them for resources and money.”18 Thus, their livelihoods 
no longer depend on their use of resources in their territory as they used 
to know it; rather, they depend on having the means to participate in a 
market economy for basic needs like buying food they cannot produce in 
their land, paying for transportation, sending their children to school, 
and so forth.  
 During fieldwork, references to hunting, fishing, and gathering fruits 
from the forest usually came up when discussing the elders’ survival 
strategies and practices. Eventually, some people mentioned that if they 
wanted to go hunting they would have to do it in forests that are located 
outside the communities, for example in the area of the Cordillera del 
Cóndor (in the case of the communities around Tundayme). The most 
common option for people to secure their basic needs is to practice 
small-scale agriculture that, in some cases, is used for subsistence and in 
others is commercialized (See Table 4.1). The most important products 
that are traditionally part of the Shuar diet are the plantain (plátano verde), 
manioc, corn, and garden vegetables, all of which are consumed on a 
daily basis.  For example, manioc can also be used to make the 
traditional chicha beverage (although from my experience in the 
communities, not all families still practice this tradition), while cocoa and 
coffee are usually grown for commercialization. Most families also grow 
chickens and pigs, and several communities have gotten involved in 
projects (either with the company or the provincial government) to raise 
fish (in aquaculture tanks) and guinea pigs. Although in some areas the 
Shuar began utilizing their land as pasture for livestock, this was not the 
case in most communities in the area of study, probably because of the 
limited size of the land.  
Besides these basic subsistence practices, how do people from the 
communities complement their family economy and obtain money to be 
able to pay for other services? At the artisanal or small-scale level and at 
the industrial level, mining is an important source of income for Shuar 
families. In four of the communities in which I completed this research, 
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people reported carrying out some kind of artisanal mining, either 
directly mining the rock in the mountains or dredging the rivers. For 
example, in one of the communities of the study, the president 
confirmed that most people participate in some kind of mining: “in this 
community, we are all miners, because we need to educate our 
children…we sell around 5 grams to 10 grams of gold in a month, at $30 
each gram.” 19  Nevertheless, it is hard to obtain more accurate 
information about exactly how many people are involved in mining 
activities since they do not want to identify themselves as artisanal 
miners.20 Large-scale mining, on the other hand, has provided a new 
source of income for many families in most communities. Even if the 
official position of some of the leaders is anti-mining, that does not 
prohibit the community members from working for the company. As 
shown in Table 4.1, at least four or five people were working in ECSA in 
almost every community at the time of the research, except in San 
Andrés and San Carlos. Etsa and Churuwia are the communities with the 
greatest number of community members working in the company. This 
is because Etsa has shown strong support for large-scale mining in 
Mirador, and the numerous mine workers in Churuwia belong to one of 
the families living in Tundayme which is in a position of conflict with the 
current president (who strongly resists the company). Still, these 
numbers are not stable and many people are quite flexible regarding their 
work. Some might grow tired of the working conditions in the company 
and shift to other jobs and even become strong opponents to Project 
Mirador, as in Yanúa’s case.  
 According to the Strategic Plan of Asociación Shuar El Pangui, 5 per 
cent of the total population of the 13 member communities obtain some 
income from cattle raising, 2 per cent from other small animal raising 
(guinea pigs, chickens, etc.), 48 per cent from subsistence agriculture and 
some commercialization, and 45 per cent from paid jobs, although there 
is no specific mention of work in the mining companies (Asociación 
Shuar El Pangui, Plan Estratégico 2011-2015: 65). As shown in tables 4.2 
and 4.3, most communities do not have large areas of land, except for 
Churuwia, considering the amount of people living there. Thus, in order 
make a living and have access to cash most people have to combine 
agricultural work on their farms with mining work or other paid activities 
like carpentry, masonry, or other kinds of labor outside their 
communities. 
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Table 4.1 
Economic Activities 
Community Economic Activities People Working in 
ECSA 
Churuwia - Subsistence agriculture: manioc, plantain, corn, 
yampeen, or taro 
- Artisanal mining (in the mountains in the 
community): gold commercialization 
- Some cattle raising and sale 
- Small productive projects to raise chickens and 
guinea pigs provided by ECSA 
Approx. 10-12 
people. Most of 
those who work or 
had worked for 
ECSA were members 
of one family living 
in Tundayme   
Etsa - Subsistence agriculture: Manioc, plantain, corn, 
yampeen, and beans  
- Sporadic hunting 
- Tilapia farms, chickens, and guinea pigs  
- Some cattle raising and sale 
Approx.13 people 
including the 
leader, his brother, 
and their children  
Yanúa - Subsistence agriculture: manioc, plantain, and 
fruit trees 
- Some cocoa and coffee for commercialization 
- Small tilapia farms 
- Some hunting, fishing, and gathering in the 
forest   
- Paid work outside the community 
-3 brothers of the 
same family worked 
there until 2010 
-5 members 
currently work in 
ECSA 
San Carlos 
Numpay 
- Subsistence agriculture: manioc, plantain, and 
corn 
- Animal raising: chickens and tilapia farms 
- Artisanal mining (using dredges in rivers) 
No members work in 
the mining company 
Paquintza - Subsistence agriculture: fruit trees, plantain, 
corn, and manioc  
- Cocoa (for commercialization) 
- Sporadic hunting 
5 people including 
the leaders 
Santiago 
Paty 
- Subsistence agriculture: only small gardens with 
some manioc, corn, and vegetables (yampeen, 
tomatoes, lettuce)/small animal raising  
- Sporadic hunting 
- Sporadic work in the municipality or offices of 
the parish council 
-Artisanal mining (using dredges in rivers) 
6 people 
San Andrés 
 
- Subsistence agriculture: Plantain, manioc, 
banana, beans, and sweet potato. Some people 
have to rent out some plots of land outside the 
community to farm.   
- Some fishing and hunting  
- A variety of paid jobs, carpentry, masonry,  
No members 
working in the 
mining company 
Certero - Subsistence agriculture: Manioc, sweet potato, 
plantain, cocoa and other vegetables  
- Animal raising: pigs and chickens  
- Artisanal mining (using dredges in rivers) 
4 people 
Source: Fieldwork Interviews. Consuelo Fernández-Salvador 
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I often had to return to the communities many times to finally locate 
community leaders in order to be able to speak with them. While at the 
beginning I had expected to find them working on their farms, I quickly 
learned that they were usually out, either working in the mining company 
or completing odd jobs to supplement their income.  
 
Table 4.2 
Basic Description of the Communities in the Parish of Tundayme 
 
Community Land Size (Hectares) No. of Members Legal Status 
Churuwia: 
“communal or 
global title deed” 
which includes 
Mirador and Etsa. 
In this case, there 
are no individual 
title deeds. 
3,800 Hectares Approx. 100 
members, 
descendants of 
the original 
owner of the 
land and his 
first wife. 
Created in the 1960s 
but obtained legal 
status in 2008. 
Etsa split from 
Churuwia and 
became a legally 
recognized 
“barrio”, while 
sharing Churuwia’s 
title deed. 
Total of 75 hectares 
divided among 3 siblings. 
Only 4 hectares are 
dedicated to communal 
use. 
25 members 
(descendants of 
two siblings), 
including 
children who 
live in 
Tundayme/El 
Pangui 
Legally recognized 
as a “barrio” 
(neighborhood) in 
2008. 
Yanúa was 
established on the 
family’s inherited 
land but does not 
have legal status. 
18 hectares Approx. 90 
people, 
descendants of 
12 siblings. 
Does not have legal 
status as a 
community 
San Carlos Numpay 
was established on 
the territory 
owned by an 
extended family. 
680 hectares of which 
approx. 70 are occupied 
by mestizos 
Approx. 70 
members 
Holds legal status 
since 2006 but it 
does not have a 
“global title deed”. 
Source: Fieldwork Interviews. Consuelo Fernández-Salvador 
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Table 4.3 
Basic Description of the Communities in the Parish of El Guismi 
Community Land Size (Hectares) No. of Members Legal Status 
San Francisco de 
Paquintza, was 
founded in 1965 by 
the siblings living 
in the land. 
Originally the 
community had approx. 
1120 ha. In the 1980s it 
was divided and now it 
only has 352 ha. 
103 people 
(belonging to the 
family who 
originally owned 
the land 
 (Strategic Plan 
ASEP). 
The larger 
community was 
divided in the 
eighties and the 
community has 
legal status since 
2008 
Santiago Paty is a 
small community 
created after 
Paquintza was 
divided. 
11/2 (one and a half) 
ha. as “global title 
deed” for the whole 
community, plus 300 
has that belong to the 
original owners of 
Paquintza (who 
donated the land to 
Santiago Paty). 
88 people 
(Strategic Plan 
ASEP) 
Most of the 
members in SP 
have migrated 
from communities 
in Morona 
Santiago, and 
some have even 
bought their land 
in SP. 
The community 
obtained legal 
status when the 
land was donated 
for its creation in 
2001. 
San Andrés, is a 
small community 
(barrio) created 
after Paquintza 
was divided. 
1 ha. as “global title 
deed” plus 
27 hectares that 
belong to the person 
who donated land to 
create the community. 
85 people 
(Strategic Plan 
ASEP) 
Members from San 
Andrés bought 
their plots of 
land. They have 
migrated mostly 
from Morona 
Santiago. 
The community 
acquired legal 
status in 2006 
when the owner 
of a farm that 
belonged to 
Paquintza donated 
a small portion for 
its creation. 
Certero, is the 
fourth community 
created after the 
division of 
Paquintza. 
18 ha. 55 people 
(Strategic Plan 
ASEP). They are 
part of the 
leader’s family. 
The leader was 
directly related to 
the family in 
Paquintza. 
2007 
Source: Fieldwork Interviews. Consuelo Fernández-Salvador 
 
In regard to subsistence strategies, the situation is more critical in 
communities like San Andrés, Santiago Paty and Yanúa where the land is 
scarcer. With most members in the first two communities having very 
limited space to plant orchards or to raise small animals (plots are usually 
15 by 30 m), they are usually forced to either rent land for agricultural 
activities or work other paid jobs, usually in El Pangui. The situation in 
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Yanúa is also complicated because the communty’s 18 hectares are 
divided between 10 families (which, in reality, leaves only a little more 
than 1 hectare per family) and some of these plots are flooded every time 
the river rises, which makes it impossible to utilize them for growing 
crops.  
This brief description on how the Shuar make a living in the 
communities around Mirador points to important issues that will be 
discussed throughout this thesis, such as the relationship to the land, the 
changing composition of the communities, and the changes and conflicts 
that the communities have suffered throughout the years. It also shows 
that both Shuar people and leaders have intersectional identities. As 
described above, some identify themselves as artisanal miners while 
others have strong ties to ECSA because they work in it and are involved 
in community projects sponsored by the company. Other community 
members are not as attached to the life in the communities because they 
work or go to school elsewhere. These and other interlocking categories, 
such as age and status (especially in the case of federation leaders), will 
be further discussed in this chapter when addressing the positions of 
status of federation leaders. I will also touch on these themes in Chapter 
5 when analyzing the diversity of discourses and positions of the Shuar 
in relation to mining.  
I conclude this section by highlighting some important differences 
shown in the chart. After reviewing the land distribution among the 
Shuar communities in this area, the discrepancies in size between 
communities is quite obvious. However, this is not necessarily the only 
difference between these communities. For example, some communities 
like Churuwia were formed in the 1960s and, although the community 
had a title deed for the land, it was only recently legalized as an 
indigenous community by the Council for the Development of 
Nacionalities and Pueblos of Ecuador (CODENPE—Consejo de Desarrollo 
de las Nacionalidades y Pueblos del Ecuador).21 Others, like Yanúa, may not 
even comply with the pre-requisites to be officially considered a 
community because they do not have enough land or members to 
become one. Finally, smaller communities like Santiago Paty and San 
Andrés are the result of the division of one larger community, Paquintza, 
which arose out of several organizational conflicts. In the chapter on 
identity discourses and practices, I will follow up on a discussion of how 
the communities that were established a few decades ago have suffered 
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important transformations in terms of community structure, subsistence 
practices, mobility, and territory. In the next section, I discuss the role of 
the associations and their engagement with the federation and the 
communities as part of the Shuar political organization. 
4.3.3  The Role of the Associations 
The associations are second-level organizations within the Shuar political 
structure that directly agglutinate communities from a specific political-
administrative unit. In the case of Asociación Shuar el Pangui (founded 
in 2009), by 2011 it came to include 15 communities that belong to three 
different parishes within the canton of El Pangui: El Guismi, Tundayme, 
and El Pangui (Strategic Plan, Asociación Shuar El Pangui, 2011). Of 
these communities, only those that are considered to be in the area of 
direct or indirect impact of Project Mirador are part of this study: 
Paquintza, Santiago Paty, San Andrés, and Certero (which belong to the 
parish of El Guismi) and San Carlos Numpai and Etsa (which belong to 
the parish of Tundayme). The associations have a hierarchical structure 
similar to the federation (although we will see that Asociación Shuar 
Kakaram is not as structured as others) and they have complete 
autonomy, which means that they can independently promote and 
develop projects in favor of the communities without depending on 
funding or approval from the federation. Associations are formed by the 
general assembly (Asamblea General, in which all members from the 
communities participate and make decisions) and the board of directors, 
which includes a president, vice-president, secretary, treasurer and other 
board members (in the case of Asociación Shuar El Pangui, there are 
eight other executive members in charge of different areas). All board 
members are all elected by the general assembly; as in the case of the 
federation, the leaders who work for the associations do not receive a 
salary, which sometimes means that they might not be fully commited in 
their work for the association.  
The work of the associations is specifically intended to benefit the 
welfare of the communities. In many cases, this involves first legalizing 
each community and its authorities. The Asociación Shuar El Pangui has 
concentrated much of its efforts to promote and fund community 
development projects. As mentioned by a former president of the 
association, the two most important institutions providing financial aid 
in the past have been the Ecuadorian Fund for the Populorum 
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Progressio (FEPP—Fondo Ecuatoriano Populorum Progressio, a private 
foundation) and ECSA. In earlier agreements with the Canadian 
company in charge of exploration, the federation negogiated that the 
company should hire   Shuar people from the communities to work in 
the company (according to a former president of Asociación Shuar El 
Pangui, they agreed that 30 per cent of the employees should be hired 
from Shuar communities). The agreement also included company 
investments in technical training, education, and productive projects 
(such as cacao plantations and aquaculture). However, the relationship 
and agreements established with ECSA regarding funding for these 
projects came to an end after the Chinese company CRCC-Tonguan 
bought the shares from ECSA in 2012 and the FESZCH elected new 
leadership, thus forcing the association to seek other ways to generate 
funds. As such, the association’s leadership in has concentrated its 
efforts on developing Shuar communities in material terms and has 
developed strong ties to the mining company. In words of the vice-
president (former president):  
 
Well, as representative of the community where I live, according to the 
Life Plan22 that we have made, the basic services would have to be 
implemented by the municipality and parish councils, while the provincial 
council would have to be in charge of large infrastructure, roads, sports 
fields, and all that, work for the development of the Shuar people so that 
we can overcome extreme poverty. To create businesses within the 
communities, for example we can talk about big projects like producing 
cacao, making chocolate, or for example do pisciculture. Where people 
from the communities can produce things and be part of big projects, that 
is why we have supported Ecuacorriente.23 
 
Although the structure of Asociación Shuar El Pangui appears to be 
solid, part of the diagnosis carried out to inform the association’s 
strategic plan points out several weaknesses: low levels of participation 
both at the association and community level, lack of management 
abilities of the leadership which resulted in limited capacity to negotiate 
funding and implement projects, and some disintegration and lack of 
coordination among the leaders. I witnessed some examples of the lack 
of coordination and interest to participate in several of the association’s 
meetings that I attended. One was held at the end of February 2013 and 
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was directed by the president of the FESZCH. While there are over 200 
members who belong to the association, I was surprised to notice that 
only approximately 30 attended, making it impossible for them to reach 
quorum and vote for their new authorities, which was the main objective 
of the meeting (even some presidents of the communities that belong to 
the association were absent). The second meeting was held in January 
2014 and was organized by the president to go over planning matters 
and issues relevant to the communities. Again, many community 
presidents were absent and, more importantly, aside from the president, 
no members of the board of directors were present. This lack of interest 
(even on the part of the leadership itself) was actually addressed by the 
president of the association who complained harshly to the people 
attending the meeting. The reasons for this lack of participation might 
have been related to general disenchantment with the association: many 
feel that the association is not fulfilling its duties to work for the benefit 
of the communities. In several conversations with leaders from different 
communities, it was clear that they were disappointed in the association’s 
leadership. They thought that the association should be stronger 
organizationally (some leaders even questioned why the association did 
not even have an office of its own) and help communities meet their 
most basic needs. Ultimately, this is precisely the reason why the 
association was created. 
Despite a certain lack of collaborative work with the communities, the 
Asociación Shuar El Pangui does have a formal structure, a space for 
offices and meetings (rented out or “borrowed” from a Shuar family in 
El Pangui), and it had developed a “Life Plan” (with an extensive 
assessment of the communities) to be implemented. Unfortunately, there 
were always complaints from the communities regarding the lack of 
attention and even accusations of corruption directed at the former 
leaders of the association.  
It is worth noting that Asociación Shuar Kakaram is very different 
from Asociación Shuar el Pangui; it took me several months to 
understand the dynamics of this association and the way it operated. To 
begin with, while it was obvious that Asociación Shuar El Pangui had its 
base in El Pangui, integrating communities from this canton, Asociación 
Shuar Kakaram is not formally based in Tundayme (the parish to which 
its communities belong) or any other location. While this association has 
a board of directors, its president is a not a resident of Tundayme or any 
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of surrounding communities (he lives in the city of El Pangui). 
Additionally, the association is made up of only two communities which 
belong to the parish of Tundayme: Churuwia (which had been divided 
into two sub-communities) and Yanúa, which was still struggling to be 
legally recognized as a community.  
The lack of consistency in the structure of Asociación Shuar Kakaram 
is probably related to the fact that it was created in response to specific 
contextual events and for a particular purpose. Its president describes the 
creation of Asociación Shuar Kakaram as necessary to fight for and 
claim the territory around Project Mirador. During a violent 
confrontation between the supporters and detractors of the project in 
2006, the future president of Kakaram realized that the only way to 
recuperate the territory was through an official legal position which 
could be established through the creation of an association that would 
unify communities opposed to the mining project. In 2007, the 
Asociación Shuar Kakaram was legally created. At the time of its 
founding, it was made up of only one community in the area, Churuwia, 
which itself was legally recognized in 2008.24 Yanúa (which was still not 
legally recognized as a community at the conclusion of my research) 
became part of the asociation later on, although in the 2006 
confrontation the family living there had fought in favor of the 
company.  
Asociación Shuar Kakaram’s most important objective is quite 
different from that of Asociación Shuar El Pangui: it seeks to reclaim 
some territory for the Shuar. Its president is very clear about the 
importance of recuperating territory in relation to the kind of well-being 
(or buen vivir, as he called it) they seek:   
The association’s plan is the following: we are looking for buen vivir, to 
defend our territory; we are not looking for the development that mestizos 
want, with all respect, but our development is not that, we want buen vivir, 
and that is to have good territory, to raise manioc, plantain, corn, chickens, 
all that we can produce, that is buen vivir…and the farm, to be able to 
educate our children…that is our development. We don’t want big 
highways, we just want to be able to get our products out to sell them, that 
is why we claim our territory back, our ancestral territory from our 
grandparents.25 
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 These differences in objectives have determined the way the 
associations work as well as the ties that they have established to 
accomplish their objectives. While Asociación Shuar El Pangui has 
worked with the mining company to establish agreements and negotiate 
benefits for the communities, Asociación Shuar Kakaram has established 
relationships with other actors like Acción Ecológica that have been part 
of an active but unsuccessful resistance against the presence of the 
company. Shuar leaders from Morona Santiago and mestizo 
representatives of regional and local organizations defending the 
environment from extractive practices are also important actors in this 
resistance. While Asociación Shuar El Pangui seems to be more 
consolidated in terms of its structure and its members, Asociación Shuar 
Kakaram appears to be more fragile in terms of its support, which is 
based on only two communities. In fact, the president’s discourse of 
resistance was echoed only by a leader from Yanúa. This apparently weak 
demonstration of support from the communities that make up the 
association demonstrates the diverse and changing reactions and 
positions that I have observed at every level of the Shuar Federation, and 
which will be discussed at length in chapter 5 on discourses and political 
practices.  
After examining the ways in which the communities and associations 
are structured, as well as some of the ways that they have positioned 
themselves regarding large-scale mining, I will now discuss the federation 
itself. In the last part of this chapter, I will discuss the ethno-politics of 
the federation, including their political objectives, possible political 
strategies, and the main areas of conflict within the federation and with 
external actors in the context of large-scale mining. 
4.4  The Ethno-Politics of the Shuar Federation 
As described earlier, the FESZCH is an organization whose leaders take 
pride in not belonging to any other organizations that might limit their 
decision-making abilities or their capability to negotiate with other 
actors. As such, the leaders in the federation consider themselves to be 
pragmatic and not necessarily tied to a particular political ideology. The 
president of the FESZCH stated, “We work differently from CONAIE 
which says, ‘No, we don’t want that project, we don’t agree …’ We at the 
FESZCH are more pragmatic, open to having a dialogue.”26 Thus, they 
are free to associate themselves with any kind of institution or company, 
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as long as the ultimate objective of such relationships is to contribute to 
local development. As is the case with many leaders in the communities 
and in the associations, the leaders of the FESZCH are interested in 
encouraging some form of entrepreneurship by taking advantage of the 
resources available in their territory (in this case mining) and of new 
technology.  
According to the Strategic Plan, the federation’s chief objective is to 
plan, design, and manage projects that are oriented towards community 
development of the Shuar people in Zamora Chinchipe (2016). In 
accordance with this plan, over the past twenty years the FESZCH has 
worked to legalize the Shuar territory, protect Shuar culture, consolidate 
the federation itself, and to improve the communities’ health, education, 
and infrastructure. However, in the federation’s discourse, the most 
immediate concern is the level of poverty in the Shuar communities: 
according to the Strategic Plan, 98 per cent of Shuar families live in 
extreme poverty. The federation considers this extreme situation to be a 
consequence of discrimination and exclusion from the state. As such, the 
federation’s efforts are primarily directed towards satisfying the 
community’s most basic needs including access to water and electricity.  
Beyond the details of the FESZCH’s projects and goals, the Strategic 
Plan includes two additional main points of the Shuar federation’s ethno-
politics and official discourse that should be included in this analysis. 
One point revolves around the importance of defending the collective 
rights of the Shuar people, which includes the right to protect their 
ancestral culture and territory.27 In fact, in the current 2016 Strategic 
Plan, some of the policies to be implemented are related to the 
legalization of territory as well as the initiation of new education 
programs (Strategic Plan 2016). Additionally, the most immediate 
concerns for the FESZCH and its leaders mostly revolve around 
securing material benefits and facilitating community development.28 In 
the same plan, two policies make explicit reference to jobs for Shuar 
people; these policies specifically refer to creating jobs in the mining 
project of Fruta del Norte (south of Project Mirador) and developing 
small businesses to become service suppliers for the mining companies. 
While the notion of protecting the ancestral territory was a recurrent 
element of the federation’s discourse and the issue of recovering territory 
lost in the colonization process was certainly mentioned by the leaders in 
many interviews, the possibility of negotiating further agreements with 
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the mining companies was the most important concern for many leaders 
(at the community, association, and federation levels) because this would 
mean immediately securing subsistence and possibilities for 
development. 29  Furthermore, the federation had no ties with 
environmental organizations and had only a few ties with other types of 
organizations to carry out community income generating projects, such 
as the FEPP and the German organization GTZ (German Cooperation 
Agency—Agencia Alemana de Cooperación),for the most part, funding and 
projects had been negotiated with the mining companies at different 
moments in the past. This was the case of ECSA in Project Mirador and 
Kinross-Aurelian in Project Fruta del Norte. 
In reference to the discussion of ethno-politics, several authors 
(Bolaños 2011; Gros 1999; Warren and Jackson 2005) have pointed out 
that indigenous peoples like the Shuar utilize their ethnic identities in 
their political struggles as a strategy to deal with subsistence and 
inclusion issues and are interested in achieving “goals more explicitly 
development oriented” (Warren and Jackson 2005: 554). The protection 
of traditions, language, and even ancestral territory may be, in some 
cases, secondary to or at least not as urgent as issues of basic everyday 
subsistence. In such cases, the notions of a marginal existence are part of 
the ethnic reaffirmation of a group: it is not only about sharing history, 
traditions, language, and culture, rather it is mostly about sharing 
experiences of racism and exclusion from a mostly mestizo society 
(Selverston-Scher 2001: 21).  
Other academics studying the indigenous movement in Ecuador have 
pointed out that, while many indigenous movements have resisted neo-
liberal practices because they consider them damaging to indigenous 
people, others have negotiated with state institutions and international 
organizations which were, to different degrees, related to these same 
“neo-liberal junctures and ideologies” (Martínez Novo 2009: 11). Thus, 
instead of seeking structural and social changes, many indigenous leaders 
have integrated themselves into a system that has encouraged the 
development of a docile subject, what Hale refers to as the “permitted 
Indian” (DeHart 2008; Hale 2004). Rather than looking for real, long-
term social change, indigenous leaders may only seek out short-term 
development projects and funds (Bretón 2013; Santana 2004).  
While this analysis is interesting and highly applicable to some of the 
work and objectives developed by the FESZCH, it is also true that both 
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discourses and strategies are part of a complex scenario in which basic 
issues of well-being and subsistence are at stake.  In the chapter on 
identity discourses, for example, it will become clear that together with 
notions of ancestrality and the territory, the history of marginality 
suffered by the Shuar has prompted them to define strategies to demand 
those material benefits long-denied by the state, just as Selverston-Scher 
has argued (2001). Furthermore, this complex scenario is also riddled 
with notions of modernity and development with which the Shuar 
constantly negotiate as part of their interactions with the mestizo world. 
The fact that the FESZCH has maintained interest in developing and 
maintaining their relationship with the mining companies shows both a 
need and desire to secure certain benefits (usually associated with jobs 
and productive projects) for the community, but also to achieve the level 
of development promised by these companies and the state.  This, 
however, does not mean that they will necessarily settle for short-term 
solutions (although some needs are very urgent); several community and 
federation leaders insist that they should focus on long-term projects 
that could actually help them transform their living conditions and their 
children’s futures, rather than on solutions that temporarily pacify them:  
That is why we have told the companies that we don’t want to sign a 
regular agreement with them but an agreement of impact-benefit for the 
Shuar people. What does that mean? It is a Life Plan that the Shuar 
Federation has…all the needs that the communities have are in that 
plan…so we want to sign a long-term and macro-agreement throughout 
the duration of the mining project, not an agreement each year, and with 
that I think we can solve the main problems and needs that the Shuar 
people have.30 
 Similarly, the Churuwia community president was very critical of the 
small productive projects offered by ECSA; he argued that the kind of 
projects that the company has designed will not help them solve 
important development issues. Instead of having productive projects, he 
would rather see the construction of a bridge that would allow people in 
the community to have access to the main road to facilitate the 
transportation of their products. In his words, “I am interested in 
projects like building a bridge to connect the community to the road, a 
project that is worth millions of dollars…I am not interested in projects 
to raise chickens, which really don’t solve anything, we already raise 
chickens and that doesn’t solve our problems.”31  
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The scenario is complex: on one hand, the federation has built its 
ethno-political discourse and strategies based on a Shuar identity that 
places great importance on the ancestral culture and territory; on the 
other hand, the Shuar people and the federation itself want to be part of 
the modern national society and their demands are mostly based on 
notions of development imported by the mestizo society. Thus, issues of 
territory, culture, and language are less urgent when the population lacks 
access roads, electricity, and drinking water, especially with the presence 
of large-scale mining in the area. Furthermore, once the leaders have 
access to funds from the extractive projects, questions related to the use 
of those funds for community well-being, potential conflicts, and 
consistency between the organization’s discourses and actual practices 
become pertinent. According to Martínez-Novo in her review on the 
research of indigenous organizations in Ecuador (2009), these issues 
should be explored more in depth; I explore this research gap in the next 
section and chapters.  
4.4.1  Negotiating with the Mining Company: Changing 
Circumstances and Conflicts in the Shuar Federation 
Everyone in the city of Zamora knows where the offices of the 
FESZCH are located, so I had no trouble finding them the first time I 
visited. It is clear that the federation is an important actor in the political 
scene of the city and province; this was made evident to me throughout 
my research. However, there was a noticeable change in the work 
dynamics and organization of the federation between the beginning of 
my fieldwork in late 2013 to the last visits I made in 2015. My general 
impression during the first period was that the federation leaders were 
extremely active and their offices were bustling. There were usually at 
least one or two leaders working at their desks on the first floor, 
especially focused on issues of education or territory; the president was 
constantly meeting with diverse individuals: members and leaders from 
the communities and associations, government officials, and the 
federation’s own technical staff or its leaders. I often had to wait for him 
to return from a meeting or a community in order to interview him.  
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Leaders of the FESZCH working at their office 
Photograph: Consuelo Fernández-Salvador 
 
 In one of the first interviews with the president of the FESZCH, I 
learned that the federation’s offices had been built with money given by 
ECSA as part of an agreement with the federation. These offices were 
located in a modern, fully-equipped, three-story building. On the first 
floor, there were six desks, each with a computer that belonged to the 
leaders in charge of specific objective areas such as land and territory, 
health, education, and so forth. The office of the president of the 
federation, a reception area, and a small staff office were located on the 
second floor. The third floor housed offices for the technical staff, 
which were also used as classrooms for training sessions. 
However, the first impression of a busy and active organization soon 
started fading away as the funds from the mining companies (especially 
ECSA and Kinross Aurelian) began to run out. The personnel who were 
in charge of accounting or the technical department were let go and 
there was no budget to pay for basic services, including electricity (I 
learned later that these services were financed by Kinross Aurelian). By 
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the middle of my fieldwork, I began visiting the president in the old 
offices of the federation, which were located in a small, deteriorated 
house in Zamora. One of the last times I visited the new building I did 
not see any of the computers or equipment nor the leaders or previous 
staff members.  
This description of the changes that the federation had suffered 
during the last three years poignantly illustrates the shift in their 
relationship with the mining companies. The stability and strength of the 
FESZCH depended heavily upon the companies’ economic support; 
thus, it is very important to understand the way it has been functioning 
in the context of a large-scale mining project: the changes in the 
relationship with the mining companies and the conflicts among the 
members of the federation generated by the presence of the mining 
project. Again, the FESZCH had supported and encouraged the 
presence of large-scale mining in Zamora Chinchipe and had negogiated 
various agreements with the mining companies. From 2007-2010, ECSA 
made financial contributions to the federation (Internal Document-
ECSA) and Kinross Aurelian was contributing to certain projects and 
even paying for the federation to operate its offices in Zamora32 until 
2015; however, in that year, the federation began to experience an 
economic crisis. While poor administration might have been responsible 
for some of this crisis, the federation lost much of the funding from the 
mining companies and is now struggling to find resources even for small 
projects or to maintain basic infrastructure for the federation itself.  
The changes in the way mining companies and the federation 
negotiate is the result of new state and company policies. To begin with, 
new laws gave the state more power over the regulation of extractive 
practices in the country, afforded the state a larger percentage of the 
contracts (51 per cent), and gave it a more important role in the 
redistribution of earnings. Thus, the government took on more 
responsibility in addressing local peoples’ needs, thereby simultaneously 
limiting the companies’ social programs and projects intended to meet 
the goals originally laid out in their environmental management plan.33 
Secondly, the new owners of the company (the Chinese company 
Tonguan CRCC, which bought the shares for ECSA in 2012) stopped 
any form of direct negotiation with the federation and the associations, 
arguing that the company had already paid a percentage of the royalties 
to the government in advance.34 This meant that the only benefits that 
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the affected Shuar communities would receive would be directly 
administered by the company’s department of community relations and 
would only include benefits that were detailed in the environmental 
management plan. Around June 2014, after months of silence from 
ECSA, several leaders from the federation traveled to Quito to meet 
with representatives of the company; unfortunately, they returned 
empty-handed. The company had insisted that they had already given 
funds to the government and that they could not sign any agreements 
with the federation. The leaders were extremely disappointed: “We were 
in a meeting for almost three hours and at the end they just said, thank 
you for coming but no, we can’t do anything for you.”35  
After a long period of dependence upon the mining companies’ 
funding, the FESZCH was suddenly forced to develop new relationships 
with different kinds of organizations in order to survive. Thus, they 
began to seek the aid of international organizations to help them with 
funding or specific projects. They also attempted to negotiate with 
government institutions like Ecuador Estratégico to help provide for their 
communities or to try to gain access to certain positions of power in 
order to be able to redirect resources to the Shuar communities.36  
Beyond their changing relationship with ECSA, the presence of large-
scale mining projects in the area of Zamora and the associated 
fluctuating funding opportunities have created and exacerbated conflicts 
and have made obvious issues of disjuncture or decentralization within 
the organization. In his article on the circulation of tsantsas37and power 
amongst the Shuar, Rubenstein describes the relationship between the 
Shuar people and the federation as asymmetrical and ambivalent 
(Rubenstein 2007). He argues that it is through the relationship of the 
federation to state institutions that the leaders have come to occupy 
positions of political and economic privilege, thus distancing themselves 
from the rest of the Shuar people. As such, federation leaders need to 
legitimize their access to positions of power because their “access to 
external funding makes them vulnerable to accusations of political 
ambition and corruption” (Rubenstein 2007: 381). Rubenstein refers to 
the federation (in this case the Shuar Federation in Morona, FICSH) 
mostly as a means to access status and power because of its relationship 
with state institutions. However, the FESZCH could be more accurately 
described as a means to establish relationships and negotiate with the 
mining companies. Decisions related to the management and distribution 
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of funds from the mining companies caused possible situations of 
corruption, power struggles, and conflicts.  The Asociación Shuar El 
Pangui and the Federation itself both experienced a crisis period: 
between 2007 and 2012, two different presidents were appointed to the 
FESZCH because of informal accusations and rumors of corruption 
from people within the communities. Most of the community and 
federation leaders that I interviewed about this event were very unhappy 
about the way the FESZCH and the association had administered funds 
received from the companies because they believed that they had 
inappropriately used these funds to develop the organizations instead of 
the communities.38 The FESZCH’s new, three-story building in Zamora 
evidences the overspending on the organization itself and the neglect of 
the communities, especially those located in the area of impact. 
Furthermore, there are also direct accusations of corruption, which imply 
that the money was not only inappropriately spent, but was actually 
stolen by the leaders who were in power at the time.  
This type of conflict and division has prevented some communities 
and associations from having a direct working relationship with the 
FESZCH. For example, at the time of my research, the president of the 
Asociación El Pangui (who was related to a former president of the 
FESZCH who was accused of corruption and who is also an important 
actor in the negotiation with ECSA) was not always invited to the 
meetings at the FESZCH to discuss important issues, thus leaving this 
association without the possibility of participating in decision-making 
processes. Some leaders from communities that belonged to this 
association complained of a lack of attention from the FESZCH itself. 
The president of the Etsa community (part of Asociación El Pangui) 
claimed that the federation did not seem interested in supporting his 
community, probably because he had supported the former president of 
FESZCH, who had been accused of corruption.  
Furthermore, although the Strategic Plan’s agenda is clear about the 
federation’s work and the leaders’ discourse is well-intentioned, most of 
the community leaders in this study agree that the actual consequences 
of the federation’s work still remain to be seen. While the president of 
the FESZCH praised the integrated work of the organization and the 
importance of the communities in its political structure, community 
members and leaders see no interest from the federation in their well-
being. This feeling, coupled with the information and rumors that the 
154 CHAPTER 4 
 
contributions made by the mining companies were only invested in the 
federation, have complicated the federation’s relationship with the 
communities. Churuwia’s president expressed frustration that the 
community has been forced to work independently, without the 
leadership or support from the federation: 
Most of the work we do is directly from the communities, not from the 
federation. I can say that the federation has never helped us with funds or 
projects. Hopefully the federation helps the community to improve. The 
Federation of Bomboiza (referring to the FISCH in Morona Santiago) 
used to help us but the Shuar Federation from Zamora hasn’t done 
anything for us.39  
 Others, like the president of Etsa, complain that their relationship 
with the federation leaders is distant and that they have never actually 
visited the communities to understand their needs. 40  However, the 
federation is not the only organization to disappoint the community 
leaders; for example, in the community of Certero, which is affiliated 
with the Asociación Shuar El Pangui, the leader thinks that the 
association’s leadership is not strong or coordinated enough. He argued 
that there is no budget to pay for salaries or offices, and that it would 
seem that the leaders are slowly quitting because there is not enough 
interest from the rest of the members. Furthermore, several leaders from 
different communities and from the Asociación El Pangui seriously 
question the legitimacy of the Asociación Kakaram, arguing that is has 
not been officially recognized by CODENPE and that it does not have 
the capacity to work for the communities.41 
To conclude this section, two important points should be 
emphasized. To begin with, it is important to recognize that the 
communities believe that the federation neglects them in terms of social 
programs and infrastructure projects. This neglect appears to primarily 
stem from the federation’s lack of resources and its inability to raise 
funds from other organizations independent of the mining company. 
The second point revolves around the presence of the mining company 
through Project Mirador and how it has greatly altered the dynamics of 
the Shuar Federation. The mining company’s presence has generally 
stoked people’s expectations of development. It has also contributed to 
an increase of power struggles and conflicts among leaders that 
ultimately create distance between the federation leaders and the 
communities and even divide whole communities. 
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As I hoped to illustrate throughout this brief ethnographic account of 
the Shuar Federation, there is great complexity in the internal dynamics 
of the federation and in its relationship with external actors. I follow this 
section with a conclusion of the main points discussed in this chapter. 
4.5  Conclusions 
In the summer of 2014, I attended a festivity organized by the FESZCH 
to celebrate Shuar culture and traditions; the event took place in the 
ethno-cultural center recently built in Timbara, 40 minutes outside of the 
city of Zamora. This center had been built with funding from a mining 
company operating close to Yantzaza, Kinross-Aurelian. While traveling 
to the center, I imagined a huge festivity with hundreds of people from 
the communities bringing typical food and chicha, handcrafts, and so 
forth. To my surprise, when we arrived at the center, we only saw about 
60 people, including all the leaders from the federation and some 
political figures, such as the highest provincial authority (the prefecto). The 
immense Shuar traditional house built for these kinds of events was not 
even half full. Some typical food (including ayampaco, a traditional dish 
made of fish or chicken wrapped in green banana leaves) was distributed 
by a couple of people to the guests. A group of children performed 
traditional dances wearing traditional dress and an Amazonian music 
group that combined an indigenous rhythm (probably Kichwa) with 
techno-cumbia performed. Meanwhile, I pondered the absence of all the 
community members and leaders that I had gotten to know from the 
area around Tundayme. How can there be a Shuar cultural festival 
without the Shuar people? Later on, I asked the people and leaders from 
the communities about this event; some did not even know it had taken 
place, while others knew about it but decided not to go because the 
federation expected them to pay for their own transportation, which was 
too expensive for them. I was told that the previous year’s celebration 
had been different because the federation had organized the event better. 
As I was leaving the center in Timbara, I wondered if the festivity was 
really designed to bring Shuar people together or if it was conceived as a 
political showcase; the presence of all the higher-level leaders from the 
federation, important provincial authorities, and the representative of 
Kinross-Aurelian (the mining company that had funded the ethno-
cultural center) seemed to indicate that it was a political stunt. The 
federation was working to strengthen its political ties and looking out for 
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the interest of its leaders, but not necessarily the base and foundation of 
the organization: the communities. 
This is an interesting episode that I think demonstrates the inability of 
the FESZCH to address the people in the communities, form part of a 
unified community, and work to build a group ethnic identity. While 
there is a strong discourse of engagement between the federation, the 
associations, and communities, this discourse slowly loses plausability 
when one analyzes its scattered, conflictive relationships and the weak 
ties that may exist between federations and communities. This was 
illustrated at an event that was supposed to be a celebration of the Shuar 
culture. 
 
Festivity at the traditional Shuar House. Ethno-Cultural Center in Timbara 
Photograph: Consuelo Fernández-Salvador 
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The purpose of this chapter was to examine the ways in which the 
Shuar Federation is structured and how it came to be as part of a gradual 
process of incorporation into the national mestizo society. A main focus 
of this chapter was to investigate if the organization has effectively 
engaged with the different levels of people that constitute it.  I also 
wanted to investigate if the Shuar people of northern Zamora Chinchipe 
have been able to consistently participate in decisions related to Project 
Mirador through the federation. In conclusion, it is clear that besides the 
rhetoric and discourse of the FESZCH, there are also situations of 
conflict, disjuncture, and power struggles at all levels. However, these 
conflicts need to be understood as a not necessarily negative or 
ineffective part of a process of accommodation and constant negotiation 
between national mestizo society and the Shuar as an organized entity.  
 This constant struggle has been apparent throughout the history of 
the Shuar organization. At first, the organization capitulated to the 
colonization process in attempts to protect the Shuar identity and 
territory; later on, the organization began to concentrate its efforts on 
alleviating poverty and bringing development to the people by 
negotiating with the state and the mining companies. In both cases, 
decisions related to the best ways to benefit the Shuar people were not 
always consistent and the perspectives of the leaders from certain 
communities and associations have sometimes differed from those of the 
federation leaders. Furthermore, the political scenario within the 
organization has been complicated by access to certain positions of 
power and privileges that come from working closely with and 
negogiating with the companies.  
Another important point related to conflicts between the federation 
and its communities has to do with access to resources and the 
opportunity to develop and implement projects. While the FESZCH had 
successfully managed to negotiate with ECSA for some time, it has now 
been left struggling for funds to just keep the federation running. This 
ultimately showcases some of the hardships that the organizations 
endure in order to lobby and develop contacts with different institutions. 
The difficulties that these organization face are primarily related to a lack 
of resources to travel, the fact that leaders usually do not get paid 
salaries, and leaders’ perception that they lack the necessary tools to 
communicate their plans and strategies. Furthermore, these hardships 
illustrate the level of marginality of local indigenous organizations within 
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Ecuadorean society, which itself reflects the level of marginality of 
indigenous people in general.  
To offer further insight about the conflicts and power struggles 
within the federation, it is important to highlight particular events. 
During the last months of my research (January-April 2015), a new 
president of the federation was elected, who seemed to be polically 
aligned with the previous leader.  However, after several months, the 
people and leaders from the communities began to seriously question his 
authority. In this situation of turmoil, an ex president of the Federation, 
who had been previously accused of corruption and criticized for his 
relationship with the mining companies had returned to the political 
scene and was appointed again for the presidency by February 2016. 
Since his legitimacy was still in doubt a general assembly was called so 
that people could vote again and he was elected by the people from the 
communities in July 2016. He then criticized the previous president for 
having dismantled the federation and for selling all their newly-acquired 
infrastructure and equipment to pay debts. At the time of the conclusion 
of my research, their mission was to consolidate the federation and to 
regain the influence it had several years prior. It appears that the mining 
companies might again play a crucial role in achieving these goals. 
In the next chapter, I concentrate on the construction of identity 
discourses and political practices of the Shuar communities. These are 
tied to the changing notions of territory and the transformation of the 
communities.  They should also be understood as part of the way Shuar 
people interact with and insert themselves into the mestizo society. 
Notes 
 
                                                
1  The discussion should also contribute to a more critical analysis of the 
indigenous movement in Ecuador in general, after a long period in which 
academia had tended to attribute mistakes within the indigenous organization to 
their weak position vis-à-vis the state (Martínez-Novo 2009; Warren & Jackson 
2005). 
2 In the accounts of Father Vidal, who first travelled to Zamora in 1892 in order 
to start the new vicariat, there is a description of only one mestizo settlement 
with the name of El Carmen, a small village of eight houses, in what is now the 
city of Zamora (Izaguirre 1978, 74-75). 
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3 Even though the Federation was created with the support of the Salesians, by 
1969, it had become completely independent of their influence and the 
organization had assumed complete responsibility for the defense and 
development of the group (Federation de Centros Shuar 1976, 118). 
4 Interview president of Asociación Shuar Kakaram, November 2013 
5 Interview president of Etsa, May 2014 
6 In spite of this general respect for the Shuar culture, as Catholic missionaries, 
they actively worked to change some practices that were not considered civilized 
or moral, such as polygamous marriages. 
7 The objective of the colonization process was to grant legal title deeds to land 
that was being used in productive ways (cattle raising or agriculture) and it was 
applied to the land of both colonos and the Shuar. 
8 Interview Father Jorge Chumapi, President of the FESZCH at the time of my 
fieldwork, 2015. 
9 Interview president of FESZCH, February 2013, January 2015; Interview 
president of FEPNASH-CH, February 2013 
10 Interview president FESZCH, January 2015; Interview president of Certero, 
May 2014 
11 Interview Rubén Nanchap-former and current president of FESZCH, April 
2016; Interview Father Chumapi, January 2015 
12 Interview president of FENOC, February 2014 
13 Interviews president and vice-president of FESZCH, October 2013 
14 Interview president and vice-president FESZCH, October-November 2013 
15 In this case, I am referring to the last Strategic Plan that was created in 2016 by 
the latest authorities of the FESZCH, which is very simple and contains the main 
objectives and lines of action. However, during the time of my research, the 
president of the federation at that time would not give me access to the plan they 
had drawn, arguing that it contained private information. This document was 
actually called a Life Plan and it was designed as part of the work indigenous 
organizations in the Amazon region were implementing with ECORAE to bring 
development to the Shuar communities. 
16 The barrios are formed when the communal territory of a centro is divided or 
split; even though the land still belongs legally to the whole community, the 
divisions might allow families to become more autonomous. 
17 Interview president of FESZCH, November 2013 
18 Interview president of Etsa, November 2013 
19 Interview president of Churuwia, October 2013 
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20 With the passing of the New Mining Law in 2009, much small-scale mining has 
been regulated and most informal miners end up doing what are considered to be 
illegal activities. 
21 The CODENPE was the institution in charge of carrying out this process that 
allows the communities and their leaders to be recognized by the state. 
22 Like the Federation, the Asociación Shuar el Pangui also elaborated a Strategic 
Plan for the years 2001-2015, which includes a diagnostic of the communities 
that belong to the Association and a plan of action for that period. 
23 Interview former president of Asociación Shuar El Pangui, January 2014 
24 Interview president of Asociación Shuar Kakaram, November 2013 
25 Interview president of Asociación Kakaram, November 2013 
26 Interview president of FESZCH, November 2013 
27 Interview president of the FESZCH, February 2013; Interview former 
president of the FESZCH, April 2016 
28 Interviews various leaders in FESZCH: president, vice-president and secretary, 
February 2013, October 2013, January 2015 
29 Interview president of FESZCH February 2013; October 2014; July 2014. 
Interview vice-president of FESZCH, October 2013. Interview former president 
of Asociación Shuar El Pangui, January 2014, Interview presidents of Santiago 
Paty and Paquintza, January 2015 
30 Interview vice-president of the FESZCH, November 2013 
31 Interview president of Churuwia, June 2014 
32 Interview president of the FESZCH, October 2013/January 2015 
33 Interview manager of the Department of Community Relations at ECSA, 
October 2013 
34 Interview `resident of the FESZCH, October 2013; Interview president and 
Leader of Education, July 2014 
35 Interview federation, July 2014 
36 Leaders from the FESZCH had been lobbying for the president of the 
Federation to later occupy the position of governor of Zamora, but did not 
succeed. However, he later went on to occupy an important position in the 
offices of the Ministry of Environment (Ministerio de Medio Ambiente) in 
Zamora. 
37  Tsantsas are shrunken human heads that the Shuar used to create after 
decapitating enemies during raids and then performing a ritual on their heads. 
The ears, mouth and nose were completely closed off by sewing them together in 
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order to prevent any evil spirit from leaving the dead person. This ritual is no 
longer practiced. 
38 Interview president of the FESZCH, January 2015; Interview President of San 
Andrés, January 2015; Interview President of Certero, January 2014 
39 Interview president of Churuwia, Nov 2013 
40 Interview president of Etsa, October 2013 
41 Interview president of Asociación Shuar El Pangui, January 2014; Interview 
president of San Andrés, January 2015. 
 
  
 
5 
Changing Discourses and Fragmented 
Practices. The construction of 
indigeneity around Project Mirador1 
 
5.1  Introduction 
In previous chapters, I introduced the discussion of large-scale mining in 
Ecuador from a political-economic perspective and went on to address 
some conflicts and mobilizations that had taken place in relation to 
Project Mirador. In Chapter 4, I focused on the complex dynamics of 
the Shuar political organization in order to understand its role in 
historical issues such as the protection of the Shuar identity and territory 
as well as in present conflicts related to large-scale mining in the 
northern part of the province of Zamora Chinchipe. In this chapter, I 
specifically discuss those identity discourses, strategies, and practices 
used mostly by the Shuar Federation and community leaders in order to 
understand the ways in which they deal with extractivism and position 
themselves in this context. The fact that I have focused on the discourses 
of the Shuar leadership might be considered a limitation in this work 
because they might not offer a deeper understanding of the daily 
experiences of the people in their communities. However, I specifically 
chose to concentrate on the leaders in order to contribute to the 
discussion on indigenous organizations in Ecuador, which has privileged 
studies on regional and national ethno-politics, leaving a gap in the 
relationship between organizations and communities and making leaders’ 
community work less visible (Andolina 2003; Becker 2010; Sawyer 1997, 
2004; Valdivia 2007; Yashar 2005; Zamosc 2004). Furthermore, while 
kinship and family ties are very important within the communities, 
positions of authority are actually legitimized through the formal Shuar 
organization, which has been adapted to a Western mestizo model. Thus, 
it makes sense to concentrate on the different levels of the Shuar 
political organization. 
Large-scale mining is relatively new in Ecuador’s history of resource 
extraction. While oil exploitation began in the 1960s and 1970s, not one 
single mining project has ever reached the phase of exploitation in 
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Ecuador’s history. This, however, does not mean that there has not been 
interest from the state and foreign companies in developing projects, 
although the conditions to do so have not always been the best. For 
example, in the area of Intag, Imbabura, exploration started in the early 
1980s but local resistance that began in the 1990s has made it impossible 
for companies to begin the exploitation phase (Avci and Fernández-
Salvador 2016). However, beginning in 2009, Correa’s government 
passed the New Mining Law as part of an effort to actively promote and 
intensify extractivism in the mining sector (Cisneros 2009; Moore and 
Velásquez 2012). As described in Chapter 3, only Project Mirador has 
advanced to the phase of exploitation. If it continues to progress, in 
2018 it would become the first open-pit large-scale mining project to 
start its operations in Ecuador. 
Just as was the case in Intag, since the 1990s, the presence of mining 
companies in Project Mirador has generated resistance, conflict, and 
even negotiation processes among the local mestizo and Shuar 
population. Although indigenous people are often perceived to be the 
defenders of the territory and resources from extractivism, this has not 
been necessarily the case in Tundayme.2 Mestizo organizations like the 
Comité en Defensa de la Naturaleza, Salud y Vida de El Pangui (Committee in 
Defense of Nature, Health and Life), created in 2006, have led the 
resistance against the mining company, especially from the city of El 
Pangui. They have received both support and opposition from the Shuar 
people in the area, leading to conflict and even violent confrontation. 
Thus, Mirador is an interesting case because, although there has been 
strong mobilization in the past, unlike the resistance in Intag (Buchanan 
2013), these movements have been inconsistent and fragmented in many 
ways.  
In the study of conflicts around mining, Bebbington and others argue 
that mining development usually generates a diversity of responses that 
go beyond simple resistance. These responses can range from open 
resistance and defense of the territory and resources to negotiating with 
the companies for benefits from the use of those resources, or even to a 
fair participation in decision-making processes (Bebbington et al. 2013; 
Bury 2002; Horowitz 2011; Velásquez 2012; Warnaars 2013). 
Furthermore, Bebbington et al. argue that not only is there a diversity of 
local responses to extractivism, but also in the emergence of social 
movements across different regions creating an “uneven geography of 
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social movements” (Bebbington et al. 2008c: 2881). The uneven 
geographical distribution of social mobilization is interesting in that it 
does not only reflect the distribution of mining itself, but also the local 
territorial dynamics that lead some movements to become stronger than 
others. Thus, as Bebbington et al. explain, it is important to map out 
social movements to understand the dynamics related to extractivism. 
Mirador is an excellent example of how diverse and changing social 
mobilization can be.  
One of the key points of this chapter is that there are no unified 
political strategies of the Shuar Federation in Zamora Chinchipe. Rather, 
there is a range of diverse and changing discourses, positions, and 
actions which might appear to be inefficient in achieving their objectives, 
but which are actually quite logical when considered within the context 
of the everyday interactions between the leaders and a variety of external 
actors. In order to explain this individualization at the level of 
communities, associations, and even the federation, I will discuss some 
several aspects that are part of the territorial dynamics around Tundayme 
and Mirador and analyze them in a historical context: the historical 
conflictivity of the Shuar Federation (FESZCH) (discussed in Chapter 4) 
and the symbolic and material use of the territory as well as the 
conformation of the communities. The last two are tied to notions of 
modernity, development, and/or ancestrality (Bebbington et al. 2008c). 
Furthermore, I will use the concept of intersectionality to explain that 
ethnicity is not an exclusive category. Being Shuar or indigenous does 
not imply a homogeneous condition in opposition to being mestizo. As 
any other social category, ethnicity is interlocked with gender, age, class, 
and other forms of identification, which might also be relevant to Shuar 
leaders as they define their positions and discourses.   
The purpose of this chapter is to understand how the above-
mentioned elements have contributed to shaping the discourses and 
political practices of the Shuar in relation to large-scale mining as part of 
a wider process in the construction of relations in the territory. This 
approach allows us to understand the reactions and diversity of positions 
of the Shuar leadership in the area not only as a direct result of the 
presence of the mining company in Mirador, but also as part of the 
complex construction of Shuar indigeneity in relation to the territory and 
its dynamics. Thus, it is important to acknowledge that the split 
discourses and constructions of identity are part of the ways in which the 
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Shuar respond to the outside world by improvising and negotiating with 
it; it is through these discourses and identities that the Shuar are able to 
make sense of reality and engage with it in the best possible way.  
In the next section, I will engage in a theoretical discussion about 
ethno-politics, indigeneity, and positionality and how these concepts can 
be understood as part of the territory and its dynamics. In the third part, 
I continue with a discussion on identity discourses and strategies related 
to large-scale mining. In the final part, I discuss the composition and 
changes in the Shuar communities and the configuration of the territory. 
5.2  Indigeneity, Positionality, and Territorial Dynamics 
Most indigenous organizations in Ecuador have articulated themselves 
around their ethnic identity. The notion of a shared cultural heritage, a 
sense of exclusion from the mestizo society, and a national agenda is 
generally what has motivated indigenous people to defend their rights 
and to strategically organize themselves based on their cultural specificity 
(Selverston-Scher 2001). Political agendas vary and may include goals 
related to the struggle over territory, control over resource extraction 
(including claims over benefits and royalties from their extraction), 
demands for participation in decision-making processes, and even 
demands to be part of a plurinational state (Bolaños 2011; Castillo and 
Cairo 2002; Conklin and Graham 1995; Gros 1999; Sawyer 2004; 
Perreault 2003a, 2003b; Valdivia 2005; Warnaars 2010, 2012). As 
discussed in Chapter 4, for many years, academics have analyzed the 
work and political agenda of the indigenous organization from a positive 
and mostly a-critical perspective (Martínez Novo 2009), preferring to 
focus on indigenous organizations’ unified and cohesive strategies 
(Andolina 2003; Becker 2010; Jameson 2011; Sawyer 1997; Varese 1996; 
Yashar 2005; Zamosc 2004), while the reality is that there is great 
heterogeneity in their strategies in terms of objectives, discourses, and 
strategies. This is why it is important to investigate the local dynamics, 
the work of organizations at the community level, and the organizations’ 
use of discourses and strategies. In the introduction, I explained that I 
use Hall’s discussion on identities, understanding them as part of a 
changing process in which there is not an essence, fixed and continuous 
history, or a well-defined sense of cultural belonging.  
In this chapter, I further elaborate on the concept of indigeneity as 
approached by Gabriela Valdivia. She suggests that the discourses and 
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practices that indigenous organizations utilize to represent themselves 
vis-à-vis the wider society are the result of different visions of what it 
means to be indigenous, including notions created by external actors but 
also by indigenous people themselves. Thus, this discourse on identity is 
adapted, imposed, and reformulated by the people and their 
organizations; it is also used as a political strategy (Valdivia 2007). She 
also utilizes the concept of articulation to show how indigeneity 
discourses and practices are positioned, as they “are actively 
interpenetrated in place by specific economic, political and cultural 
interests, an in relation to subjects at multiple scales, as well as the 
conditions of possibility for their enunciation” (Valdivia 2005: 286). In 
other words, there is not a single or correct way to construct indigeneity 
as a response to changing material and social conditions. Furthermore, 
the ways in which indigeneity is constructed is a result of the interaction 
of several elements ranging from local experiences to the influence of 
market liberalism, environmental conservation, human rights, and so 
forth. In her analysis of the ways in which the Cofán and Secoya people 
have articulated their indigeneity and negotiated with companies in their 
territories, she discusses articulation as historically-situated, related to 
environmental and cultural claims, and including “a range of positions 
engaging multiscalar discourses on ‘development’, ‘human rights’, and 
‘citizenship’” (Valdivia 2005: 286). These discourses are not simply 
imposed by external actors; rather, indigenous groups themselves engage 
with and transform these discourses locally, allowing people to position 
themselves within different articulations of indigeneity and even 
shuffling between them. 
Furthermore, in his research on the Cofán, Cepek criticizes views that 
tend to simplify indigenous positions and discourses as essentialized and 
instrumental to their objectives3 because it is assumed that they have 
been adopted from transnational images of what is expected from them4, 
as in the case of the notion of the “ecologically noble savage” (Cepek 
2008: 197). He argues, 
And it is not enough to analyze indigenous environmental rhetoric as a 
product of transnational identity politics. Neither simply false nor blatantly 
ideological, these approaches are limited in that they fetishize one aspect 
of a larger process. In the Cofán case, the emergence of conservationist 
attitudes and institutions involved the combined dynamic of material 
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practice, cultural logic, ecological change, and global politics. (Cepek 2008: 
197) 
 As does Valdivia, Cepek understands the production of discourses 
and the construction of identities as part of a process that incorporates a 
variety of elements including the group’s own knowledge and 
understanding of their world the consequences of the presence of oil 
companies, the subsequent awareness of the fragility of their 
environment, and global politics.  
Following Cepek and Valdivia, I understand Shuar’s indigeneity as a 
complex process that is situated in a specific context. In this case, their 
indigeneity revolves around Project Mirador and incorporates internal 
and external views and discourses on being Shuar. Unlike Valdivia, 
though, I will concentrate on views and discourses of modernity, 
development, and ancestrality, include the Shuar’s changing relationship 
with the territory itself, and consider the transformation undergone by 
the communities. In this analysis, it is important to consider the 
contribution of decolonial anthropology to shed light on the way these 
concepts may be used by Shuar leaders as a political strategy. Several 
authors have already discussed the fact that, in order to be recognized 
and legitimized as political adversaries, indigenous leaders have had to 
learn and adapt to an acceptable political speech, thus leaving “the 
unacceptable” behind, although they do not necessarily discard it 
(Cruikshank 2005; Graham 2002). The notion of indigeneity as a political 
strategy itself may well be conditioned to what is considered appropriate 
and legitimate by a Western mestizo political and even academic 
scenario; for example, the way indigenous leaders use certain categories 
such as class, ethnicity, territory, race, and culture to gain access to 
resources and rights, as mentioned in the introduction (De la Cadena 
2010; Hale 2004). 
Viveiros de Castro (2004) further emphasizes that while indigenous 
people utilize categories and concepts that may be considered familiar or 
appropriate in a Western setting, it is necessary to acknowledge that 
there might be different meanings ascribed to such concepts. In the 
context of what he calls perspectivism (a set of ideas and practices about 
cosmology found throughout indigenous America that imagines a variety 
of subjective human and non-human agencies) (2004: 6), he argues that a 
real translation should not be to merely find synonyms between two 
languages, but rather to “avoid losing sight of the difference concealed 
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within equivocal ‘homonyms’ between our language and that of other 
species,” since we never really speak about the same things (2004: 7). 
These spaces of equivocation, as Viverios de Castro calls them, are those 
in which there is not only a failure to understand but “a failure to 
understand that understandings are necessarily not the same, and that 
they are not related to imaginary ways of ‘seeing the world’ but to the 
real worlds that are being seen” (Viveiros de Castro 2004: 11). 
Ultimately, to achieve a good translation (which is one of the main tasks 
of anthropology), any alien concepts should be allowed “to deform and 
subvert the translator’s conceptual toolbox so that the intention of the 
original language can be expressed in the original language” (2004:4). 
Concepts such as territory and community as well as the ways in which 
they are used as part of leadership discourses might be particularly prone 
to having these differences and ambiguity in meanings because they have 
been shaped or conditioned in a context of colonialism; this, in turn, has 
allowed certain meanings or new constructions to surface while others 
are pushed down. Such considerations regarding the construction of 
indigeneity within the Shuar Federation can offer interesting insights and 
will also be explored in this chapter. 
Finally, I will analyze the Shuar’s indigeneity as part of the territorial 
dynamics that have been transformed over time and as a result of the 
arrival of different actors in a given space. As discussed in Chapter 2, this 
concept refers to the forms of symbolic and material attachments that 
different groups build in relation to a given geographical space, as well as 
the interactions and relations of power with different actors in it (in this 
case, missionaries, colonos, the state5, the mining company, and NGOs) 
(Little 2001; Warnaars 2013). By considering the articulation of 
indigeneity as part of territorial dynamics, I hope to avoid a simplistic 
understanding of the presence of the mining company and its effects on 
these dynamics over the last decade. In other words, the discourses 
created will be understood as a response not only to the effects of the 
mining company per se, but they also as a response to a series of 
previous interactions with other actors in the territory at different points 
throughout history.  
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5.3  The Shuar Federation: Discourses and Political  
  Strategies  
As Hall argues, identities are produced within the sphere of 
representation and discourse, but they also interact with material and 
concrete experiences. Therefore, there are several dimensions of identity 
that connect the symbolic realm to the discursive, political, and material 
levels (Hall and DuGay 2003).  In this sense, identity discourses are part 
of or inform the ethno-political practices of a group and, as such, they 
become interesting objects of analysis. In the context of ethno-politics, 
discourses and strategies are related to the ways in which people see 
themselves and how they position themselves in relation to the larger 
society, especially within a highly-structured organization like the Shuar 
have. Thus, this section will concentrate on the ways in which the 
federation, the associations, and the communities articulate a discourse 
of being Shuar as a part of their political practices, especially in relation 
to the context of large-scale mining.  
Furthermore, and as mentioned in an earlier chapter, there is not 
necessarily one unified and homogeneous position regarding large-scale 
mining at the level of the federation, association, or even community 
level. This diversity of positions and practices also evidences a variety of 
identity discourses in which important issues of ancestrality, territory, 
and subsistence strategies play different roles in each discourse. Thus, 
the notion of positionality does not apply to the Shuar people as a whole 
or even to the federation itself; rather, it heavily depends upon the 
specific experiences and histories of the communities and the leaders. At 
the same time, discourses from both the federation and the communities 
inform positions regarding large-scale mining as well as specific practices 
of resistance and negotiation.  
5.3.1  The Federation’s Rhetoric and Political Strategies 
The discourse of the FESZCH (Shuar Federation of Zamora Chinchipe) 
as an indigenous political organization touches on different issues 
important to the construction of a “universal” Shuar identity and to the 
definition of certain political strategies that are key to their demands of 
the state and in their struggle to have control over the mineral resources 
in their province. In their discourse, I see at least three different relevant 
points that complement one another: the first one revolves around the 
territory and the sense of being native to the land, a condition that makes 
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the Shuar its “rightful owners.” This discourse appeals to an ideal or past 
identity and it reinforces the notion of the Shuar as ancestral people who 
are, to a certain extent, the the caretakers of the biodiversity in the forest; 
their use of language, cultural practices (like making and drinking chicha), 
and especially subsistence practices essential to the Shuar lifestyle like 
hunting, fishing, and gardening are posited as evidence of the Shuar’s 
“harmonious” relationship with nature and the environment. Most of the 
individuals that I interviewed recognized that most of these practices are 
not as common today as they were in the past, and there is some interest 
(mostly at the federation level) in revitalizing them.6 
This universal dimension of the FESZCH’s discourse is very much 
shared by Shuar communities and their leaders and it allows people to 
express their membership in a large ethnically-based, “imagined 
community” 7  (despite all the conflicts in the different levels of 
organization, between associations, and among communities). 
Nevertheless, I would argue that this dimension of the FESZCH’s 
discourse works more as a rhetorical tool that helps the organization in 
its political strategies than as part of a constant and everyday notion of 
being Shuar. In fact, most “ideas” related to being Shuar refer to the way 
the Shuar were in the past but which no longer hold true for most of the 
people from the communities. On the other hand, claiming ancestrality 
to the territory is a strategy to make demands to the state and the mining 
companies in the area. Several of the FESZCH’s leaders argue that, given 
that there is so much natural richness in Shuar territory, they should be 
allowed to share in part of it. For the president of the federation, since 
the “mining companies are built on the Shuar’s aboriginal territory,”8 the 
company should negogiate with the federation to compensate for the 
impact of mineral exploitation by giving money directly to the 
organization (which did happen at some point in their relationship with 
two mining companies). In their view, although the Shuar have lost a 
great deal of territory in the last fifty years and the area around Project 
Mirador does not necessarily belong to Shuar communities anymore, the 
notion of having minerals beneath “ancestral land” should entitle them 
to direct financial benefits. In the words of the secretary of the 
federation, 
The Shuar Federation is supporting the exploitation but in a rational 
manner, with high technology. In the XXI century, we cannot go on being 
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so poor, dying of hunger, all the while having all that gold, copper, and 
bronze beneath our land.9 
 Another important dimension of the FESZCH’s discourse is 
expressed in terms of the Shuar’s marginalization from Ecuadorean 
society and the state. The discourse on ancestrality and territory, thus, 
becomes more of a racial, class-based identity discourse; the federation 
feels that Shuar communities in Zamora Chinchipe are extremely poor 
(according to them, more than 90 per cent of the population lives in 
extreme poverty) and have been historically marginalized precisely 
because they are Shuar.10 They see the poverty in which most Shuar 
communities are immersed as the result of a society and a state that 
excluded and displaced them from their original territories. Although 
today the Shuar might be friendly with mestizo people and even 
intermarry with them, there is also a generalized feeling of inequality and 
injustice that permeates their relationship with mestizos. This can be 
expressed at different levels, from community members complaining 
that the mestizos stole their land to federation leaders complaining that 
there is not a single Shuar in a position of authority in public offices in 
the province (which, for the most part, is accurate). This inequality is 
perceived as having its roots in racism, which is still present among the 
colonos; according to these racist ideas, the Shuar were and sometimes still 
are categorized as ignorant savages who are easy to manipulate and cheat 
and who do not deserve governmental support. The president of the 
FESZCH clearly illustrates the frustration of having been manipulated 
and relegated by the mestizo society when the colonos started settling the 
Amazonian territory, while the vice-president places great responsibility 
on a state that clearly abandoned the Shuar people: 
  
The Shuar were the original owners of the Amazon region and 
Zamora… they were the aboriginal, original, and millenary owners. But 
we have now been displaced and relegated and our territory has been 
taken away…people were cheated into trading the land for things like 
shotguns, dogs for hunting, mirrors, lamps.11 
 
 Then came the government authorities in their time, but they were not 
capable of attending to the most fundamental needs and demands of the 
Shuar people; they just never did. They denied us, abandoned us, they 
left us behind. They denied us our rights. Now we are in marginal and 
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relegated conditions, abandoned. You know, pardon me, that the Shuar 
have been living for a long time in conditions of misery, exploitation, 
hunger, all bad things have happened to us.12 
 
 This discourse recounts the social injustices that the Shuar have 
suffered and calls for adequate compensation, especially from the state. 
Thus, the Shuar seek to support the mining industry in Zamora because 
they see it as an opportunity to finally force the state to acknowledge that 
they have the right to benefits derived from mineral exploitation in their 
lands; they see this as compensation for operating in what used to be 
their territory and as compensation for the state’s historical neglect.   
The third dimension of the discourse utilized by the FESZCH 
revolves around their desire for development and modernity. This desire 
is tied to the fact that the Shuar live in poverty and have been excluded 
by the state and mestizo society; as such, the Shuar generally believe that 
development has not reached their communities (either though the 
action of the mining companies, or the state through Ecuador Estratégico, 
as will be discussed in Chapter 6). Although there is interest in 
revitalizing some forgotten cultural practices, the federation and 
communities feel that it is more important to be part of the development 
and modernity that has already reached the rest of the society. Having 
access to adequate housing, basic services, and good education in the 
communities are probably the most important indicators of development 
and progress to the Shuar, although they are not the only ones. 
According to the secretary of the federation, “The Shuar cannot go on 
the way they are, without housing, education, without clothes. What 
people want is to live well, have a good cell phone and a good car, why 
not?” 13 These desires not only revolve around meeting basic needs, but 
are also related to being part of a mestizo society and its images of 
consumption and modernity. As several leaders expressed in the 
interviews, they believe that the mining industry can help insert the 
Shuar people into the national society and that the mining companies are 
responsible for helping the Shuar communities to develop (Various 
interviews-leaders, 2013). As such, for the FESZCH, mining is tightly 
linked with well-being and progress; unsurprisingly, this notion has 
informed the way that the federation has approached mining companies. 
Nevertheless, the relationship between the Shuar and the most important 
mining companies in the province (ECSA and Aurelian Kinross) has not 
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always been simple, as discussed in other chapters. As will be discussed 
in Chapter 6, the relationship between the Federation and Ecuador 
Estratégico is also complex, and both leaders and community members 
have been disappointed by this governmental entity. 
While it is simpler for the FESZCH as an organization to have a 
unified and official discourse and homogeneous strategies in relation to 
large-scale mining, the situation at the association and community level is 
quite different. Leaders at the community level do not always hold the 
same position towards mining, and they also use a variety of discourses 
and visions of what being Shuar should be. In the next section, I will 
discuss these discourses. 
5.3.2  Identity Discourses and Political Practices in the 
Communities 
The universal dimension that is part of the rhetorical identity discourse 
within the federation is also present at the community and association 
levels. In these contexts, this discourse might involve more detailed 
notions of the everyday life (as it used to be), especially as it stands in 
contrast to mestizo identities. This discourse especially revolves around 
shared practices and ways of living, including hunting and fishing, 
making and consuming chicha (traditional drink usually made with 
manioc), eating ayampaco (traditional fish dish), and, of course, speaking 
Shuar. These practices have an important symbolic value because they 
were passed down from generation to generation. Many Shuar spoke 
about their ancestors being present in the territory for a long time, 
affirming that they have been there “desde las primeras épocas” (from the 
beginning) or at least 200 years. Different community leaders frequently 
used the phrase “Somos vividores” to describe themselves, referring to the 
fact that their families had not migrated from other parts of the country, 
like the colonos coming from the highlands have. Of course, this discourse 
gives them a very strong sense of belonging and of being the “rightful 
owners of the territory,” unlike the mestizos who had recently migrated. 
Another important dimension of this discourse revolves around the 
Shuar’s traditional subsistence practices, which are considered to be 
essential to their lifestyle and are understood as evdence of their 
harmonious relationship with nature and the environment. Traditional 
Shuar subsistence practices revolving around hunting, fishing, and 
gardening are considered to be non-harmful activities that do not destroy 
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the forests, unlike many of the colonos’s practices. The indigenous people 
live off the forest, so they must protect it to ensure their own survival. 
As one of the leaders from the community of San Andrés said, “Going 
to the mountain is like going to the market, but no money is needed.”14 
However, during my conversations with members and leaders in the 
communities I understood that these discourses were nostalgic; they 
seemed to appeal mostly to an ideal or past identity that some of them 
would like to recover. Generally, the Shuar themselves recognize that 
such discourses do not reflect reality or are not practical anymore (except 
in the case of a few communities which oppose any kind of mestizo 
influence). These discourses are also closely related to the cultural 
changes the indigenous communities suffered when the colonos started 
settling the Amazonian territory, which is seen as a violent process 
through which they lost much of their territory. 
Nevertheless, the Shuar’s concept of their own identity is far more 
complex and subtle; it is also strongly characterized by the consequences 
of the relationships that the Shuar have had with different actors over 
time, including missionaries, colonos, government institutions, and, more 
recently, the mining company. Beyond the rhetorical use of a universal 
Shuar identity that might help the federation and even community 
leaders support some of the claims that they have made in defense of the 
Shuar people or territory, the way people actually enact their Shuarness is 
quite different.15 In their daily routines, Shuar people engage with a 
variety of spaces that force them into the mestizo lifestyle in every sense, 
from working in the mine to attending school and negogiating with 
mostly the mestizo local authorities. All of these interactions inundate 
the Shuar with objects and symbols that are far removed from those 
nostalgic notions of being Shuar. Leaders also belong to different 
interlocking identity categories in terms of age, status or subsistence 
strategies and even geographic location, as will be discussed in the 
following sections. Thus, the discourses in the communities are more 
real in the sense that they are related to actual everyday life decisions 
regarding the community’s future and its relationships with certain actors 
like the mining company. I have decided to describe these varying 
discourses as positions on a flexible continuum; on one extreme of the 
continuum, the discourses are extreme with very adamant and strong 
positions on ancestrality and resistance, while on the opposite extreme 
the discourses have very practical notions of modernity and 
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development. Generally, communities whose leaders conceptualize 
Shuarness in terms of the lifestyle of their ancestors and which claim that 
they still carry on these traditions are located in areas closer to 
Tundayme and Project Mirador, where the links to the territory are 
stronger than in communities closer to El Pangui. Such leaders are 
usually part of the communities located in the area of direct influence of 
the mining project, which have had more direct contact with the 
company itself and may have engaged with or have more knowledge of 
conflicts related to the project. Interestingly, the leader of one of the 
communities (Etsa, closely located to the other two that are also in the 
area of direct impact) is ideologically positioned at the other extreme of 
the continuum: he is more interested in working and negotiating benefits 
for his community. This fact is precisely what triggered my interest in 
analyzing not only the varying content of the discourses on identity, but 
also understanding the process through which these discourses were 
being shaped and the effect they had on the community leaders’ political 
practices. If we understand that Shuar identity is being constructed and 
understood differently within the community itself, then it is not 
surprising that the political claims made by the Shuar leaders and 
communities are also different.  However, there are also cases in which 
identity discourses are not necessarily expressed through specific 
strategies or actions. 
Ancestrality and Resistance vs. Progress and Modernity 
The community of Yanúa is located on one of the extremes of this 
continuum while Santiago Paty and Etsa are located on the other 
extreme.  As is shown on the map of this area, Etsa and Yanúa belong to 
the parish of Tundayme and are located within the area of direct impact 
of Project Mirador; Santiago Paty belongs to the parish of El Guismi and 
is located further from Mirador. Given their proximity to the project, 
both Etsa and Yanúa are more likely to be affected by any kind of 
conflict related to the presence of the mining company. However, their 
location might also be advantageous because these communities are 
located closer to the company’s community relations office. 
Very much like the universal dimension of the discourse on being 
Shuar, the leader of Yanúa and his brothers have created a concept of 
identity related to the notion of ancestrality, traditional subsistence 
practices, and the territory’s value. From their perspective, the traditional 
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Shuar lifestyle offers the people in the communities the well-being they 
need and, for that reason, they do not seek external aid from the 
company or government institutions. They are proud of the Shuar 
identity and their cultural practices, and they insist that they maintain 
most of their traditional cultural practices: they still hunt, fish, drink 
chicha, speak Shuar all the time, and even practice religious rituals with 
the use of hallucinogens, a practice that other communities did not 
mention during my research. Whether or not people are truly involved in 
these cultural practices is unclear; in fact, the community leader worked 
outside the community as a “jornalero” (day laborer), working for people 
who have larger plots of land. Additionally, the community itself is too 
small to hunt regularly. Yet, the preservation of their cultural practices 
and the elements of nature that are important to them (waterfalls, rivers, 
forests, and native medicinal plants) is an important part of the discourse 
they use to resist the presence of the mining industry. For this family in 
Yanúa, the important practices that they learned from their ancestors are 
key to their community’s subsistence and well-being. Thus, their 
discourse is based on the defense of the Shuar territory precisely because 
it is directly linked to their subsistence practices and to the protection of 
their rituals, both of which are also related to the notion of permanence 
of the group. For them, it is important to guard the territory so that the 
animals do not leave and they can continue to hunt; they want to protect 
the waterfalls and palm trees in order to continue performing their 
rituals. According to their leader, “here we are ‘vividores’ since God put us 
here, we are millenary, we live here like a tree trunk. If you wanted to 
take down the tree you couldn’t, because it is so deeply rooted.”16  
The notion of being vividores means that they have occupied the 
territory “forever,” unlike the case of the recent and “invasive” colonos. 
As this leader recalls, his father owned much of the land around Yanúa 
(although it is hard to know precisely how much land there was), but it 
was destroyed by the Zigzeños (from the town of Zigzig, in the 
highlands) when they invaded the land. According to him, in those times 
the Shuar were actually afraid of the colonos and, as such, many fled the 
area to escape from them. After colonos took the land from his father, he 
could not leave much to his children. “There is no more land for us to 
expand the community and that is why we want to get back that land…it 
is also part of the law.”17 It is clear, then, that the defense of the territory 
is not necessarily only linked with the presence of the mining company, 
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but it has its roots in old conflicts that are now being exacerbated by 
Project Mirador. It would seem that in the context of large scale mining 
with all of its related environmental and territorial consequences, older 
conflicts related to the land loss and the impact on the Shuar’s 
subsistence practices are also being brought to light.  
Between Discourses and Political Practices 
In reality, besides hunting (which is probably done sporadically in the 
forests closer to the Cordillera del Cóndor) and some fishing in the Kimi 
River, the community grows plantain, cocoa, coffee, and fruit trees; 
however, given the limitations related to land size and adequate growing 
conditions (many farms might get flooded by the river throughout the 
year), the leaders from Yanúa (three siblings) as well as their brothers-in-
law and other members of the family have been forced to look for paid 
jobs outside the community, including in the mining company. In fact, 
the three brothers worked in ECSA for several years and were fierce 
supporters of the company until they were fired (and not adequately 
compensated) for certain conflicts that began in relation to their rights as 
workers. When and how is it that the support to the company becomes a 
strong resistance to its presence in the area, demanding the company to 
leave so that they could recuperate their ancestral territory (which 
according to the leaders should include the Cordillera del Cóndor)?  
In the early 2000s, the arrival of the Canadian company to the area of 
Tundayme and Mirador brought great expectations of development and 
progress to the mestizos and to the Shuar communities. Although some 
important groups were resistant to large-scale mining, many members of 
different Shuar communities started working in the company and 
became recipients of projects implemented by ECSA. The brothers from 
Yanúa also became part of the company’s work force but, after several 
years, they were fired for fighting against what they saw as unjust 
treatment and false promises made by ECSA. One of them stated in an 
interview, “There was this month in which we had to work from 6 a.m. 
to 6 p.m. and for the extra hour they would pay us 30 or 50 cents…when 
we left the company, they paid us $400 dollars for compensation after 
ten years of work, so, because of those mistakes that the company made, 
we have opened our eyes and our mind…”18 
However, the discourse of resistance itself was actually created after 
leaving the company. The discourse developed in the context of new 
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relationships established with a variety of external actors who were 
working in the area in open activism against the mining company. While 
it is not clear when and how these relationships were established, it is 
important to understand that Yanúa and its leaders became part of a 
wider network of resistance which included strong organizations such as 
Acción Ecológica, INREDH and Ecumenical Commission on Human 
Rights (CEDHU—Comisión Ecuménica de Derechos Humanos). This network 
also includes mestizo activists from Quito and Azuay who were part of 
other resistance organizations such as the Assembly of the People of the 
South (Asamblea de los Pueblos del Sur) and even Shuar activists from 
Morona Santiago and the Asociación Shuar Kakaram (whose president 
declared his opposition to mining since its creation). In fact, Yanúa’s 
main leader supported a lawsuit presented by Acción Ecológica, INREDH, 
and CEDHU in a collective action against Project Mirador because of 
the company’s violation of nature’s rights. While the group did not win 
this lawsuit, it actually became an international claim that was taken to 
the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights (CIDH—Comisión 
Interamericana de Derechos Humanos).19 
The discourse used by the leaders in Yanúa shows open resistance 
and opposition to the company. Nevertheless, their activism and actions 
were not echoed in other communities and the resistance has been 
unable to gather further Shuar support for this discourse. In fact, the 
main leader in Yanúa insisted that he was alone in his resistance and that 
he did not really have the support from neighboring communities like 
Churuwia, another member of Asociación Shuar Kakaram (which itself 
was actually created to oppose mining). Thus, many communities 
remained quite ambiguous in their position towards mining and the 
company, and many Shuar people simply disagreed with and criticized 
open resistance; this is even the case of family members in Yanúa who 
currently work in ECSA and were critical of the leader’s activism.  
While the leaders from Yanúa had been in contact with organizations 
from outside the area, in one of my last visits to the field, I discovered 
that they had joined CASCOMI. Even though CASCOMI was created 
by mestizo campesinos (peasants) from the area around Project Mirador to 
defend their land from the company or at least to force the company to 
adequately compensate them for the land already sold, several Shuar 
leaders had also joined this organization to support the effort to defend 
the land and territory. As part of their strategy, CASCOMI pushed for 
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some of their members’ land to be considered part of a Shuar 
community (even though none of that land belonged to any of the Shuar 
communities at the time) to be able to protect it as ancestral territory. 
While CASCOMI had the support of Churuwia and Yanúa, in reality 
the only Shuar leader who actively participated in all of this group’s 
meetings and protests against ECSA was Yanúa’s leader. However, on 
several occasions he expressed his dissatisfaction with the work that was 
being done. Apart from feeling manipulated at times (especially in the 
protest in the town of San Marcos where he was left alone with the 
people from Yanúa), he felt that CASCOMI’s objectives were different 
from theirs: while Asociación Kakaram was demanding that the 
company leave Mirador so that the Shuar could reclaim their ancestral 
territory in all of Cordillera del Cóndor, while CASCOMI was interested 
in defending a specific area that affected the mestizos’ land and in 
securing adequate compensation from ECSA.20 In the end, the presence 
of Shuar activists in this organization would become even weaker and 
more disperse after the tragic death of Yanúa’s leader in December of 
2014. He was murdered at the end of 2014 and his death became a 
symbol for some activists and leaders participating in resistance against 
the mining company. While in the media and on social networks there 
have been accusations made blaming the company and even the state for 
wanting to silence an anti-mining leader, local versions are varied. What 
is clear for some community leaders, though, is that groups like 
CASCOMI and other activists had put this leader in the spotlight, 
turning him into the voice of these organizations and thus putting him in 
danger (conversation with presidents of Etsa and San Carlos, January 
2015). 
Progress and Modernity: The Communities of Etsa, Santiago Paty, and 
San Francisco de Paquintza 
Although there is a generalized conception of the Shuar identity based 
on “ancestrality,” the use of the Shuar language, and certain specific 
cultural practices, leaders of several communities on one extreme of the 
continuum have actually developed a discourse based on particular 
notions of progress, modernization, and development. All three 
communities discussed in this category belong to the Asociación Shuar 
El Pangui. They also share a position of support of the mining company 
and are not really interested in claiming back any indigenous territory; 
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rather, they concentrate on acquiring well-being and good living 
conditions for the people in the communities, becoming entrepreneurs, 
and getting involved in productive projects and even industry. Thus, 
their discourse about being Shuar does not revolve around maintaining a 
link to the ancestral way of life, but rather to becoming a modern Shuar 
person who is capable of building a future for him/herself. In this case, 
being Shuar is expressed not only in cultural but primarily in material 
terms: they see their communities as poor and their people as 
uneducated, and they are forced to compete with the mestizo society. As 
one member of the community of Etsa stated, the Shuar people may 
have land and large farms, but that is not enough to have a decent 
standard of living, “Nature may have a lot of richness, but we don’t have 
the money to do anything.”21 Or as the leader in Santiago Paty stated: 
…there is much water in the Amazon region and we grow anything we 
want, but we also need to live and have the best life, have a normal life, 
have a life with all the benefits. The Shuar also want to have a good house, 
a good business, to start their own business, to be entrepreneurs and for 
businesses to open their doors to us.22 
 According to this discourse, it is very important to turn the 
communities into modern spaces with all basic services (electricity, water, 
and sewage) and to help the younger generations access education. They 
recognize they cannot live as their ancestors did anymore, so they instead 
wish to adapt to a more modern, mestizo society. As such, leaders in this 
community negotiate with the state institutions and the company in 
order to try to obtain such benefits for their communities. 
The leaders of Santiago Paty and Paquintza are quite young, and this 
seems to influence their conceptions of being Shuar. As one of them 
explained, younger people are more interested in building things for the 
future of their communities; they want Shuar people to become 
entrepreneurs, have small businesses, and think about progress and 
development. This implies the need to be part of an institutional 
structure and to have knowledge of the logistical and political processes 
at the local level (parishes, municipality, and provincial authorities) in 
order to to be able to obtain real and concrete benefits. For example, the 
leader from Santiago Paty has a clear view on development. In our 
interview, he compared his development-related accomplishments in 
Santiago Paty (creation of a school, a community house, and access to 
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electricity) to the reality of many communities in the neighboring 
province of Morona Santiago (where he is originally from); he said: “This 
is nothing like Morona Santiago; over there, it is sad: no roads, no 
electricity, no changes at all.”23  
 While in Santiago Paty the community’s limited land (1 hectare, as 
indicated in Chapter 4) can be a serious limitation to any kind of project, 
in Paquintza limitations are related to the global title deed. After the 
community land was dismembered, there has been an interest from the 
FESZCH and certain communities to recuperate the lost territory. 
However, the president of Paquintza and other young members of the 
community are not interested in recuperating the community title deed 
to Paquintza24 for various reasons. To begin with, they foresee great 
conflict with the mestizo people who bought land when Paquintza was 
divided. Second, while they agree that the notion of recuperating a global 
territory is a way to claim what used to be an “ancestral” territory, it 
might also become an obstacle to people fulfilling their needs in modern 
times. The fact that individual title deeds allow people to use their land in 
the way it best meets their needs (for example, mortgaging it or using 
their land as guarantee for a loan) is proof that individual deeds are more 
useful than the communal title deed. In his words, the community land 
belongs to everyone and no one at the same time, making reference to 
the fact that it cannot be used by any member individually and no one 
can individually claim it. The value of the “ancestral” community 
territory then becomes irrelevant in a context of progress and 
modernization.  
 In this context, communities like Santiago Paty, Etsa, and Paquintza, 
have considered the presence of the mining company to be positive, 
especially in terms of the implementation of important infrastructure 
projects, the construction of highways, and the creation of schools. 
Thus, the discourse about development is tightly linked to mining in 
Mirador. While there might be a certain concern regarding 
environmental impacts, the leaders are mostly worried that the company 
might finish mining before it develops productive projects in the 
communities. Just as the FESZCH, leaders in Santiago Paty and 
Paquintza state that their communities supported the mining company 
with the hope that it would bring progress to their members; in this case, 
people are not rejecting large-scale mining per se, rather they are 
disappointed in the company’s treatment of the Shuar people. Thus, 
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their disenchantment is more related to unfulfilled promises than 
anything else.  
 
 
Leaders of Santiago Paty and Paquintza during an interview 
Photograph: Consuelo Fernández-Salvador 
 
Negotiate to Progress 
At this point, it is important to mention that part of the notions of 
progress and modernization is also the ability of these leaders to 
successfully negotiate for their communities and actually obtain benefits 
from the company or the government. Contrary to Yanúa’s position, the 
leaders from these communities are not interested in getting involved in 
any activism against the presence of the mining company; on the 
contrary, their administration has concentrated on inserting itself either 
into the bureaucratic machinery of the state or into negotiation processes 
with the company. For example, most members of the community of 
Etsa work for ECSA and are beneficiaries of productive projects 
implemented with the help of the company’s department of community 
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relations. In the words of Etsa’s president, once the decision to develop 
the mining project was made by the government, they had to take 
advantage of the company’s presence and try to benefit from it, either by 
working for it or taking advantage of some small projects and donations 
to the community.25 If before there were no sources of employment in 
the area, now 90 per cent of the families from Etsa work in the mining 
company. However, Etsa works closely with the company and is 
probably the only indigenous community in the area of direct impact of 
Project Mirador to develop important productive projects on a larger 
scale. For example, the company helped the community construct eight 
fish pools. It also helped Etsa install electricity in the community, a 
process that started more than two years ago until light posts were finally 
erected in May, ready to be connected to the general circuit.26 According 
to a staff member of ECSA’s department of community relations, it has 
actually become a “model community” in terms of motivation to 
collaborate with the company in order to develop community projects.27  
 
 
One of eight fish pools in Etsa 
Photograph: Consuelo Fernández-Salvador 
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This has not been the case in other communities like Santiago Paty 
and Paquintza because the mining company does not seem interested in 
developing any ties with communities located in the area of indirect 
impact. While in the early years of the project, the Canadian 
administration implemented some projects in these communities, the 
Chinese company has not fulfilled those previously made development 
promises. For this reason, the leaders of these communities have 
concentrated more on establishing a relationship with state institutions as 
well as with the municipality. The president of Santiago Paty proudly 
showcases the results of his ability to negotiate and manage the 
relationship with the municipality so as to obtain specific benefits for his 
community: electricity, a school, and a community house. Furthermore, 
the leaders from both communities are involved in the Land Planning 
System (POT—Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial), a planning process 
through which urban and rural communities are incorporated into 
planning infrastructure and development programs. 28 Additionally, 
Paquintza’s leader is very interested in selling some of the community’s 
land (where he and his relatives have their farms) to ECSA so that they 
can use it  as landfills; for him, this would be a good way to bring some 
material benefits to the community, although there is some concern 
around the issue of relocation and of keeping the community together.  
Unlike Yanúa’s case, the leaders of Santiago Paty and Paquintza are 
somewhat disappointed in the company not because of territorial 
concerns, but because of their lack of support of local development and 
productive projects in their communities; otherwise, these leaders 
appreciate and welcome the company, at least in terms of the 
employment opportunities it provides. This is actually a recurring 
discourse at all levels, from the communities to the federation: after 
being in the area for such a long time, the Shuar people generally feel 
that the company has not fulfilled their development expectations.  
Ambivalent Discourses: The Community of Churuwia, San Andrés, and 
San Carlos Numpai 
Compared to the communities located at each extreme of the 
continuum, there are other cases in which radical resistance and identity 
discourses are present but simultaneously tempered with ambivalent 
positions and actions towards the mining company. Although the leaders 
and members from these communities may have strong feelings about 
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the territory in which their communities are located, their position 
regarding the mining company is vague and somewhat indifferent. 
Furthermore, some of these discourses do not accurately reflect the 
reality of their communities. 
In Churuwia, the community assigns a great deal of importance to the 
territory, probably because the kinship group has lived there for several 
generations (with some changes due to contact with colonos) and there is a 
clear feeling of belonging to the territory itself. The oldest brothers and 
leaders strongly affirm that their family has owned all the land around 
Tundayme and towards the mining project; they have not “come” from 
anywhere else because their ancestors have lived in the same territory  
for generations, even before the community was legally formalized. They 
explain the reason for living apart from the town of Tundayme in terms 
of the global title deed of their community, saying, “People from 
Tundayme are individual29 and mestizos, and we are Shuar, that is why 
we cannot move or go anywhere else.”30 If in Churuwia the territory is 
important because of the heritage and the ancestors, in San Andrés it is 
more about the value of the land itself. For its president, the land is the 
source of life because it provides not only the food to survive but also 
enough to sell and make money to address other needs. For the 
president of San Andrés, there is much value in having a house and a 
“finca” (farm) to grow their food and raise animals. He remarks, “it is the 
people who don’t have this that are poor.” In both cases, the 
communities fear that ECSA might take their land: “we are bothered by 
the Chinese because they want to buy our land and relocate us 
somewhere else; but we are not going to let them because the Shuar have 
been the owners forever and we are not going anywhere.”31 
Like Yanúa’s leader, the president of the community of San Carlos 
also claims ownership of the land that extends towards Valle del Kimi 
(close to ECSA’s campground), thus making the Shuar the owners of the 
territory around Mirador. San Carlos is located closer to the community 
of Machinaza and the highway that leads to El Pangui, located across the 
Zamora River; this means that it is also part of the area of direct impact 
of the mining project. This leader is particularly concerned about the 
land that, according to him, had belonged to his family for thousands of 
years. When the colonos arrived to the area, they illegally took some of the 
land that belonged to San Carlos and still occupy it to this day. To him, it 
is important to defend the land and the territory because they are sacred, 
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the source of all natural richness, and the means to secure the 
community’s livelihood. In this sense, they need the land and would 
never accept to give it away or sell it as the colonos have done.32 
Despite these strong discourses related to territory and land, the 
positions and actions of some of these leaders towards mining are quite 
ambivalent or even indifferent; in some cases, the decision to support 
large-scale mining seems to be ultimately based on whether the company 
delivers on its early promises of development, even though the given 
community’s anti-mining discourses might be quite strong. For example, 
Churuwia’s leader openly rejected the presence of the mining company, 
but he rarely showed up in any event related to the resistance 
movements, as Yanúa’s leader did. He constantly complained that the 
projects that the company had developed in the community (productive 
projects with chickens and guinea pigs) were small and irrelevant and 
were not significant enough to contribute to real development. However, 
he also stated that he would consider signing an agreement with ECSA if 
the company offered something that is a priority for them: a bridge over 
the river and a road to the community. Thus, his rejection of the 
company seems to be more strongly related to its inability to fulfill the 
peoples’ needs than to other considerations related to the protection of 
the territory and the environment. For San Carlos’ leader (who has not 
lived in the community for several years), the problem is not so much 
related to the presence of the company itself, but to the way the royalties 
and earnings should be distributed; from his perspective, royalties should 
be given directly to the Shuar people as a form of compensation. This 
statement, however, was quite different from the radical position he had 
when I first started doing fieldwork in the area in February 2013. At that 
time, he was very critical of any kind of external influence that could 
change ancestral practices and, thus, he saw the presence of the mining 
company as a negative influence for the Shuar people. 
While some of the identity discourses and the way the leaders of these 
communities have interacted with the mining company might be similar 
to those already described, my intention is to show that, in the latter 
cases, there seems to be less consistency. In some cases, leaders and 
members of communities are not happy about the mining company not 
necessarily because its presence represents a threat to their territory or 
their way of life (which has become “amestizada 33 ,” in words of 
Churuwia’s leader), but mostly because the company has not fulfilled its 
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promises of community development and aid. Thus, their discourse and 
position towards the company can easily change according to the 
changes in benefits they receive from it. For this reason, Churuwia’s 
leader is quite inconsistent in spaces or moments of resistance and San 
Andrés leader has never actually collaborated in any way with other 
leaders who have assumed a more activist position. Ultimately, it seems 
that many leaders would gladly work and cooperate with the company if 
they saw real progress and development for their communities. 
Furthermore, in these cases, there does not seem to be a connection 
between strong feelings about the territory and the land, desire to 
recuperate lost territory, and a position that demands protecting the land 
from large-scale mining.  While some people are concerned that the land 
might be taken away and they might be relocated, the communities have 
not made any significant demands to the company regarding 
environmental impacts from mining; also, they have not expressed any  
interest in formally protecting what they consider to be their “ancestral” 
territory. In San Andrés, for example, as much as its president talks 
about the value of land, most people living in the community do not 
have enough space (since the land for the whole community amounts to 
only 1 hectare) to cultivate or raise animals; as a result, they are forced to 
rent land outside of the community to farm. The only person who has 
enough land is the president himself; he had previously purchased the 
“finca” from a family member when the land of Paquintza was divided 
and decided to donate one of a total of 29 hectares to create a 
community. Furthermore, there are strong contradictions between those  
discourses in the communities related to traditional subsistence practices 
(such as the notion of the forest being a sort of “supermarket” for them) 
and the reality of their current lives. In fact, most people in San Andrés 
migrated from communities in Morona Santiago because they were 
isolated and too far into the jungle, preventing them from having access 
to roads, jobs, and schools for their children. If such Shuar people still 
engage in any kind of traditional subsistence practices, it is probably only 
when they occasionally return to their communities. The reality of living 
in San Andrés in Zamora is quite different from their discourses related 
the land, territory, and their traditional way of living. 
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Community of Santiago Paty, located on the edge of the highway 
Photograph: Consuelo Fernández-Salvador 
5.3.3  Final Thoughts on the Discourse Continuum  
Before drawing some basic conclusions about the description and 
analysis of discourses and practices of the Shuar community in the 
context of large-scale mining, it is important to emphasize that, even 
though this typology or continuum helps us to understand and 
categorize the variety of discourses and political practices among the 
Shuar, it is by no means a clear-cut definition of the whole reality and 
diversity of positions and forms of identity that the Shuar have and enact 
in their everyday life in the communities. As Valdivia (2005) and Hall 
(1990) argue, the articulation of identities, discourses and positions are 
constantly changing as people adjust to new situations and actors, 
including the new company’s administration, new leadership in the 
federation, and even new community leaders. Furthermore, although in 
my research I did incorporate the opinions of other community 
members, I primarily focused on the leaders’ positions and opinions. 
Even though the leaders’ authority is very strong and they ultimately 
guide the direction of the whole community, this does not mean that 
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other members may not have divergent points of view; these divergent 
points of view are precisely one of the sources of conflict within 
communities, as we have seen through various examples. 
The continuum described above shows that there is some correlation 
between the discourse of identity (which includes notions of 
development and well-being), the political practices and negotiation of 
the communities’ leaders, and their relationship and experiences with 
different external actors. However, as stated above, discourses are 
enacted in multiple ways that are not always related to being Shuar, 
which shows that the intersection of identities blur rather than reinforce 
social categorization (Mollet and Faria, 2013: 123). 
Younger leaders who were raised in communities close to urban 
centers and who attended mestizo schools evidently may not feel strong 
ties to forms of subsistence and lifestyles that are considered “ancestral” 
and traditionally Shuar and which are very much linked to different 
conceptions of land and territory. In the same vein, leaders who migrated 
to the communities in order to be closer to the highway and to the city 
of El Pangui value such access more than the symbolic meaning of living 
in their own communities located deep in the forest and with access to 
large swaths of territory. In the case of Etsa, Santiago Paty, and 
Paquintza, they support large-scale mining because they consider it to be 
the solution to many of the problems that are common to Shuar 
communities, such as the lack of access to basic services, issues of 
poverty, lack of education, etc. Very much like the Secoya and Kichwa 
cases analyzed by Valdivia (2005), being Shuar is expressed not only in 
cultural terms but mostly in terms of being marginalized, poor, 
uneducated, and in need of development and progress, all notions that 
are developed in opposition to a mestizo model of society (which to 
them stands as modern and developed). Thus, these leaders are 
interested in projecting themselves and their communities into a variety 
of spaces that go beyond the experience of a traditional Shuar 
community through entrepreneurship, education, and even sports. 34  
Furthermore, the possibility of working in the mine or developing 
projects with the aid of the mining company or state institutions opens 
the door to different positions and discourses. In this case, being 
efficient administrators means that they can utilize the resources 
available to benefit their communities; thus, it would make sense to 
welcome large-scale mining since it can provide opportunities to 
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improve their lives in particular ways.  
The discourse on poverty and marginality is also utilized by the 
FESZCH.  Although many Shuar claim that they are the rightful owners 
of the territory, concerns for environmental degradation or cultural 
impact are not more important than the communities’ social and 
economic needs or their views on modernity. Thus, support or 
acceptance of mining (as opposed to rejection of mining to protect the 
land) can be justified in terms of the benefit the communities receive and 
to which they feel entitled as a form of compensation for the 
exploitation of the riches in their ancestral territory. That same line of 
thinking also justifies the conflict between certain communities, the 
Federation, and the mining company when the communities believe that 
the company is not fulfilling its promises of projects, funds, long-term 
agreements, etc. The FESZCH and most of the communities in the 
research currently find themselves embroiled in such conflictive 
situations. 
On the other hand, leaders who reject large-scale mining and the 
presence of the mining company have turned to ethnic/territory-based 
claims to justify their opposition to mining. However, while some of 
those communities might have strong discourses, they are also 
ambivalent in their positions and actions, as in Churuwia’s case. To 
structure his demands, Yanúa’s leader argues that protecting the 
environment and defending their ancestral territory are vital to the 
reproduction of the Shuar culture (Cepek 2008; Sawyer 2004). As such, 
Asociación Shuar Kakaram has been key in linking the few radical Shuar 
leaders (such as Yanúa’s leader and an activist from Bomboiza, Morona 
Santiago) to other Shuar and mestizo activists and organizations. The 
alliance between these groups with CASCOMI, even if weak in terms of 
Shuar presence and participation, is probably the only currently active 
opposition movement in the area. The construction of a radical 
discourse against the mine and in favor of protecting the territory is 
crafted at the intersection of a variety of experiences and interactions 
with different actors. Strong positions of resistance seem to be based on 
a combination of experiences, including losing family land to the colonos, 
experiencing unfair labor treatment by the mining company, and being 
influenced by Acción Ecológica and their discourse on protecting the 
territory and land.   
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 Notions of development, modernity, and ancestrality have been 
included and reworked in the discourses of indigeneity (Valdivia 2005) 
used by the Shuar. These concepts are an influential part of the 
experiences of the Shuar’s daily lives in their communities and of their 
changing relationship with the territory, colonos, and with a variety of 
external actors in specific contexts. In the description of the discourses 
used by the Shuar, I have emphasized the relationship between these 
concepts, their influence on leaders’ and communities’ positions on 
large-scale mining, and their influence on some of the strategies and 
practices the Shuar use to achieve certain goals. In the last section, I will 
explore some issues related to the composition and the experience of the 
communities as well as the relationship to the territory as part of a 
territorial dynamics. 
5.4  Fragmented Territory and Communities 
In an extractivist context, it is unsurprising that the local people vary in 
terms of the discourses, political practices, and positions that they adopt; 
however, my argument regarding the Shuar Federation as an integrated 
political organization is that, beyond the expected diversity of positions, 
they lack joint and engaged discourses, practices, and strategies of 
resistance or negogiation that might prevent them from achieving some 
of their objectives, and this particular situation is not necessarily 
common to all large-scale mining contexts. For example, unlike the 
context in Mirador, in Intag there was a diversity of positions. However, 
there was also a strong and consistent mobilization against mining. As 
Avci and Fernández-Salvador argue, “In Intag, despite the polarization 
the mining conflict created among the local population, the opposition 
groups constructed a territory-based project and identity that has allowed 
the movement to get stronger throughout the years” (Avci and 
Fernández-Salvador 2016: 920).  
 As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, there are several 
factors that may explain these diverse and individualized practices and 
discourses. These factors incude (but are not limited to) the level of 
discord and power struggles within the Shuar political organization, their 
complex relationships and uses of the territory, and the transformation 
of the communities over time. In the following section of this chapter, I 
analyze the last two elements that, from my perspective, have favored 
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the fragmentation instead of cohesion of political discourses and 
strategies.  
As the Shuar understand it now, the notion of community is very 
different from what it used to be only a century ago, before the 
missionaries arrived to the territory and highland mestizos continued the 
“colonization process” in the early 1960s. The missionaries were actually 
responsible for the integration of centros or communities into Shuar 
culture; previously, the Shuar had lived in scattered family groups that 
lived in large houses, sometimes including several wives and their 
children (Harner 1978: 73); they had no centralized form of authority 
among the various households (Rubenstein 2005).  The community 
concept was introduced by missionaries in order consolidate Shuar 
settlements and to educate the children in missionary schools 
(Rubenstein 2005). With the creation of the mission centers, the 
Salesians intended to give the Shuar a certain sense of community that 
the traditional or previous neighborhoods seemed to be lacking. While 
they were not really villages, they did provide a sort of a community 
center that included a school, a church, some houses, and even a health 
center (Salazar 1977: 27). The idea of the community or centro was further 
reinforced in the period of the Ley de Reforma Agraria y Colonización (Law 
of Agrarian Reform and Colonization) as a practical way to defend the 
land belonging to the Shuar from the colonos and to legalize it before the 
state. Thus, the notion of the centro was originally and arbitrarily 
established through a series of processes by external actors; today, the 
Shuar have had to maintain and adapt this imposed community structure 
in order to keep their land and identity. 
In the area in which I completed my research, both the communities 
of Churuwia (close to Tundayme and located within the area of direct 
impact of Project Mirador) and Paquintza (close to the city of El Pangui 
and located within the area of indirect impact of Project Mirador) were 
legalized in the 1960s. In Paquintza’s case, the Salesian priests helped the 
siblings (who had inherited the land in the area) to legalize it under the 
Ecuadorean Institute of Agrarian Reform (IERAC—Instituto Ecuatoriano 
de Reforma Agraria, the government institution in charge of titling of land 
at that time).35 The creation and legalization of communities (which 
really refers to the granting of legal land titles usually in the form of 
communal land) is directly linked to the defense of the Shuar territory, 
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given that their land was not considered productive by the state (in terms 
of farming or livestock) and could thus be taken over by the colonos.  
The community has served different purposes in different historical 
moments; although this concept of community was imposed by 
missionaries as part of their quest to educate and “civilize” indigenous 
people, it eventually became a strategy to defend the territory and 
maintain some sense of ancestral ownership. In the 1970s, community 
organizations played an important role in development policies adopted 
by the government and NGOs; in other words, the notion of 
“development” was tied to the possibility of indigenous people 
establishing communities and being able to contribute to development 
projects with the help of external institutions (Troncoso 1999: 133). 
These efforts were part of the government indigenist policies that sought 
to transform indigenous groups that were considered archaic and 
backwards into “productive contributors to the sought-after national 
development agenda,” 36  as Bretón argues (Bretón 2013: 74). 
Furthermore, although the land in the communities had been legalized, 
there were still other additional processes that the communities needed 
to complete in order to legally be recognized as indigenous communities 
by government institutions such as the CODENPE. By completing 
these processes to legitimize the communities and obtain the title deed to 
the land, the communities were able to become rightful beneficiaries of 
the state, especially under the current government policies. 
The adoption of this particular concept of community is yet another 
example of how the Shuar have had to find different political strategies 
to engage with the larger mestizo society. The Shuar’s relationship with 
mestizo society is affected and shaped by external dynamics in which 
development plays a definitive role (Bretón 2013; Troncoso 1999). So, 
however conflictive or divided the communities I visited might be, they 
are important spaces through which the Shuar insert themselves into the 
logic of development and into the mestizo society; communities also 
serve as a means to establish a relationship with government institutions 
in order to demand benefits for themselves. These dynamics became 
clear as I spoke to several people in different communities; although they 
mentioned the cultural importance of living together, they further 
emphasized the need to be organized according to this particular 
structure in order to benefit from the state. In Etsa, for example, the  
brother of the president explained that he considers it important to live 
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like Shuar (work the land and speak the language) because they were 
born Shuar; however, he and his brother’s main goal is to develop a 
modern community that provides all the basic services and benefits of 
more urban settings. For the president of Certero, people who live alone 
(on individually-held land plots) miss out on the possibility of benefitting 
from community life, especially in terms of infrastructure: “to have a 
communal house, electricity, a small soccer field, that is why we work 
together, to obtain things and benefits for ourselves.”37  
The Shuar’s engagement with the outside world has also been 
evidenced by the fact that the mestizo way of life has become a model to 
be followed in the communities, which, in turn, has caused conflicts, 
power struggles, and divisions in them. Similar to many other indigenous 
communities throughout the Amazon region and Ecuador, the dynamics 
of the Shuar communities are complex. Several authors have studied 
other Amazonian groups in Ecuador who have also suffered the effects 
of missionary contact, pressure from the colonos, and extractivism. 
Valdiva (2007) discusses an interesting case in which different indigenous 
groups in northern Amazonia in Ecuador have reacted to and negotiated 
in different ways with oil companies as part of the demand against 
Chevron. Similarly, Cepek (2008) analyzed a case in which a group of 
Cofanes were forced to migrate to a new territory in order to avoid the 
effects of oil companies’ extractive projects in their ancestral lands. 
Other authors have focused on a diversity of issues affecting indigenous 
peoples’ lives. For example, the political organization and live 
threatening situations like drug trafficking among the Secoya (Vickers 
2003); the Kichwa engagement with ecotourism (see Hutchins 2007); 
and the process of construction of a Kichwa identity and the relationship 
to the language use (see Uzendosky 2014). Although the Shuar in 
Zamora Chinchipe may not have suffered such dramatic interactions 
with external actors, they have clearly been drawn to a much more urban 
and mestizo way of life. Many Shuar people migrate to urban areas or 
live part-time between the community and other towns in order to 
access education and jobs. This is the case of the community of Etsa, in 
which most community members (especially mothers and their children) 
spend much of their time in nearby towns such as Tundayme and El 
Pangui so that their children can attend school there. In cases like 
Churuwia, where whole families (the descendants of one son) have lived 
in Tundayme for decades, the only thing that really ties them to the 
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community is their farms, since they had never experienced life in a 
community setting as such. In these cases, one might argue that, in spite 
of the place of residence, the Shuar still deeply value and try to maintain 
kinship ties; however, reality demonstrates that members who are not 
linked to their communities have divergent visions of their futures and 
those of their families, potentially resulting in conflicts. For example, 
throughout the time of my research in Churuwia, one of the siblings 
living in Tundayme constantly challenged the authority of his brother, 
the elected president of the community. At one point, each sibling 
asserted himself to be the elected, legal president of the community, each 
claimed affiliation to a different association, each had a different vision 
of well-being for their community and, as such, each held a different 
position towards large-scale mining and Project Mirador. 
In cases in which children have left the community to study in nearby 
towns or cities, it is very unlikely that they will ever return to be part of 
the community’s day-to-day experience. In fact, the decision to leave was 
precisely because they were already looking (as their parents did) for a 
way to insert themselves into a mestizo society that values a certain kind 
of education and training. In most communities, the children did not 
have the basic amenities required to study (i.e. electricity) and this, of 
course, was considered an obstacle to their progress. 
As described in the cases above, kinship ties are still considered to be 
the basis for the continuity of the communities. However, in those 
comunities created after Paquintza was divided several decades ago, the 
situation is quite different. This division resulted in the fragmentation of 
families and the loss of a common land that belonged to specific kinship 
groups. Santiago Paty and San Andrés are no longer inhabited by the 
original extended families that owned the land. Rather, these 
communities are composed of a hodgepodge of nuclear families, most of 
whom are immigrants from Morona Santiago or other places, who 
bought plots of land from the original Shuar families.  
The ways in which these communities have been created entails a 
range of implications. To begin with, it is clear that in San Andrés and 
Santiago Paty, the community is not equivalent to a kinship group. 
Second, the notion of a communal territory does not have any meaning. 
Finally, the land is not considered to be important to the community’s 
well-being because it is so small that most community members are 
forced to look for work elsewhere in the mining company, as laborers, or 
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as farmers on rented land.  Although most of the members of these 
communities had originally moved from the north leaving their own 
communities and access to extensive land plots behind, they are not 
considered a priority or part of their subsistence. In fact, most people 
migrated from Morona Santiago because their own communities were 
located so deep in the forest that they had trouble accessing schools and 
roads. In this case, the value of the communal land or territory is 
secondary to the value of being close to urban areas that offer other 
kinds of services. For the leader in Santiago Paty, the “backwardness” of 
the jungle is quite clear. He explains, “It is very sad in the communities 
located deep in the forest; there is no electricity, no roads, or anything. 
Now that we are in contact with civilization, we have changed some 
practices, we have started to get dressed.”38 Thus, well-being is not 
necessarily understood in terms of a sense of belonging to an ancestral 
territory, but rather in terms of modern development, infrastructure, and 
access to certain services.  
5.4.1  Changing Notions of Territory 
As such, it is important to link the discussion about the changing 
composition of the communities to the notion of territory in order to 
understand the lack of integration of the Shuar people’s discourses and 
political strategies. It is important to discuss the complex process of 
creation and the subsequent division or fragmentation of the 
communities in terms of territory. With the arrival of the colonos to the 
area, the Shuar lost much of their land either because they left the area in 
an effort to avoid having contact with the mestizos, or because they fell 
victim to some type of unfair land exchange or sale as discussed earlier 
(Rubenstein 2005).  At this time, the Shuar’s different concepts of and 
meanings attached to the land and the territory clashed and the 
hegemonic view of state ultimately prevailed.  
In communities like Churuwia (which was the largest community in 
my study in terms of size), community members make reference to the 
original territory that extended from what is now Tundayme to the mine 
in Mirador; all of this land belonged to their grandfather:  
Churuwia is formed by the Sanimbia family and my father, who is the 
chief—thanks to him, we all have land and he is the only owner of the 
land on which we live until today. Otherwise, the land would have gone to 
the hands of our relatives who once left the area and now came back. All 
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this land belonged to my grandfather. For example, the military 
detachment was my father’s farm and my grandfather Mashendo used to 
live where the mining concession is now.39 
 Currently, Churuwia occupies around 3,800 hectares east of 
Tundayme; this area is across the the Kimi River while the military 
detachment and ECSA’s campground are located to the north of 
Tundayme.  Although the land in Churuwia was divided a few years ago 
to allow a part of the extended family form the community of Etsa, the 
community title deed has remained the same and, thus, this community 
is still the largest in my research. Paquintza’s case is different; after it was 
divided, the global title deed was annulled and some of the land was 
given to the state and some was sold to mestizos (in fact, it was a 
mestizo who found a way to claim some of the territory to sell a portion 
of it to the mining company). 40  While the original community had 
around 1,200 hectares, Paquintza now only occupies around 350 
hectares. and the new communities range from 18 to 1 hectares each. 
Ultimately, all these changes were brought about by the incorporation 
of the Shuar into Ecuadorean national life and have forced them to look 
outside their communities in order to ensure their well-being. For several 
decades, their livelihoods have no longer depended upon the use of 
resources within their territory; unlike their ancestors, they now need the 
means to participate in a market economy to satisfy basic needs like 
buying food they cannot produce in their communities, paying for 
transportation, and sending their children to school.  
 The type of loss and fragmentation of territory and communities that 
the Shuar have experienced is not something new in the Amazon region. 
The Shuar were not the only people to lose their land because of the 
colonization of the region that began in the sixties; for example, other 
indigenous groups have also suffered the effects of land loss and 
territory encroachment related to oil exploitation in the northern part of 
the Ecuadorean Amazonia. Precisely because the life and well-being of 
many indigenous communities has been threatened in so many ways, 
protecting the territory has been a chief priority on the agenda of many 
indigenous organizations in the Amazon region. The fight for the 
territory is key in the defense of indigenous rights as well as a 
fundamental part of the ethno-political strategy of these groups (Cepek 
2008; Little 2001; Sawyer 2004; Vickers 2003).  
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At this point, it would be interesting to compare the Shuar’s case to 
others in which the territory has played a predominant role in building a 
strong discourse about indigeneity. In his study of the environmental 
discourses and the role of conservationism in the everyday lives and 
political projects of the Cofán people, Cepek argues that the connection 
between identity and traditional territory has oriented “their participation 
in a process of self-determination that bases political rights on 
conservationist commitments” (Cepek 2008: 196). Cepek’s study is 
interesting because he studies the Cofane’s environmental discourses 
both at the level of political strategies and at the level of community life; 
both of these discourses argue that the protection of the territory is 
fundamental to achieving what they understand as well-being. As their 
ancestral community Dureno became surrounded by oil fields, the 
Cofanes’ traditional subsistence practices became limited as game and 
fish grew scarcer. In order to continue their way of life, they decided to 
resettle the community 200 kilometers downriver. The new community, 
Zábalo, “…is clean, quiet, isolated and surrounded by game-filled forest” 
(Cepek 2008: 207). This decision was based on a notion of identity that 
values and is constructed upon a way of life that is dependent upon the 
forest. This way of life and identity discourse separate this indigenous 
group from people who live in the cities, which are spaces they believe to 
be filled with hunger, sickness, and conflicts. However, according to 
Cepek, the community leaders did not immediately respond to oil 
extraction and the subsequent transformation of the forest with this 
strong valorization of the forest. He concludes: 
As petroleum-based development gradually reshaped the region, Cofán 
people in the most impacted areas found themselves on shrinking islands 
of forest. In these confined spaces, they witnessed the consequences of 
large-scale forest clearing. Simultaneously, they experienced their own 
power to impact the Amazonian environment by pursuing traditional 
subsistence activities in a transformed, restricted space. In such small 
forest islands as Dureno, they realized that their hunting and fishing 
practices could decrease game populations in new and destructive ways. 
(Cepek 2008: 207-208) 
 In the Cofane’s case, the notion of conserving the territory is part of 
the everyday life of the communities as well as part of their macro-level 
political strategies. The specific dynamics of the territory created by the 
presense of colonos and oil companies activated a particular response from 
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the leaders of the group of people who decided to move. Additionally, 
the Cofanes were able to find a space to establish a new community. It 
would be very difficult for the Shuar to relocate easily because of the 
scarcity of land and the ways in which it has been distributed and 
legalized.  
While the case of the Cofanes illustrates the articulation of both 
macro and community-level politics, Perreault’s study on the discourses 
about identity and territory in the Kichwa community of Mondayacu in 
the Amazon region illustrates a completely different scenario. Unlike the 
rhetoric utilized by the regional indigenous organizations, people in the 
communities do not think in terms of a shared and ancestral territory or 
heritage; rather, their identities depend upon everyday practices related to 
the chackra 41  (Perreault 2001). Perreault and Sawyer argue that the 
notion of an ancestral territory and the sense of belonging to it are the 
products of a self-conscious process in which indigenous organizations 
have identified their territories as a key ideological component in the 
concept of an indigenous nationality (Perreault 2001; Sawyer 2004).  
Comparatively, the situation of the Shuar in Zamora Chinchipe is 
quite different. While in the official discourse of the FESZCH and its 
leaders there is an intention to recuperate the ancestral territory, it has 
been clear that most efforts are actually directed to negotiate with the 
state and the mining companies to improve the socio-economic 
conditions of the communities and the federation itself,42 unlike the 
work of the Kichwa organization analyzed by Sawyer, for example.43 
Although in their discourses some Shuar leaders place great importance 
on the legacy of their ancestors and their ties to the territory, in reality, 
mobilization around a territorially-based identity seems hardly present in 
the communities I studied. Aside from the Asociación Shuar Kakaram, 
none of the other associations or communities in the area of research 
were interested in claiming back the territory around Project Mirador 
(Avci and Fernández-Salvador 2016: 8). For example, a former president 
of Asociación El Pangui explained that he did not feel that claiming back 
the lost and ancestral land was not an option because the Shuar 
themselves had divided and sold it. For him, it was more important to 
continue improving and developing the communities by negotiating with 
the mining companies. As we have seen in this chapter, most community 
leaders are more interested in looking after the well-being of the people 
or demanding more benefits from the companies and the state. Leaders 
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from Etsa, Santiago Paty, Paquintza, Etsa, and even Churuwia exemplify 
this.  
Thus, it is clear that within the Shuar organization in Zamora 
Chinchipe, the idea that Shuar territory should be defended and 
recuperated as part of the federation and community’s identity 
discourses and political strategies, is inconsistent. The division and 
rupture that has occurred within the communities and the general land 
loss that began in the 1960s, has left the Shuar people with little space to 
carry on any traditional subsistence practices, and limited the possibility 
of extended families and their descendants to continue living in their 
communities in the future. The reality of families migrating to and from 
other provinces and living on plots of land that are so reduced that it 
forces them to rent space to farm elsewhere is not in line with the notion 
of an ancestral Shuar territory. In any case, the sense of belonging to a 
Shuar “territory” seems to be increasingly more fragile; as such, it is 
impossible to define objectives based on belonging to a disappearing 
Shuar territory.  
Such issues related to territory loss, federation conflict, and constant 
power struggles have resulted in conflictive, inconsistent discourses of 
Shuarness and in different articulations of indigeneity in the wider socio-
political context. In this case, Hall’s view that collective identities are 
articulated according to certain positions and interests rather than 
according to a shared history and cultural essentialisms is still more 
evident among the Shuar of northern Zamora Chinchipe and the 
Federation itself. However, as Hall argues, while the diverse 
constructions of indigeneity and choices people make respond to specific 
moments and are not part of a historical continuity, they are also not 
random or arbitrary; they are part of and respond to territorial dynamics 
in which the model of the mestizo society has permeated life in the 
communities and in which the presence of continuous waves of different 
actors (Little 2001) has shaped and altered the configuration of the 
territory and the relationships around it.   
5.5  Conclusions 
This chapter has focused on the construction of Shuar indigeneity in the 
Shuar’s relationship to different external actors and, particularly, within 
the context of large-scale mining by addressing local responses, 
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positions, and expectations related to the process of extractivism. In this 
context, it is understood that conflicts related to resources and control 
over them are not only related to practical and economic matters in 
terms of their scarcity or availability, but are also very much related to 
politics, culture, and identity (Perreault and Valdivia 2010).  
The purpose of this chapter was to discuss the ethno-politics around 
Project Mirador; when issues of identity are contextualized in terms of 
the material aspects of life, the discussion becomes political. Thus, 
discourses related to the meaning of being indigenous—in this case, of 
being Shuar— also carry meanings and values that are important to 
issues like the use of resources, the relationship to nature and the 
territory, notions of development, and so forth (Vadjunec et al. 2011: 
11). At the same time, these discourses influence political decisions and 
practices, especially in relation to the Shuar Federation and, in particular, 
to the leadership in the communities. 
During this analysis, I have emphasized the importance of not 
simplifying positions of identity and political struggles and have instead 
concentrated on situations of diversity, transformation, conflict, and 
even fragmentation. I have argued that it is important to take a broader 
perspective on such situations, understanding them as part of a larger 
context and a longer historical process and not just as a result of the 
presence of large-scale mining in the area in recent decades. It is vital to 
take the concepts of territorial dynamics and interlocking identity 
categories into account in order to understand the ways in which actors 
at all levels of the Shuar Federation shape their discourses and define a 
diversity of positionalities and strategies of resistance or negotiation. For 
example, I have shown that notions of territory and the transformation 
of the communities, which are the result of a process in which the Shuar 
had interacted with the mestizo society during the past sixty years, have 
contributed to the definition of rather disperse efforts to deal with large-
scale mining and the actors involved in it.  
I complete this discussion with two key conclusions. To begin with, it 
is important to acknowledge that the community itself is, in fact, a 
product of colonialism; however, like other indigenous groups, the Shuar 
have not only adapted to this new form of social and territorial 
organization, but they have also utilized it as a means to engage with the 
mestizo society and especially with the state. While the original creation 
of Shuar communities was certainly arbitrary, the community proved to 
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be strategic in the struggle to reclaim the Shuar territory that was being 
lost to the colonos, to construct an ethnic-spatial-based identity vis-à-vis 
the colonos, and to demand services from the state. While the 
communities have gone through several transformations (including the 
integration of mestizos into the communities through marriage), they are 
still important spaces in symbolic and material terms. However, their 
members and leaders are constantly re-signifying their experience in 
relation to the community, as they also share other interests and desires 
that tie them to different social categories and to a larger mestizo society. 
Furthermore, most Shuar members and leaders in this study were born 
and raised in the communities, and thus the meanings they attach to the 
relations within them are quite different from those meanings that the 
oldest members of their families and their ancestors attached to them.  
Second, the fact that the territory is part of the official discourse of 
the FESZCH but is not necessarily very important to the communities is 
an interesting statement on the political organization itself.  Territory is 
not necessarily a priority for the community leaders because people are 
more interested in achieving well-being based on material wealth, 
development progress, and social improvement. It would seem that 
territory remains an abstract notion and, as Perreault (2001) and Sawyer 
(2004) have argued, it is utilized as part of a political rhetoric that is very 
common to indigenous organizations. In this case, the notion of territory 
reflects the need for a political discourse that makes sense in the context 
of the nation-state. Furthermore, besides contributing to and using 
discourses related to territory, the federation has also focused most of its 
efforts on negotiating material benefits for the communities. What does 
this gap between discourses and strategies tells us about the Shuar 
Federation as a whole? Is this discrepancy the result of a negotiation 
between what is expected from them as political actors (De la Cadena 
2010) and what they really aspire to in terms of living standards? In other 
words, is it more effective for indigenous leaders to employ a discourse 
related to fighting for ancestral territory than it is to focus on their fight 
for access to potable water, electricity, and even mining royalties?  
It seems that there are no simple answers to these questions, but they 
can provide some basis for an interesting debate around discussions that 
have been included throughout the thesis. These discussions are related 
to the constant negotiations between the Shuar and the mestizo society. 
It is clear that basic concepts that are now used everyday, such as 
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territory and community, development and modernization are Western 
impositions on the Shuar people; and the Shuar federation, which is 
another form of adaptation to colonialism, is constantly juggling with all 
these concepts, notions and strategies I further elaborate on this 
discussion in the chapter on conclusions  
The next chapter will focus on the political role of Ecuador Estratégico 
as an instrument of the nationalist resource agenda of the government. 
However, it will also discuss the interactions of the Shuar people and 
organization with the company around issues of development and 
modernity, which are main topics of discussion throughout the whole 
dissertation. 
Notes
                                                
1 A shorter version of this article was published as a chapter ‘Los Shuar frente al proyecto 
estratégico de El Mirado: el manejo de identidades y prácticas políticas fragmentadas’ 
(2017) in K. Van Teijlingen, E. Leifsen, C. Fernández-Salvador and L. Sánchez-Vázquez 
(eds) La Amazonía Minada. Minería a Gran Escala y conflictos en el sur del Ecuador. 
2 In fact, it has not been the case in many Ecuadorian anti-mining movements, 
which are mostly made up of mestizo people, as in the case of Intag.  
3 For an interesting discussion on the way Amazonian indigenous people have 
managed those essentialized images, see Conklin and Graham 1995.  
4 In this context, Valdivia also discusses the concepts of authentic and inauthentic 
indigeneity, referring to the differences between indigenous groups who have 
chosen to either identify with images of the ‘ecologically noble savage’ (authentic 
indigeneity) and thus develop relationships with ecological organizations and 
adamantly oppose extractivism, while others have chosen to negotiate with oil 
companies and are more interested in material benefits than in becoming 
guardians of the forest (inauthentic indigeneity). For Valdivia (2007), though, 
both forms of identity and strategies are equally legitimate and they are the result 
of different elements coming into place in specific contexts. 
5 Dominant and paradigmatic notions of territory are crafted and imposed by 
states in their effort to assert their hegemony. In extractive contexts, for example, 
Svampa (2008), argues that the state and the companies create imageries of 
territories that allow them to exploit resources while disregarding local 
populations. Thus, official notions of territory tend to exclude other meanings 
ascribed to them, creating a tension of “territorialities” (Svampa, 2008:7).  
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6  Interview president of the FESZCH, February 2013; several interviews 
president of Yanúa, Nov 2013-August 2014; president of San Carlos, January 
2015. 
7 Benedict Anderson (1993) discusses the concept of imagined communities to 
explain the rise of nationalism in Europe. He argues that imagined communities 
are a form of corporation in which the members, while they do not know each 
other, hold a strong sense of belonging and solidarity, especially through the use 
and even manipulation of symbols. 
8 Interview president of the FESZCH, October 2013 
9 Interview secretary of the FESZCH, October 2013 
10 While in the introduction I included official information on poverty levels in 
the parish of Tundayme, the discussion around issues of poverty among Shuar 
leaders pays more attention to their own discourses and perceptions around 
material needs and exclusion. 
11 Interview president of the FESZCH, October 2013 
12 Interview vice-president FESZCH, October 2013 
13 Interview secretary of the FESZCH, October 2013 
14 Interview leader of San Andrés, July 2014 
15 Other authors have also described and analyzed the differences in discourses 
between indigenous organizations and the communities that belong to them. See 
Perreault’s (2001) discussion of the community of Mondayacu and Bjureby’s 
(2006) discussion of the Shuar organization in Morona Santiago. 
16 Interview leader of Yanúa, November 2013 
17 Interviews of Yanúa’s leader, May-August 2014 
18 Interview of Yanúa’s leaders, January 2015 
19 Interview of Gloria Chicaiza-Acción Ecológica, April, 2014 
20 However, CASCOMI’s position has become much more radical in the last 
years because of ECSA’s constant harrassment of the farmers in the area, 
especially in what used to be the town of San Marcos. 
21 Interview of member of Etsa, June 2014 
22 Interview of president of Santiago Paty, January 2014 
23 Interview of leader of Santiago Paty, January 2014 
24 Paquintza was a single community that held a communal title deed but, due to 
organizational conflicts in the 1980s, the land was divided and several 
communities were formed in what used to be the territory of Paquintza (which is 
still considered to be the main community). Currently, the federation and some 
of the leaders from the newly formed communities are negotiating with the state 
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to regain the community title deed, which could create conflict with mestizos 
who had bought some land in the old Paquintza territory. 
25 Interview of leader of Etsa, November 2013 
26 According to the new policies regarding mining and local development (issued 
by the government and announced by the Secretariat of Peoples, Social 
Movements and Citizenship Participation in 2009), the mining company should 
only implement specific projects as part of their environmental management plan, 
such as small productive projects like the ones mentioned above. Larger 
infraestructure projects are the responsibility of Ecuador Estratégico as the company 
in charge of channeling royalties from mining into the development of local 
communities.  
27 Observation during a meeting with the staff of the Department of Community 
Relations of ECSA, June 4th 2014) 
28 The POT is a land-planning system implemented by the government of Correa 
and it is described in detail in Chapter 6. 
29 Individual means that mestizo have individual title deeds to their lands, not 
communal title deeds like many Shuar. 
30Interview leader of Churuwia and his family, November 2013  
31Interview president of San Andrés, January 2015 
32Interview leader of San Carlos, January 2015 
33 Adopt a mestizo lifestyle  
34 The leader of Paquintza, for example, helps train young Shuar girls from the 
communities around to compete in provincial speed races; he constantly posts 
news about these races on social networks. 
35 Interview president of the community of Certero, June 2014 
36 Original text in Spanish: “sectores productivos desde el punto de vista del 
perseguido desarrollo nacional” (Bretón 2013: 74) 
37 Interview community member of Etsa, May 2014; Interview president of 
Certero, May 2014). 
38 Interview president of Santigo Paty, May-August 2014 
39 Interview member of the Sanimbia family, Tundayme, June 2014 
40 Interview leader of Paquintza, January 2015 
41 The chackra is the piece of land used for which subsistence agriculture  
42 In this case, an exception would be the efforts made by the FESZCH to 
recover the lost land and the community title deed for Paquintza, an action that 
would result in mestizos being expelled from their lands. However, not all leaders 
supported this claim, as explained above. Another effort to recuperate territory 
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occurred at the end of the term of the FESZCH’s president, when he demanded 
that the land in Cordillera del Cóndor (then occupied by the mining concession) 
be returned when the extraction project concluded. This claim is highly 
questionable due to environmental impact and the duration of the mining project; 
and it was never convened.  
43 This might also be a result of the FESZCH not being ideologically aligned with 
national organizations that work in the defense of the indigenous territory, such 
as the CONAIE and the CONFENAIE in the Amazon region. On the contrary, 
other indigenous organizations have quite an elaborate discourse around the 
defense of the territory associated with the preservation of indigenous culture. 
See Sawyer (2004) for an analysis of an indigenous organization (OPIP) in the 
northern Amazon region and the analysis of the evolution of the Federation of 
Indigenous Organizations of Napo (FOIN) discussed by Perreault (2003a). 
  
 
 
6 
A transition to state control: the role 
of Ecuador Estratégico in the context 
of Project Mirador1 
 
6.1  Introduction 
In the previous chapters, I have concentrated on the Shuar population’s 
political organization, identity discourses, and political strategies in the 
context of Project Mirador. I have argued that rather than having a 
unified political front, they have scattered positions on large-scale 
mining. This diversity of positions revolves around discourses on what it 
means to be Shuar within the larger mestizo society, issues of territory, 
and the transformation of the communities. In this chapter, I focus on a 
different actor in the extractive scenario, Ecuador Estratégico, and its role 
in the re-distribution of resources and implementation of development 
initiatives in the populations that live near the strategic projects. This 
role is closely connected to the interactions with local Shuar 
communities and their own expectations of development tied to the 
mining project. 
 As has been the case in many countries in the region under post-
neoliberal governments, Ecuador has developed an agenda of intensive 
extractivism over the last several years, involving not only the 
exploitation of oil, but also aggressive attempts to develop a large-scale 
mining industry. As discussed in Chapter 3, while extractivism was also 
part of the previous neo-liberal agenda, an important difference between 
oil and mineral extraction in Correa’s government was the integration of 
the principle of redistribution; this implies that shares of the profits from 
the extracted resources would be redistributed to populations in the area 
of impact and also invested in social programs around the country (Arsel 
and Avila 2011; Davidov 2013). This has allowed the state to recuperate 
its central role in mineral extraction. In its new role, the state receives 
percentages of utilities and royalties that had never before been 
negotiated with foreign companies and it now acts as the main 
208 CHAPTER 6 
 
redistributing agent of royalties. As a part of this transition, a new 
government actor has emerged to claim control over the state. This 
institution, Ecuador Estratégico, is in charge of channeling royalties from 
projects considered to be strategic for the country (oil extraction, mineral 
extraction, and others) to the local communities most impacted by them. 
 The emphasis on extractivism in Correa’s government has been 
criticized by academics and social organizations as a return to neo-liberal 
practices (Bretón 2013; Gudynas 2012; Walsh 2010a). After the 
incorporation of several articles of the Constitution of 2008 regarding 
the sumak-kawsay and the rights of nature, as well as the passing of the 
New Mining Law in 2009, there was great expectation that extractive 
practices would be limited and regulated. However, the government 
became very clear about its intentions to transform the wealth from the 
extraction of resources into funds for local development. Unlike 
previous neo-liberal governments, Correa would re-distribute some of 
these funds to the people living around the areas of extraction, making 
them a priority. For this reason, after the government had signed the 
contract for exploitation of Project Mirador with the Chinese company 
CCRC-Tonguan in 2012, Correa publicly declared that there should be 
no direct negotiations between the mining company and the local 
communities.  
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the political role of Ecuador 
Estratégico as part of a process of the re-politicization (Hogenboom 2012) 
of resource exploitation in which the overall objective is re-distribution 
and social investment. While in the 1980s and 1990s oil exploitation lost 
the importance and political significance it had once had as a symbol of 
progress throughout the “Oil-Boom” that began in the 1970s, oil and 
now mineral extraction have become strategic again as part of Correa’s 
nationalist government program (Davidov 2013). Resource exploitation, 
especially mineral extraction, have become key in the implementation of 
social programs that aim to reduce poverty and bring development to 
those areas close to extractive projects, all of which are closely tied to the 
concept of buen vivir, which was incorporated into the Constitution of 
2008. 
 In this chapter, I argue that, besides implementing development in 
local communities, Ecuador Estratégico serves a political function: by 
directly using the earnings and royalties from resource extraction to carry 
out development projects and promising buen vivir, it legitimizes and 
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justifies extractivism. Furthermore, it emphasizes a form of traditional 
development based mostly on the construction of infrastructure and 
large investment in specific projects, avoiding altogether the new 
approach to alternative development that was introduced in the new 
constitution as part of the notion of buen vivir. The discussion in this 
chapter considers how Ecuador Estratégico operates as well as the 
discourses and rhetoric it utilizes in a context of developmentalism, 
regulation, and redistribution of resources to the population. This 
analysis will help us to understand the politics of social and local 
development projects. I will also examine the practices, discourses, and 
interactions of the Shuar population vis-à-vis Ecuador Estratégico and 
argue that, unlike essentialized notions of being indigenous, the Shuar 
are constantly struggling to attain modernity and development as a way 
to achieve progress and become part of the mestizo national society. In 
most cases, their constant disappointment with this state institution and 
in the mining company are not necessarily because they feel that their 
traditional lifestyle is being threatened, but because both the company 
and the state have failed to fulfill their expectations. Underlying this 
discussion is the question of how both the state and local indigenous 
people conceive of development, either as the satisfaction of material 
needs or as a more encompassing perspective that also considers issues 
of equality, access to rights, and social justice.  
 I begin with a brief analysis of the concept of buen vivir in the 
constitution and how it its tied to a new regime of development. 
Afterward, I point out some of the discrepancies between development 
policies and programs in the National Development Plan (Plan Nacional de 
Desarrollo) and the National Plan for Buen Vivir (Plan Nacional del Buen 
Vivir). As part of a discussion about the political role of minerals in the 
Correa’s government, I will then focus on Ecuador Estratégico, the way it 
operates as a state institution in charge of local development, and its role 
in legitimizing extractivism and in controlling the local population. I 
conclude by analyzing the company’s interactions with the local Shuar 
population and communities around Tundayme and their perceptions of 
development and well-being. 
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6.2 Sumak Kawsay and Development in the State’s  
Constitution 
The sumak kawsay has become an important concept not only in 
Ecuador’s constitution but also in its National Development Plan (Plan 
Nacional de Desarrollo), which is now known as the National Plan for Buen 
Vivir (Lu et al. 2017), and in several state institutions including Ecuador 
Estratégico. Because this institution seeks to improve people’s quality of 
life, its work is directly associated with local development, buen vivir, and 
notions of interculturalism, especially when dealing with indigenous 
populations.  
Taken from the foreword of Ecuador’s Constitution of 2008, the 
following excerpt states the importance of the concept of buen vivir or 
sumak kawsay as a guiding principle in the construction of a new society. 
These concepts are the foundation upon which Ecuador is currently 
building its agenda of economic, social, and environmental rights (Plan 
Nacional del Buen Vivir, Secretaría Nacional de Desarrollo: 2013-2017).  
We, the sovereign people of Ecuador, recognizing our ancestral, millennial 
roots, forged by men and women of different groups, celebrating nature, 
the Pacha Mama2, of which we are a part and which is vital for our 
existence, invoking the name of god and recognizing our diverse religions 
and forms of spirituality, appealing to the wisdom of all our cultures, 
which make our society richer… 
We have to builda new form of coexistence among citizens, in diversity 
and harmony with nature, to achieve buen vivir, the sumak kawsay.  
(Constitución Política de la República del Ecuador, Foreword 2008: 15)3 
 Although there is no precise definition of the concept of buen vivir in 
the constitution’s text, two elements are clearly important: respect for 
cultural diversity and ancestral cultures as well as the importance of a 
harmonious relationship with nature and the environment. As expressed 
in Chapter II, Section II, Article 14: the constitution guarantees “the 
right of the people to live in a healthy and ecologically balanced 
environment, which assures sustainability and buen vivir, sumak kawsay” 
(Constitution 2008).4  
 Buen vivir is the Spanish translation for sumak kawsay, a Kichwa 
expression which generally refers to a holistic form of well-being in 
which people live in harmony with their social, natural, and spiritual 
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environments as expressed in their relationships to their communities, 
nature, and the spiritual world (Viola 2014: 58). Despite the accepted 
translation of the sumak kawsay to Spanish, some authors like Villalba 
argue that there is really not a single definition for the term and thus its 
application should depend on the context. In fact, according to Villalba, 
indigenous people tend to think that the incorporation of the terms buen 
vivir or vivir bien into the constitutions of Ecuador and Bolivia are only “a 
pale metaphor that tends to weaken their meaning in an anthropocentric 
manner” (Villalba 2013: 1430). 
 Whatever limitations the concept of buen vivir may have, it was 
inspired by the cosmovision and ancestral philosophies of indigenous 
people in the Andes where the notion of development is non-existent 
(Walsh 2010a). It also includes references to other philosophies or 
ideologies. For example, according to the National Plan for Buen Vivir 
(2013-2017), buen vivir is a notion common to all the native peoples of 
the world, including those from Western civilization. It may refer to the 
satisfaction of material needs but also to the cultivation of the mind, the 
practice of virtue, the concepts of beauty and pleasantness, and even the 
ethical considerations of what is good (2013: 23). Considering this 
reference of buen vivir as a universal concept, the plan states that the 
“Citizens’ Revolution’s Government” has incorporated some of the 
ideas from the Amazonian and Andean indigenous people of Ecuador 
alongside novel concepts to make it the central objective of its public 
policy. The closest to a definition of the sumak kawsay to be found in the 
National Plan for Buen Vivir reads, “it strengthens social cohesion, 
community values and the active participation of individuals and 
collectivities in relevant decisions for the construction of their own 
destiny and happiness…”5 It is also based on respect for diversity and 
the ecosystems around it (Plan Nacional del Buen Vivir 2013: 23). In 
addition to the constitutional articles in which the respect for diversity 
and the harmonious relationship with nature are fundamental, the buen 
vivir in the National Plan for Buen Vivir also includes elements of social 
cohesion, community values, and participation, which are associated with 
Andean cosmovision. In her analysis of this definition, Catherine Walsh 
argues that “equity, democracy, participation, protection of bio-diversity 
and natural resources, and respect for ethnic-cultural diversity” are also 
part of a new development framework known as human development, 
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which is also part of the Western, modern conception of the world 
(Walsh 2010a: 16).  
 Thus, the definition of sumak kawsay or buen vivir remains somewhat 
ambiguous; however, the use of this concept in the government’s 
discourse should be read as strategic and responds to the need to create 
distance between its agenda and those of previous neo-liberal 
governments, which emphasized economic growth as a main pillar for 
development. The new government seeks to challenge “the profit-
making drive integral to modernization” (Lu et al. 2017: 87). 
Furthermore, by proposing alternative forms of development connected 
to notions of well-being based on living a dignified life in peace and 
harmony with nature and other people, the constitution and the National 
Development Plan are key to building a path towards a new kind of society 
and moving away from old paradigms (Bretón 2013). Part of this strategy 
involves using two other elements besides the sumak kawsay that are also 
key to the objectives of the Citizen’s Revolution, as expressed in the 
constitution, the National Development Plan, and the National Plan for Buen 
Vivir. As Walsh explains, buen vivir, the rights of nature, and a new regime 
of development make up a new triangular model of society; this model 
should be conceptualized as public policy (Walsh 2010a: 18) and 
implemented through the application of laws and a diversity of 
government programs. This new vision of society was defined after long 
debates in the National Constitutional Assembly mainly as a criticism of 
a development regime that was based on the accumulation of capital and 
the pursuit of efficiency, often at the expense of nature and the 
environment (Acosta 2010).  The following is a conceptualization of 
development in terms of buen vivir, according to the National Development 
Plan (2007-2010): 
…we understand development as the achievement of buen vivir for all 
men and women, in peace and harmony with nature and as the indefinite 
prolongation of human cultures. Buen vivir presupposes that liberties, 
opportunities, capacities, and the real potential of individuals are expanded 
in such a way as to simultaneously achieve that which society, territories, 
and collective, diverse identities–understood as universal and individual 
human beings at the same time— value as the object of a desirable life. 
Our concept of development obliges us to recognize, understand, and 
value each other so as to facilitate self realization and the construction of a 
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shared future. (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo, 2007-2010: 54) (my 
translation) 6 
 According to this definition, development is understood as relative to 
what each person, individually and as part of a collective group, 
considers to be a desirable way of living; however, the National 
Development Plan establishes 12 specific national objectives to be 
accomplished in the period 2007-2010 (the next plan, the National Plan for 
Buen Vivir also establishes 12 objectives for the period of 2010-2013). 
Indeed, for development to be achieved according to this plan, it is 
necessary that the state recuperate its administrative, planning, 
regulatory, and redistributive capacities (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 
2007-2010: 6). As Walsh argues, development is actually conceived in the 
context of the state under a technocratic and economistic approach 
(Walsh 2010a: 20). Examples of this notion of development are included 
in the National Development Plan and the National Plan for Buen Vivir (Plan 
Nacional de Desarrollo 2007-2010: 63; Plan Nacional del Buen Vivir 
2010-2013: 75) (in which there is reference to selective substitution of 
importations and extractivism as crucial to development). This notion is 
also included in actual government programs that link well-being to the 
extraction of resources and the development of infrastructure by 
institutions like Ecuador Estratégico.  
Escobar’s analysis of the National Development Plan also shows some 
inconsistencies between this new notion of development and mainstream 
development concepts, both of which are included in the plan: 
It is telling, for instance, that the Plan speaks of ‘strategic areas to amplify 
the economic growth that can sustain human development (energy, 
hydrocarbons, telecommunications, mining, science and technology, water 
and rural development)’ as deserving ‘special attention by the State’ (p.73). 
This notion of strategic areas is problematic since they seem exempt from 
the cultural and environmental criteria that underlie the conception of the 
sumak kawsay; the government’s recent mining policies operate under this 
principle. (Escobar 2010: 22) 
Clearly, there are contradictions between the discourse of the 
constitution, policies, and Correa’s government’s real practices (Arsel 
2012; Bretón 2013; Davidov 2013; Radcliffe 2012; Van Teijlingen and 
Hogenboom 2016). While the new constitution grants rights to nature, at 
the same time it is deeply commited to providing welfare to the 
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population, especially to marginalized groups with the greatest needs. 
The concept of sumak kawsay, which in itself implies a harmonious 
relationship with the environment and nature, could not be 
accomplished if intensive natural resource extraction (which is also 
associated with old models of development) is seen as the main 
mechanism to provide that well-being to the people. In this context, 
Ecuador Estratégico serves as an interesting case study to analyze the ways 
in which the government has managed to portray extractive practices as 
necessary and even desirable to help improve the living conditions of 
people and achieve their buen vivir, all the while investing in a model of 
development that is closer to the classic notions of the 1960s (Arsel and 
Avila Angel 2011; Arsel 2012). Lu et al. argue that, indeed, funding for 
social programs can only occur by intensifying the extraction of natural 
resources in a context in which the state “circularly justifies its presence” 
by attempting to find solutions to state-caused problems since the 
establishment of the oil industry in Ecuador (Lu et al. 2017: 93).  
 To understand the contradictions in the idea that extractivism, buen 
vivir, and the rights of nature can coexist, it is important and fair to 
acknowledge that in the government’s agenda, extractivism is only the 
first stage in the process of achieving buen vivir, which can really only be 
accomplished with a change in the productive matrix. The concept of a 
productive matrix is understood as the way in which a society is 
organized in order to produce goods and services, including the 
associated productive processes and the social relations (Senplades 2012: 
7). The goal of this administration is to change Ecuador’s productive 
matrix based on a model of production/exportation of primary goods 
with low levels of technology and high levels of concentration of 
earnings. 7  Ultimately, the administration seeks to transition from a 
society that bases its economy on resource extraction and exportation to 
one that privileges diversified production, is eco-efficient, and whose 
resources are also based on knowledge, capacity, and biodiversity (2012: 
11). In this process, the goal is also to create new forms of creating and 
distributing wealth in order to incorporate actors that have been 
historically excluded from the market development scheme. 
 Therefore, the emphasis on this stage is to increase the production of 
wealth through extractivism and to re-distribute it to the most vulnerable 
populations, thereby alleviating poverty, providing basic services, and 
developing infrastructure. Ecuador Estratégico is key in this stage precisely 
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because it channels wealth derived from the extraction of natural 
resources towards local development which, at least for now, is 
understood as key to the development of infrastructure. As stated in the 
introduction, Ecuador Estratégico’s main political role is to effectively show 
that, in this government, the extraction of minerals serves a social agenda 
and that local populations are the main beneficiaries of the wealth that 
results from extractivism (unlike what previous neo-liberal governments 
did regarding oil extraction). 
6.3  What is Ecuador Estratégico? 
The public company of strategic development, Ecuador Estratégico, was 
created in September 2011 as the institution responsible for 
implementing local development programs in the area of influence of 
strategic projects 8  including mining initiatives, oil exploitation, and 
hydroelectric projects throughout the country. This means that the 
company is in charge of overseeing the whole process, from planning, 
designing, evaluating, financing, to implementing social investment 
projects and programs. As specifically stated in its main social objectives, 
these programs should include the construction of Centers for Buen Vivir9, 
community police stations, health and education infrastructure, and any 
other project deemed necessary by Ecuador’s president (Ecuador 
Estratégico official web site). In fact, this company has taken over the 
construction of roads, bridges, government star projects, and the 
millennium communities and schools10, which will be discussed later in 
this chapter. Furthermore, in the last report published on their webpage 
(2017), sanitation projects, education, and road infrastructure are the 
most important objectives, having received around $600 million in 
investment. Other important initiatives include health projects, 
electrification, telecommunications, urban development, sports, and the 
construction of Millennium Communities.  
 Ecuador Estratégico is unique in the way it operates; unlike other state 
institutions (such as ECORAE, the Institute for the Regional Amazonian 
Eco-Development or Instituto para el EcoDesarrollo Regional Amazónico) 
which depend upon the general state budget, Ecuador Estratégico receives a 
percentage of surplus and royalties from mining and oil exploitation 
directly from the State Bank/Public Treasury. This mechanism allows it 
to make decisions independently and work efficiently. In the words of a 
former manager of the company, local development has to be 
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accomplished both “quickly and efficiently” and “this is why it was 
decided to use the tools that are given to public companies.”11  In 
different interviews with the authorities of Ecuador Estratégico, it became 
clear that a main concern (and simultaneously a measure of success) of 
this institution is the challenge to make large investments in local 
development projects in the shortest timeframe possible.  The general 
manager said, “…even though the company was recently created, the 
investment that has been carried out is huge; in the Amazon region up to 
the end of 2013 it was over $400 million, and this was accomplished 
even though the company was only created in 2011…”12Also, according 
to the latest information presented on the company’s web page (2017), 
the investment in all of Ecuador amounts to $839.3 million dollars in 
1,166 development projects in all 13 provinces in which strategic 
projects have been implemented (of which $1.5 million were invested 
only in the province of Zamora Chinchipe). At this point, it is important 
to clarify that development projects are not only implemented where 
there are disbursements of money made by extractive companies. In 
Zamora Chinchipe, for example, while the Chinese company had paid 
the government $40 million as advanced royalties, the money invested in 
that time period already amounted to $77 million.13 
 According to Ecuador Estratégico’s strategic plan 2016-2017, the 
following financing sources are all included in the public treasury 
account and are all available to Ecuador Estratégico for investment in the 
kind of projects described above, or can be used directly by 
municipalities and head parishes (known as GADs, Decentralized 
Autonomous Governments or Gobiernos Autónomos Descentralizados), in 
areas of mining concessions or influence: 
- 12 per cent of profits generated by private mining and hydrocarbon 
operators and 5 per cent of profits from small-scale mining. 
- 70 per cent of royalties generated by mining (large or small-scale 
mining). The information on the exact percentage was provided by 
the general manager of Ecuador Estratégico (Interview February 2014). 
- Contracts for mining services: 3 per cent corresponds to the 
municipal and parish government and Ecuador Estratégico is entitled to 
a percentage based on their needs. 
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- Any amount of surplus generated by public operators in strategic 
projects that should go to the general state budget (Update to the 
Plan Estratégico Empresarial de Ecuador Estratégico 2015-2017 
2017: 12-13). 
 Ecuador Estratégico works closely with the ministries in charge of 
specific areas in which they develop projects (especially the ministries of 
education and of health) and the GADs (which include provincial and 
municipal parish offices and councils), which are the most important 
actors in the development of local projects. Projects developed in local 
(and indigenous) communities are supposed to be managed by 
municipalities and parish councils, since these administrators are most 
basic political-administrative units and should be aware of the needs of 
the local population. According to this plan, parish councils14 should 
carry out feasibility studies before Ecuador Estratégico begins any project 
or infrastructure initiative for indigenous communities. According to the 
general manager, this process is somewhat problematic because local 
GADs (especially parish councils) lack the experience, the administrative 
capacity, and budget to carry out such studies, develop projects on their 
own, or properly respond to projects presented by indigenous 
communities. Another problem in this organization is related to the 
historical difficulties and exclusion that indigenous communities and 
organizations have faced in dealing with government institutions. In the 
past, they had worked directly with government institutions, but are now 
excluded from such collaborations and have unrealistically been forced 
to develop projects on their own with the GADS or to present projects 
through them. These problems prompted Ecuador Estratégico to create a 
special agency to work directly with indigenous communities in the 
Amazon region: the Regional Amazónica was created in 2013 and is located 
in El Puyo, Pastaza (a northern province in the Amazon region). 
Through the office of the Regional Amazónica, Ecuador Estratégico was able 
to work directly with the indigenous communities. This meant that the 
company would be in charge of hiring experts to do the feasibility 
studies and facilitating the projects from beginning to end. 
 According to this organization, Ecuador Estratégico has to work with 
the local GADs, indigenous communities, and other institutions in order 
to meet the needs of the local population in different provinces. The 
manager of the company describes the way they work, saying: 
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For every project—be it sanitation, education, health, roadwork—we have 
to coordinate with the ministry in charge. So, for example, we know of a 
certain Kichwa community in the province of Pastaza that has needs in 
terms of health…so we ask the Ministry of Health if, within their own 
planning, they have considered serving this community. If they say, ‘Yes, 
we have planned to build a health center type B to satisfy the health needs 
of a certain number of patients,’ then we know that as part of the profiling 
we do, we should include a health center, or schools, or other types of 
infrastructure.15 
 In conclusion, Ecuador Estratégico’s work is complex because it requires 
coordination with many different entities at different levels. 
Furthermore, while its objectives revolve around the development of 
projects that include major investments in infrastructure related to 
health, education, and roadwork, in some cases it has had to absorb the 
work that should be done by other institutions, such as the GAD. By 
creating the Regional Amazónica and reaching out directly to the 
indigenous communities, this institution found a more efficient way to 
regulate local development. For this purpose, the office hired indigenous 
people from different indigenous nationalities and incorporated the 
notion of interculturalism into its approach to cultural diversity.  
 The development of projects in indigenous communities in the 
Amazon region was a definite challenge for Ecuador Estratégico. The 
decision to create this office was a response to several difficulties. To 
begin with, the limited administrative and financial capacity of 
communities to manage projects and contract third parties to do studies 
was a major hurdle that needed to be addressed. Additionally, the 
intention to establish a more direct communication with the people in 
the communities in order to understand their needs and cultural context 
required the establishment of such an institution. Finally, the creation of 
this office satisfied a formal petition made by the Amazonian 
nationalities to allow them to directly benefit from development projects. 
As the director of the Regional Amazónica affirmed, part of the 
government’s objectives is to satisfy the needs of the indigenous people 
in the region who had not received enough attention from previous 
governments. Thus, the work of the Regional Amazónica is considered 
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emblematic; as such, this is an important dimension of the discourse 
used by the staff.  
 The creation of this office is also important in terms of basic notions 
of redistribution and interculturalism, which are both tied to the goal of 
achieving buen vivir. The following quote from the manager of Regional 
Amazónica illustrates these principles, which are key to the government of 
the Citizen’s Revolution and the constitution and which are expressed in 
the National Plan for Buen Vivir: 
This is important because it shows that the government has actually 
implemented the new public policies designed for the Amazon region, in 
terms of fair and equal distribution of the gains that come from the non-
renewable resources, such as mining…and this office here in Pastaza is the 
only one that has taken the element of interculturality into consideration; 
our team consists of people from seven different nationalities…which 
means that they are interlocutors when we go to the communities…this 
and our modest experience as Amazon people have helped us to collect 
information on the needs of the nationalities.16 
 Part of the office’s work and the reason for incorporating staff from 
different nationalities was to facilitate the collection of information from 
indigenous communities in order to design a macro Plan for 
Nationalities (Plan de Nacionalidades). As part of this new intercultural 
approach, in 2013 the office started a new survey process in order to 
learn from the indigenous people about their needs and desires. Teams 
of indigenous staff implemented the survey over a period of two months 
in 399 of the 1,181 indigenous communities established in the Amazon 
region. Based on this survey, Ecuador Estratégico decided to create the Plan 
for Nationalities, which was created to delineate a plan of action for 
development in all Amazonian indigenous communities. The director of 
the Regional Amazónica anticipated that most people in the communities 
would agree that their priority was to create access to basic services like 
water and sanitation and then to continue on to other important areas 
such as sewage, education, and roads. This plan was supposed to be 
completed by January 2015, but still has not been published or made 
available in any way.17  
 Further along, I will address the notion of interculturalism in the work 
of the office of Regional Amazónica, especially in regard to the Shuar 
communities in the area of Tundayme. After having described the most 
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important aspects of how Ecuador Estratégico operates, I now discuss the 
politics of extractivism.  
6.4  The Politics of Extractivism: Buen vivir, Development, 
and Redistribution in Ecuador Estratégico 
Correa’s government has been identified as part of the New Left, post-
neoliberal regimes also present in countries like Venezuela and Bolivia 
because it has implemented a series of anti-neoliberal reforms in the 
mineral sector. After decades in which the governments of these 
countries had liberalized and privatized resource extraction, there has 
now been a change towards re-regulation, re-taxation, and even re-
nationalization (Arsel 2012; Bebbington and Humphreys 2011; Davidov 
2013; Escobar 2010; Gudynas 2012; Hogenboom 2012). Besides 
protecting the mineral and oil sector, a main objective of this agenda was 
to increase the budget to help finance social programs. 
Davidov studies mineral extraction in Ecuador in the context of the 
International Monetary Fund post-nationalism (Davidov 2013). In this 
context, Correa’s government is part of the leaders of the New Left who 
envision a kind of resource nationalism in which their country’s 
economic growth is led by mineral extraction. This resource nationalism 
is also part of a new notion of state sovereignty. Davidov has argued that 
Correa created a public image of mining that distances itself from the 
way oil exploitation was managed in neo-liberal governments. Thus, 
while oil exploitation symbolized everything that was wrong with neo-
liberalism—namely de-regulation of the private sector, low levels of 
social investment, and low levels of local development—mining 
represented a “new national enterprise” that could be “molded into an 
‘authentically’ populist industry.” (Davidov 2013: 491) 
Davidov argues that, while the image of oil exploitation has been 
permanently damaged and may no longer be important in the 
government’s nationalist programs, it would seem that the policies 
regulating extraction itself (regardless of the type resource to be 
exploited) continue to be important. Hogenboom (2012) states that 
several leftist regimes in Latin America have implemented new policies 
on mineral extraction to accomplish several political objectives. One of 
these objectives is an attempt to expand social expenditures in the form 
of social programs directed at the most impoverished sectors of society 
(Bebbington and Humphreys 2011: 140). Thus, this strategic use of 
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resource extraction under progressive governments justifies mineral or 
oil exploitation by defining them as key for sustaining different social 
programs that are directed at the most impoverished in society (Arsel 
2012; Gudynas 2012, 36; Lu et al. 2017). According to Hogenboom, 
there are only a few formal budgetary ways in which revenues are 
directed towards social spending but, in general, the income increase 
should lead to higher social investment. However, Ecuador Estratégico is 
part of those formal mechanisms in which income and royalties from oil 
and mining are directly invested into local development; as such, it 
makes an interesting case study. 
The following quote from a former general manager of the company 
clearly illustrates the link between development and resource extraction 
and also the perception that extractivism is vital if well-being and 
development are desired: 
In a very simple way and citing the president of the country a bit, being 
close to a mining project like you, should understand that this is a blessing, 
that this is reason for local development.18  
 According to this perspective, people are supposed to be thankful for 
living in areas in which strategic projects are implemented. As part of the 
resource nationalism model (which emphasizes the need to regain 
control of the operations and the financial gains of extractive 
companies), mineral exploitation ultimately seeks to reduce poverty and 
improve peoples’ welfare (Arsel and Avila 2011; Bretón 2013, Davidov 
2013; Lu et al. 2017; Van Teijlingein and Hogenboom 2016). Ecuador 
Estratégico has become a main re-distributing channel and a key actor in 
this political agenda. 
 While the link between buen vivir and the extraction of minerals can be 
problematic (Arsel and Avila Angel 2011), it is actually reinforced by the 
official rhetoric used by Ecuador Estratégico. It is present in official 
documents such as the Strategic Plan (2016), as part of its articulation of 
the National Plan for Buen Vivir, on the company’s web page 
(www.ecuadorestrategicoep.gob.ec), in brochures that are distributed to 
local communities, and, of course, in the interviews I conducted with 
authorities of the company. In the company’s official declaration of its 
mission, the distribution of benefits from the extraction of natural 
resources is a step towards the achievement of sumak kawsay:  
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To execute social investment plans, programs, and projects with efficiency 
and efficacy, contributing to an equal redistribution of those earnings 
generated by the responsible management of natural resources, in order to 
achieve Buen Vivir for those communities in the areas of influence of 
strategic projects.19 
 Buen vivir is understood as a direct consequence of the extraction of 
resources and subsequent reinvestment of associated profits in certain 
areas. To recall, local communities located in areas around extractive 
projects such as Mirador receive advanced royalties from the project 
itself but also benefit from other projects in different provinces.  As the 
manager of the Regional Amazónica expressed in an interview, it is 
important that people recognize that the good things they have are a 
product of resource extraction, that they accept this reality, and commit 
to it: “we know that they (people from the indigenous communities) 
have understood that there has to be a commitment, that the resources 
to have a good school, to have a dignified home, to have water, come 
from a responsible exploitation of oil.”20 In other words, there should be 
an acceptance and acknowledgment of the benefits of resource 
extraction. 
 The company’s official web site (www.ecuadorestrategico.gob.ec) also 
emphasizes the link between well-being and resource extraction: besides 
the two slogans that greet the reader, “recursos que construyen 
felicidad”(resources that build happiness) and “el país de los sueños cumplidos” 
(the country of fulfilled dreams), there is a permanent section that 
summarizes the development and infrastructure projects that the 
company has implemented in  provinces in which strategic projects have 
been developed. In a video also presented on the web page, the message 
at the beginning is clear: “before, communities close to mining, oil and 
any other strategic projects could only dream of these things…”21  For 
example, the website includes a video made about the province of 
Zamora, showing the new river walk of the city of Zamora (which cost 
approximately $3 million dollars). The webpage also showcases the 
construction of streets, parks, hospitals, and two millennium schools all 
in the area of two important mining projects, Fruta del Norte and 
Mirador (but none in the area of direct/indirect impact of Project 
Mirador). 
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Millenium School in Los Encuentros (close to El Pangui). The sign reads: Mining promotes 
education in your community  
Photograph: Consuelo Fernández-Salvador 
 
 Besides the obvious link between buen vivir and resource extraction, 
there is another important message that is emphasized in interviews and 
on the website: that these communities were left out of the wealth 
generated from extractive projects in the past and this government is 
working for the benefit of local communities as no other administration 
has done before.  This is a powerful message that the state is constantly 
sending to the people through the construction of infrastructure and the 
development of projects (both symbolically and specifically through 
signs and billboards). As the coordinator of the Shuar area in the office 
of Regional Amazónica enthusiastically affirmed, “this government is 
making the dream come true…the hope of the communities which have 
been forgotten for so many years, remembering, historically, since 1830, 
there have been many presidents, and the Amazon region was even 
considered to be a myth…”22 
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 Why is there a need to make the link between buen vivir and the 
extraction of resources so obvious? Why is it that people have to be 
aware that the Millennium School in El Pangui and the community 
police unit in Tundayme were created only because of the presence of 
Project Mirador? The most evident answer is that, while bringing local 
development can be understood as simply re-distributing resources and 
wealth to impoverished populations, it can also work as a form of 
compensation that aims to gain local support and, most likely, to isolate 
opposition groups (Pellegrini and Ribera Arismendi 2012: 114). In this 
case, compensation is reduced to a transaction that offers benefits for 
the costs and effects caused by extractive practices, while in reality the 
government dismisses important concerns that people historically 
affected by extraction might have (Lu et al. 2017: 92). As Ferguson 
argues (1994), neither state bureaucracies nor development projects are 
impartial, apolitical machines that exist only to promote social services. 
In this case, while Ecuador Estratégico is a company that works mainly to 
allocate resources in order to carry out projects and deals mostly with the 
technical aspects of these projects, it has an underlying political 
objective. While it legitimizes the extraction of resources through local 
development, it also helps to reinforce and expand the state’s 
bureaucratic power and plays a role in the project of citizenship-making 
(Lu et al. 2017: 114). In this context, for example, people who are 
recipients of housing, water services, sewage, schools, and other mega 
infrastructure projects are definitely being influenced in their view of the 
source of this local investment, namely oil and mineral extraction. In 
other words, if people feel that their needs (which have been ignored for 
so long) are now being satisfied, then there should be no reason to resist 
extractive practices like large-scale mining. 
This argument makes sense in a context in which strong efforts are 
made by the government to push for extractivism at any cost. As 
described in Chapter 3, after the New Mining Law was passed and the 
government’s intention to intensify mineral extraction was made clear 
(Cisneros 2009; Davidov 2013; Weyland 2009), it also became obvious 
that any form of resistance or disruption to mining activities would be 
criminalized (Bebbington and Humphreys 2011; Bebbington 2012; 
Hogenboom 2012; Moore and Velásquez 2012). However, the 
government’s efforts to redistribute wealth from resource extraction to 
the local population in order to guarantee their well-being contradict the 
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lack of community participation in decisions regarding extractive 
practices in their own territory (Cisneros 2009). Also discussed in 
Chapter 3, Correa has found ways to either control or co-opt the 
population in issues related to mining activities (Bebbington 2012; 
Moore and Velásquez 2012). While some of these forms of control 
might be violent or tend to neutralize organizations and communities, 
other forms of control are exercised through powerful bureaucratic 
machinery. For example, through its development projects, Ecuador 
Estratégico asserts the presence of the state and might be used as a 
strategy to regulate and control local communities that would otherwise 
organize themselves against extractivism. 
 In a similar line of thinking related to development projects, some 
authors argue that these projects could be considered a part of a 
patronage system that exercises new forms of domination over a 
population that has suffered a history of abandonment from the state; 
this is very true in the case of the indigenous communities in Zamora 
Chinchipe (Bretón 2013: 83; Tuaza 2011). Furthermore, Bretón argues 
that the notions of sumak kawsay and alternative development have been 
instrumentalized in the relationship between ethnicity and development 
in order to organize and regulate the indigenous population. Walsh also 
criticizes the use of sumak kawsay as instrumental and functional to the 
state: “the crucial question is whether buen vivir is becoming another 
discursive tool and co-opted term, functional to the State and its 
structures and with little significance for real intercultural, interepistemic, 
and plurinational transformation” (Walsh, 2010a: 20). In other words, 
besides bringing development to local communities and in some ways 
alleviating poverty (which, in the government’s rhetoric, is equivalent to 
buen vivir), Ecuador Estratégico is a means to keep people content with what 
they receive from mineral extraction and to prevent any possible source 
of conflict. 
 Indeed, the presence of Ecuador Estratégico and the whole government 
apparatus represented in the many different regional offices in the 
province of Zamora also evidence a sense of a “state comeback” 
(Bebbington 2012; Bretón 2013; Tuaza 2011) in rural areas, particularly 
in the Amazon region. This comeback has altered the dynamics of the 
interactions between the indigenous population and the mining 
company. As described in Chapter 3, while Shuar communities and 
organizations used to negotiate directly with ECSA to obtain benefits for 
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the Shuar people, new government policies took control both over 
mining activities and all social projects. Authorities from Ecuador 
Estatégico state that the mining royalties were not previously redistributed 
to Shuar and mestizo communities; as such, these communities were 
forced to deal with the mining companies’ paternalistic treatment and 
were usually forced to settle for small projects, such as the construction 
of a community house or a small soccer field.23 Ecuador Estratégico aims 
for larger, long-term infrastructure and development projects, exactly the 
types of projects Shuar leaders have been expecting from the mining 
company for almost a decade. However, while it is true that the Shuar 
people expect more than small, short-term projects, they also felt that 
they had more control over negotiations with the company. In dealing 
with Ecuador Estratégico, many Shuar seem to feel powerless and, once 
again, disappointed. 
 While the state attempts to expand its presence and control over the 
areas around extractive projects, the local populations react in a variety 
of ways. As has been discussed in previous chapters, indigenous leaders 
at the federation and community levels hold different positions regarding 
large-scale mining and the development projects. For the president of 
Yanúa, for example, the sort of development projects proposed by the 
mining company or Ecuador Estratégico were meaningless because he was 
more interested in claiming back the territory in the Cordillera del 
Cóndor. However, most leaders are eager to present projects to the 
company to improve life in the communities. In this final section, I will 
move away from the state rhetoric and concentrate on the Shuar’s 
response to promises of buen vivir, expectations of development 
(Ferguson 1999), and their own vision of what good living should be in 
their communities. While there might be a contradiction between the 
notions of alternative development in the constitution and the type of 
development Ecuador Estratégico intends to implement, the Shuar people 
are very much aligned with the development ideals of the latter 
institution. The notions of modernity and progress present in the urban 
areas represent precisely the model they desire for their communities. 
6.5  The Shuar Communities around Project Mirador:  
 Passive Recipients of Policies or Active Subjects? 
Authors like Martínez Novo (2014) and Bretón (2013) have argued that, 
while the state utilizes indigenous symbols, some elements of their 
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cosmovision, and even their demands as part of its political agenda, it 
does not really recognize indigenous people as actors on the political and 
economic scene. Concepts associated with being indigenous—like the 
sumak kawsay or interculturalism—which appear to entail a critical 
understanding of cultural diversity, seem to actually be used in ways that 
do not hold deep meanings but rather that are ultimately vague and 
ambiguous. As was discussed earlier, buen vivir or sumak kawsay began as 
an idea of well-being related to the harmonious relationship with the 
environment and ended up being expressed as a classical model of 
development.   
However, I argue that the Shuar actively struggle and/or negotiate in 
different spaces and through different mechanisms to achieve what they 
believe is good for their people. Furthermore, while they feel that Ecuador 
Estratégico has not delivered on its promises of development, ideally the 
company offers them exactly the type of projects that they have expected 
from the state and the company for several years. Clearly, the Shuar’s 
discourses about development have been created and continue to evolve 
in a complex context that defies any kind of simplification or 
essentializing from external actors.  
 From the perspective of Ecuador Estratégico and the government, 
communities located in the areas in which resources are extracted are 
privileged; if they have historically been neglected and excluded by the 
state, now they are the recipients of the distribution of the wealth that 
results from resource extraction in their territory. However, while 
authorities and staff in the state company talk about this privilege as well 
as of the concepts of buen vivir, interculturalism, and equality, people 
from local indigenous communities around Tundayme simultaneously 
complain about the lack of services and infrastructure as well as the 
unfulfilled promises of development.  
 Despite the creation of the office of the Regional Amazónica, leaders 
from the FESZCH feel cheated: although before the state was absent 
from the communities, at least they had some leverage to negotiate 
directly with the mining companies. Now, ECSA refuses to sign any 
agreement with the Shuar after having paid $40 million to the state as 
anticipated royalties; the Shuar feel that these funds have not been yet 
translated into the much-anticipated development and infrastructure in 
the communities located in the areas of direct and indirect impact. The 
president of the FESZCH complains:  
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We met with EE a year and a half ago to learn about how the 
communities would benefit from the implementation of certain 
projects, to provide the communities with potable water, sewage and 
electricity, and now the manager of Ecuador Estratégico in Zamora calls 
us again to inform us of the same thing, that the projects had only 
advanced 0.5 per cent and that they still need 99 per cent to complete 
the programs. So, we decided not to stay in the meeting, we adopted a 
position of resistance and left the meeting; we did this because there is 
nothing going on in the Shuar communities.24  
 The FESZCH is aware that Ecuador Estratégico is focused on building 
major infrastructure projects such as roads, hospitals, and millennium 
schools that should be beneficial to the population in Zamora at large; 
however, they question if the Shuar communities will receive specific 
attention. Leaders at the FESZCH feel that, via its relationship with the 
company, the government should specifically address the Shuar people 
and develop infrastructure, such as health centers and bilingual 
millennium schools in their own communities.25 Furthermore, the Shuar 
Federation claims that the Shuar people have a right to be compensated 
in material terms because the company is located in ancestral territory 
and because the Shuar have been historically excluded and marginalized 
by the mestizo society (a message that was conveyed in the meeting with 
the technical staff from the Regional Amazónica in October 2013). The 
Shuar people perceive that new infraestructure is being developed in the 
city of El Pangui, Tundayme, and a range of other places, but not in the 
Shuar communities directly affected by Project Mirador; this fact cannot 
be denied.  
While representatives of Ecuador Estratégico perceive that the Shuar 
people are only interested in small, irrelevant projects such as the 
community sport field (la canchita), testimonies from different community 
leaders evidence a different reality. Furthermore, federation and 
community leaders are very much aware that royalties from mining 
companies should be invested in local development as a way to attempt 
to compensate for years of poverty and exclusion. 
 For example, the leader of the community of Certero talks about 
projects that were unsuccessfully presented to the municipality of El 
Pangui several years prior; at the time of the interview, he thought that 
these projects would finally be executed through the work of Ecuador 
Estratégico and the Regional Amazónica: 
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We were invited to Pastaza to a meeting with Ecuador Estratégico; I took all 
55 applications that I had turned into the municipality for different 
projects and had never obtained anything. The houses from MIDUVI26 
[Ecuadorean Ministry of Urban Development and Housing] were also not 
delivered over a period of 5 years…we don’t want $10,000 or $40,000; in 
my community we need at least $600,000. They did build the community 
house, but I want to have a sewage system because at the moment we only 
have septic wells? And that is not hygienic; we also want a sports field for 
the kids and grandchildren to play sports…and water and sewage, as well 
as modern houses. That is why I ask that amount because they have never 
helped the Shuar people. Where are the royalties? They come from our 
mining project…which is not located in another country, it is located on 
my land…so they said in February they will start building all this 
infrastructure.27 
 
 
Community Police Station in Tundayme 
Photograph: Consuelo Fernández-Salvador 
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 Unfortunately, the leader from Certero was still awaiting these 
projects a year later. In fact, most community leaders have the same 
complaint: they have presented projects and attended meetings in 
Zamora and El Puyo with the staff from the Regional Amazónica, but they 
have mostly returned empty-handed. They believe the government 
institution does not comply with their request because of the lack of 
budget or the fact that the projects they present to either Ecuador 
Estratégico or directly to the Regional Amazónica are not a priority 
according to their rationale. This is because the state company 
categorizes the types of projects that should be carried out in terms of 
how urgent and important they are for the welfare of the people.28  
 At this point, it is important to address the communities’ and 
federation’s leaders’ failed expectations related to the survey carried out 
by the office of Regional Amazónica. As part of the new approach of 
interculturality, the goal of this visit to communities was to create spaces 
of dialogue in which indigenous leaders could interact with the staff of 
the office whom they perceived to be their equals; these meetings would 
also provide opportunities for them to express the needs of their 
communities in terms of basic services like education, health, and other 
issues. In fact, while I was visiting the Shuar Federation, the president 
mentioned a series of meetings that the personnel of Ecuador Estratégico 
would be having in the province. The next day, I joined the vice-
president of the FESZCH and the president of Asociación Shuar 
Kakaram in the parish council of Tundayme’s office to attend this 
meeting. In this case, three members of the technical staff representing 
the Regional Amazónica who belong to the Shuar and Achuar nationalities 
were present at the meeting, which, in fact, seemed to create an 
atmosphere of trust and confidence with the presidents of the 
communities. Only representatives of two of the four communities in 
the area were present at the meeting. Overall, leaders of Churuwia and 
Yanúa, the president of Asociación Shuar Kakaram, the vice-president of 
the FESZCH, and the president of the parish council were present. The 
meeting started with a very strong nationalist speech given by one of the 
representatives of the Regional Amazónica, followed by a very practical, 
technical discussion by a staff member from the office in Zamora. On 
one hand, the representatives of the regional office addressed the fact 
that the Shuar people had been excluded by previous governments and 
that it was the president’s intention to change this and work to benefit 
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them through Ecuador Estratégico. In their words, it was “time to close the 
gap between mestizos and indigenous people,” a sentiment that was 
obviously shared by all participants. On other hand, a member of the 
staff of the office of Ecuador Estratégico in Zamora discussed the priorities 
of the communities, emphasizing the information that was provided by 
the president of the parish council of Tundayme: all the indigenous 
communities that belong to the parish lack basic services and this is a 
priority for Ecuador Estratégico and the Regional Amazónica. However, while 
running water, electricity, and sewage are priority, feasibility studies 
would need to be carried out first to determine if they could actually be 
implemented in the communities.  
 Finally, the group ultimately agreed that the Shuar communities in the 
area needed to solve the most basic problems regarding water, 
electrification, and sewage. However, while the meeting was supposed to 
open spaces for the leaders to express their concern about these and 
other issues, the agenda for Ecuador Estratégico’s work seemed to have 
already been defined in advance. This was made clear in the statement 
made by the director of the Regional Amazónica regarding the priorities of 
the Plan for the Nationalities, as well as comments made by a member of 
the staff in charge of social programs. They said, “we told them we had 
to prioritize, we can’t do everything, for us a covered sport field is not a 
priority, but water is…”29 
 The real issue underlying these priorities is tied to the argument that 
development projects are not only related to the building of 
infrastructure or provision of services; rather, they are a way of 
controlling and determining how people should live and are linked to 
notions of “civilizing” and regulating the Amazonian indigenous 
communities. Furthermore, they express a paternalistic attitude that 
seems to permeate the relationship between indigenous people and 
Ecuador Estratégico’s mestizo staff, who view the desires and needs of 
some leaders as irrelevant, whimsical and not worthy of serious 
consideration. For the mestizo staff and directors, Western notions of a 
dignified life have to do with having a decent house, clean water, and, 
above all, access to electricity (I cover this more in depth in the next 
section). However, for the Shuar leaders, having access to a sports field, 
schools, and transportation is important not only because of their 
relevance to basic survival, but because they provide access to a mestizo 
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lifestyle and notions of modernization.30 Thus, for them, all of those 
needs are a priority.  
 This discussion, the general complaints of the Shuar people regarding 
the lack of attention from Ecuador Estratégico, and even the superficiality 
of the meeting I attended raise questions regarding the issue of 
interculturalism. The Regional Amazónica was created to explicitly work 
with the indigenous population in the Amazon region and immediately 
introduced the concept of interculturalism as a way to acknowledge and 
respond to different cultural contexts. However, I would argue that, like 
the buen vivir, the notion of interculturalism is treated in ambiguous ways 
and is mostly limited to vague notions of cultural respect and diversity. 
According to Walsh, real interculturalism is a political project in process 
that should go beyond recognition and tolerance of diversity; it should 
seek to foster “the construction of a new and different kind of society, 
relations and conditions”31 (Walsh 2008: 140). This involves not only 
economic changes, but also the recognition and inclusion of different 
cosmologies, different forms of knowledge and ancestral memory, and 
ways of engaging to nature. Interculturalism also involves the realization 
that cultural diversity is framed within a context of power relations, as 
part of a racialized colonial structure (Guerrero 2011: 77; Walsh 2010b: 
78). It is clear that the company does not really address any of these 
issues and that the concept of interculturalism is being used without any 
real meaning attached to it. In the interviews I carried out with the 
authorities from Ecuador Estratégico, the term was used often when 
referring to the nationalities of the Amazon region, but they never really 
explained how the concept would be practically implemented, how it 
would be considered when deciding what types of projects were more 
important to the communities, or how these projects would be 
administered. Furthermore, several leaders, including the leader from 
Certero who I quoted above, mentioned that interactions with the staff 
and manager of the Regional Amazónica never had positive results. The 
diagnostics meeting in Tundayme simply collected basic (but already 
known) information on the communities’ needs without considering any 
changes in the priorities, as illustrated in the example above. In a 
company context in which decisions are made based on technical and 
economic considerations, there seems to be little room for thinking 
beyond simplified assumptions of what cultural relevance and what real 
community participation should be. The question remains if the 
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diagnostics process was really part of a broader intercultural agenda to 
address issues of inequality or if these concepts were simply utilized as 
part of a rhetoric with no further meaningful significance.  
6.5.1 Between Discourses and Reality: The Life Choices of the 
Shuar Regarding Development 
Arsel and Avila (2011) and Davidov (2013) have pointed out the 
contradiction between the government and the Ecuadorean Constitution 
of 2008 in terms of development policies. While the new constitution 
grants rights to nature, at the same time, it is tied up to its deep 
commitment to provide welfare to the population, especially to those 
groups with the greatest needs. The concept of sumak kawsay, which in 
itself implies a harmonious relationship to the environment and nature, 
cannot be accomplished if intensive natural resource extraction is seen as 
the main mechanism to provide well-being for the people. 
 As discussed before, while discourses of redistribution and buen vivir 
are part of the institutional rhetoric of Ecuador Estratégico and the state 
regarding the importance of extracting natural resources, this alternative 
model of development incorporated in the constitution has remained an 
abstract concept. The classic view of development continues to underpin 
the government’s agenda, at least in this stage of the transformation of 
the productive matrix. This notion of development has become a 
universal model since the end of World War II and it is based on the 
assumption that progress and well-being in a society will be reached 
through economic growth. Economic growth was (and still is) seen as 
the only way to alleviate poverty and to solve redistribution issues, as 
well as to help consolidate industrialization and production of 
technology (Gudynas 2012).  
 The intensification of extractivism fits within the classic view of 
development, which also emphasizes the construction of infrastructure 
that is symbolic of progress in the Western world: roads, bridges, 
hospitals, schools, and displays of industrialization (Arsel 2012; Gudynas 
2003). Thus, in accordance with pre-established logic and notions of how 
development should work in both mestizo and indigenous communities, 
projects are designed by the state’s technical staff and not by the 
communities. As Schavelzon suggests, it would seem that the buen vivir 
has become a bureaucratic replacement of the term “development,” but 
with the same logic behind it (2015: 194).  
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 In this context, the sort of development promoted by Ecuador 
Estratégico goes hand in hand with the logic of the POT, a system of 
development and planning based on territorial organization also 
implemented by the current government and regulated by the Organic 
Code of Territorial Organization, Autonomies and Decentralization 
(COOTAD—Código Orgánico de Organización Territorial, Autonomía y 
Descentralización). While the POT defines parameters as to how the 
territory should be conceptualized and managed, Ecuador Estratégico 
establishes a development logic that privileges huge investments in 
infrastructure, resulting in what I would call a sort of Amazonian 
“urbanizing.” Ultimately, this serves as a way to organize and “civilize” 
the territory (Gudynas 2003). The state company’s star projects in 
Zamora Chinchipe and other Amazonian provinces (such as the 
millennium communities and schools) are also evidence of this 
perspective and logic. Although Tundayme has been chosen to be a 
Millennium Community due to its proximity to Project Mirador, the 
implementation of most of the new services and infrastructure has been 
delayed.32 However, two iconic communities in the northern part of the 
Amazon region (one in Panacocha and one in Playas del Cuyabeno) can 
serve as examples to understand the logic behind these initiatives. While 
Ecuador Estratégico’s staff and authorities recognized that different 
indigenous communities do not respond to a single model, it became 
clear that they should incorporate certain elements that are basic in an 
urban setting. To begin with, the layout emulates that of a typical 
mestizo town, although many indigenous communities traditionally live 
in a dispersed pattern usually around their farms and not concentrated 
around a specific center. Second, the communities incorporate all basic 
services (a school, a health center, a technology center, and even a police 
unit) and pay special attention to urban decoration (parks, river walks, 
and so forth), which is a clear way of organizing and regulating the jungle 
landscape and the life within it.  
 Thus, buen vivir is directly associated with having a civilized and 
dignified kind of life from a Western and urban perspective; as the 
director of the Regional Amazónica in El Puyo affirmed, “the people of the 
communities…I wonder if they ever dreamed of having their own house 
with water and sewage, living with dignity;” he added, “the idea of the 
Millennium Community is to provide them with all the basic services, 
that they have a town just as we [the mestizos] deserve, that they have 
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access to education….the idea is to give them that special treatment they 
deserve because they are living in an area close to the strategic 
projects…” 33  In the words of the former general manager of the 
company, “they feel proud that if they have a strategic project it has 
allowed them to have a place to live with more buen vivir, which is what 
they know as sumak kawsay.”34 As noted before, the message sent by the 
government through Ecuador Estratégico is that it is making dreams—
including the dream of achieving happiness—come true for these 
communities. The slogan on the webpage echoes this sentiment: 
“Resources that Build Happiness.” 
 While there is much debate as to what kind of development is 
envisioned by the government versus what is implemented by Ecuador 
Estratégico, it is important to ask what people in the local communities 
really want. Essentializing images and discourses on indigenous people 
many times portrays them in ways that might actually clash with their 
own vision of well-being. In the chapter on discourses and political 
practices, it is clear that while there might be a universal discourse on 
being Shuar tied to ideas of ancestrality, everyday notions tend to be 
more changing and fragmented; it is also very much influenced by a 
mestizo logic. One of the leaders interviewed in my study made it very 
clear that, because of the influence and imposition of the mestizo 
society, the Shuar have had to adapt to modernity and become 
competitive with mestizos. According to him and other people from the 
communities, it is no longer sufficient or possible to live like their 
ancestors, who really did not need much besides what they could get 
from the forest.  
 As many people from the communities have stated, there was no 
need for their grandparents to read, write, seek education, or earn 
money. Nowadays, these needs have changed because their relationship 
and their insertion in the mestizo society has evolved. Today, the Shuar’s 
lives are very much entangled with their mestizo neighbors and they 
consider themselves to be part of Ecuadorian society. In this sense, they 
seek the same goods and well-being for their communities that any other 
citizen would seek for their families: decent living conditions, quality 
education for their children, and enough income to be able to satisfy 
most basic expenses. As was discussed in the chapter on discourses, 
several young community leaders have a different vision for their future 
which is not so closely tied to their communities’ land and the territory, 
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but rather to becoming entrepreneurs and developing productive 
projects. For example, the leader of Certero understands good living in 
terms of engaging in the hard work associated with maintaining his 
orchards and hunting (as his ancestors did). But, he also sees the value in 
those things that are important to mestizo society, “but now it is 
important to have good drinking water, good education, we want to 
improve ourselves, we want to be educated, we want a dignified life.”35 
 In fact, most of the Shuar communities in this study are actively 
involved in the process of POT. The formulation and implementation of 
development plans must be articulated within the different levels of 
administrative division in Ecuador: region, province, canton, parish, and 
district. These must also correspond to the objectives defined by the 
National Secretariat for Planning and Development (SENPLADES—
Secretaría Nacional de Planificación y Desarrollo) in the National Plan for Buen 
Vivir. Thus, the COOTAD serves as an instrument to homogenize and 
simplify all levels of public administration, from the parishes and 
municipalities to provincial councils and the nation (Lu et al. 2017: 111-
112). Specifically, the objective of the POT or land use planning is to 
“complement the economic, social and environmental planning within a 
territorial dimension; carry out interventions in the territory; and, orient 
its development and sustainability”36 (COOTAD Art 297). The point of 
this planning system is to grant more autonomy to local forms of 
government and authority such as the municipality and the parish and to 
incorporate rural communities in the process of development. For 
example, Article 308 of the Law of COOTAD specifies that indigenous 
communities with collective land titles are a form of ancestral territorial 
organization and are considered to be a basic unit of citizen participation 
within the GADs. Thus, development programs that are part of the POT 
of parishes and cantons should include a diagnostic process within 
indigenous communities that should help determine their needs and the 
projects or programs that should be implemented over the next four or 
five years according to an assigned budget. The objective of the POT is 
to prioritize the ways in which resources should be invested based on the 
proposals made to local government entities in order to reduce poverty, 
promote education, and facilitate the provision of social services (Lu et 
al. 2017: 112). 
 However, I would argue that this process is a way to rationalize and in 
a way “urbanize” the space and the territory of rural communities that 
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belong to each canton. As Lu et al. argue, while the COOTAD is 
supposed to be a guide for the development of local plans, in reality it 
“provides a vision of territory that is functional to the political project of 
the Revolución Ciudadana” (Lu et al. 2017: 112) since subnational 
governments should always work within the framework of the national 
level planning. For example, part of the POT process is to map out 
communities in new patterns of settlement so as to facilitate the eventual 
implementation of basic services. In other words, the communities 
would have to re-arrange their living spaces such that electricity, sewage, 
and running water facilities could be easily installed. This has required 
most Shuar communities to change their traditional, scattered living 
arrangements to adopt a community model in which households are 
structured around a main center. This arrangement includes a network of 
roads, and the creation of specific areas for certain activities, such as the 
community center, parks, “green” spaces, and so forth.  
The mestizo-town logic is very much present in this new 
reconfiguration of the communities and it is justified by technical 
limitations important to the implementation of basic services. 
Furthermore, as stated in the COOTAD, this organization has also been 
imposed because communities are part of the administrative units in 
charge of elaborating development projects both at the rural and urban 
level. In this case, indigenous community spaces are not given any 
special consideration, although it has been acknowledged that 
implementing development projects in these spaces can be more 
complicated. According to the municipality planning director of El 
Pangui, while it is easier to plan within the Shuar communities that are 
part of the canton, communities that are located deep in the forest 
present more difficulties in every sense, especially because they are 
culturally very different. From the director’s perspective, the 
communities they work with have become acculturated and their 
aspirations are similar to those of mestizos’, which makes it easier to 
work with them.37 
 Most Shuar leaders are very much “onboard” with the POT and/or 
with Ecuador Estratégico’s development projects. Several leaders showed 
me the recently drawn maps of their communities and explained how 
houses should be relocated and streets designed. None of the leaders 
were critical of or disagreed with the layout (including the green space 
designation that, I admit had bothered me so much because, as I 
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understood it, the whole community was already part of a “natural green 
space”). The leader of Etsa constantly compared his community to urban 
settings such as El Pangui and insisted that living in a town implied 
receiving many benefits from the municipal government, although he 
was aware that they also had a cost. Many leaders and members of the 
communities in the area feel this way, even if they are not completely 
involved in the process of the POT. For example, the president of San 
Andrés is very interested in having his community acquire the category 
of head parish. He said, “Why can’t the Shuar have a parish council? In 
this way, we can have a school in the parish and other benefits…”38 
Furthermore, as discussed in other chapters, many members of the 
communities actually live in El Pangui or Tundayme or they travel 
between these urban areas and their communities because they have 
access to schools and basic services that they do not have in their own 
communities. Thus, there is a sense of value attached to the urban areas 
because they can provide the progress they lack in their own 
communities; as such, the final goal is to make the communities as urban 
and modern as the nearby towns. 
 For example, in Churuwia, Santiago Paty, and Etsa, the desire to 
develop and modernize the communities is very strong and the 
community members see the process of “urbanizing” as the first step in 
that process. The president of Santiago Paty talks about his community 
in this sense, saying, “the community is a little more organized…we have 
a good location, a square layout as you can see, the houses and the 
streets; very nice as you can see.” In response to my question related to 
the official layout, he responded, “of course we have the layout and with 
that we have our development plan, with a budget and all, and we also 
aspire to have our Millennium Community.”39 The president of Etsa 
referred to his community, explaining, “this is going to change pretty 
soon, they are going to open up streets, install potable water, build 
latrines, each time more and more like an urban center; that is what we 
are aiming for.”40 
 The process of the POT and the projects carried out by Ecuador 
Estratégico are complex, bureaucratic, and require that the communities be 
recognized by CODENPE. Once this is verified, each community has to 
design the layout and mapping (which also involves a study for which 
they have to pay) and they have to work together with the technical staff 
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of the municipality and parish council to carry out a diagnostic process 
to determine the needs and priorities of each community.  
 Beyond the details of the process, it is evident that the Shuar 
communities have to work together with the local government as part of 
a development structure that is also tied to the state’s national 
development plan. The POT is perceived by the communities as an 
opportunity to become modern and to exercise their rights and fulfill 
obligations as any other Ecuadorean citizen. The leader of Etsa perfectly 
illustrates this: 
We want to have better services, as any other citizen, and pay taxes, of 
course. What is the importance of the community layout? The law says 
that we have to live in this way because otherwise we are not going to get 
anything…it is an obligation and a right to have the communities 
urbanized. They are municipal regulations and they are implemented 
through the parish councils and they bring documents and share the 
information in the communities and they say they have to urbanize the 
communities in order to provide benefits. For example, communities like 
Kimi, Valle del Kimi, Yanúa, and Mirador cannot receive any benefits 
because they are not urbanized. You have to show the community layout 
and map approved by the municipality, and comply with all the 
requirements, such as the number of households and people.41 
 As is clear from many of the examples and quotes from the Shuar 
leaders, most of the people in the communities in this study seemed to 
have already internalized the notions of modernity and development as 
they are considered signs of progress and well-being (Teijlingen 2016). 
Emulating mestizo, urban settings, is a way to belong to a modern 
national society, which is one of their greatest aspirations. This means 
that, in many ways, they acknowledge that a Shuar identity connected to 
the territory and traditional forms of subsistence can no longer continue 
to exist. It also means that, as shown in the chapter on Shuar discourses, 
the struggle to protect or recuperate a territory is not as important as the 
desire to belong to the modern national society. 
6.6  Conclusions 
This chapter had two goals: to examine the political role of Ecuador 
Estratégico within a nationalist agenda in which the extraction of resources 
is key and to understand how the Shuar population struggle in their 
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pursuit of development vis-à-vis the state company. To accomplish this 
twofold objective, I first demonstrated the contradictions between the 
concept of buen vivir, extractivism, and development, as conceptualized in 
the constitution and the National Plan for Buen Vivir.  I then examined 
how these concepts were really implemented in extractive contexts and 
through Ecuador Estratégico.  
 On one hand, I argue that the state company has a political role in 
legitimizing mineral extraction by becoming a main regulator of wealth 
redistribution and local development. As such, it has incorporated and 
linked the notion of buen vivir to extractive practices and to classic forms 
of development. On the other hand, it has been clear that, despite all the 
conceptual contradictions, the Shuar people and organizations favor and 
even endorse Ecuador Estratégico’s development logic. This support of the 
state company’s work makes sense considering that the Shuar people 
have important material needs, especially in terms of access to basic 
services and adequate living conditions. Thus, after years of exclusion 
and suffering the consequences of the colonizing process (which 
included landloss and changes in their subsistence practices as a means 
to adapt to the mestizo lifestyle), Shuar people expect the government to 
deliver on its promises to end poverty and improve life in their 
communities. However, the danger is that the Shuar may be satisfied 
with a notion of development that is limited to the provision of basic 
material needs and access to the amenities of the urban lifestyle, without 
demanding change related to the complex issues of inequality and 
exclusion. Ultimately, the Shuar, as most indigenous people in the 
Ecuadorean Amazon, continue to struggle to overcome structural issues 
that are the product of years of exclusion. What is really at stake is that 
issues of social justice may remain unsolved because, as Gudynas argues 
(2012), redistribution and local development in the way it is envisioned 
by the state company will not really change the economic structures of 
society that created and maintains that exclusion.  
Notes
                                                
1 The article ‘La Minería para el Buen Vivir? Large-Scale Mining, Citizenship and 
Development Practice in Ecuador’, based on this chapter and written in 
collaboration with Karolien van Teijlingen, was submitted to the Journal of Latin 
American Perspectives to be published in a special issue on Buen Vivir and at the 
moment it is being reviewed by the editorial committee.  
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2 Pacha Mama is an Andean concept that generally refers to mother nature as the 
source of life. 
3  Original text in Spanish: “Nosotras y Nosotros, el pueblo soberano del 
Ecuador, reconociendo nuestras raíces milenarias, forjadas por mujeres y 
hombres de distintos pueblos, celebrando a la naturaleza, la Pacha Mama de la 
que somos parte y que es vital para nuestra existencia, invocando el nombre de 
dios y reconociendo nuestras diversas formas de religiosidad y espiritualidad, 
apelando a la sabiduría de todas las culturas que nos enriquecen como 
sociedad…Decidimos construir una nueva forma de convivencia ciudadana, en 
diversidad y armonía con la naturaleza, para alcanzar el buen vivir, el sumak 
kawsay” (Constitución Política de la República del Ecuador, Foreword 2008: 
15) 
4 Original text in Spanish: “Se reconoce el derecho de la población a vivir en un 
medio ambiente sano y ecológicamente equilibrado, que garantice la 
sostenibilidad y el buen vivir, sumak kawsay.” (Constitution 2008)  
5 Original text in Spanish: “fortalece la cohesión social, los valores comunitarios y 
la participación activa de individuos y colectividades en las decisiones relevantes 
para la construcción de su propio destino y felicidad…” (Plan Nacional del Buen 
Vivir 2013: 23) 
6 Original text in Spanish: “…entendemos por desarrollo la consecución del 
buen vivir de todos y todas, en paz y armonía con la naturaleza y la 
prolongación indefinida de las culturas humanas. El buen vivir presupone que 
las libertades, oportunidades, capacidades y potencialidades reales de los 
individuos se amplíen de modo que permitan lograr simultáneamente aquello 
que la sociedad, los territorios, las diversas identidades colectivas y cada uno -
visto como un ser humano universal y particular a la vez- valora como objetivo 
de vida deseable. Nuestro concepto de desarrollo nos obliga a reconocernos, 
comprendernos y valorarnos unos a otros a fin de posibilitar la autorrealización 
y la construcción de un porvenir compartido.” (Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 
2007-2010: 54) 
7 However, after 10 years of government, the change in the productive matrix is 
still in its early stages, since the country’s economy still depends greatly on oil and 
mineral extraction (which has not even started yet). 
8 Ecuador Estratégico only operates in those 13 provinces where strategic projects 
are being developed. The state considers strategic projects to be those initiatives 
that generate high revenues and manage energy in any of its forms: oil and 
mining exploitation, electricity, water, and telecommunications.  
9 These are Childhood Centers for Buen Vivir and are dedicated to providing care to 
children between 1 and 3 years old. 
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10 Millennium schools and communities (model communities that offer housing 
and provide basic services as well as techoogy and infraestructure to the people 
living in them) are the star projects of Ecuador Estratégico. They have been built 
throughout Ecuador, receiving great investment to develop infraestructure and 
technology. 
11 Interview former general manager of Ecuador Estratégico, February 2014 
12 Interview former general manager of Ecuador Estratégico, February 2014 
13 Interview director of Ecuador Estratégico in Zamora Chinchipe, May 2014 
14 Not all projects are part of the work Ecuador Estratégico does; for example, 
community houses, sports fields, and small projects should be managed by the 
local GAD. In fact, other important projects like electrification or systems for 
potable water are really part of the work the local GADs should be doing in the 
urban and rural communities, but many times Ecuador Estratégico has taken over 
these projects. 
15 Interview former manager of Ecuador Estratégico, February 2014 
16 Interview director of Regional Amazónica, December 2014 
17 During the interview, I had asked if it was possible to have access to the plan, 
but apparently since it was not approved it was not yet public information. 
18 Interview former general manager, Ecuador Estratégico, February 2014 
19 Ecuador Estrategíco’s official web site: 
http://www.ecuadorestrategicoep.gob.ec/misionvisionvalores_/ 
20 Interview regional manager Amazónica, December 2014 
21 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K_TlP9uR7p4) 
22Interview Coordinator of the Shuar Area of the Regional Amazónica, December 
2014 
23 Interview manager of Ecuador Estratégico in Zamora, May 2014 
24 Interview president of FESZCH, July 2014 
25 It is interesting to observe some contradictions in relation to these categories: 
while there are many infrastructure projects such as the improvement of parks in 
El Pangui and the river walk in Zamora (in which $3.7 million dollars were 
invested according to reports in Ecuador Estratégico’s official web page: 
www.ecuadorestrategico.gob.ec) as well as the construction of a velodrome in the 
city of Zamora (which is one of three sports infrastructure projects built in the 
province with an investment of $5.7 million dollars)  and two Millenial Schools, 
Shuar communities in the area of direct impact of Project Mirador still have 
nothing to show; the only accomplishment in terms of basic services that I had 
witnessed throughout my fieldwork (2013-2015) was the installation of the 
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electricity network in the community of Etsa, for which its president had been 
doing paperwork for over two years.  
26 Ministerio de Desarrollo Urbano y Vivienda/Ministry of Urban Development 
and Housing 
27 Interview president of Certero May-June 2014 
28 The category of work with most priority is the one that includes basic living 
conditions such as running water, sewage systems, electricity, and waste 
management. The next category includes health and education as well as 
household construction. The last category includes roads, culture, sports, and so 
forth. Furthermore, Millennial Communities (one for each nationality, as ordered 
by President Rafael Correa) and Schools are considered emblematic projects and 
they, along with the construction of highways, are very important because they 
are part of the president’s compromise to the people (Interview of staff member 
of Ecuador Estratégico in Zamora, July 2014). 
29 Interview, Ecuador Estratégico staff member, Dayana Erazo, July 2014 
30 In many cases, the communities might already have access to clean sources of 
water, even if they do not have infrastructure for every house to have direct 
access to it. Also having potable water and regular service implies that they will be 
charged for the service and people might not be able to afford it. 
31 Original text in Spanish: “construcción de sociedad, relaciones y condiciones de 
vida nuevas y distintas.” (Walsh 2008: 140) 
32 In fact, throughout my study (2013-2015), only the police unit, a technology 
center, and the offices of the parish council were built as part of the project of 
the Millenium Community. In my last visit in 2016, the situation, in terms of 
infraestructure, was the same. 
33 Interview former director of Regional Amazónica, December 2014 
34 Interview former general manager Ecuador Estratégico, February 2014 
35 Interview president of Certero, January 2014 
36 Original text in Spanish: “…complementar la planificación económica, social 
y ambiental con dimensión territorial; racionalizar las intervenciones sobre el 
territorio; y, orientar su desarrollo y aprovechamiento sostenible…” 
(COOTAD Art 297). 
37 Interview director of the Planning Department, January 2015 
38 Interview president of San Andrés, January 2015 
39 Interview president of Santiago Paty, January 2014 
40 Interview president of Etsa, June 2014 
41 Interview president of Etsa, June 2014 
  
 
 
7 Conclusions 
 
7.1  Introduction 
The objective of this research was to understand the ways in which 
identity discourses are shaped and how these discourses define political 
practices and strategies within the Shuar Federation in its dealings with 
Project Mirador. The second objective was to determine if the practice 
of ethno-politics has been a useful strategy for the Shuar people in their 
struggles related to mining extraction as they attempt to connect 
responses of local communities to wider political and economic 
dynamics. It was also important to find out if there was a connection 
between identity discourses and political strategies and to determine how 
flexible and changing these were. While it is somewhat expected that in 
the context of large-scale mining there will be some level of division 
among the local population’s positions and perspectives (Avci and 
Fernández-Salvador 2016; Buchanan 2013), two things were clear to me 
during the initial period of fieldwork in the context of Project Mirador. 
First, the largest and most influential Shuar Federation in the province 
was supportive of mining, while the strongest mobilization against the 
project had been led mostly by mestizos. Second, not only was there a 
variety of positions regarding mining amongst the Shuar communities, 
but these were highly flexible and changing. The challenge was to 
understand what was it that made the Shuar leaders, who belonged to 
one single organization, react so differently to similar conditions created 
by the presence of the mining company. It was also important to 
understand how these reactions, in turn, produced isolated resistance 
efforts or negotiation attempts. 
 As discussed throughout the thesis, the Shuar Federation and the 
community leaders are constantly struggling for access to resources to 
benefit the Shuar people and the organization itself, regardless of 
accusations of corruption or situations of conflicts. They struggle 
because they are always in a subordinate position, whether in their 
negogiations with the mining company, state institutions, or even with 
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missionaries (in earlier times). Being marginalized and historically 
excluded by the mestizo society and the state though specific laws and 
policies has meant that the Shuar have had to develop different strategies 
to confront the larger society. Identity discourses and political practices 
are part of the strategies through which the Shuar have had to re-invent 
themselves in a way so that they can continue being Shuar, but also 
become part of Ecuadorian society with all the rights and privileges that 
other citizens enjoy. Thus, I have emphasized the importance of not 
simplifying positions of identity and the political struggles, and instead I 
have concentrated on situations of diversity, transformation, and even 
conflict in those borderland areas. In this concluding chapter, I would 
like to highlight the main findings and contributions of this thesis (some 
of which are more predictable than others) as well as some questions 
that remain to be answered and that can lay the groundwork for future 
research.  
 Before addressing the main discussion, however, I would like to 
highlight what I consider to be future research possibilities in light of the 
contributions of this thesis. From my perspective, the most important 
task that was undertaken in this thesis was the study of the Shuar 
leadership in the communities of Zamora Chinchipe. While this research 
did not set out to do an ethnography of the communities in the area 
around Project Mirador, it did collect important ethnographic 
information on the communities themselves and on the Shuar political 
organization. Considering the groundwork of my thesis, I see two 
interesting starting points for future research. One of these would be an 
ethnographic examination of the Shuar communities that studies crucial 
issues such as the change in the way territory is conceived and managed, 
and in subsistence practices. While not first on the political agenda, the 
possibility that Shuar people in Zamora may map out and legalize, title 
deeds of the land (many of them in hands of the colonos without legal 
support), could be a tool to be used by any Shuar organization to 
strengthen the communities. Second, while the relationship between the 
Salesian missionaries and the Shuar in Morona Santiago has also been 
widely documented, the history of the Franciscan missions and the the 
contact and work they did with the Shuar people is somewhat scattered 
and should be systematized. These early contacts with the missionaries 
and the way they educated the indigenous people might also provide 
interesting information on issues such as the language loss and the 
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dynamics of the political organization in this province. All this 
information should contribute not only to an academic discussion, but 
could also help Shuar leaders strengthen their organization and the work 
they do in favour of the people in the communities. 
7.2  Indigeneity and Positioning as Part of Territorial 
Dynamics 
The framework of indigeneity (Valdivia 2007) and the concepts of 
articulation and positioning (Hall 2003) have been key to understanding 
identity discourses and strategies as they are framed and produced in 
specific conjunctures, as they inform the decisions made regarding large-
scale mining, and as they influence interactions between the Shuar and 
different actors. At all levels of the organization—from the federation 
leaders to the associations and the communities—there are 
individualized micro discourses, positionings, and practices. There is also 
an apparent lack of collaborative, integrated work among the different 
organizational levels. Diverse positions connected to identity discourses 
(in some cases more than others) occurred not only between different 
communities but even among family members, as in the case of Yanúa 
and Churuwia. Thus, as Hall had suggested, there is not a Shuar identity 
per se, or a historical continuity that would serve as a basis for the 
articulation of identities, but rather particular interests in specific 
contexts. 
 From Hall’s perspective, collective identities are articulated or 
enunciated around specific interests and they are not necessarily 
connected through a sense of historical continuity; however, in the case 
of the FESZCH and its community leadership, the notion of historical 
territorial dynamics (Little 2001) has helped us to understand the diverse 
ways in which indigeneity has been shaped. In this thesis, the concept of 
territorial dynamics has shown that the changing relationship of the 
Shuar with the territory and the transformation of the communities 
(both of which are the result of interactions with the mestizo beginning 
with the arrival of the missionaries and colonos and now continuing 
through the presence of the state and the mining company) have 
contributed to the construction of flexible and changing identities and 
positions regarding large-scale mining.  
 Although the notion of a territory is central in the discourse and 
strategy of many indigenous organizations in the Amazon region, it has 
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not been a priority for the FESZCH. The extreme division between the 
land in the communities, the land’s proximity to the main provincial 
highway and to several urban centers, and the migration from 
communities in the north (favored precisely because of the strategic 
location of some communities in terms of access to schools and 
transportation), are all factors that have contributed to the fragmentation 
of the territory. Thus, it makes sense that, for most of these community 
leaders, the priority was not the territory and its protection (although it 
was of some concern), but rather the well-being in their communities, 
understood in terms of modernization and advancement.  
 As I have shown, many leaders in this study completely dedicate their 
efforts to working for concrete and material benefits for the people. 
Basic services that are still not provided for most communities in the 
area—such as electricity, drinking water, and sewage—are evidently the 
most immediate concerns and they are considered signs of progress. 
Other concerns are also highly valued; for example, the Shuar want 
access to education, the possibility of becoming entrepreneurs, and to 
live in communities that emulate mestizo, urban settings and all their 
amenities. To the Shuar, they see access to these goods and services as a 
means to insert themselves into the modern mestizo society. Thus, since 
the mining company has not delivered on its promises of well-being and 
development, all their expectations have been placed on Ecuador 
Estratégico, the state company in charge of managing the resources from 
mineral extraction and redistributing wealth. 
7.3  Development in the Context of Extractivism 
In Project Mirador, Ecuador Estratégico is the new actor in charge of local 
development. Despite its role as a strictly managerial company in charge 
of the technical aspects of development, it also serves a very important 
political role. The contradictions between the proposed concepts of buen 
vivir and the emphasis on extractivism as well as the development logic 
that replaced the notions of an alternative development have required 
the government to develop certain strategies to be able to continue with 
oil and mineral exploitation. As I have argued, the role of Ecuador 
Estratégico is to justify and legitimize the extraction of minerals by 
delivering development to local communities and, in a way, regulating 
and controlling the local population.  
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 In this context, there are two important concluding points related to 
the interactions between the Shuar communities and organization. First, 
most leaders and people from the communities want the same kind of 
development that Ecuador Estratégico offers. Second, since Ecuador 
Estratégico is the company that mostly directs the development of 
infrastructure, the decisions as to what programs will be implemented 
and where appear to respond only to technical and financial 
considerations. This implies that, although there should be a strong 
intercultural component in their work with indigenous communities in 
the Amazon region, the reality is that projects implemented by the state 
company respond to a strong top-down approach and are not necessarily 
participatory.  However, there is a perception among the Shuar people 
and leaders that, while the company has contributed to the construction 
of schools, hospitals, and roads, their communities (especially those 
closer to Project Mirador) are still being left out. The question they ask 
themselves is whether the decision for the implementation of projects is 
really just technical or has more political implications; in other words, it 
may be important for the government to show major infrastructure work 
in the main urban centers where they can gain support from more 
people, but not necessarily in the communities. Overall, the relationship 
between Ecuador Estratégico and the Shuar people reflects the same 
historical issues of exclusion and has left them struggling to obtain what 
they think it is fair for their communities.  
 Most Shuar leaders (except the leader from Yanúa) were actually in 
favour of the presence of the state company in the area and did not 
question its view on development for the reasons already explained 
above. It is clear that the work of Ecuador Estratégico is crucial to 
establishing the most basic infrastructure necessary to assuring people a 
decent and dignified life. As discussed in the introduction, classic 
definitions of development have been harshly criticized; however, 
poverty and unfulfilled material needs persist in these communities, and 
it appears that this company may be able to help address those needs to 
some extent. Nonetheless, the state company still supports a limited 
notion of development and well-being, and the danger is that Shuar 
leaders may give up on other important issues including their struggle for 
access to equal rights as Shuar and Ecuadorian citizens and their 
attempts to overcome a history of inequality and exclusion. 
Unfortunately, in a scenario in which local communities have been 
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historically abandoned by the state, everyday struggles to obtain basic 
living conditions for their communities occupy most of the leaders’ 
efforts (especially at the community level). This, in turn, may prevent 
them from looking at deeper, long-term structural issues. In the end, the 
history of the FESZCH and other indigenous organization in Ecuador is 
one of constant struggle to overcome a situation in which they are seen 
of as the “other” in the state’s hegemonic national project (Selverston-
Scher 2001). Whether they succeed in becoming part of the national 
project on their own terms is still yet to be seen.  
7.4  Main Conclusions and Contributions  
After this brief discussion of the main findings discussed throughout the 
dissertation, in this final section I reflect on what I consider to be the 
most important insights and contributions of this study. One basic, 
relevant contribution of this thesis is that it challenges the dominant 
narratives of indigenous politics and organizations that tend to idealize, 
dismiss, or trivialize political struggles based on ethnic claims. 
Essentialized imaginaries about indigenous people used by the larger 
society, environmental organizations, and even academics obscure 
processes of change and marginalization (in terms of access to resources, 
control of their territory, and so forth) that groups like the Shuar have 
suffered as part of colonialism throughout the last century. These 
imaginaries of the Shuar usually emphasize their harmonious relationship 
with nature and the environment and lead to certain expectations of 
what their choices and political strategies should be. For example, in the 
context of large-scale mining, it is expected that indigenous organizations 
resist extractivism in defense of their territory and their culture, many 
times vilifying their efforts to negotiate for the people. Also, part of an 
idealization of indigenous groups and their political organizations is the 
assumption that discourses and practices are devoid of conflict and that 
the collective good is above all personal interests and power struggles. I 
must admit, that this was partly also my perspective when I started 
fieldwork and it took an effort to understand that complex power 
relations permeated the Shuar Federation as they would any other 
political organization.  
 The inclusion of other social categories in the analysis of Shuar 
discourses and strategies is also important to challenging the over-
simplification and idealization of indigenous organizations and politics. 
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As stated in the introduction, the reference to other forms of social 
difference (such as age, status, and geographic mobility) and subsistence 
practices has helped the discussion stay away from binary readings that 
view indigenous people in opposition to mestizo people, as if they were 
two separate, monolithic groups. As Rivera Cusicanqui (2010) argues, 
denying the contemporaneity of Shuar people renews former colonizing 
practices by framing indigenous groups as passive recipients of an 
imposed worldview who are incapable of change, adaptation, and 
creation. From this perspective, the discussion of intersectionality 
proved useful in looking at the way different social categories interlock 
which, in many cases, leads to increasing and exacerbating hierarchies 
among and between groups. Furthermore, in the context of the Shuar 
political organization, it especially helped understand how leaders 
negotiate their position not only as part of the Shuar Federation or 
communities but also as part of the larger mestizo society.  
Throughout the thesis, I have described the flexible categories or 
“situated accomplishments” (Mollet and Faria, 2013: 123) through which 
Shuar leaders constantly navigate, construct discourses, and define 
strategies. In chapters 4 through 6, I offered many examples of how 
discourses are shaped at the intersection of a variety of flexible social 
categories, but also through relationships with different actors and 
through specific experiences. For example, having a position of 
important status in the federation and direct access to the mining 
company is quite different from the experiences of certain community 
leaders. In Yanúa’s case, its leader felt cheated by the mining company 
and, through a strong relationship with an environmental NGO, he 
eventually developed an activist position of resistance towards mining. 
Thus, leaders make decisions and define their positions towards large-
scale mining not only based on their sense of belonging to a Shuar 
community, but also according to their own personal and family interests 
and relationships with a variety of actors. Age also seems to be influential 
in terms of how the leaders think about development, modernization, 
and extractive practices. More distant from the experiences of older 
Shuar people, younger leaders are eager to participate in the larger 
society and they see large-scale mining as an opportunity to do so. Thus, 
indigeneity is constructed in conjunctures that go beyond ethnicity. 
 In this context of multiple, intersecting categories and experiences, 
how do we understand the construction of indigeneity as a political 
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strategy? Does the concept of indigeneity make sense when discourses 
and positions are very much influenced by other factors that are not 
related only to being Shuar or being indigenous? The framework used in 
this thesis states that there is no single or correct version of indigeneity. 
Rather, it is important to recognize the flexibility and space needed to 
negotiate the construction of political identities, as has been the case for 
the Shuar leadership. Although diverse, the construction of indigeneity at 
all levels of the FESZCH has allowed the expression or enunciation 
(Hall 1990) of shared interests and shared notions of exclusion among 
Shuar leaders. This is an important aspect of ethno-politics because it 
allows us to recognize the interplay between the issues of class and 
ethnicity (Grey and Postero 2014) and it is very relevant to the constant 
efforts for improving the material conditions of the Shuar people. As 
discussed in the thesis, all leaders have stories of marginality, racism, 
under-development, loss of land, and abuse from the company; all these 
experiences are related to the neglect by the state and the mestizo 
society. While a few leaders view themselves as rich in terms of the 
resources available in their territory (even though that territory has been 
significantly reduced), most think of their communities as poor and 
under-developed. Thus, while the Shuar struggle in contexts like large-
scale mining might not respond to essentialized identities and a specific 
cultural distinctiveness, it does respond to a history of imposition by a 
colonial structure that has excluded them from the wider mestizo society 
precisely because of their cultural distinctiveness. 
 This discussion is also relevant when addressing the work of the 
federation for the people in the communities. Although in a position of 
marginality, indigenous organizations are not directly funded by the state, 
which means that the FESZCH’s leaders are responsible for financing 
projects for the communities and also for looking for funds to sustain 
the federation, which is itself a titanic task. This is why it is important for 
organizations like these to build strong networks with national and 
international institutions, which the federation has not done because of 
its extreme dependency on the mining companies. These Shuar 
organizations have purposely stayed away from the national indigenous 
organization (CONAIE) because of its position of resistance against 
extractivism. Ultimately, this discussion showcases the level of 
marginality of local indigenous organizations and indigenous people in 
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Ecuadorian society, another important discussion within the study of 
ethno-politics. 
 While in this thesis I have engaged with postcolonial discussions in 
my analysis of the Shuar Federation, it is important to note some 
tensions in regard to the poststructuralist approach. The first tension is 
related to my use of Hall’s discussion on identities as the basis for my 
analysis of indigeneity and the attention I pay to material dynamics 
throughout the thesis. The second tension is related to how I use 
poststructuralist thinkers to explain how indigenous leaders incorporate  
certain Western categories into their political struggles. As discussed 
earlier, some authors (De la Cadena 2010; Escobar 1995; Viveiros de 
Castro 2004) are critical of concepts that have been conceived and 
imposed by a Eurocentric perspective in a colonial context. Notions of 
territory, community, political organization/federation, development, 
and modernization have been forcefully incorporated by indigenous 
populations as part of the new order brought about by colonialism; these 
concepts are still constantly reinforced by the state apparatus. In fact, as 
has been discussed in several chapters of the thesis, all of these 
categories have been key in determining the relationship between the 
state and the Shuar people. In an effort to decolonize this hierarchical 
structure, many authors then question the use of these concepts among 
indigenous leaders and even among academics themselves. 
 From the perspective presented in this thesis, however, I understand 
that the strategic use of these pre-conceived Western notions has 
allowed the Shuar leaders to make concrete demands for their symbolic 
and material rights either by directly confronting or by opening spaces 
within the dominant institutions and structures. These categories may 
not always be used in the same fashion or carry the same meanings as 
they were originally conceived, but they have served the Shuar 
Federation in their struggle to gain some leverage vis-à-vis the state and 
other important actors. To recall Quijano’s discussion in the 
introduction, while he argues that the entire experience of indigenous 
peoples has been permeated by colonization in such a way that colonial 
categories are even now a part of the way they understand the world, 
new meanings and forms of appropriation have also been used by them 
in order to make sense of the changing world (1998). On one hand, the 
concept of community has undergone important transformations for the 
Shuar people and they have given this concept and many others different 
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meanings or have used them strategically: for example, despite being an 
arbitrary concept for the Shuar in the beginning, the community has 
actually become an important space to interact and make demands of the 
state. On the other hand, while the concept of territory is part of the 
federation’s official discourse, it has not become a universal priority for 
the community leadership because of other competing priorities.   
However, other notions like entrepreneurship are gaining more support. 
In this context, the concept of a Shuar communal territory (as in the 
global title deeds) becomes less important and useful because it cannot 
be sold or used in any way for individual commercial initiatives. These 
examples highlight how the Shuar people and leaders are in charge of the 
transformation of cultural categories and structures, many times 
discarding certain notions that are no longer useful to them. 
 The creation of the federation is perhaps the ultimate example of 
appropriation by the Shuar people in their attempts to negogiate with 
mestizo society and the state. As discussed in Chapter 4, even before the 
political organization was formed, the Shuar were already taking 
advantage of the forced contact with the missionaries and their 
education system. In accordance with Rubenstein’s argument (2005), I 
have posited that the Shuar political organization—which, again, was 
created upon the foundation of early mission centers in order to protect 
the Shuar identity and territory—was crucial for the Shuar in becoming 
national citizens (which was as much their goal as it was the state’s). 
However, while this group was structured in the same fashion as any 
other organization in the national political system, federations do not 
necessarily respond to the same Western mestizo logic of efficiency, 
consistency, and affiliation or membership. One of the reasons for this is 
that the federation represents a group that is based on ethnicity and 
kinship ties. Belonging to a federation is not necessarily based on a 
shared ideology or decision to support a particular line of action, but 
rather it comes along with belonging to a a community. Furthermore, 
while members of the communities share a notion of belonging to a 
Shuar collectivity, participation as members and leaders of the federation 
is defined in terms of certain interests and needs. In this context, the 
decision of a leader to affiliate the community he represents with a 
specific federation is not made necessarily on its ideological position or 
the alliances it has with other regional and national indigenous 
organizations; rather, this decision is primarily related to how committed 
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the leadership believes the federation is to working for the welfare of the 
communities. At the same time, community leaders may not always 
agglutinate or express the positions of everyone in the community they 
represent. In Yanua’s case, for example, while the leader was the main 
anti-mining activist in the area around Tundayme, he faced much 
opposition within his own family. Thus, from the outside, the positions 
and practices of the FESZCH regarding large-scale mining might appear 
inconsistent and scattered; however, in reality, this reflects a process in 
which the leadership negogiates the different positions and perspectives 
that the people and the leaders from the different communities have. 
Ultimately, beyond having all the community members on-board with an 
agenda of resisting large-scale mining or negotiating with the mining 
company, the federeation’s priority is to respond to the needs of the 
communities and deliver on their promise to improve the lives of people. 
Evidently, as has been discussed throughout the thesis, the FESZCH has 
faced many obstacles in meeting these expectations: conflicts within the 
organization because of power struggles, old family grudges, and 
conflicts in communities (many due to the presence of the mining 
company), lack of funding, the inability to negotiate with national and 
international organizations to obtain funding, and the marginality of 
which the FESZCH is part.  
 Thus, we could argue that that the federation itself is a critical space 
through which the Shuar leaders negotiate between family, community 
and political/institutional relationships; it also allows them to negotiate 
between local/community notions of leadership (maybe even tied to past 
forms of dealing with conflict and exercising power), and those notions 
that are part of the national political structure. Furthermore, while the 
federation may not conform to a Western notion of political 
organization, it is definitely a predominant space from which Shuar 
leaders can act in favor of the people in the communities and interact 
with institutions at the local and national level. 
 To conclude this point, I would like to return to De la Cadena’s 
discussion in which she argues that, unlike the use of imposed, Western 
concepts by indigenous leaders, the introduction of the concept of 
“earth-beings” into the political arena is a way of constructing 
indigeneity as insurgence. However, one could also affirm that certain 
forms of appropriation as well as the use of categories and institutions 
are also a way of disrupting or at least challenging the established order 
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and the expectations for indigenous organizations. For example, the 
desire of the Shuar Federation to control resources and to participate in 
the distribution of wealth in order to improve the communities’ material 
well-being is already a strong stand. Just as is the case in the use of earth 
beings in certain contexts, the efforts to negotiate with extractive 
companies or demands to manage royalties from the projects may cause 
unrest among a variety of actors, from academics to government 
institutions and environmental organizations. From this perspective, the 
FESZCH and other indigenous organizations defy those imaginaries 
about indigenous people that tend to dismiss their material needs and 
aspirations based on romanticized notions of what is it like to live in the 
Amazonia. Furthermore, we can argue that many Shuar leaders 
(especially the younger ones) have already internalized many mestizo 
concepts about community, territory, and ways of engaging with 
mainstream politics; as Quijano would argue, these concepts have 
become part of their imaginary of being Shuar. For many young leaders, 
the community is not necessarily an arbitrary concept anymore; it is 
already part of their experience of being Shuar, as is being involved in 
the federation and engaging in a wider political arena. Thus, from my 
viewpoint, it is not useful to engage in a discussion that emphasizes a 
radical separation between the indigenous and the Western mestizo 
cosmologies because, ultimately, such discussions tend to reaffirm the 
static binary categories I have intended to disrupt in this thesis, and may 
even reinforce essentialized imaginaries of the Shuar.  
 Finally, the above discussion is relevant not only for the FESZCH but 
for many other organizations nationwide. While the indigenous 
movement in Ecuador is clearly diverse, it is possible to identify certain 
major tendencies developed over the last two decades which are also 
evident at the local and regional level. Broadly speaking, there is one line 
of action followed by organizations like the CONAIE (and at a local 
level, leaders like the president of Asociación Kakaram and leaders from 
Yanúa) that resist and challenge the state and its hegemonic view of the 
territory and the resources in it, in an effort to push for a real 
plurinational state. Another major tendency is followed by other 
organizations like the Council of Evangelical Peoples and Organizations 
of Ecuador (FEINE—Consejo de Pueblos y Organizaciones Evangélicas del 
Ecuador) which, for decades, had been struggling to incorporate 
indigenous people into the mestizo society and to improve their living 
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conditions. As the FEINE, the FESZCH and most of the Shuar 
community leaders in this study are seek to create spaces within the 
mestizo nation-state that would allow them and the people they 
represent to participate in the larger society. Their intention is to 
strategically play by the rules laid out by the state and the mestizo society 
because their aspiration is to be part of it, especially in terms of 
development, modernization, and material well-being. However, the 
definition of objectives and strategies in these terms has provoked 
criticism from other indigenous organizations, activists, and academics. 
They see their position as openly making alliances with neo-liberal actors, 
which have greatly contributed to their situation of marginality.    
 How should these two different positions and strategies be evaluated? 
Should indigenous leaders ally with those sectors that have subjugated 
them? Are they entering into neo-liberal dynamics, looking to obtain 
short-term results, and in the process ignoring important cultural and 
symbolic issues? Or are they simply making use of already established 
dynamics to demand what they consider to be their rights: compensation 
for the resources in their territory, investment in education, adequate 
housing and living conditions, and so forth? On the other, hand, is it 
possible to achieve well-being and solve basic subsistence problems for 
the people in the communities from a position of open resistance to the 
state? In today’s Ecuador, is it still possible for indigenous people to 
think of well-being without considering material issues (which also 
include access to education, health services, etc.)? While impossible to 
answer these questions from an outsider, mestizo perspective, one thing 
needs to be clear: indigenous people should be able to make their own 
decisions and to have the ability to choose their own paths to well-being, 
without having to justify their actions to a mestizo society that has 
insisted on creating imaginaries and expectations based what it considers 
to be good, appropriate or even moral for them. 
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